Opinion

Light v. Haws

  • 472 F.3d 74
  • 2007 WL 8408
Court
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed
Jan 3, 2007
Status
Published
Author
Sloviter
On the bench
Sloviter, Chagares, Nygaard
Cited by
24 cases
Authority
More cited than 73.2%

holding that employee of Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, when he initiated an enforcement proceeding against plaintiff, was protected from liability as a matter of law by doctrine of absolute immunity

How later courts described this case

  • holding that employee of Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, when he initiated an enforcement proceeding against plaintiff, was protected from liability as a matter of law by doctrine of absolute immunity
  • recognizing absolute immunity applies to a defendant who functioned as an agency advocate in bringing a civil compliance action and civil contempt petitions
  • noting the necessity of a “meticulous analysis” of the official’s actions and functions before a determination could be made that absolute immunity would attach

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Opinions of the United

2007 Decisions States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

1-3-2007

Light v. Haws

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 05-4516

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007

Recommended Citation

"Light v. Haws" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 1711.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/1711

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2007 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 05-4516

JOHN D. LIGHT

v.

CHARLES B. HAWS; ROBERT BELFONTI;

TONY RATHFON; STEVE BARTUS, all individually;

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION; GOVERNOR OF PENNSYLVANIA,

in their official capacities only,

Appellants

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 03-cv-00725)

District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

November 6, 2006

Before: SLOVITER, CHAGARES and NYGAARD,

Circuit Judges

(Filed January 3, 2007)

Michael L. Harvey

Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania

Department of Justice

Harrisburg, PA l7l20

Attorney for Appellants

Donald A. Bailey

Bailey & Ostrowski

Harrisburg, PA l7ll0

Attorney for Appellee

OPINION OF THE COURT

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.

Before us is an appeal by Charles B. Haws, Assistant

Counsel for the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental

Protection (“DEP”), from the order of the District Court denying

his motion for summary judgment on the ground of absolute

prosecutorial immunity in this action brought pursuant to the

Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Light v. Haws, No. 03-cv-

0725, 2005 WL 2230026 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2005). Plaintiff,

John D. Light, is a former farmer and businessman who owns

and operates almost 200 apartment units throughout south-

central Pennsylvania.

I.

The dispute arises out of actions taken by the DEP

following complaints by neighbors and reports from its own

investigators with respect to Light’s maintenance of a large

variety of assorted material and furnishings within and outside

the garage and barn of his farm in Lebanon County. The District

Court noted that the material observed on the property included

“trucks, tractors, log skidders, and farming equipment,” as well

as “[c]onstruction waste, farming supplies, several thousand

stacked tires, and piles of scrap metal overgrown with brush[.]”

Id. at *1-2.

Following discovery, Haws and the other defendants,

2

Robert Belfonti, Tony Rathfon, and Steve Bartus,1 all of whom

are employees of the DEP, the Secretary of the DEP, and the

Governor of Pennsylvania, filed a motion for summary

judgment. The District Court granted the motion in favor of

defendants on Light’s claims that the Pennsylvania Solid Waste

Management Act, 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6018.101 et seq.,

is unconstitutionally vague and that the actions of the Governor

and the Secretary of the DEP violated the state constitution. The

District Court denied the remainder of the defendants’ motion

for summary judgment. Only Haws appeals, as the denial of a

claim of absolute immunity, to the extent it raises questions of

law, may be the subject of an interlocutory appeal. See Mitchell

v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). On a pre-trial denial of

immunity, “we review the legal issues in light of the facts that

the District Court determined had sufficient evidentiary support

for summary judgment purposes.” Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d

776, 782 (3d Cir. 2003).

In this case, consideration of the facts is difficult because

they have not been presented by the parties in a coherent manner

and because some of the relevant facts are contested. It is

apparent, however, that following the complaints about material

on Light’s property, DEP investigator Robert Belfonti inspected

the property and issued a compliance order on November 20,

2001 for violations found on the property. Light’s

administrative appeal of that order was dismissed for failure to

comply with discovery orders during his prosecution of the

appeal. Because Light never sought a supersedeas, Haws began

enforcement proceedings against Light by filing a petition to

enforce the November 20, 2001 order in the Commonwealth

Court.

Following a hearing, that court found Light in violation of

the November 20, 2001 order and, by order dated April 16, 2002,

directed that he comply with the November 20, 2001 order

within ninety days. Light failed to comply with the April 16,

1

The District Court used the spellings “Belfanti” and

“Bartos.”

3

2002 order and Haws filed a petition for contempt. On

September 19, 2002, the Commonwealth Court held a hearing on

the contempt petition and deferred ruling on the condition that

Light comply with the April 16, 2002 order. In an order issued

that same day, the Court directed the DEP to monitor Light’s

compliance, and “apply forthwith to the Court for an order of

contempt” if Light failed to comply with the order. App. at

246-47.

Light alleges that after the end of the hearing, his counsel

showed Haws a copy of a federal civil rights complaint that

Light was prepared to file that afternoon. According to Light,

Haws angrily told him in response that “[W]hat goes around

comes around[. I]f you think you’ve been harassed before, you

wait to see what we do now.” App. at 49 (Am. Compl. ¶ 51).

Light further asserts that when he and his counsel complained

that this was a threat and that “it was unlawful for DEP to

threaten retaliation in this manner, [Haws] aggressively offered

that ‘it isn’t a threat – it’s a promise.’” Id. at ¶ 51. Light alleges

he was “extremely frightened” by this encounter, and deferred

filing the complaint in an attempt to avoid conflict with the DEP.

Id. at ¶ 54.

Light also alleges that on two separate occasions

following the September 19, 2002 hearing, Haws and Belfonti

visited his property. The record does not establish either when

these visits took place or their purpose although Light asserts in

the Amended Complaint that “the only purpose of [one of the

alleged visits] was to display [Haws’] power and to intimidate

[Light.]” Id. at ¶ 55. Light’s affidavit discusses an undated

“walk through” of his property that occurred at some point with

Judge Pellegrini, at which Haws was present. App. at 289.

Haws’ declaration states that he has “entered Mr. Light’s

property solely for the purpose of preparing for Commonwealth

Court hearings or when accompanied by the Judge presiding

over those hearings.” App. at 73.

On March 30, 2003, Haws filed a second petition for

contempt regarding Light’s failure to comply with the April 16,

2002 and September 19, 2002 orders. Between August 2003 and

4

January 2004, the Court found Light in contempt of its orders

multiple times on the basis of several non-compliance

certifications Haws filed with the Court based on inspection of

the property by DEP personnel. The Court found that Light had

failed to purge his contempt and directed that Light be confined

nightly in Lebanon County Prison between January and April

2004. On January 25, 2005, following a status conference, Haws

filed a certificate of compliance in the Commonwealth Court and

requested that the matter be marked closed on that date.

Light filed his § 1983 action in the United States District

Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania in April 2003. In

his Amended Complaint he charges that Haws violated his

Fourth Amendment right to be free from warrantless searches

and retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment

when he issued the courtroom threat in response to Light’s

federal civil rights complaint. See App. at 47, 49 (Am. Compl.

¶¶ 43, 54). Light also claims that Haws selectively enforced the

Commonwealth’s environmental laws against him, set “perjury

traps” for him, sought harsher penalties, and manipulated and

misled the Commonwealth Court. App. at 46-50 (Am. Compl.

¶¶ 41, 42, 46, 56, 57). As noted earlier, the only issue before us

is whether Haws is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity.

II.

“Most public officials are entitled only to qualified

immunity” from Section 1983 actions. Yarris v. County of

Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 135 (3d Cir. 2006); Buckley v.

Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) (ordinarily, “[q]ualified

immunity represents the norm”) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). Nonetheless, in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.

409 (1976), the Supreme Court held that, in light of the

immunity historically accorded prosecutors at common law, state

prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983

for actions performed in a quasi-judicial role. Id. at 427, 431.

This protection is “not grounded in any special esteem for those

who perform these functions, and certainly not from a desire to

shield abuses of office, but because any lesser degree of

immunity could impair the judicial process itself.” Kalina v.

5

Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted).

This court has since amplified that “participation in court

proceedings and other conduct intimately associated with the

judicial phases of litigation” are “actions performed in a

quasi-judicial role.” Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d

339, 356 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). We have given as other examples of prosecutorial

actions that warrant absolute immunity, “acts undertaken by a

prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings

or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an

advocate for the State[.]” Yarris, 465 F.3d at 135 (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted); McArdle v. Tronetti, 961

F.2d 1083, 1085 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that prison physician

and prison counselor were absolutely immune as to their

testimony in court and psychiatric reports to the judge, as that

was an “integral part of the judicial process”).

The burden to establish prosecutorial immunity is on the

prosecutor. Haws argues that the District Court erred by

focusing solely on his alleged courtroom threat to Light rather

than considering separately each of Haws’ actions “as a

prosecutor.” Appellant’s Br. at 11. Moreover, Haws asserts that

his comments to Light in the courtroom also fall within the

scope of prosecutorial immunity.

Both parties treat Haws, an assistant DEP counsel, as a

prosecutor in the classic sense. Although Haws, as counsel to an

administrative agency, is not in precisely the same position as a

district attorney, his authority includes, inter alia, filing actions

to enforce compliance with court orders. In that capacity, he

functions as a prosecutor.

Courts are obligated to take a functional approach to

questions of absolute immunity, and should focus on “the nature

of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who

performed it and evaluate[ ] the effect that exposure to particular

forms of liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise

of that function.” Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 125 (3d Cir.

6

2001); Larsen v. Senate of Commonwealth of Pa., 152 F.3d 240,

249 (3d Cir. 1998) (examining legislative immunity and noting

that “[t]he Supreme Court has adopted a functional approach to

immunity issues . . . turn[ing] on the nature of the act.

Therefore, to determine whether a particular immunity is

appropriate, we must look to the interests behind it, remaining

mindful that it is the interest in protecting the proper functioning

of the office, rather than the interest in protecting its occupant,

that is of primary importance.”) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted); see also Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d

1203, 1212-13 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting that the “Supreme Court in

Butz[v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)] and Imbler intended a

functional test rather than one based on status or title. Butz

particularly stressed the need to make an inquiry into the

particular decision challenged to determine whether an official is

entitled to absolute immunity.”) (footnote omitted).

Haws functioned as the Department of Environmental

Protection’s advocate in bringing the initial civil action in the

Commonwealth Court for compliance with the DEP’s order, and

in the subsequent civil petitions for contempt. 35 Pa. Stat. Ann.

§ 6018.104 (10), (11) (2006) (authorizing the DEP to institute

civil proceedings to compel compliance, as well as to initiate

“prosecutions against any person or municipality under this

act”).

In Butz, the Supreme Court held that:

The decision to initiate administrative proceedings against

an individual or corporation is very much like the

prosecutor’s decision to initiate or move forward with a

criminal prosecution. An agency official, like a

prosecutor, may have broad discretion in deciding

whether a proceeding should be brought and what

sanctions should be sought. . . .

The discretion which executive officials exercise

with respect to the initiation of administrative

proceedings might be distorted if their immunity from

damages arising from that decision was less than

7

complete . . . .

....

We believe that agency officials must make the

decision to move forward with an administrative

proceeding free from intimidation or harassment.

Because the legal remedies already available to the

defendant in such a proceeding provide sufficient checks

on agency zeal, we hold that those officials who are

responsible for the decision to initiate or continue a

proceeding subject to agency adjudication are entitled to

absolute immunity from damages liability for their parts

in that decision.

Id. at 515-16; see also Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224

(1988) (“Under [the functional] approach, we examine the nature

of the functions with which a particular official or class of

officials has been lawfully entrusted, and we seek to evaluate the

effect that exposure to particular forms of liability would likely

have on the appropriate exercise of those functions.”); Ernst v.

Child & Youth Servs. of Chester County, 108 F.3d 486, 495 (3d

Cir. 1997) (applying functional analysis and concluding that

child welfare workers “are entitled to absolute immunity for their

actions on behalf of the state in preparing for, initiating, and

prosecuting dependency proceedings”); Schrob v. Catterson, 948

F.2d 1402, 1411 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting Butz holding and

concluding that “absolute immunity is extended to officials when

their duties are functionally analogous to those of a prosecutor’s,

regardless of whether those duties are performed in the course of

a civil or criminal action”).

A meticulous analysis of Haws’ actions and functions on

behalf of the DEP is necessary before a determination can be

made whether absolute immunity should attach to any of Light’s

challenges. The District Court only addressed whether Haws’

alleged threat to Light following the September 19, 2002 hearing

warrants absolute immunity. The District Court held that Haws’

actions as alleged “did not take place during ‘an integral part of

the judicial process.’” Light, 2005 WL 2230026, at *7 (quoting

McArdle, 961 F.2d at 1085). Instead it stated that “Haws’s

8

alleged threats were made during a private conversation with

Light and his counsel.” Id. We do not disagree at this stage of

the proceeding, although we do not preclude an ultimate decision

that Haws may be entitled to qualified, or even absolute

immunity, because his statements, at most, suggested further

prosecution. See McGruder v. Necaise, 733 F.2d 1146, 1148

(5th Cir. 1984) (“These defendants allegedly used their

prosecutorial powers to threaten McGruder into dismissing his

damages suit. McGruder therefore argues that their activities

were not those of a prosecutor seeking to punish and deter crime,

but of an agent of the county seeking to intimidate a citizen in

his exercise of constitutional rights. Such a motivation would be

reprehensible and such threats abhorrent, but they do not lift the

decision to maintain a criminal prosecution from the

prosecutorial activities protected by Imbler.”).

Light also charges that Haws retaliated against him by

filing “manipulat[ed]” contempt petitions against him and

subjecting him to “expensive harassing litigation.” App. at 50,

47 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 56, 41). Haws’ actions in bringing any of

the civil petitions against Light, by contrast, are precisely the

type of actions that absolute immunity is designed to protect.

Haws was acting as an advocate for the state in that connection,

which included authority to pursue DEP compliance actions. Cf.

McArdle, 961 F.2d at 1087 (prison counselor not entitled to

absolute immunity for filing a petition for involuntary

commitment, because he had “no special authority or

responsibility to file such petitions” outside of that of the public

at large).

Even if Haws’ statements or actions were malicious, as

Light suggests, Haws’ motivation in bringing any of these

actions is irrelevant to the absolute immunity analysis. Kulwicki

v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Consideration

of personal motives is directly at odds with the Supreme Court' s

simple functional analysis of prosecutorial immunity . . . . The

Court has explicitly stated that even groundless charges are

protected, in the interest of maintaining vigorous prosecution of

crime.”); see also Bernard v. County of Suffolk, 356 F.3d 495,

498 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[A]s long as a prosecutor acts with

9

colorable authority, absolute immunity shields his performance

of advocative functions regardless of motivation.”).

Light further alleges that Haws subsequently made good

on his threat by visiting his property in order to “display his

power and to intimidate [him].” App. at 49-50. There is record

evidence that at least one of Haws’ visits apparently occurred in

the presence of Judge Pellegrini at a walk-through ordered by the

judge. If this occurred, it could have been an action taken in the

context of the litigation, and hence entitled to absolute immunity.

On the other hand, on at least one visit Haws may have

functioned as a DEP investigator, when he, along with Belfonti,

examined whether Light had disposed of waste or complied with

the DEP’s order. “When a prosecutor performs the investigative

functions normally performed by a detective or police officer, it

is neither appropriate nor justifiable that, for the same act,

immunity should protect the one and not the other.” Kalina v.

Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 126 (1997) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). Moreover, in his own declaration, Haws

explained how continued inspections “of Mr. Light’s property by

Department personnel” influenced his various decisions to bring

continued noncompliance actions against Light. App. at 71.

The District Court made no analysis of whether absolute

immunity attached to Haws’ subsequent visits to Light’s

property. It is unclear on this state of the record what role Haws’

own investigatory inspections, if any, played in this decision-

making process.

Courts have noted “the gray areas between prosecutorial

and investigative activity.” Schrob, 948 F.2d at 1414. In Imbler

v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976), the Supreme Court

stated that “[t]he procedural difference between the absolute and

the qualified immunities is important. An absolute immunity

defeats a suit at the outset, so long as the official’s actions were

within the scope of the immunity. The fate of an official with

qualified immunity depends upon the circumstances and

motivations of his actions, as established by the evidence. . . .”;

see Schrob, 948 F.2d at 1407 n.5 (“[A]n official with qualified

immunity must establish that the[ ] conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

10

reasonable person would have known.”) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted).

Haws, who advanced his absolute immunity defense at

the summary judgment stage, had the burden to demonstrate that

absolute immunity should attach to each act he allegedly

committed that gave rise to a cause of action. “[T]he official

seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that

such immunity is justified for the function in question.” Burns

v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991) (“The presumption is that

qualified rather than absolute immunity is sufficient . . . . We

have been quite sparing in our recognition of absolute

immunity[.]”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted);

see also Forsyth, 599 F.2d at 1212 (reading Butz as “placing a

heavy burden on . . . defendants to demonstrate a need for

protection greater than that provided by qualified immunity”).

The District Court noted that Haws failed to comply with

Local Rule 56.1 in presenting evidence in connection with his

summary judgment motion. 2005 WL 2230026, at *1 n.1.2

2

The applicable local rule provides:

A motion for summary judgment filed pursuant to

[Fed. R. Civ. P. 56], shall be accompanied by a separate,

short and concise statement of the material facts, in

numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving party

contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.

The papers opposing a motion for summary

judgment shall include a separate, short and concise

statement of the material facts, responding to the numbered

paragraphs set forth in the statement required in the

foregoing paragraph, as to which it is contended that there

exists a genuine issue to be tried.

Statements of material facts in support of, or in

opposition to, a motion shall include references to the parts

of the record that support the statements.

11

Remand is therefore appropriate. See Mancini v. Lester, 630

F.2d 990, 994, 996 (3d Cir. 1980) (where “factual record [was]

sketchy,” remanding to district court to “further develop the facts

and apply to them the functional test of Imbler . . . .”); King v.

Simpson, 189 F.3d 284, 288 (2d Cir. 1999) (in light of functional

analysis required to “determine if the duties of the [parole

commissioner defendant] were judicial or prosecutorial . . . or

administrative,” vacating dismissal of the complaint on absolute

immunity grounds and remanding “the matter to the district court

for additional development of the record in whatever form the

court deems appropriate”).

In light of the uncertain state of the record, the failure of

the parties to agree as to uncontested facts and the failure of the

District Court to make any determination as to which relevant

facts are not in dispute, we cannot conclude which of Haws’

actions are entitled to absolute immunity as a matter of law. We

note, however, that Haws is entitled to a determination by the

District Court as to which actions are entitled to absolute

immunity. Once the District Court makes that determination it

will be in the position to limit further proceedings accordingly.

All material facts set forth in the statement required

to be served by the moving party will be deemed to be

admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be

served by the opposing party.

M. D. Pa. L.R. 56.1.

12

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.