Kenneth Seymour v. City of Des Moines

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3842

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Kenneth Seymour, Rachel Seymour, *

*

Appellants, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Southern District of Iowa.

City of Des Moines, Brian Danner, *

Barry Arnold, *

*

Appellees. *

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Submitted: May 18, 2007

Filed: March 25, 2008

___________

Before WOLLMAN, BRIGHT, and JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judges.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Kenneth and Rachel Seymour appeal from the district court’s1 order granting

summary judgment to the City of Des Moines, Iowa (“the City”), and Des Moines

police officers Detective Brian Danner and Sergeant Barry Arnold (collectively “the

defendants”). We affirm.

1

The Honorable Thomas Shields, United States Magistrate Judge for the

Southern District of Iowa, to whom the case was referred by consent of the parties

under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).

I.

A. The Events of March 20, 2002

On March 20, 2002, the Seymours (whom we shall refer to by their first names)

were the parents of three sons: three-year-old Joshua, eighteen-month-old Joseph, and

four-month-old Nathaniel. At about 6:30 that evening, Rachel left the home to do

some shopping, taking Joshua with her while Kenneth remained at home with Joseph

and Nathaniel. Sometime during the evening, Nathaniel became fussy. Kenneth tried

to calm him by holding him and placing him in a child swing. Nathaniel remained

fussy. Believing that the child might be hungry, Kenneth tried twice to reach his wife

on her cell phone, but was unsuccessful. Nathaniel eventually calmed down, and

Kenneth placed him on the chair upon which Nathaniel typically slept during the day.

Kenneth was later able to reach his wife and suggested that she come home.

After Rachel returned home, she and Kenneth prepared Joseph and Joshua for

bed. When Rachel checked on Nathaniel, she discovered that he was not breathing.

Kenneth called 911, and emergency medical personnel came to the home shortly

thereafter. Members of the Des Moines Police Department, including Officer Richard

Ramsey (a patrol supervisor) and Officer Lorena Bland, arrived around the same time

as the ambulance. Rachel accompanied Nathaniel in the ambulance to the hospital.

Kenneth remained home with Joshua and Joseph, intending to join his wife at the

hospital once someone arrived to watch the children.

Officer Ramsey called Sergeant Arnold, who was the head of the department’s

child abuse investigative team, and apprised him of the following facts: that the child

had been fussy; that the father had twice tried unsuccessfully to reach the mother on

her cell phone; that the child eventually fell asleep; that when the mother later

returned the father’s call the father told her that it was time for the child to be fed; and

that when the mother got home and checked on the infant, he was not breathing.

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Arnold was also told that the mother had already left for the hospital and that the

father had stayed home to care for their two other children. Arnold told Ramsey,

“Well, just have him [Kenneth] wait there, and we will be out there very quickly.”

Arnold then called Detective Brian Danner, the on-call officer in the crimes

against children unit, and told Danner to meet him at the Seymour residence. Arnold

next called Detective James Keller of the child abuse unit and directed him to go to

the hospital. Arnold testified that he thought that Kenneth wanted to stay with the

children and that, assuming neighbors or family came to the home to watch the

children, he (Arnold) would quickly arrive at the Seymour residence, take Kenneth to

the hospital, and conduct a short interview. Arnold also called the Child Protective

Services supervisor and apprised him of the situation. Arnold testified that he made

the call as a matter of professional courtesy and that he was not reporting child abuse,

which would have required Child Protective Services to respond.

Kenneth’s father arrived at the residence shortly after the ambulance had

departed. At some point, other individuals arrived as well. Kenneth told the officers

on the scene that he wanted to leave for the hospital, but was informed that he had to

stay where he was until the detectives arrived. Relatives asked whether Kenneth could

leave and were told that he was required to remain.

Shortly before Arnold arrived at the Seymours’ home, Keller called him from

the hospital and told him that Kenneth’s presence was requested at the hospital. He

also told Arnold that Nathaniel was not going to survive and that the doctors would

stop performing CPR once Kenneth arrived. Arnold called Detective Danner, who by

this time had arrived at the Seymour home, and told him that he would be there very

shortly and that he and Danner would need to drive Kenneth to the hospital as soon

as they were able to do so.

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Danner arrived approximately twenty minutes after Kenneth’s father. Danner

was inside the residence for a short while and then went outside with Kenneth.

Arnold arrived while Danner and Kenneth were outside. Upon arriving at the

Seymour residence, Arnold briefly discussed with Kenneth which of Kenneth’s

relatives would stay behind with the children. Arnold and Danner then drove Kenneth

to the hospital, with Danner questioning Kenneth during the trip. Once they arrived

at the hospital, it appears that Arnold, who had been driving, began asking most of the

questions. Some of the questions concerned the possibility that Kenneth may have

accidentally dropped Nathaniel or that Kenneth, frustrated by Nathaniel’s fussiness,

may have shaken him. Kenneth told the officers that nothing out of the ordinary had

happened while he was watching Nathaniel, whereupon Arnold concluded the

questioning and permitted Kenneth to leave the vehicle. Nathaniel died shortly after

Kenneth arrived at the hospital. The parties agree that Nathaniel’s death was not the

result of any criminal behavior by Kenneth. The most likely cause of death was

Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS).2

B. Training, Policies, and Procedures

Because Arnold was the officer in charge of the investigation, it is his training

and experience, rather than Danner’s, that we will discuss. In addition to his other

training, Arnold had attended classes on child fatality investigations and a week-long

course on investigating the physical and sexual abuse of children offered by Fox

Valley Technical College (Fox Valley) and sponsored by the United States

Department of Justice.3 The Des Moines Police Department does not offer formal

2

Although the parties sharply contest the timing and duration of various events,

the exact timing is not material to our analysis of this case. At the least, forty-five

minutes elapsed between Kenneth’s first request to leave his home and his exit from

Arnold’s vehicle.

3

Arnold is also a member of the Polk County Child Death Review Team, a

group that reviews child deaths and informs the legislature of its findings.

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internal training on child abuse investigations, relying instead on the training offered

in courses such as those offered by Fox Valley. The department’s procedures are

derived from the Fox Valley course as well as from the Fox Valley training manual.

Arnold testified that although the procedures they use are adopted from the Fox Valley

training, the Fox Valley training manual does not establish City policies.

Arnold testified that “[the child abuse unit’s] initial response is to treat all child

death as a possible homicide until [their] investigation proves otherwise,” and

explained that in child death investigations evidence of physical trauma sometimes

fails to appear until the autopsy. The department’s standard practice in child death

cases is to interview the individuals who were caring for the child before the medical

emergency occurred. Standard procedure also calls for detaining and separating those

persons present at the scene. Arnold noted, however, that “nobody is considered a

suspect.” He also testified that it would not always be necessary to detain those

persons at the scene. Questioning generally serves a two-fold purpose: that of

obtaining medically useful information and acquiring information about possible

crimes. Both Arnold and Danner testified that not all investigations call for the same

procedures.

C. Testimony Regarding Kenneth’s Detention

Arnold testified that “[w]e did not have any indications [while he was on his

way to the Seymour residence] that there was any child abuse.” He also testified,

however, that the officers did not know whether Nathaniel’s medical distress was the

result of SIDS or an inflicted injury. When asked why he ordered Kenneth to be

detained, he stated that his “first thought was that he had stayed there on his own

volition to care [for] his children. We wanted to talk to him. And I believe that we

were going to make a very timely response there.” Arnold also added that he thought

that Kenneth would try to contact family members or neighbors who could come over

and watch the children and that once Arnold arrived, he would be able to take Kenneth

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to the hospital. Arnold testified that there was no reason why Kenneth would be

detained once family members had arrived to take care of the children and that had he

been informed of Kenneth’s desire to go to the hospital, he would have tried to

accommodate that request. He added that taking Kenneth to the hospital would be

consistent with his training. Arnold testified further that, in the circumstances, it was

appropriate to interview Kenneth while he was apart from the other family members.

D. The Present Action

This case was removed to federal court under federal question jurisdiction. See

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and (c). The Seymours’ third amended petition alleges that the

defendants violated their constitutional rights while acting under color of state law,

in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They also allege various state law causes of action

that include defamation, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional

distress. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment,

concluding, inter alia, that the section 1983 claim failed because the officers were

entitled to qualified immunity. As for the state law claims, although the district court

rejected the defendants’ argument that they were entitled to emergency response

immunity, it nevertheless concluded that the Seymours’ state law claims failed for

other reasons.

II.

We review de novo the district court’s order granting the defendants’ motion

for summary judgment. Ferguson v. United States, 484 F.3d 1068, 1072 (8th Cir.

2007) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party presents no genuine dispute

of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Fischer v. Andersen Corp., 483 F.3d 553, 556 (8th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).

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A. The Federal Cause of Action

In their section 1983 claim, the Seymours contend that Kenneth’s detention at

his home violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.

Specifically, they argue that the seizure was unsupported by reasonable suspicion of

criminal activity, that it was unreasonably lengthy, and that it was tantamount to an

arrest without probable cause. They further contend that Arnold and Danner are not

entitled to qualified immunity for this constitutional violation because reasonable

officers in their position would have known that their conduct violated the law. The

Seymours also argue that the City is liable for the officers’ constitutional tort because

the violation sprang from the City’s constitutionally suspect policies regarding child

death investigations.

1. The Officers’ Liability

To determine whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, courts

undertake the two-part analysis set forth in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). The

first step requires us to ask whether the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional

right. Id. at 201. If the officer has violated a constitutional right, the inquiry next

turns to whether that right was clearly established in the context of the situation the

officer faced. Id. at 201-02.

“For an investigative Terry-type seizure to be constitutional under the Fourth

Amendment, an officer must be aware of particularized, objective facts which, taken

together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant suspicion that

a crime is being committed.” United States v. Donnelly, 475 F.3d 946, 952 (8th Cir.)

(quotation omitted), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2954 (2007). Courts “must balance the

nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests

against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.”

United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983). “An investigative detention may

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turn into an arrest if it ‘lasts for an unreasonably long time,’” Donnelly, 475 F.3d at

953 (quoting United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1999)),

“or if it is too intrusive.” Pace v. City of Des Moines, 201 F.3d 1050, 1054 (8th Cir.

2000) (citing United States v. Dixon, 51 F.3d 1376, 1380 (8th Cir. 1995)).

Before addressing Kenneth’s detention in detail, we observe first that, on

appeal, the defendants justify the detention primarily in terms of the state’s interest in

investigating a possible crime rather than on acquiring information that may have been

useful for Nathaniel’s treatment. This emphasis on criminal investigation echoes

evidence in the record indicating that the officers’ actions were directed principally

toward investigating possible criminal activity.4 Accordingly, our inquiry will focus

on whether Kenneth’s detention was a reasonable law enforcement measure and not

on whether there were any community caretaking concerns that may have justified the

restriction on Kenneth’s liberty. Cf. Samuelson v. City of New Ulm, 455 F.3d 871,

877 (8th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that law enforcement may, under some

circumstances, seize someone for the purposes of protecting public and individual

safety, even if there is no suspicion of criminal activity) (citations omitted).

The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the Seymours indicates that

Kenneth’s detention commenced when Kenneth was told by an officer on the scene

that he was to remain at the Seymour home until Arnold arrived. Although Arnold

testified that he thought that Kenneth had stayed behind willingly so that he could

watch his other children, the order nevertheless constituted a curtailment of Kenneth’s

freedom. Even if he was unlikely to have used that freedom to go to the hospital

before neighbors or relatives had arrived, a reasonable person in Kenneth’s position

4

Danner and Arnold state in an affidavit, for example, that “the only purpose

of all [their] actions that evening [was] to determine whether the cause of

[Nathaniel’s] medical emergency was criminal in nature.” We also note that the

officers questioned Kenneth even after Arnold had reason to believe that no medically

useful information was likely to be elicited because he knew from Detective Keller’s

telephone call that Nathaniel was not going to survive.

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would have believed that he was not at liberty to ignore the officers’ instructions to

remain at home. Cf. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (“We

conclude that a person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment

only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable

person would have believed that he was not free to leave.”). In sum, we conclude that

Kenneth’s seizure commenced upon his being told that he was not free to leave and

did not end until he was allowed to exit Arnold’s vehicle.5

We turn next to the justification for the seizure. The defendants appear to

contend that the seizure was based upon a reasonable suspicion that Kenneth may

have committed a crime. In their brief, the defendants recite a litany of crimes that an

officer might have suspected: child endangerment, willful injury, attempted murder,

and murder. In appraising this argument, we note first that there is nothing inherently

suspicious about a fussy baby or about a father calling the child’s mother to inquire

about the mother’s return so the baby could be fed. Moreover, the record does not

clearly indicate the likelihood that an infant’s otherwise unexplained medical distress

should be attributed to criminal conduct, as opposed to non-criminal causes, such as

SIDS. Arnold offered no testimony regarding the relative frequency of criminal as

compared to non-criminal causes in child death cases. Rachel, an attorney who has

worked since 1999 as an attorney with the Polk County Juvenile Public Defender’s

5

The defendants, citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 687-88 (1985),

argue that some of the detention’s duration is attributable to Kenneth himself. They

contend that Kenneth could not have left until the relatives had arrived and that he had

spent some time deciding who should care for his children. Kenneth’s decision to

wait for relatives did nothing to prolong the detention, and any delay resulting from

his indecision regarding who would stay behind appears to have been brief. Sharpe

is thus inapposite because in that case, the delay “was attributable almost entirely to”

one of the defendants. Id. at 687-88. We also note that any indecision over child-care

arrangements at this point would not compel the conclusion that Kenneth would have

been unprepared to leave the house if he had been afforded the opportunity to do so

earlier.

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Office, and who is active in a SIDS support group, testified that SIDS is the leading

cause of infant deaths. The defendants contend, referring to Arnold’s deposition

testimony, that Arnold knew from his “training and experience that fussy children

often become battered children.” (Appellee Br. at 2). The record does not appear to

reflect any such testimony by Arnold.6 Arnold testified instead that he had told

Kenneth in the car that “[i]n cases of shaken babies, crying is the most frequent trigger

mechanism that causes good people to make a really poor decision and shake them

just to try to get them to stop crying.” Observing that shaking is commonly

precipitated by frustration over fussiness is not the same as suggesting that fussiness

often leads to shaking. It bears mention, too, that Arnold testified that there was no

indication of child abuse at the time he ordered the detention.

We also observe that in cases such as this, where the facts allegedly giving rise

to a suspicion of criminality may reasonably appear to untrained eyes to be innocent

in nature, we require some explanation regarding how the officer’s training endowed

seemingly innocent facts with criminal significance. See United States v. Johnson,

171 F.3d 601, 604 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment requires an officer to

explain why the officer’s knowledge of particular criminal practices gives special

significance to the apparently innocent facts observed.” (emphasis in original)). The

officers do not adequately explain how their training and experience might have led

a reasonable officer to suspect that Kenneth had committed a crime. In light of the

foregoing, we cannot conclude from this record that Kenneth’s detention was

supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

Having determined that the detention violated Kenneth’s constitutional right to

be free from unreasonable seizures, we turn to the second step of our qualified

immunity analysis, which requires us to consider whether the right was clearly

6

At oral argument, counsel for the defendants implied that the fact that the

caregiver was male was a relevant consideration. We have found no support for that

contention in the record.

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established. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. “This second step is a fact-intensive inquiry

and must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad

general proposition.” Samuelson, 455 F.3d at 875 (quotation omitted). “It is

sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine . . . will

apply to the factual situation the officer confronts.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. If

Arnold made a reasonable mistake in supposing that his actions were legal, he is

entitled to qualified immunity. Id.

We conclude that Arnold made a reasonable mistake as to the legality of his

actions. First, because Kenneth initially desired to stay home with his son and

because Arnold planned on arriving promptly, an officer in Arnold’s position could

have reasonably believed that his detention order would not effectively result in an

appreciable curtailment of Kenneth’s liberty. Second, as the defendants observe, the

state has a strong interest in investigating child death cases. Third, Arnold testified

that child deaths can be difficult to investigate and that it is important to interview the

person who had cared for the child immediately before the incident. Finally, we note

language in the case law suggesting that the reasonableness of police action in the

Fourth Amendment context is to be assessed by weighing the magnitude of the

intrusion against the importance of the government interests. See, e.g., Place, 462

U.S. at 703 ( directing courts to “balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the

individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental

interests alleged to justify the intrusion.”). Given the foregoing considerations, we

cannot say that an officer conducting a child death investigation who pursued a means

of investigation that he thought would be fairly unintrusive and which he considered

useful in the circumstances made an unreasonable mistake regarding the legality of

his actions. Arnold and Danner were thus entitled to qualified immunity with respect

to the detention order.

This does not end our inquiry, however, because even if the officers had made

a reasonable mistake of law by concluding that they could lawfully detain Kenneth,

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the Seymours also contend that a reasonable officer would understand that the

detention was unreasonably long and was tantamount to a de facto arrest. In other

words, we must undertake a qualified immunity analysis not just with respect to the

fact of detention, but with respect to its quality and duration as well.

The police were required to act with diligence and to take reasonable steps to

confirm or dispel their suspicions in a timely manner. See United States v. Bell, 183

F.3d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1999) (“After making a valid Terry stop, police officers must

diligently work to confirm or dispel their suspicions in a short period of time.”). If we

were evaluating this case from the perspective of “the 20/20 vision of hindsight,”

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989), we might conclude that a reasonable

officer would know that detaining Kenneth at home was not a reasonable means of

quickly confirming or dispelling any suspicion that the officers may have had that

Kenneth had harmed Nathaniel. The officers on the scene could have questioned

Kenneth and then let him proceed to the hospital (accompanied, if necessary, by a

police officer), subsequent to which Arnold and Danner could have interrogated him.7

This would have been consistent with the procedures suggested by Arnold’s training

and would have enabled Kenneth to proceed forthwith to the hospital.

7

The defendants, citing Arnold’s testimony, note that there might be any

number of justifications for detaining individuals in a child death investigation. Many

of the justifications appear to be general in nature, however, and do not necessarily

indicate that Kenneth should have been detained at home. Indeed, Arnold disclaimed

as irrelevant one of the rationales proffered on appeal – the risk of flight. Many of the

rationales proffered would appear to have been fully served by allowing Kenneth to

go to the hospital in the company of an officer. Furthermore, Arnold testified that

there was no reason why Kenneth would have been required to stay once family

members had arrived to take care of the children, and indicated that he would have let

Kenneth go to the hospital, probably accompanied by an officer, had Arnold been

apprised of Kenneth’s request.

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In assessing Arnold’s conduct, we must bear in mind that his actions are not to

be viewed through the lens of judicial hindsight. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Moreover,

“allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing

interests may make it more difficult to find the law clearly established when assessing

claims of qualified immunity.” Walker v. City of Orem, 451 F.3d 1139, 1151 (10th

Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). As we noted earlier, Arnold believed that the intrusion

upon Kenneth’s interest in getting to the hospital would be minimal. Moreover, none

of the officers at the scene had informed Arnold that Kenneth wanted to go to the

hospital. We acknowledge that both Arnold and the officers on the scene could have

done a better job of communicating with one another and of safeguarding Kenneth’s

rights. Even if Kenneth’s detention was unduly prolonged, however, we cannot say

that a reasonable officer in Arnold’s position would have known that Kenneth’s

detention was too lengthy or intrusive to pass constitutional muster. For similar

reasons, we conclude that, even if the seizure had objectively developed into a de

facto arrest, a reasonable officer could have concluded that the seizure was

investigative in nature.

2. The City’s Liability

The Seymours contend next that the City is liable for the violation of Kenneth’s

Fourth Amendment rights. We disagree. A municipality may not be held liable under

section 1983 “unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature

caused a constitutional tort.” Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,

691(1978). A municipality will not be liable merely because it employed a tortfeasor.

Id.

We recently addressed Monell liability in Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, 486

F.3d 385 (8th Cir. 2007) (en banc). In Szabla, we delineated two basic circumstances

warranting Monell liability: 1) where “a particular municipal action itself violates

federal law, or directs an employee to do so,” Szabla, 486 F.3d at 389 (quoting Bd. of

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the County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404-05 (1997) (emphasis in original));

and 2) where “a facially lawful municipal action has led an employee to violate a

plaintiff’s rights” and “the municipal action was taken with ‘deliberate indifference’

as to its known or obvious consequences.” Id. at 390 (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 407

(emphasis supplied)).

With these two circumstances in mind, we conclude that Monell liability is not

warranted in this case. First, we cannot say, on the basis of this record, that the

procedures adopted by the City violate federal law or direct its employees to do so.

The Seymours contend that the procedures adopted by the City require officers to

detain individuals regardless of whether there is probable cause or reasonable

suspicion to do so. We disagree. From Arnold’s and Danner’s testimony it is

apparent that the City’s child death investigation procedures are investigative

techniques to be used where appropriate rather than commandments to be obeyed

regardless of the circumstances. Arnold testified, for example, that because the Fox

Valley training (from which the City’s procedures are adopted) does not cover every

situation an officer might face, officers must use judgment and common sense in

dealing with situations not specifically addressed in the training. He also testified that

it would not always be necessary to detain someone if there is no suspicion of a crime,

thus indicating that officers are not directed by the procedures to detain individuals

in every case. Moreover, Danner testified that “we gain our knowledge from those

schools. And even that isn’t policy. Those are just guidelines for us to use. Every

investigation is different. You just can’t go A, B, C.” Thus, it appears that while the

investigative techniques taught by Fox Valley and other schools are commonly

employed, whether and how they are used in a particular case is a matter of discretion.

Accordingly, we cannot say that any City policy affirmatively directs officers to

violate constitutional rights. Cf. Dick v. Watonwan County, 738 F.2d 939, 942 (8th

Cir. 1984) (holding that a policy that vested discretion in individual officials did not

affirmatively sanction the constitutional violation at issue).

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Nor can we discern any evidence that the City took a municipal action with

“‘deliberate indifference’ as to its known or obvious consequences.” Szabla, 486 F.3d

at 390 (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 407). There is no evidence, for example, that the

City failed to train its officers in the proper exercise of their discretion. See id. at 392-

94 (describing the contours of “deliberate indifference” based upon failure to train).

Neither Arnold nor Danner was asked questions in their depositions about the training

that the City’s officers receive on such topics as safeguarding constitutional rights in

child death investigations or the circumstances in which it is appropriate to deviate

from commonly used procedures. The Seymours’ mere allegation of inadequate

training will not give rise to a genuine dispute of material fact on the subject. See

Robinette v. Jones, 476 F.3d 585, 591 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that a mere assertion

of inadequate training unsupported by evidence to that effect will not suffice to defeat

summary judgment).

We need not speculate whether our conclusion might well have been different

had there been evidence that the City’s policies required officers to detain individuals

in child death investigations without regard to the specific circumstances of the

situation, or if there had been evidence that the City had not adequately trained

officers to recognize the circumstances in which it would be appropriate to seize

caregivers in such cases.

B. The State Law Causes of Action

1. The Seymours’ Defamation Claim

The Seymours contend that Arnold and Danner made statements to Child

Protective Services that defamed them. We disagree. The Seymours do not indicate

what defamatory statements were made, and suggest only that Arnold requested an

investigation. They make no citation to the record supporting this suggestion, and the

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record indicates that he merely apprised Child Protective Services of the basic,

uncontested facts surrounding Nathaniel’s medical distress.8

2. The Other Claims

The Seymours argue that the district court erred by granting summary judgment

on their other claims on grounds that were not raised by the defendant.9 See Heisler

v. Metro. Council, 339 F.3d 622, 631 (8th Cir. 2003) (“We have repeatedly held that

in the Eighth Circuit, a district court commits reversible error when it grants summary

judgment on an issue not raised or discussed by the parties.”). The defendants do not

argue that the district court’s grant of summary judgment was procedurally proper or

that it correctly analyzed the Seymours’ claims. Instead, they argue that the district

court can be affirmed on any ground supported by the record. They proffer on appeal

the very same ground that they asserted in their motion for summary judgment which

was rejected by the district court; namely, that they were entitled to emergency

response immunity pursuant to Iowa Code § 670.4(11). After reviewing the parties’

arguments, the district court’s memorandum of law, and the Iowa Code, we conclude

that the defendants were entitled to emergency response immunity under Iowa Code

§ 670.12 (which covers municipal employees) and § 670.4(11) (which encompasses

municipality liability). Under Iowa law, municipalities will be exempt from liability

on claims “based upon or arising out of an act or omission in connection with an

emergency response.” Iowa Code § 670.4(11). Municipal employees are likewise

exempt from liability, “unless actual malice or willful, wanton and reckless

misconduct is proven.” § 670.12. Iowa courts have interpreted broadly the

8

We have also considered the Seymours’ contention that Arnold and Danner

defamed Kenneth by implication and conclude that it lacks merit. It also bears

mention that there is no indication that Danner made any defamatory statements.

9

The remainder of the state law causes of action allege false imprisonment,

assault and battery, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress,

conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and loss of spousal consortium.

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circumstances to which these immunities apply. Cubit v. Mahaska County, 677

N.W.2d 777, 784 (Iowa 2004). The Seymours contend that Arnold and Danner were

not responding to Nathaniel’s medical emergency, but were instead conducting a

criminal investigation. In light of the broad construction accorded the immunity

statutes, we do not believe that emergency response can be parsed so finely. The

investigative response arose out of and was related to a medical emergency. In such

situations, a response by the child abuse unit may result in the disclosure of medically

helpful information. It will not do so in every case and did not do so here, but the

purposes of emergency response immunity would be ill served if officers who are

charged with quickly uncovering information related to a child’s medical emergency

were left to speculate whether their inquiries were sufficiently tied to a precise

definition of emergency response. Although there may well be cases in which the link

between law enforcement action and emergency response is sufficiently attenuated

that immunity would not be appropriate, we conclude that immunity was appropriate

here. As to the officers specifically, the undisputed evidence, viewed in the light most

favorable to the Seymours, does not support the Seymours’ contention that Arnold and

Danner acted with malice or that their conduct was wilful, wanton, or reckless.

The judgment is affirmed.

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part.

I respectfully dissent.

While I agree with much of what the court says today, I cannot agree that the

officers were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the detention order, as I

conclude that under the circumstances the officers made an unreasonable mistake

regarding the legality of their actions.

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