Kenneth H. Swipies v. Frank Kofka

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 03-1274

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Kenneth Harold Swipies, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Northern

* District of Iowa.

Frank Kofka, *

*

Appellant. *

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Submitted: October 17, 2003

Filed: November 3, 2003

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Before WOLLMAN, FAGG, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

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MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

Woodbury County Deputy Sheriff Frank Kofka appeals the district court’s1

denial of his motion for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity in Kenneth

Swipies’s civil rights action. We affirm.

In July 2000, Mr. Swipies was having a two-week court ordered visitation with

his twelve-year-old daughter, Kendra. Deputy Kofka drove past James Stark’s

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The Honorable Donald E. O’Brien, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of Iowa.

residence and observed Kendra, Mr. Swipies’s wife Tina, and Mr. Stark sitting on the

front porch. Deputy Kofka became concerned for Kendra’s safety because he knew

that Mr. Stark was then charged with sexually abusing a fourteen-year-old female,

and he believed that Mrs. Swipies had serious mental and substance-abuse problems

which rendered her unable to provide adequate supervision. After discussing the

situation with the Woodbury County Attorney’s Office, Deputy Kofka returned to

Mr. Stark’s residence, but no one was there. Deputy Kofka then went to the home of

Mr. Swipies, who was present with his wife and daughter. The officer removed

Kendra and returned her to her mother’s custody.

Mr. Swipies filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit claiming constitutional and

statutory violations. Deputy Kofka moved for summary judgment on the basis of

qualified immunity, arguing that the emergency removal was necessary because

Kendra was in imminent danger of being abused. Determining that the emergency

removal was not objectively reasonable, the district court denied Deputy Kofka’s

motion.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity unless his conduct violated clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982). We review the

denial of a summary judgment motion claiming qualified immunity only to the extent

the denial turns on an issue of law. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 306

(1996); Wilson v. Lawrence County, 260 F.3d 946, 951 (8th Cir. 2001) (appeals court

has jurisdiction to review only whether plaintiff stated valid constitutional claim and

whether claim was clearly established at time of alleged violation); Gregoire v. Class,

236 F.3d 413, 416-17 (8th Cir. 2000) (de novo standard of review). The sequence of

our analysis is to ask first whether, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,

the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right; and

second, whether, in the specific context of the case, the right was clearly established.

See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001) (excessive-force case). The

dispositive inquiry in deciding “whether a right is clearly established is whether it

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would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation

he confronted.” Id. at 202. We have previously noted that in section 1983 actions

involving interference with the right to familial integrity, “it is nearly impossible to

separate the constitutional violation analysis from the clearly established analysis.”

See Manzano v. South Dakota Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 60 F.3d 505, 511 (8th Cir. 1995);

see also Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201 (in “determining whether a constitutional right was

violated on the premises alleged, a court might find it necessary to set forth principles

which will become the basis for a holding that a right is clearly established”).

Parents have a liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their

children. See Manzano, 60 F.3d at 509. This interest can be limited by the state’s

compelling interest in protecting a child: “the parental liberty interest in keeping the

family unit intact is not a clearly established right in the context of reasonable

suspicion that parents may be abusing children.” See Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d

1437, 1462 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828 (1987). “[W]hen a state official

pursuing a child abuse investigation takes an action which would otherwise

unconstitutionally disrupt familial integrity, he or she is entitled to qualified

immunity, if such action is properly founded upon a reasonable suspicion of child

abuse.” Manzano, 60 F.3d at 510-11. Viewing the facts here in the light most

favorable to Mr. Swipies, and noting the inconsistencies among Deputy Kofka’s

statements in the summary judgment record, we conclude that Mr. Swipies retained

the right not to be separated from his child in the face of Deputy Kofka’s suspicion

that Mr. Stark might abuse Kendra. We further conclude that it would have been

clear to a reasonable officer that removing Kendra in those circumstances would

violate Mr. Swipies’s parental liberty interest. Thus, the district court properly denied

summary judgment. See Gregoire, 236 F.3d at 416-17 (denial of summary judgment

should be upheld if “there is a genuine dispute concerning predicate facts material to

the qualified immunity issue”).

Accordingly, we affirm. We also deny Mr. Swipies’s pending motion to strike

and for sanctions.

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WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

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