Opinion

McKee v. Hart

Court
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed
Jan 6, 2006
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 40.3%

plaintiff claimed he was demoted because of his statements regarding his investigation and report about conduct of his co- workers

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  • plaintiff claimed he was demoted because of his statements regarding his investigation and report about conduct of his co- workers

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The opinion

Opinions of the United

2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

1-6-2006

McKee v. Hart

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 04-1442

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 04-1442

DWIGHT L. MCKEE;

ALLEN L. JONES

v.

HENRY HART;

WESLEY RISH;

ALBERT MASLAND;

JAMES SHEEHAN;

DANIEL P. SATTELLE

Daniel P. Sattele,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 02-cv-01910)

District Judge: Honorable Richard Caputo

Argued March 10, 2005

Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, ROTH and

AMBRO, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 6, 2006)

Charles W. Rubendall, II, Esquire (Argued)

Donald M. Lewis, III, Esquire

Keefer, Wood, Allen & Rahal, LLP

210 Walnut Street

P.O. Box 11963

Harrisburg, PA 17108-1963

Counsel for Appellant

Donald A. Bailey, Esquire (Argued)

Bailey Stretton & Ostrowski

4311 North 6 th Street

Harrisburg, PA 17110

Counsel for Appellee

OPINION OF THE COURT

AMBRO, Circuit Judge

Daniel Sattele appeals the District Court’s denial of his

summary judgment motion seeking qualified immunity in a suit

brought by Allen Jones alleging that Sattele, among others, had

2

retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights.

Because Jones did not allege that Sattele deprived him of a

constitutional right—and because even if he had, that right was

not clearly established at the time Sattele engaged in the alleged

conduct—we conclude that Sattele is entitled to qualified

immunity. We therefore reverse the decision of the District

Court and remand for further proceedings.

I. Factual and Procedural History

In May 2002, Jones was hired as a special investigator for

the Pennsylvania Office of Inspector General (“OIG”).1 The

OIG is responsible for investigating allegations of fraud, waste,

misconduct, and abuse in executive agencies of the

Commonwealth. At the time of the events at issue in this case,

Sattele was an Investigations Manager at OIG and was Jones’s

supervisor.

In mid- to late-July 2002, Jones was given a lead role in

the investigation of Steve Fiorello, the chief pharmacist at

Harrisburg State Hospital. There was only one other person

assigned to the investigation. A few weeks after the

investigation began, Jones told Sattele that he was concerned

about problems in the pharmaceutical industry that went beyond

the Fiorello investigation—specifically that he believed the

1

Jones had previously been employed by OIG. He left that

position in 1991.

3

industry was routinely bribing state officials. Jones informed

Sattele that he wanted to broaden the Fiorello investigation to

include the entire pharmaceutical industry. Thereafter, Jones

continued to inform Sattele about his concerns regarding the

industry.

In response, Sattele told Jones to stay focused on the

Fiorello investigation and not to investigate corruption in the

pharmaceutical industry as a whole. Sattele subsequently

removed Jones from his lead role in the Fiorello investigation in

September 2002 2 because Jones had, in Sattele’s words, “lost

focus.” Sattele based this conclusion on the fact that Jones

continued to voice concerns about the entire pharmaceutical

industry even after Sattele had told him to concentrate only on

Fiorello.

In October 2002, Dwight McKee, one of Jones’s

colleagues at OIG, filed a complaint against other OIG

employees, alleging that they had retaliated against him for

exercising his First Amendment rights. In November 2002, an

amended complaint was filed, joining Jones as a plaintiff and

Sattele as a defendant. Jones brought a cause of action under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Sattele and the other defendants had

also retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment

rights. Jones claimed generally that he was retaliated

2

Jones was still assigned to that investigation even though his

role had changed.

4

against—through intimidation and harassment by his

supervisors—for complaining to his supervisors that public

corruption investigations were being obstructed and delayed for

reasons that were not legitimate.

In particular, at his deposition Jones identified three

comments by Sattele that he perceived as harassment in

retaliation for his refusal to stop voicing his concerns about the

pharmaceutical industry.3 First, he testified that Sattele told him

that

Mac [McKee] was torpedoed.

Some of the things that he got

maybe he deserved, but a lot of

them he didn’t. He was torpedoed.

You keep your mouth

shut . . . . Mac has been torpedoed,

keep your mouth shut or the same

thing can happen to you.

In a similar vein, Jones recalled that Sattele told him, in early

October 2002, that if Jones could not adjust to the way OIG

operated, he would have to leave his employment there.

3

Jones also identified a fourth incident that he alleged was

harassment, involving Henry Hart, another defendant. Hart,

however, is not a party to this appeal, and as that incident is not

relevant to our decision, we do not discuss it here.

5

Second, Jones testified that Sattele told him to “quit

being a salmon,” by which he meant that Jones should “quit

swimming against the current with the pharmaceutical case.”

(Sattele testified at his deposition that he told Jones to “go with

the flow” and not “swim against the current” because he was

concerned that Jones was not working with the lawyers in the

office and was not operating within a “team concept.”)

Third, Jones related an incident that occurred in October

2002, after he had been removed as co-leader of the Fiorello

investigation. Jones stated that thereafter he was not allowed to

speak to anyone about the investigation without Sattele’s

permission. He nevertheless went to pick up documents from

Fiorello, the target of the investigation, while Sattele and

another of his supervisors were out of the office. Jones testified

that, when he got back, Sattele met him “first thing,” took him

into a room with another OIG colleague, “and demanded to

know why [he] went . . . without [Sattele’s] permission to pick

up papers.” Jones also stated that Sattele and his colleague

accused Jones of having had an interview with the Director of

the Department of Public Welfare, something Jones denied.

All defendants moved for summary judgment in August

2003, and the District Court granted the motion with respect to

all defendants except Sattele in February 2004. As for Jones’s

claims against Sattele, the District Court determined, based on

the three comments identified by Jones, that (1) “with respect to

Mr. Sattele, Mr. Jones has presented evidence that could lead a

6

reasonable jury to conclude that his requests to investigate the

pharmaceutical industry were a substantial or motivating factor

in the retaliatory harassment or intimidation he may have

suffered” and (2) it could not decide whether Sattele had

qualified immunity absent a factual determination as to whether

Sattele’s conduct constituted retaliatory harassment. In its

decision, the District Court also determined that Jones was not

disciplined in connection with voicing his concerns about the

pharmaceutical industry and that “[a]t no time during his

employment has Mr. Jones’s job classification, pay, or benefits

been reduced or altered.” Sattele now appeals from the denial

of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.

II. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review

The District Court had federal question jurisdiction over

Jones’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the

collateral order doctrine. See Doe v. Groody, 361 F.3d 232, 237

(3d Cir. 2004) (“[A] denial of qualified immunity that turns on

an issue of law—rather than a factual dispute—falls within the

collateral order doctrine that treats certain decisions as ‘final’

within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” (citing, inter alia,

Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996))); Forbes v. Twp. of

Lower Merion, 313 F.3d 144, 147 (3d Cir. 2002) (“When a

defendant moves for summary judgment based on qualified

immunity, the denial of the motion may be appealed

immediately under the collateral-order doctrine because ‘[t]he

7

entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense

to liability[] and . . . is effectively lost if a case is erroneously

permitted to go to trial.’” (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.

511, 526 (1985)) (alterations, emphasis, and omission in

original)).4

We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s

conclusions of law in its qualified immunity analysis. Doe, 361

F.3d at 237. In addition, “we may review whether the set of

facts identified by the district court is sufficient to establish a

violation of a clearly established constitutional right, but we may

not consider whether the district court correctly identified the set

of facts that the summary judgment record is sufficient to

prove.” Forbes, 313 F.3d at 147 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

We note also that at this stage of the litigation we are

looking at the facts as presented by Jones, i.e., Satelle’s

statements were retaliatory, rather than the exercise by Satelle of

appropriate supervisory limits on Jones’s performance of his

assignment.

4

Sattele contends that there is no factual dispute preventing us

from exercising jurisdiction over this appeal, and Jones does not

dispute that position.

8

III. Discussion

Qualified immunity insulates government officials

performing discretionary functions from suit “insofar as ‘their

actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the

rights they are alleged to have violated.” Id. at 148 (quoting

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)). To

determine whether an official has lost his or her qualified

immunity, we must first “decide ‘whether a constitutional right

would have been violated on the facts alleged . . . .’” Doe, 361

F.3d at 237 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001))

(omission in original). If the answer to that question is “yes,”

we must then “consider whether the right was ‘clearly

established.’” Id. at 238 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201)). If

we also answer “yes” to the second question, we must conclude

that the official does not have qualified immunity.

Sattele contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity

because (1) his three statements to Jones about his work on the

Fiorello investigation did not deprive Jones of his First

Amendment rights, and (2) even if Jones did allege a violation

of a constitutional right, that right was not clearly established at

the time Sattele made the comments. We address each argument

in turn.

A. Did Sattelle Violate a Constitutional Right of

Jones?

9

“A public employee has a constitutional right to speak on

matters of public concern without fear of retaliation.” Brennan

v. Norton, 350 F.3d 399, 412 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation

marks omitted). In light of this fundamental principle, we have

held that, in certain circumstances, a public employee may bring

a cause of action alleging that his or her First Amendment rights

were violated by retaliatory harassment for the employee’s

speech about a matter of public concern even if he or she cannot

prove that the alleged retaliation adversely affected the terms of

his or her employment. See Suppan v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228,

234–35 (3d Cir. 2000). In Suppan, we indicated that when the

“plaintiffs’ complaint allege[d] a campaign of retaliatory

harassment culminating in . . . retaliatory rankings [low ratings

on promotion lists],” then a “trier of fact could determine that a

violation of the First Amendment occurred at the time of the

rankings on the promotion lists and that some relief [was]

appropriate even if plaintiffs [could not] prove a causal

connection between the rankings and the failure to promote.”

Id. This holding is premised on the idea that being the victim of

petty harassments in the workplace as a result of speaking on

matters of public concern is in itself retaliation—even if the

employee cannot prove a change in the actual terms of his or her

employment—and thus could be actionable under the First

Amendment. Id. at 235.

In this context, the key question in determining whether

a cognizable First Amendment claim has been stated is whether

“the alleged retaliatory conduct was sufficient to deter a person

10

of ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment

rights . . . .” Id. at 235 (internal quotation marks omitted). The

effect of the alleged conduct on the employee’s freedom of

speech “‘need not be great in order to be actionable,’” but it

must be more than de minimis. Id. (quoting Bart v. Telford, 677

F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.)); see also Brennan,

350 F.3d at 422 n.17 (noting that “incidents of what might

otherwise be trivial ‘harassment’” may be actionable through

their “cumulative impact . . . even though the actions would be

de minimis if considered in isolation”). As stated earlier, the

District Court determined that Jones’s allegation that Sattele

retaliated against him for speaking out about the pharmaceutical

industry met the standards set out in Suppan.

Sattele does not dispute the District Court’s conclusion

that Jones sufficiently alleged that he was speaking out on a

matter of public concern. Sattele does argue, however, that the

District Court’s conclusion (by pointing to the three statements

Sattele made to Jones, the latter alleged a retaliatory harassment

claim under the First Amendment) was incorrect. In particular,

Sattele contends that his three allegedly retaliatory comments

were trivial and insufficient to deter a person of ordinary

firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights. We

agree.

Despite our holding in Suppan that a plaintiff’s allegation

of a “campaign of retaliatory harassment” by a public employer

as a result of the plaintiff’s speech created a cognizable First

11

Amendment claim even without an alleged causal connection to

a change in the plaintiff’s terms of employment, not every

critical comment—or series of comments—made by an

employer to an employee provides a basis for a colorable

allegation that the employee has been deprived of his or her

constitutional rights. See Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202

F.3d 676, 685 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that “not every reaction

made in response to an individual’s exercise of his First

Amendment right to free speech is actionable retaliation”); Bart,

677 F.2d at 625 (holding that plaintiff had alleged an actionable

First Amendment claim when she claimed that “an entire

campaign of harassment[,] which though trivial in detail may

have been substantial in gross,” had been mounted against her,

but cautioning that “[i]t would trivialize the First Amendment to

hold that harassment for exercising the right of free speech was

always actionable no matter how unlikely to deter a person of

ordinary firmness from that exercise”). We have noted that

“‘courts have declined to find that an employer’s actions have

adversely affected an employee’s exercise of his First

Amendment rights where the employer’s alleged retaliatory acts

were criticism, false accusations, or verbal reprimands.’”

Brennan, 350 F.3d at 419 (quoting Suarez, 202 F.3d at 686)

(holding that allegations that a supervisor stopped using the

plaintiff’s job title and did not capitalize the plaintiff’s name as

a result of plaintiff’s speech, even if true, did not rise to the level

of a constitutional violation because they were de minimis). The

comments made by Sattele fall into this category.

12

Sattele’s statements to Jones in the fall of 2002 were all

aimed at getting Jones to focus on the investigation to which he

was assigned —looking into the activities of a particular person

in a particular state agency—instead of focusing on Jones’s own

wide-ranging concerns about the pharmaceutical industry as a

whole, something that OIG was not investigating. There is no

question Sattele’s statements were critical of Jones’s job

performance, and they may be construed as reprimands for

Jones’s continued expressions of concern about potential

corruption in the pharmaceutical industry. However, even

looking at the record in the light most favorable to Jones (as we

must at this stage in the proceedings), we cannot conclude that

Sattele’s comments, taken together, would have deterred a

person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First

Amendment rights.

In Suppan, the plaintiffs allegedly were subjected to

repeated chastisements and threats from their superiors over a

period of more than a year based on their membership in a union

negotiating team, and they alleged that they were given low

ratings on their promotion eligibility evaluations in retaliation

for those activities. 203 F.3d at 230–31. By contrast, Jones was

admonished a few times for straying from the scope of the task

he was assigned. The District Court explicitly found that,

despite Jones’s changed role in the Fiorello investigation, he

suffered no alteration in his employment benefits, pay, or job

classification as a result of speaking out about potential

corruption in the pharmaceutical industry. Based on the set of

13

facts identified by the District Court, Jones’s allegations about

Sattele’s conduct simply do not rise to the level of a retaliatory

harassment claim under the First Amendment.

Because Jones has not alleged the deprivation of a

constitutional right, Sattele is entitled to qualified immunity.

For the sake of completeness however, we now turn to the

second prong of the qualified immunity analysis and determine

whether—assuming that Jones had sufficiently alleged the

violation of a constitutional right—that right was clearly

established at the time of Sattele’s alleged conduct.

B. Assuming Sattele Violated a Constitutional Right

of Jones, Was that Right Clearly Established at

the Time of the Alleged Conduct?

“‘[C]learly established rights’ are those with contours

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand

that what he is doing violates that right.” McLaughlin v.

Watson, 271 F.3d 566, 571 (3d Cir. 2001). Put another way,

“there must be sufficient precedent at the time of the action,

factually similar to the plaintiff’s allegations, to put [the]

defendant on notice that his or her conduct is constitutionally

prohibited.” Id. at 572. The Supreme Court has recently

reiterated this point, stating that “[i]t is important to emphasize

that this [clearly established] inquiry ‘must be undertaken in

light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general

proposition.’” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 125 S. Ct.

14

596, 599 (2004) (per curiam) (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201)

(emphasis added).

Before Sattele allegedly engaged in the conduct at issue

in this case, we held, as discussed at Section III(A), supra, that

a public employee states a First Amendment claim by alleging

that his or her employer engaged in a “campaign of retaliatory

harassment” in response to the employee’s speech on a matter of

public concern, even if the employee could not prove a causal

connection between the retaliation and an adverse employment

action. Suppan, 203 F.3d at 234–35. We then reiterated, in

Baldassare v. New Jersey, 250 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2001), that “[a]

public employee has a constitutional right to speak on matters of

public concern without fear of retaliation.” Id. at 194 (citing,

inter alia, Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383–84 (1987)).

Jones contends that Suppan and Baldassare, taken together,

were sufficient precedent to put Sattele on notice that his

conduct—making harassing comments to Jones arising out of

Jones’s voicing of concerns about corruption in the

pharmaceutical industry—was constitutionally prohibited.

In Suppan, however, we gave little guidance as to what

the threshold of actionability is in retaliatory harassment cases.

Instead, we merely held that such a claim existed. Suppan, 203

F.3d at 235. Moreover, the alleged conduct in Suppan spanned

more than a year and involved the supposed lowering of ratings

on employees’ promotion evaluations and the admonishment of

employees because of their union activities and support for a

15

particular mayoral candidate. Id. at 230–31. Based only on our

acknowledgment of a retaliatory harassment cause of action in

Suppan and the facts of that case, a reasonable official in

Sattele’s position would not have been aware that making a few

comments over the course of a few months (the gist of which

was asking an employee to focus on his job) might have run

afoul of the First Amendment.

Baldassare also does not further Jones’s argument that

his First Amendment right to be free from retaliatory harassment

was clearly established at the time of Sattele’s alleged conduct.

That case involved a straightforward retaliation claim brought

under the First Amendment in which the plaintiff alleged a

direct causal connection between his speech on a matter of

public concern and his demotion, see Baldassare, 250 F.3d at

194 (plaintiff claimed he was demoted because of his statements

regarding his investigation and report about conduct of his co-

workers), not that he was subject to a campaign of retaliatory

harassment such as the one involved in Suppan and alleged by

Jones in this case. Thus, Baldassare would not have helped

Sattele understand that his conduct might be constitutionally

prohibited.5

5

Moreover, we note that even if Baldassare were relevant to

determining whether Jones’s right to be free from retaliatory

harassment was clearly established at the time of Sattele’s

alleged conduct, that case would not necessarily put a reasonable

official in Sattele’s position on notice that making comments

16

such as Sattele’s would violate the First Amendment. Under the

traditional retaliation analysis articulated in Baldassare, the

second inquiry, after the plaintiff has established that he or she

was engaging in activity protected by the First Amendment, is

whether the plaintiff’s “interest in the speech outweighs the

state’s countervailing interest as an employer in promoting the

efficiency of the public services it provides through its

employees.” 250 F.3d at 195. We have stated that, in

determining the interest of the employer for purposes of this

balancing test, “we must consider ‘whether the [expression]

impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers,

has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for

which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes

the performance of the speaker’s duties or interferes with the

regular operation of the enterprise.’” Id. at 198 (quoting Rankin,

483 U.S. at 388) (alteration in original). The District Court

determined in this case that there was no evidence that OIG’s

interest in conducting an efficient investigation was impaired by

Jones’s speech. However, given our precedent on this issue, a

reasonable official in Sattele’s position could have understood

his actions toward Jones as being justified because the need to

maintain efficient working relationships and to improve Jones’s

performance of his duties on the Fiorello investigation

outweighed his interest in speaking generally about potential

corruption in the pharmaceutical industry, a matter outside the

scope of the investigation OIG was conducting. Cf. Sprague v.

Fitzpatrick, 546 F.2d 560, 565 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that, even

though speech leading to public employee’s discharge

“concerned matters of grave public import,” the balance

17

We did touch on the retaliatory harassment theory again

in our Brennan decision, noting once more that “a plaintiff may

be able to establish liability under § 1983 based upon a

continuing course of conduct even though some or all of the

conduct complained of would be de minimis by itself or if

viewed in isolation.” 350 F.3d at 419 n.16. Brennan provided

some additional guidance about what types of conduct would

support such a claim, holding that some of the plaintiff’s

allegations (that he had been taken off the payroll for some time

and given various suspensions as a result of his speech) would

support a retaliation claim, whereas other of his allegations

(including his claim that his supervisor stopped using his title to

address him) would not because of their triviality. Id. at 419.

However, Brennan was not decided until 2003, after Sattele’s

alleged conduct, which occurred in the fall of 2002, had already

taken place. Thus, to the extent that Brennan added some

specificity to the contours of the retaliatory harassment cause of

action, an employee’s First Amendment right to be free from

such harassment was still not clearly established at the time of

Sattele’s conduct. See Brosseau, 125 S. Ct. at 600 n.4 (noting

that the parties had pointed the Court to “a number of

. . . cases . . . that postdate the conduct in question” and that

weighed against finding that speech protected by the First

Amendment when it had “completely undermined” the

effectiveness of the employer-employee relationship).

18

“[t]hese decisions, of course, could not have given fair notice to

[the official] and are of no use in the clearly established

inquiry”).

Moreover, as discussed at Section III(A), supra, we also

stated in Brennan that courts have not found violations of

employees’ First Amendment rights “where the employer’s

alleged retaliatory acts were criticism, false accusations, or

verbal reprimands.” 350 F.3d at 419 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Brennan therefore lends support to Sattele’s argument

that his critical comments to Jones did not violate Jones’s First

Amendment rights.

Accordingly, because of the dearth of precedent of

sufficient specificity (and factual similarity to this case)

regarding a public employee’s First Amendment right to be free

from retaliatory harassment by his or her employer at the time of

Sattele’s conduct, we cannot say that the constitutional right

Jones alleged Sattele violated was clearly established. Sattele is

therefore entitled to qualified immunity under the second, as

well as the first, prong of our Saucier analysis.

IV. Conclusion

The three comments made by Sattele in response to

Jones’s voicing of his concerns about potential corruption in the

pharmaceutical industry, although critical of Jones’s speech,

were all intimately related to Jones’s job performance and would

19

not have deterred a person of ordinary firmness from exercising

his or her First Amendment rights. As the District Court found,

the comments were also unaccompanied by any change in

Jones’s employment benefits or wages. We cannot conclude,

based on this factual situation, that Jones alleged a deprivation

of a constitutional right.

Moreover, even if there had been such a deprivation,

Jones’s constitutional right to be free from a campaign of

retaliatory harassment was not clearly established at the time of

Sattele’s alleged conduct. Suppan (and Baldassare to the extent

it is applicable), although they were decided before the events

at issue in this case, did not define the bounds of a retaliatory

harassment cause of action with sufficient specificity, nor were

their facts sufficiently similar to those alleged here, such that

Sattele would have been on notice that his conduct was

constitutionally prohibited.

Accordingly, Sattele is entitled to qualified immunity,

and we reverse the contrary decision of the District Court and

remand for further proceedings.

20

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