P. N. v. Clementon Bd of Ed

Opinions of the United

2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

4-5-2006

P. N. v. Clementon Bd of Ed

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 04-4705

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006

Recommended Citation

"P. N. v. Clementon Bd of Ed" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 1192.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/1192

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2006 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 04-4705

P. N., an infant, individually and by

his parent and legal guardian; M. W.,

Appellants

v.

CLEMENTON BOARD OF EDUCATION

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. No. 02-cv-01351)

District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson

Argued December 12, 2005

Before: SLOVITER, SMITH, and STAPLETON,

Circuit Judges.

(Filed: April 5, 2006)

Jamie Epstein (Argued)

Cherry Hill, N.J. 08002

Attorney for Appellant

James F. Schwerin (Argued)

Parker, McCay & Criscuolo

Lawrenceville, N.J. 08648

Attorney for Appellee

OPINION OF THE COURT

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.

Section 615(i)(3)(B) of the Individuals with Disability

Education Act (“IDEA”) provides: “In any action or proceeding

brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award

reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs to the parents of a

child with a disability who is the prevailing party.” 20 U.S.C. §

1415(i)(3)(B). Plaintiffs-Appellants P.N. and his guardian M.W.

(collectively “plaintiffs”) appeal from the District Court’s Order

denying their motion for prevailing party attorneys’ fees and

granting summary judgment to defendant Clementon Board of

Education.

I.

P.N. was born in 1988 and suffers from Attention Deficit

Hyperactivity Disorder. During the 2000-01 school year, the

Clementon Board of Education (“CBE”) expelled P.N. after he

sent a note threatening to blow up his school. P.N. was home-

schooled for the rest of the year, but was permitted to return to

school for the 2001-02 year. P.N. did not repeat that threat but

CBE again suspended him during the 2001-02 school year for

disruptive behavior. The parties dispute the specific conduct

that resulted in this suspension.

Plaintiffs filed a petition for a due process hearing on

October 25, 2001.1 The petition sought the following relief: that

1

It is unclear whether CBE ever filed a cross-petition for a

due process hearing. CBE claims to have filed such a petition,

Appellee’s Br. at 2, but at oral argument, counsel for plaintiffs

stated that the school did not file a cross-petition for a due process

hearing and counsel for CBE did not contest this statement. The

only petition for due process present in the record is P.N.’s. The

November 1 consent decree refers only to the “petition for

2

P.N. be returned to school, that P.N. be reimbursed for the cost

of all psychological services received by P.N. since being

required to receive such services by CBE,2 that a § 504 plan

under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 be prepared by CBE,3 and

that P.N. be evaluated by an independent child study team.

The parties settled the underlying dispute before a due

process hearing took place, and the Administrative Law Judge

(ALJ) entered two consent orders. The first one, dated

November 1, 2001, ordered:

1. On 11/5/01, C.S.D.4 shall return P.N. to his current

placement that was in place prior to his removal on

10/16/01.

emergent relief filed on 10/25/01 with the Office of Special

Education of the New Jersey Department of Education by Jamie

Epstein, Esquire for petitioner, with Frank Cavallo, Esquire, for

respondent, having consented to the following relief.” App. at 25.

2

CBE required that P.N. see a psychologist after his first

expulsion from school.

3

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is codified

at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) and provides:

No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the

United States, as defined in section 705(20) of this title,

shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded

from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be

subjected to discrimination under any program or activity

receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program

or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the

United States Postal Service.

4

“C.S.D.” refers to Clementon School District.

3

2. On 11/5/01, C.S.D. shall provide P.N. with appropriate

accommodation in regards [to] any behaviors which may

interfere with P.N.’s ability to receive an education. Dr.

Paul Booker may provide assistance in the development

of said accommodation.5 If such assistance is provided,

on the return date, this forum shall determine if C.S.D.

should reimburse petitioners for Dr. Booker’s fees.

3. P.N. is to receive an Independent Child Study Team

Evaluation in accordance with the procedures outlined in

N.J.A.C. 1:6A-14.3. at C.S.D’s expense. The Social

Work evaluation shall be performed by C.S.D. The

psychiatric evaluation shall be performed by Dr.

Raymond H. Schweibert, M.D. If counsel cannot agree

on who will do the learning and school psychology

evaluations by 11/7/01, each shall submit three names for

each evaluation to this forum with the right to object to

one of the three proposed evaluators for each evaluation. .

..

4. C.S.D. shall provide petitioners transportation to and

from all evaluations.

5. This matter shall reconvene on 12/5/01 before the

undersigned A.L.J.

6. This decision is final pursuant to 20 U.S.C.A. §

1415(i)(1)(A) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.510 (1999). If either

party feels that this decision is not being fully

implemented, this concern should be communicated in

writing to the Director, Office of Special Education

Programs.

App. at 25-26 (emphasis in original).

The second Consent Order, dated February 13, 2002,

5

Dr. Booker is a private mental health professional seen by

P.N.

4

stated that the parties “agreed to a resolution of all remaining

issues” and ordered:

1. Respondent [C.S.D.] will pay the parents in the

amount of $425.00 in satisfaction of petitioners’ claims

for reimbursement for the costs of psychological

treatment and psychiatric services to date, said payment to

be made no later than March 25, 2002.

2. Respondents will pay the reasonable costs of

attendance at the IEP [Individualized Education Program]

meeting of psychologist Paul Booker, . . . said meeting to

be scheduled on a date as soon as possible, convenient to

all participants, including Dr. Booker, said payment to be

made no later than 30 days after said meeting.

3. The remaining claims raised in the petition of appeal

and subsequent amendments, including petitioners’

allegations that the respondent violated their rights to

timely receipt of student records, are dismissed.

4. The issue of counsel fees is reserved for decision by a

court of competent jurisdiction or for amicable resolution

between the parties.

5. This decision is final pursuant to 20 U.S.C.A. §

1415(i)(1)(A) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.10(1999).

App. at 27-28.

On March 26, 2002, plaintiffs filed a complaint in the

United States District Court for the District of New Jersey

setting forth the background and the history of the consent orders

and seeking prevailing party attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to

the IDEA. CBE responded, inter alia, that plaintiffs are not

prevailing parties under the provisions of the IDEA. In July

2002, P.N. and his parents filed a motion to enforce that part of

the ALJ Order of February 13, 2002, requiring CBE to pay P.N.

$425.00, as well as for statutory interest, attorneys’ fees, and

costs incurred in enforcing the Order. On October 31, 2002, the

5

District Court issued an opinion denying plaintiffs’ motion for

$425.00 and costs. The case was then reassigned to another

District Judge on March 13, 2003 and marked closed by the

clerk of the court. On June 15, 2004 the District Court granted

plaintiffs’ motion to reopen. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs filed

their motion for prevailing party attorneys’ fees. CBE filed a

cross-motion for summary judgment.

The District Court granted CBE’s motion for summary

judgment and denied plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees,

holding that although the consent orders entered in favor of

plaintiffs did not “preclude Plaintiff from being a prevailing

party,” App. at 10, plaintiffs’ success was de minimis and they

were therefore not entitled to attorneys’ fees. The District Court

stated that obtaining an IEP, an order for reimbursement of

psychological services in the amount of $425.00, reinstatement

in school, and an evaluation by an independent child study team

did not constitute a “substantial victory.” App. at 13. In

addition, the District Court stated that “Plaintiffs did not prevail

beyond the basic requirements of the IDEA and N.J.A.C. 1:6A-

14.4, and cannot be considered a prevailing party because of

their failure to achieve any relief on the merits of their claim that

materially altered their legal relationship with CBE. Thus, an

award of attorney[s’] fees is inappropriate.” App. at 13-14.

Plaintiffs appeal from the District Court’s order granting

summary judgment to CBE. Plaintiffs contend that the consent

orders entered by the ALJ rendered them the prevailing party and

that their success was significant. In response, CBE contends

that pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckhannon

Bd. v. West Virginia D.H.H.R., 532 U.S. 598 (2001), attorneys’

fees cannot be granted for settlements entered into in the course

of administrative proceedings. CBE further contends that even

if attorneys’ fees can be recovered for consent orders entered

into pursuant to administrative proceedings, the District Court

correctly found that plaintiffs had only de minimis success in

this case.

II.

6

This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the

same standard as did the district court. Antonelli v. New Jersey,

419 F.3d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 2005). In reviewing the grant of

summary judgment, we must view the underlying facts and all

reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to

the party opposing the motion. In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig.,

385 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is

appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.

This court reviews the District Court’s denial of

attorneys’ fees for abuse of discretion. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 559 (1988); Morgan v. Perry, 142 F.3d 670,

682-83 (3d Cir.1988). An abuse of discretion occurs when a

district court’s decision “rests upon a clearly erroneous finding

of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of

law to fact.” Hanover Potato Products, Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d

123, 127 (3d Cir. 1993) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

However, if the District Court denied the fees based on its

conclusions on questions of law, our review is plenary.

Washington v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 959, 962 (3d Cir.1986).

III.

A. The Buckhannon Standard

Under the “American Rule,” parties are typically

responsible for their own attorneys’ fees. See Alyeska Pipeline

Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). As

noted above, however, the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1440, et seq.,

contains a specific provision authorizing an order for such fees

as “part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability

who is the prevailing party.” J.O. ex rel. C.O. v. Orange Tp. Bd.

of Educ., 287 F.3d 267, 271 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing 20 U.S.C. §

1415(i)(3)(B)).

In Buckhannon Bd. v. West Virginia D.H.H.R, the

Supreme Court clarified its interpretation of the term “prevailing

7

party.” 532 U.S. at 605. The Court held that in order to be a

“prevailing party,” a party must be “successful” in the sense that

it has been awarded some relief by a court. Id. at 603. The

Court noted that this concept of “success,” however, is not

inconsistent with a defendant’s voluntary compliance. The Court

acknowledged that a party benefitting from a settlement

agreement, for example, could be a “prevailing party,” provided

the “change in the legal relationship of the parties” was in some

way “judicially sanctioned.” Id. at 605; see also John T. ex rel.

Paul T. v. Delaware County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545,

556 (3d Cir. 2003).

This court has held that Buckhannon applies to the fee-

shifting provision of the IDEA. See John T., 318 F.3d at 556

(holding that “Buckhannon applies to attorney[s’] fee claims

brought under the IDEA fee-shifting provision”). In interpreting

Buckhannon, we have stated that “a stipulated settlement could

confer prevailing party status under certain circumstances,” John

T., 318 F.3d at 558 (emphasis in original); namely, where it

alters the legal relationship of the parties and is judicially

sanctioned. A stipulated settlement is judicially sanctioned

where it: 1) contains mandatory language; 2) is entitled “Order,”

3) bears the signature of the District Court judge, not the parties’

counsel; and 4) provides for judicial enforcement. Id. (citing

Truesdell v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 290 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2002));

see also Preservation Coalition v. Federal Transit Admin., 356

F.3d 444, 452 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that Buckhannon does not

limit fee awards to enforceable judgments on the merits and

consent decrees); Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990, 993

(8th Cir. 2003) (holding that a court-approved settlement was not

enforceable by the court absent a new action for breach of

contract and therefore plaintiffs were not prevailing parties).

The District Court found that the consent decrees at issue

here met the requirements set forth in John T. and Truesdell.

The District Court noted that the Consent Order entered on

February 12 “(1) contain[ed] mandatory language stating that

[CBE] ‘will’ do certain things, (2) was entitled ‘Consent Order,’

(3) bore the signature of the ALJ, and (4) is enforceable under §

1983 and in state court.” App. at 10.

8

CBE contends that to constitute a decree under

Buckhannon, a court must retain jurisdiction to enforce the

settlement and have the power to issue a citation for contempt

for non-compliance. It argues that because the ALJ here did not

and could not6 retain jurisdiction to enforce its consent orders in

accordance with Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of

America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994), these orders lacked the judicial

imprimatur required by Buckhannon to confer prevailing party

status.

The Supreme Court had previously considered whether a

court maintains jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement

when it does no more than “so order” a stipulation and order of

dismissal that dismisses the complaint after settlement without

reference to the settlement agreement. Id. The Court held that

there was no jurisdiction, but noted that

[t]he situation would be quite different if the parties’ obligation

to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement had been

made part of the order of dismissal. . . . In that event, a breach

of the agreement would be a violation of the order and . . .

jurisdiction to enforce the agreement would therefore exist.

Id. at 38. Kokkonen suggests settlement of an administrative

proceeding is the equivalent of an administrative decree on the

merits where, as here, the parties’ obligation to comply with the

terms of the settlement agreement has been made part of the

order of dismissal. See A.R. ex rel. R.V. v. New York City

Dept. of Educ., 407 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2005).

6

See, e.g. Bellesfield v. Bd. of Educ. of Randolph, 96

N.J.A.R. (EDU) 35 (N.J. Adm. 1995) (“Administrative Agencies

only have those powers specifically granted either expressly or by

implication. An Administrative Officer is a creation of Legislation

who must act only within the bounds of the authority delegated to

him. . . . [and] does not have the power and is not the appropriate

forum . . . for enforcement.”)(citations and quotation marks

omitted).

9

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has

convincingly addressed and rejected an argument similar to the

one that CBE makes here. In A.R., the parents of disabled

children instituted four separate New York State administrative

proceedings challenging, under the IDEA, the special

educational programs that the New York City Department of

Education had provided for disabled children. In two of the four

proceedings, impartial hearing officers entered decisions for the

plaintiffs on the merits. In the two others, impartial hearing

officers issued “Statements of Agreement and Order” that

recorded the terms of settlement agreements between the parties.

The plaintiffs then sought attorneys’ fees. The Court of Appeals

held that IDEA administrative decisions may, in certain

circumstances, confer prevailing party status. It noted that

although an administrative decision on the merits in an IDEA

case does not have judicial imprimatur, it has administrative

imprimatur:

Its terms are enforceable, if not by the IHO itself,7 then by

a court, including through an action under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. . . . [W]e conclude that the combination of

administrative imprimatur, the change in the legal

relationship of the parties arising from it, and subsequent

judicial enforceability, render such a winning party a

‘prevailing party’ under Buckhannon’s principles.

A.R., 407 F.3d at 76 (emphasis in original).

The Second Circuit specifically rejected the argument

made by the Board of Education there, similar to that made by

CBE here, that plaintiffs “cannot be ‘prevailing parties’ because

the IHOs conducting their hearings lacked jurisdiction to enforce

the terms of the settlement agreements . . . . Under our analysis,

the fact that the IHOs, as is common in administrative

procedures, have no enforcement mechanism . . . is irrelevant, at

least so long as judicial enforcement is available.” We are

7

IHOs are Impartial Hearing Officers who are appointed by

the local board of education.

10

persuaded by the analysis in A.R.

CBE argues that because N.J. Admin. Code § 1:1-19.1

(2006) mandates review of settlements by an ALJ, the ALJ’s

signature here does not provide the required judicial imprimatur;

it simply attests to the fact that the Orders were not contrary to

law. CBE cites to Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990 (8th

Cir.2003), in support of this proposition. In Christina A., the

plaintiffs, inmates at a training school who had challenged the

education being provided, obtained a hearing and approval of a

settlement pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), which requires that

“[t]he court must approve any settlement . . . of a certified class.”

The Eighth Circuit held that they were not prevailing parties for

purposes of fees because this type of agreement is not

enforceable by a court absent a separate breach of contract

action, and therefore, does not bear the necessary judicial

imprimatur.

As is clear from A.R., a settlement of administrative

proceedings that is judicially enforceable meets the Buckhannon

requirements. Because the consent orders entered here were

enforceable through an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 and

under state law, these consent orders, unlike those in Christina

A., satisfy Buckhannon.

B. Prevailing Party Status

We turn to the basis on which the District Court denied

plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees: its conclusion that

plaintiffs “cannot be considered [ ] prevailing part[ies] because

of their failure to achieve any relief on the merits of their claim

that materially altered their legal relationship with CBE.” App.

at 13. The Supreme Court has rendered a number of decisions

on this issue. In Farrar v. Hobby, the Court held that “a plaintiff

‘prevails’ when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially

alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the

defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the

plaintiff.” 506 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1992) “[P]laintiffs may be

considered ‘prevailing parties’ for attorney[s’] fees purposes if

they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves

11

some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” Hensley

v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (emphasis added)

(quotation marks and citation omitted). Thereafter, the Court

stated that, to succeed, “at a minimum, . . . the plaintiff must be

able to point to a resolution of the dispute which changes the

legal relationship between itself and the defendant.” Texas State

Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792

(1989).

We summarized our review of the applicable legal

principles in Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E.,

where we held that a resolution “materially alters the legal

relationship between the parties” when it “modif[ies] the

defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the

plaintiff.” 172 F.3d 238, 251 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations and

quotation marks omitted).

The Supreme Court noted that certain victories may be

“technical or de minimis” but characterized its approach as

adopting a “generous formulation” of “prevailing party” status.

See Texas State Teachers, 489 U.S. at 792; J.O., 287 F.3d at 271.

In a later case, the Court clarified the distinction that exists

between the issue of plaintiff’s eligibility for an attorney’s fee

award and the amount of the attorney’s fee that should be

awarded.

In Farrar, the Court first explained the meaning of

“technical” victory by providing the following example:

In [Texas State Teachers], the District Court declared

unconstitutionally vague a regulation requiring that

“nonschool hour meetings be conducted only with prior

approval from the local school principal.” . . . [T]his

finding alone would not sustain prevailing party status if

there were “‘no evidence that the plaintiffs were ever

refused permission to use school premises during

non-school hours.’” . . . Despite winning a declaratory

judgment, the plaintiffs could not alter the defendant

school board’s behavior toward them for their benefit.

12

Farrar, 506 U.S. at 113. The Court then stated:

Now that we are confronted with the question

whether a nominal damages award is the sort of

“technical,” “insignificant” victory that cannot

confer prevailing party status, we hold that the

prevailing party inquiry does not turn on the

magnitude of the relief obtained. We recognized

as much in Garland when we noted that “the

degree of the plaintiff’s success” does not affect

“eligibility for a fee award.”

Although the “technical” nature of a

nominal damages or any other judgment does not

affect the prevailing party inquiry, it does bear on

the propriety of fees awarded under § 1988.

Farrar, 506 U.S. at 113-14 (emphasis in original; citations

omitted).

The District Court’s finding that plaintiffs’ success was

not “substantial” is largely irrelevant to a determination of

whether or not they were prevailing parties. “‘[T]he degree of

the plaintiff’s overall success goes to the reasonableness of the

award under Hensley, not to the availability of a fee award vel

non.’” Truesdell, 290 F.3d at 166 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Texas

State Teachers, 489 U.S. at 782). The relevant inquiry is

whether plaintiffs’ success was significant. Regardless of how

substantial their success, if plaintiffs succeeded on a significant

issue they are entitled to prevailing party status.

Plaintiffs here received all that they sought. Specifically,

they sought that P.N. be returned to school immediately, that

CBE reimburse them for the cost of all psychological services

received by P.N., that CBE hold a meeting to develop a section

504 accommodation plan for P.N., that CBE pay for P.N.’s

psychologist to participate in said meeting, and that the child

study team evaluation requested by the school be performed by

an independent child study team.

13

Plaintiffs obtained orders from the ALJ requiring that

each of these demands be met. The Orders benefitted P.N. and

forced CBE to change its behavior, thus altering their legal

relationship. As such, the Orders meet the standards enunciated

by the Supreme Court.

The District Court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs’ failure

to “prevail beyond the basic requirements of the IDEA,” App. at

13, and achieve substantial relief precluded them from prevailing

party status is perplexing. The purpose of the fee provision in

IDEA is to enable parents or guardians of disabled children for

whom the statute was enacted to effectuate the rights provided

by the statute. To suggest, as CBE does, that plaintiffs must

establish a new right or expand the requirements of the IDEA in

order to obtain attorneys’ fees is to ignore the Supreme Court’s

“generous formulation” of the term “prevailing party.” Texas

State Teachers, 489 U.S. at 792. As required by the Supreme

Court’s interpretation of “prevailing party,” discussed supra, the

Orders altered the legal relationship between the parties by

compelling the school to reinstate P.N. and by forcing CBE to

act in accordance with the IDEA.

CBE contends that the relief obtained in this case is

identical to the relief obtained in J.O., 287 F.3d at 267, where

the plaintiff was denied attorneys’ fees. The cases are

distinguishable. In J.O., this court held that a party cannot be a

prevailing party if it receives interim relief that is not merit-

based. The plaintiff in J.O. filed suit for attorneys’ fees after an

ALJ granted her request that her child, C.O., be reinstated in the

public high school. The ALJ’s order to reinstate C.O. in school

“[was] effective only until an appropriate placement could be

found for C.O. or until a ‘further Order of an [ALJ], or until the

issuance of a final decision in this matter.’” J.O., 287 F.3d at

274. This court characterized the reinstatement as a “stay-put”

order to maintain the status quo that would have no effect on

C.O.’s further educational placement, rather than a determination

of the merits of the case. Thus, the order did not render the

plaintiffs the prevailing party.

CBE argues that, like C.O., P.N. was returned to his

14

previous placement in high school. This argument is unavailing,

however, because, unlike the order in J.O., there is no indication

that the Orders at issue here are temporary stay-put orders. The

Orders do not state that P.N.’s reinstatement is pending a further

hearing or proceeding, or that the reinstatement will end on any

particular date. Rather, the Orders unconditionally require his

reinstatement in school. Moreover, plaintiffs were successful on

other fronts. As noted above, they received, inter alia,

reimbursement for psychological services and an evaluation by

an independent child study team rather than the CBE’s child

study team, as CBE wanted.

CBE also contends that insofar as P.N. obtained an IEP,

this was only a de minimis victory. CBE cites to John T., 318

F.3d at 545, for the proposition that obtaining an IEP does not

give a plaintiff prevailing party status. Once again, the cases are

not comparable. In John T., we held that plaintiffs who had

obtained an acceptable IEP were not entitled to prevailing party

status only because the IEP was achieved through private

negotiation. We stated, “Although John T. undoubtedly realized

an objective of his litigation upon obtaining an acceptable IEP

which placed him in public schools, this result was not

‘judicially sanctioned’ as required by Buckhannon. John T. and

[the defendant] developed the IEP through negotiations out of

court.” Id. at 560. We did not hold, as CBE contends, that

securing an IEP is insufficient to obtain prevailing party status.

Our analysis focused only on the fact that the IEP was achieved

through “negotiations out of court.” 318 F.3d at 560.8

8

The District Court’s conclusion that the ALJ’s order

requiring reimbursement of P.N. for $425 in psychologist’s fees

was a de minimis recovery that could not make P.N. a “prevailing

party” is particularly troubling for two reasons. First, as we have

pointed out, there is no de minimis exception to the rule that a

plaintiff “prevails” whenever “relief on the merits of his claim

materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by

modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that benefits the

plaintiff.” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111-12. See p. __, infra. In Farrar,

for example, the Supreme Court found a plaintiff who received $1

15

Because plaintiffs are prevailing parties who have

achieved success on significant issues, we will reverse the

District Court’s Order granting summary judgment to CBO, and

remand this case to that court with instructions to award

reasonable attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs.

in nominal damages to be a prevailing party. Second, even when

considered for the purpose of determining the amount of attorneys’

fees to be awarded, an award of $425 in the context of the IDEA

can hardly be regarded as de minimis. As Amici point out, IDEA

claims often involve low income families raising handicapped or

otherwise troubled children receiving some kind of public

assistance. See Br. Amici Curiae of Nonprofit Educational

Organizations at 19. Indeed, we believe the IDEA’s fee shifting

provision is specifically designed to protect those families for

whom $425 is not a de minimis amount of money.

16