Stevenson v. Carroll

Opinions of the United

2007 Decisions States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-30-2007

Stevenson v. Carroll

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 05-1088

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Case No: 05-1088

DAVID STEVENSON; MICHAEL MANLEY;

*MICHAEL L. JONES,

Appellants

v.

THOMAS CARROLL, Warden

*Reinstated per clerk’s order of 08/09/05

_____________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Delaware

District Court No.: 04-cv-139

District Judge: The Honorable Kent A. Jordan

_____________________

Argued June 4, 2007

Before: SMITH, COWEN, and SILER, Circuit Judges*

*

The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Senior Circuit Judge for the

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by

designation.

(Filed: July 30, 2007)

Leon F. DeJulius, Jr. (Argued)

Jones Day

500 Grant Street, 31st Floor

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Counsel for Appellants

Richard W. Hubbard (Argued)

Department of Justice

820 North French Street

Carvel Office Building

Wilmington, DE 19801

Counsel for Appellee

_____________________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_____________________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Three detainees in the Delaware Correctional

System–David Stevenson, Michael Manley, and Michael L.

Jones–filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Warden

Thomas Carroll, alleging violations of their substantive and

procedural due process rights. The District Court dismissed their

complaint. On appeal, they assert that their allegations of

placement in restrictive confinement state valid substantive and

2

procedural due process claims sufficient to survive a motion to

dismiss. We agree, and remand the case to the District Court.

I.

At the time of their complaint, Stevenson and Manley

were awaiting resentencing. Both had been convicted and

sentenced to death in January 1997, but their sentences were

vacated and remanded on or about May 30, 2001. At that time,

they were moved off death row, and into the Security Housing

Unit (“SHU”). Stevenson was moved from the SHU to a less

restrictive pre-trial facility in December 2003, but was returned

to the SHU in January 2004. Neither one of them received a

hearing or explanation for their transfers into the SHU. They

were both subsequently re-sentenced to death on February 3,

2006.

Jones was awaiting trial at the time of the complaint.

Following a disruption at Gander Hill Prison in Wilmington,

Delaware, he and several other inmates were moved to the SHU

on or about February 19, 2003. Jones asserts that, like Stevenson

and Manley, he was not afforded an explanation or hearing

regarding his transfer into more restrictive housing. He does,

however, state that he was alleged to have been involved in the

riot at Gander Hill. Jones was subsequently found guilty of first-

degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment on September

16, 2005.

The appellants seek relief in the form of a transfer back

3

into the general prison population, monetary damages, and the

establishment of a system of review for transfers of pretrial

detainees into the SHU.1

The Warden filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which was granted on December 7,

2004. The District Court held that the detainees’ transfer out of

the general prison population into the SHU for nonpunitive

reasons was within the scope of the prison officials’ authority

with respect to prison management. In its ruling, the District

Court relied upon Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). The

plaintiffs appealed from this order on January 4, 2005.2 Review

of a dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) is plenary.

Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 684-85 (3d Cir. 1997).

II.

Stevenson, Manley, and Jones present two arguments as

1

Stevenson and Manley are now on death row, and Warden

Carroll indicates that Jones is now housed in the part of the SHU

reserved for sentenced inmates. Accordingly, their request for

injunctive relief on the grounds that they are improperly

confined pretrial detainees is moot. The other two forms of relief

they seek continue to be viable.

2

The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1331. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291.

4

to why their complaint should have survived the motion to

dismiss. First, they argue that they have sufficiently asserted a

liberty interest in being free from punishment prior to imposition

of sentence. Second, they assert that they should have been

afforded notice of their transfer and an opportunity to respond.

The Warden disputes the sufficiency of their substantive and

procedural due process claims, arguing that they have made only

conclusory allegations regarding punishment and have no

cognizable liberty interest in being housed in the general prison

population.

In support of his contention that the complaint made only

conclusory statements regarding punishment, the Warden looks

to Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 351-53 (3d Cir. 2005). The

opinion in Evancho, however, offers the Warden no support.

The holding of Evancho is that the amended complaint of a state

employee filed against the state attorney general alleging

violations of the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law and her civil

rights failed to meet the liberal pleading requirement of Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Evancho admitted that she did not

have evidence of the involvement of one of her named

defendants. Id. at 350. The complaint here is significantly

different in that it does support a claim for substantive due

process violations. As the Warden acknowledges, the complaint

alleges that “Plaintiffs weren’t given an explanation for the

punitive move.” This express reference to punishment is

supported by numerous references in the complaint to lengthy

stays in isolation with prisoners who had disciplinary problems

or who were in protective custody, and the imposition of

5

additional hardships that are not shared by the general prison

population. The reasonable inference from these factual

allegations is that appellants were impermissibly punished.

Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir.

1990) (“We accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint and

all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them.”).

Liberal pleading dictates that, particularly in the context of a pro

se complaint, such allegations be deemed sufficient. Erickson v.

Pardus, --- U.S. ---, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007); Gibbs v.

Roman, 116 F.3d 83, 86 (3d Cir. 1997).

To be sure, there are reasonable inferences apart from

punishment that could be drawn from the complaint as

explanation for the appellants’ confinement. Jones notes that he

was alleged to have been a participant in a riot at the Gander

Hill detention facility. If this allegation is true, it is entirely

possible that his relocation to the Smyrna facility’s SHU was for

disciplinary reasons rather than for impermissible retaliation or

punishment. Likewise, Stevenson and Manley admit that they

had been sentenced to death, but that only their sentences had

been vacated. Death sentences are available in Delaware only

for offenses of first-degree murder. See 11 DEL. CODE §§ 636,

4209(a). Accordingly, the Warden’s assertion that Stevenson

and Manley were housed in the SHU because they were charged

with violent offenses is also a legitimate inference to be drawn

from the complaint. However, the fact that such inferences may

be drawn is proof that the dismissal was premature. The

appellants have met their obligation to provide grounds for their

entitlement to relief by presenting factual allegations sufficient

6

to raise their right to relief above a speculative level. See, e.g.,

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, --- U.S. ---, 127 S. Ct. 1955,

1964-65 (2007).

The complaint also alleges sufficient facts to make out a

claim for relief based on procedural due process. In addition to

the list of deprivations the plaintiffs suffered, the complaint

states that they were not afforded “all the rights of normal pre-

trial [detainees],” and that the “standard practice at Delaware

Correctional Center” of returning those whose sentences had

been vacated to the general prison population was not followed.

These allegations do not explicitly state the nature of the

appellants’ alleged liberty interest, but they provide an adequate

framework for the inquiry. See, e.g., Unger v. Nat’l Residents

Matching Program, 928 F.2d 1392, 1402 (3d Cir. 1991)

(requiring “facts in [the] complaint from which we could infer

that [plaintiff] had a liberty or property interest”).

The complaint details the differences between the

conditions they encountered in the SHU and those encountered

by regular pretrial detainees. It evinces the appellants’

contention that they were improperly housed in the SHU without

explanation or an opportunity to contest their placement. The

complaint states that the appellants wrote to Warden Carroll and

his employees requesting an explanation for their confinement

in the SHU, but received no response. The reasonable inference

to be drawn from these allegations is that the appellants assert

a liberty interest in being free from punishment while awaiting

sentencing and in not being held in the SHU indefinitely. The

7

plaintiffs specifically requested relief in the form of “a system

to inform inmates why they were put into isolation, who made

the decision to put them in isolation, and a chance to appeal the

decision to a non-partisan official.” They also requested that the

prison “[m]ake procedural safeguards.” The allegations in the

complaint sufficiently raise the appellants’ claim that their

procedural due process rights were violated.

III.

A.

Although both Stevenson and Manley had been convicted

at the time of their complaint, they are classified as pretrial

detainees for purposes of our constitutional inquiry. See Cobb v.

Aytch, 643 F.2d 946, 962 (3d Cir. 1981) (“The right to remain

at liberty continues until a court pronounces a judgment of

sentence, although after a jury has pronounced a guilty verdict

the court may insist upon greater assurance that a defendant will

submit to sentence.”); see also Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d

335, 341 (3d Cir. 2000). Their initial sentences had been vacated

and they were awaiting resentencing at the time of their

complaint and for the duration during which they allege they

were subjected to due process violations. Jones was awaiting

trial at the time of the complaint. The Warden does not contest

the status of the appellants as pretrial detainees for purposes of

this appeal.

B.

8

With respect to the substantive due process claims of

punishment, in Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court established

the principle that “under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may

not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance

with due process of law.” 441 U.S. 520, 535-36 (1979). The Bell

Court mandated a pragmatic approach to determining what

constitutes punishment, and formulated the “reasonable

relationship” test for determining whether a restriction is

punitive. Id. at 539 (“[I]f a particular condition or restriction of

pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate

governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to

punishment.’”). To aid courts in applying this test, the Bell

opinion looked to the test in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372

U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) for factors that courts might use as

guideposts in distinguishing restrictions that are punitive from

those that are not:

Whether the sanction involves an affirmative

disability or restraint, whether it has historically

been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes

into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its

operation will promote the traditional aims of

punishment–retribution and deterrence, whether

the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,

whether an alternative purpose to which it may

rationally be connected is assignable for it, and

whether it appears excessive in relation to the

alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the

inquiry....

9

See also Bell, 441 U.S. at 537-38. However, the Court cautioned

that “[a]bsent a showing of an expressed intent to punish on the

part of detention facility officials, that determination generally

will turn on ‘whether an alternative purpose to which [the

restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and

whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative

purpose assigned [to it].’” Id. at 538 (quoting Kennedy, 372 U.S.

at 168-69). Thus, “if a restriction or condition is not reasonably

related to a legitimate goal–if it is arbitrary or purposeless–a

court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the

governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally

be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.” Id. at 539.3

3

In a footnote, the Court exhorted that

In determining whether restrictions or conditions

are reasonably related to the Government’s

interest in maintaining security and order and

operating the institution in a manageable fashion,

courts must heed our warning that “[s]uch

considerations are peculiarly within the province

and professional expertise of corrections officials,

and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the

record to indicate that the officials have

exaggerated their response to these

considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to

their expert judgment in such matters.”

Id. at 540 n.23 (citations omitted).

10

Unconstitutional punishment typically includes both

objective and subjective components. As the Supreme Court

explained in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991), the objective

component requires an inquiry into whether “the deprivation

[was] sufficiently serious” and the subjective component asks

whether “the officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state

of mind[.]” Id. at 298. The Supreme Court did not abandon this

bipartite analysis in Bell, but rather allowed for an inference of

mens rea where the restriction is arbitrary or purposeless, or

where the restriction is excessive, even if it would accomplish

a legitimate governmental objective. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-

39 & n.20. Thus, we agree with the summary of the holding of

Bell in Rapier v. Harris:

[A] particular measure amounts to punishment

when there is a showing of express intent to

punish on the part of detention facility officials,

when the restriction or condition is not rationally

related to a legitimate non-punitive government

purpose, or when the restriction is excessive in

light of that purpose.

172 F.3d 999, 1005 (7th Cir. 1999).

Because the District Court could not make either an

objective inquiry into the severity of the deprivations or a

subjective inquiry into the mental state of the officials at the

motion to dismiss stage, the dismissal was improper. One

reasonable inference from the allegations in the complaint of

11

disparate treatment of prisoners is that, at a minimum, the

appellants’ confinement in the SHU was arbitrary. See id. at 304

(allowing collective examination of conditions of confinement);

see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 542 (stating that confining pretrial

detainees “in such a manner as to cause them to endure genuine

privations and hardship over an extended period of time might

raise serious questions under the Due Process Clause as to

whether those conditions amounted to punishment”). Stevenson

and Manley assert that they were not treated in the same manner

as other similarly situated inmates. Jones’ allegations suggest

that one of the other prisoners who was alleged to have been

involved in the riot at Gander Hill was released from the SHU

in July 2003, and two others were moved into the general prison

population in August 2003. These allegations intimate a degree

of as yet unexplained arbitrariness in the procedures regarding

placement in the SHU.

In evaluating a pretrial detainee’s claim of

unconstitutional punishment, courts must examine the totality of

the circumstances within the institution. In Hubbard v. Taylor,

399 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005), we explained that “[o]ur inquiry

into whether given conditions constitute ‘punishment’ must

therefore consider the totality of circumstances within an

institution.” Hubbard, 388 F.3d at 160. Appellants assert that, as

compared to the conditions for the general prison population,

housing in the SHU is significantly more restrictive. The

complaint draws specific, item-by-item comparisons between

the restrictions in the SHU and those in the general prison

population. The allegations in the complaint raise an inference

of impermissible punishment that precludes granting a motion

12

to dismiss and may warrant further discovery.4

When warranted, such discovery need not be extensive.

In situations such as this, where the allegations of punishment

are coextensive with the allegations that form the basis for the

procedural due process claim, it will generally be sufficient for

the prison officials to submit affidavits to show that the

classification was appropriate based on reasonable prison

management concerns. While district courts have discretion to

manage their cases, such affidavits alone will often be adequate

to resolve the punishment inquiry. Although the substantive and

4

The able District Judge erroneously relied upon Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) for the proposition that the

institutional decision to place appellants in the SHU “is exactly

the type of decision the Supreme Court noted when it held that

federal courts should defer to prison officials with respect to

managing the ‘ordinary incidents of prison life.’” Appellants’

pretrial detainee status necessitates a more nuanced approach.

The focus in Sandin was on state-created liberty interests

regarding “freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding

the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to

protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, ...

nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the

inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at

484 (emphasis added). The Court emphasized that its holding

was driven by “the range of confinement to be normally

expected for one serving an indeterminate term,” id. at 487, and

the “expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of

law,” id. at 485. Several courts of appeals, including this one,

subsequently concluded that “Sandin does not apply [to pretrial

detainees]. Sandin concerned punishment of a sentenced

prisoner, and therefore required a completely different analysis.”

Fuentes, 206 F.3d at 342 n.9; see also Benjamin, 264 F.3d at

188.

13

procedural due process evaluations are distinct, a showing by

the prison officials that a restrictive housing assignment is

predicated on a legitimate managerial concern and is therefore

not arbitrary or purposeless, will typically foreclose the

substantive due process inquiry.

C.

Appellants assert that they were denied notice of their

transfer and an opportunity to respond. The Supreme Court has

repeatedly stated that “[t]he core of due process is the right to

notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” LaChance v.

Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 266 (1998). Appellants have

sufficiently pled facts to show that they were housed in the

restrictive conditions of the SHU without any procedural

protections. Although pretrial detainees do not have a liberty

interest in being confined in the general prison population, they

do have a liberty interest in not being detained indefinitely in the

SHU without explanation or review of their confinement. This

result is compelled by our holding in Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d

140 (3d Cir. 2000). In our discussion in Shoats focusing on the

liberty interests at stake, we explained that “we have no

difficulty concluding that eight years in administrative custody,

with no prospect of immediate release in the near future, is

‘atypical’ in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id.

at 144. Unlike appellants, Shoats was a sentenced inmate who

received periodic review of his status, to which he was permitted

to respond. Id. at 145-46. As explained above, the protections

due to sentenced inmates provide a floor for what pretrial

detainees may expect.

In determining what procedural protections are adequate,

we are guided by the tenet that “[d]ue process is flexible and

14

calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation

demands. Accordingly, resolution of the issue whether ...

administrative procedures provided ... are constitutionally

sufficient requires analysis of the governmental and private

interests that are affected.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,

334 (1976) (citations omitted). Thus, the substantive liberty

analysis is integral to the inquiry into the process due. See, e.g.,

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560 (1974) (“Consideration

of what procedures due process may require under any given set

of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise

nature of the government function involved as well as of the

private interest that has been affected by governmental action.”

(citations omitted)); Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175, 190 (2d

Cir. 2001).

Taking into account both the private interests of the

detainees and the governmental function involved, it becomes

clear that the process required for administrative transfers of

pretrial detainees need not be extensive. Detainees have a liberty

interest in not being subjected to punishment for the crime with

which they have been charged until after they have been

convicted and sentenced, but the governmental interest in

maintaining prison security for the duration of their detention is

substantial. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540 (1979) (“The

Government also has legitimate interests that stem from its need

to manage the facility in which the individual is detained.”).

Prison officials must provide detainees who are

transferred into more restrictive housing for administrative

purposes only an explanation of the reason for their transfer as

well as an opportunity to respond. This level of process

comports with the Supreme Court’s holding in Hewitt v. Helms,

459 U.S. 460 (1983) that the removal of a sentenced inmate

15

from the general prison population and his transfer into

administrative segregation requires at least a minimal degree of

process. The Court explained that “the Due Process Clause

requires only an informal nonadversary review of evidence ... in

order to confine an inmate feared to be a threat to institutional

security to administrative segregation.” Id. at 474. This informal

nonadversary review is satisfied when an inmate receives “some

notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present

his views to the prison official charged with deciding whether to

transfer him to administrative segregation.” Id. at 476. The

Court further explained that “[t]he proceeding must occur within

a reasonable time following an inmate’s transfer....” Id. at 476

n.8.

The degree of process required varies depending on the

reason for the transfer, with greater process accorded to

prisoners who are confined for disciplinary infractions than

those moved for purely administrative reasons. See Mathews,

424 U.S. at 334. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974),

the Supreme Court held that “written notice of the charges must

be given to the disciplinary-action defendant in order to inform

him of the charges and to enable him to marshal the facts and

prepare a defense,” and “there must be a ‘written statement by

the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons’ for the

disciplinary action.” Id. at 564. As the Second Circuit has noted,

“the procedures required by Wolff apply if the restraint on

liberty is imposed for disciplinary reasons; if the restraint is for

‘administrative’ purposes, the minimal procedures outlined in

Hewitt are all that is required.” Benjamin, 264 F.3d at 190; see

also Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1005-06 (7th Cir. 1999).

Due to the unique exigencies of prison management, and in

accordance with Hewitt, the minimal exchange of paperwork our

holding will occasion need not occur prior to the transfer of a

16

detainee.

Jones’ complaint suggests that his transfer was

occasioned by his alleged participation in a prison riot, which

may necessitate a higher level of procedure. Stevenson and

Manley allege only that they were transferred without

explanation. The Warden stated in an affidavit attached to his

memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss that Jones’

transfer to the SHU was due to the fact that he had “very serious

pending charges” and “a number of inmate disciplinary

infractions.” The Warden also stated that Stevenson and Manley

were housed in the SHU based on their “potential ... to again

receive a sentence of death.” Accordingly, the District Court

should examine the asserted purposes for appellants’ detentions,

and determine whether sufficient process has been afforded.

In considering the asserted rationale for placing pretrial

detainees in restricted housing, courts should be mindful of our

pronouncement in Shoats: “Shoats could conceivably be held in

administrative custody merely because his prior crimes

reasonably foreshadow future misconduct.” Shoats, 213 F.3d at

146. This consideration is consistent with the Supreme Court’s

emphasis on the principle that “we are unwilling to substitute

our judgment on these difficult and sensitive matters of

institutional administration and security for that of ‘the persons

who are actually charged with and trained in the running’ of

such facilities.” Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 588 (1984)

(quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 562).

In Bell, the Supreme Court instructed that if there is a

reasonable relationship between the particular condition or

restriction of pretrial detention and a legitimate governmental

17

objective, then that condition, “without more,” does not infringe

upon a detainee’s constitutional rights. Bell, 441 U.S. 539. In

this case, at the motion to dismiss stage, it is not possible to

discern whether the relationship between the appellants’

detention in the SHU and a legitimate governmental objective

is reasonable. Such a determination may be properly made on a

motion for summary judgment, at which point the Warden must

come forward and demonstrate the governmental objective in

question.

IV.

Warden Carroll asserts that he is entitled to qualified

immunity on the grounds that even if the facts alleged show a

violation of a constitutional right, that right was not clearly

established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (“The

relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is

clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable

officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he

confronted.”). The District Court dismissed the complaint on the

merits and therefore did not reach the issue of qualified

immunity. It is not necessary for us to resolve this question now.

We leave it to the District Court to consider qualified immunity

on remand.

V.

Under the liberal construction of complaints afforded to

pro se prisoner plaintiffs, we find that the complaint challenges

the reasonable relationship of the appellants’ confinement to a

legitimate government objective and alleges impermissible

punishment of pretrial detainees. The complaint alleges

deprivations suffered by the appellants and compares their living

18

conditions to those of the general prison population. The

appellants asserted that they had sought, but been refused, an

explanation for their placement in the SHU. Accordingly, the

complaint alleges sufficient facts to survive the motion to

dismiss. We will vacate the dismissal of the complaint and

remand the case to the District Court.

19