Opinion

Barton v. Curtis

Court
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed
Jul 30, 2007
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 40.4%

The opinion

Opinions of the United

2007 Decisions States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-30-2007

Barton v. Curtis

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 06-3336

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007

Recommended Citation

"Barton v. Curtis" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 644.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/644

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2007 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD

CIRCUIT

No. 06-3336

CHRISTOPHER BARTON

v.

WILLIAM A. CURTIS, JR., in his individual capacity,

Appellant

On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands

(D.C. No. 05-cv-00002)

District Judge: Hon. Curtis V. Gomez

Argued May 7, 2007

Before: SLOVITER, STAPLETON, and VAN ANTWERPEN,

Circuit Judges

(Filed July 30, 2007)

_____

Terryln M. Smock (Argued)

Office of Attorney General of Virgin Islands

Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas

USVI 00802

Attorney for Appellant

Andrew C. Simpson (Argued)

Andrew C. Simpson Law Offices

Christiansted, St. Croix

USVI 00820

Attorney for Appellee

_____

OPINION OF THE COURT

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.

I.

William A. Curtis, the Director of the United States

Virgin Islands Department of Justice, Special Investigations

Division, who is the defendant in a suit filed by Christopher

Bryant Barton pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, appeals from the

order of the District Court of the Virgin Islands denying his

motion for summary judgment. Curtis argues that he is entitled

to qualified immunity because he was acting in his official

capacity in the events at issue. Barton responds that this court

does not have jurisdiction, an issue we must address as a

preliminary matter.

II.

A brief statement of the facts and procedural posture is

necessary to put the matter before us in context. Barton and his

former wife had been involved in a custody dispute when Mrs.

Barton, on August 8, 2001, filed a complaint in the Territorial

Court of the Virgin Islands alleging that Barton had removed

their two children from the territory in violation of an order of

that court. After investigating Mrs. Barton’s report, Curtis

submitted an affidavit on January 8, 2003, to the Territorial

Court in support of probable cause to arrest Barton for violating

14 V.I.C. § 843, Fraudulent Claims Upon the Government. The

affidavit stated that the Territorial Court awarded physical

custody to Mrs. Barton pursuant to a Florida court order (dated

2

August 24, 1999); that Barton brought his two children to the

Virgin Islands in violation of the Florida court order; and that the

Territorial Court found that Barton made “fraudulent

misrepresentations of fact[ ]” when he successfully petitioned

the court for sole custody of his two children on September 11,

2000. App. at 87-89.

Barton was arrested in South Carolina on a fugitive

warrant and was sent to the Virgin Islands where he was tried in

2004 on three counts of “knowingly and willfully conceal[ing] a

material fact from a government agency” in violation of 14

V.I.C. § 843(2). App. at 83-84. Specifically, the charge was

that he had failed to inform the Territorial Court “that in August

of 1999, he had been ordered by a Florida court and/or general

master of said court,” (1) “to return his children to the state of

Florida,” (2) “to relinquish the physical custody of his two

children to the children’s mother,” and (3) “not to leave Broward

County, Florida with his children.” App. at 83-84.

On February 25, 2004, Barton was convicted by a jury on

all three counts and was sentenced to imprisonment. However,

on December 30, 2004, the District Court Appellate Division

reversed Barton’s conviction. Barton v. Gov’t of the V.I., No.

Civ.A.2004-89, 2004 WL 3048845 (D.V.I. Dec. 30, 2004). The

Appellate Division relied heavily upon an affidavit submitted by

Judge Robert Carney, the Florida judge assigned to Barton v.

Barton, Case No. 99-8422 (37) (93), who stated that:

NO Order ratifying the General Master’s Report

was ever entered in this matter, again, NO Custody

Order was ever entered in this case by me granting

any rights of custody to either parent regarding the

above referenced children.

App. at 77.

Thereafter, Barton filed this action in the District Court of

the Virgin Islands, claiming that Curtis, in his individual

capacity, violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “by denying him due

process under the law and his right to liberty.” Curtis’ Br. at 3.

On August 22, 2005, Curtis filed a motion for summary

3

judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. After the District

Court held a hearing, it concluded that there were material facts

in dispute and denied Curtis’ motion for summary judgment.

Specifically, the District Court found that whether Curtis

knowingly or recklessly presented false information to the

Territorial Court in his affidavit in support of probable cause is a

material issue of fact to be determined by the jury. Curtis then

filed a notice of appeal.1

III.

Under the collateral order doctrine established by the

Supreme Court, there is interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over

orders that fall into “that small class [of orders] which finally

determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights

asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too

independent of the cause itself to require that appellate

consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.”

Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546

(1949). In Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985), the

Supreme Court held that a claim of qualified immunity is

reviewable on interlocutory appeal under Cohen where “(1) the

defendant was a public official asserting a defense of ‘qualified

immunity,’ and (2) the issue appealed concerned, not which facts

the parties might be able to prove, but, rather, whether or not

certain given facts showed a violation of ‘clearly established’

law.” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 311 (1995) (citing

Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528).

We summarized the applicable principles in Schieber v.

City of Philadelphia, 320 F.3d 409 (3d Cir. 2003), where we

stated:

This Court has jurisdiction to review a District

Court order denying qualified immunity at the

summary judgment stage under the collateral order

1

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over

all appeals from final orders issued in the District Court of the

Virgin Islands.

4

doctrine to the extent that the denial turns on

questions of law. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.

511, 527-28. . . . We have no jurisdiction,

however, in an interlocutory appeal to review a

District Court's determination that there is

sufficient record evidence to support a set of facts

under which there would be no immunity.

Id. at 415 (internal citation omitted).

This court exercises plenary review of questions of law

appealed pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. Id. In

reviewing a denial of summary judgment, this court must view

the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,

appellant Barton. See, e.g., Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 775

(3d Cir. 2004).

Barton argues that we do not have jurisdiction because

the District Court denied Curtis’ motion for summary judgment

on the ground that there is a genuine dispute as to material facts.

He relies in part on the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v.

Jones, where the Court limited “interlocutory appeals of

‘qualified immunity’ matters to cases presenting more abstract

issues of law.” 515 U.S. at 317 (emphasis added). In Johnson,

the police officer defendants moved for summary judgment

claiming that they were not present at and were not participating

in the beating of the plaintiff; and asserting qualified immunity.

Id. at 307. The District Court denied summary judgment,

holding that there was “sufficient circumstantial evidence

supporting [the plaintiff’s] theory of the case.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh

Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction over the

interlocutory appeal and the Supreme Court affirmed its

dismissal of the appeal. Id. at 308, 320. The Johnson Court

balanced the competing considerations that underlie questions of

finality. Id. at 315. It observed that determining whether a

genuine issue of material fact exists is the sort of question that a

trial judge confronts regularly and that “appellate judges enjoy

no comparative expertise in such matters.” Id. at 316. The

Court also noted that determining whether a record demonstrates

a “genuine” issue of fact at trial “can consume inordinate

5

amounts of appellate time.” Id.

In Johnson, the Court quoted from Mitchell with respect

to the separable requirement of Cohen, stating:

it follows from the recognition that qualified

immunity is in part an entitlement not to be forced

to litigate the consequences of official conduct that

a claim of immunity is conceptually distinct from

the merits of the plaintiff’s claim that his rights

have been violated.

Johnson, 515 U.S. at 312 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Mitchell,

472 U.S. at 527-28).

Qualified immunity protects government officials “from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The Supreme Court has

set forth a two-step objective reasonableness test to determine

whether qualified immunity should be granted. Saucier v. Katz,

533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001); see also Kopec, 361 F.3d at 776.

“First, the court must consider whether the facts alleged, taken in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the officer's

conduct violated a constitutional right.” Kopec, 361 F.3d at 776

(citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). If “‘a violation could be made

out on a favorable view of the parties’ submissions,’” the court

must determine “‘whether the right was clearly established.’”

Id. (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). “‘The relevant

dispositive inquiry’ in making this determination is ‘whether it

would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted.’” Id. (quoting Saucier,

533 U.S. at 202).

Reasonableness under the second factor is an issue of law

for the district court to determine; however, if there are facts

material to the determination of reasonableness in dispute, then

that issue of fact should be decided by the jury. Sharrar v.

Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 826-28, 832 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Hunter

v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991)) (holding, on appeal from a final

6

judgment, that a jury must decide whether “relevant historical

facts” are disputed and, if so, determine whether defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity).

IV.

Following these precedents, the District Court in this case

approached the issue of qualified immunity as a two-part test, as

set forth in Saucier. First, the Court heard arguments on

whether, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Barton,

Curtis violated Barton’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from

arrest without probable cause. The parties do not dispute that

this right is clearly established.

As to the second step, Barton’s complaint alleged that

Curtis’ affidavit, which was the basis for the Territorial Court’s

issuance of a warrant for Barton’s arrest, contained evidence that

Curtis knew to be false “and nevertheless deliberately made

them or he acted with reckless disregard for the truth.” Barton’s

Compl. at 2. In support of this claim, Barton argues that Curtis

stated in his affidavit “[t]hat . . . Barton in an effort to deceive

the court, withheld the fact that this matter of custody had been

brought before a Florida Court,” App. at 89, even though, before

submitting that affidavit, Curtis had reviewed the transcript of

the custody hearing, at which Barton had in fact disclosed the

prior proceedings in Florida and North Carolina. Moreover,

Barton supports his allegation that Curtis’ actions were either

“knowing” or “reckless” by submitting evidence that there was

no prior award of custody to Mrs. Barton, as the Florida “order”

on which Curtis relied was by a master and had never been

entered by Judge Carney, the Florida judge.

We do not decide at this preliminary stage of the

proceedings whether Curtis’ interpretation of the facts

discovered in his investigation of Barton, as he presented them

in his affidavit in support of probable cause, was objectively

reasonable or unreasonable. The District Court next needed to

determine, as a matter of law, whether “it would be clear to a

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation

he confronted.” Kopec, 361 F.3d at 776. During the motion

hearing on the summary judgment, the District Court noted that,

7

taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a

determination of whether or not Curtis acted recklessly or

knowingly would be more appropriately one for a jury.

We note that the issue as to whether Curtis knowingly or

recklessly presented false information to the Territorial Court is

the basis of Barton’s claim that Curtis violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Thus, the disputed issue of fact is inseparable from the legal

question of qualified immunity. See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 312.

Because the District Court denied summary judgment on

the ground that there is a material issue of fact to be determined

by the jury, the order falls within Johnson and is one of the

limited instances in which this Court does not have jurisdiction

to hear an appeal of summary judgment in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983

cause of action where the defendant is asserting qualified

immunity.2 We will therefore dismiss this appeal for lack of

jurisdiction.3

2

See 19 Moore’s Federal Practice § 202.07[2][b][iii][A]

(Matthew Bender 3d ed.) (“[T]he district court might have denied

a defendant’s motion for summary judgment because of the

existence of a genuine factual dispute about what occurred. For

example, under the plaintiff’s version of the facts immunity might

be inapplicable, while under the defendant’s version of the facts

immunity would apply. In such a case, the court of appeals cannot

decide the immunity issue as a matter of law, since the applicability

of the defense will depend on what facts are found after a trial. In

effect, an interlocutory appeal would require the circuit court to

consider an issue that is not separate from the factual merits of the

case.”).

3

Curtis argues that the § 1983 claim against him must be

dismissed because he was acting in his official capacity and

therefore the action cannot be maintained against him. Barton’s

suit names Curtis in his individual capacity. The Supreme Court

has held that “state officials, sued in their individual capacities, are

‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S.

21, 31 (1991). The District Court did not reach this issue and

because it does not present an issue of qualified immunity

8

appropriate for interlocutory appeal, we will not address it.

9

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.