Williams v. Bitner

Opinions of the United

2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-25-2006

Williams v. Bitner

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 05-1930

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 05-1930

HENRY WILLIAMS,

Appellee,

v.

ROBERT S. BITNER; JAY STIDD; ROBERT W. MEYERS;

TERRY L. WHITMAN; ROBIN L. KERSTETTER;

GREGORY P. GAERTNER; FRANKLIN J. TENNIS;

GEORGE SNEDEKER; GARY EMEL; SCOTT WYLAND,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Intervernor in District

Court)

Robert S. Bitner; Jay Stidd; Robert W. Meyers;

Terry L. Whitman; Robin L. Kerstetter; G.P. Gaertner;

F. J. Tennis; George Snedeker; Gary Emel; Scott Wayland,

Appellants.

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 01-cv-02271)

District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner

Argued February 28, 2006

Before: SLOVITER and FUENTES, Circuit Judges, and

BRODY,* District Judge.

(Filed July 25, 2006)

Barbara Adams, General Counsel

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Michael A. Farnan, Chief Counsel

Raymond W. Dorian, Assistant Counsel (Argued)

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

55 Utley Drive

P.O. Box 598

Camp Hill, PA 17011

Counsel for Appellants

Michael Cooke (Argued)

Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project

924 Cherry Street

Philadelphia, PA 19107

Counsel for Appellee

_______________________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_______________________

FUENTES, Circuit Judge.

Henry Williams, a Muslim inmate assigned to work as a

cook in his prison’s kitchen, was ordered to help prepare a meal

that included pork. Williams refused, explaining that his religious

beliefs prohibited him from handling pork. As a result, Williams

was fired from his kitchen job, cited for misconduct, and punished

accordingly. Williams brought this action against numerous prison

officials, alleging violations of his rights under the First and

Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and

*

Honorable Anita B. Brody, United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

2

Institutionalized Persons Act. The District Court dismissed

Williams’s Fourteenth Amendment claim but refused to grant

qualified immunity to the prison officials with respect to the

remaining claims. We are asked to determine whether, for the

purposes of qualified immunity, the conduct alleged by Williams

constituted a violation of his “clearly established” rights. For the

reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of

qualified immunity with respect to Williams’s First Amendment

claim.

I. Background

Appellee Henry Williams (“Williams”) is an inmate at the

State Correctional Institution at Rockview (“SCI-Rockview”), a

Pennsylvania corrections institution. Appellants (collectively, the

“Prison Officials”) are employees and officials of the Pennsylvania

Department of Corrections (“DOC”), the majority of whom are or

were employed at SCI-Rockview.

A. Factual Background 1

Williams is a Muslim who believes that the Koran directs

Muslims not to consume pork and to refrain from aiding others to

consume pork in any circumstances. See The Koran, Part II,

70:173 n.210 (“He has forbidden you . . . the flesh of swine.”).

Williams further states that Islamic scholars endorse Chapter

Eleven of Leviticus in the Old Testament, which prohibits

adherents from handling swine. Williams has acted in accordance

with this interpretation of his religion throughout his incarceration,

and the Prison Officials do not challenge the sincerity of his

religious beliefs.

The DOC requires able-bodied inmates to work when

assigned to a job. SCI-Rockview officials assigned Williams to

1

Because we are reviewing a claim of qualified immunity,

we view the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the

party claiming injury. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

(2001).

3

work as a cook in the prison kitchen, despite the fact that he neither

applied for nor wanted that job. Upon receiving his work

assignment, Williams expressed his concerns over possible contact

with pork to the “head” inmate-cooks, who coordinated other

inmates’ daily responsibilities in the kitchen. Williams notified

them that, as a practicing Muslim, he could not handle pork or

assist in its preparation. They agreed to accommodate his concerns

by transferring him to another assignment when pork was served

for lunch. It is unclear from the record whether this

accommodation was recognized by prison officials.

On Saturday, March 3, 2001, Williams began his shift as

usual. He worked as a cook preparing hot cakes in the morning

and later switched to another job in the kitchen when it was time to

prepare roast pork for lunch. While lunch preparations were

underway, defendant Scott Wyland (“Wyland”), one of SCI-

Rockview’s food service instructors, noticed that there was a

shortage of available inmate-cooks. Although the lunch

preparations would likely be finished in time for meal service,

Wyland directed Williams to resume his position as cook and to

help divide that day’s pork rations.

Williams refused to follow Wyland’s direction, citing his

religious beliefs. Wyland reported Williams’s refusal to defendant

Gary Emel (“Emel”), the food service supervisor. Emel then

approached Williams and ordered him to help ration the pork.

Wyland indicated that Williams could wear gloves, an

accommodation that other Muslim inmates had previously found

acceptable. Williams again refused, stating that he would still be

violating his faith by assisting others to consume pork. Emel fired

Williams from his kitchen job and instructed Wyland to issue

Williams a misconduct citation for failing to follow a direct order.

Pursuant to SCI-Rockview policy, Wyland notified defendant

George Snedeker (“Snedeker”), a prison captain, of the incident

and Snedeker approved the misconduct citation.

On March 6, 2001, defendant Jay Stidd (“Stidd”), a

corrections hearing examiner, conducted a disciplinary hearing.

Prior to the hearing, Williams had submitted a written defense, in

which he cited federal case law suggesting that prison officials

4

cannot force Muslim prison inmates to assist in the preparation of

pork and requested that one of the prison’s Muslim chaplains be

called as a witness. Stidd declined Williams’s request and found

him guilty of refusing to obey an order. As a sanction, Williams

was placed on “cell restriction,” meaning that, for a period of thirty

days, he could leave his cell only for daily meals and to attend

weekly Muslim religious services.

Williams appealed Stidd’s decision to SCI-Rockview’s

“Program Review Committee,” which included as members

defendants Robert L. Kerstetter, Gregory P. Gaertner, and Franklin

J. Tennis. The Committee affirmed Stidd’s determination in a

decision drafted by defendant Terry L. Whitman, deputy

superintendent of SCI-Rockview. The decision noted that the

Committee had contacted a member of SCI-Rockview’s chaplaincy

who indicated that Islamic teachings can be interpreted to allow

adherents to touch pork while wearing gloves.2 Williams

unsuccessfully appealed the Committee’s decision to defendants

Robert W. Myers, superintendent of SCI-Rockview, and Robert S.

Bitner, the chief hearing examiner.

Williams suffered a number of consequences as a result of

the misconduct citation. He served twenty-seven days of the thirty-

day cell restriction sentence, during which time he missed all but

one religious observance per week, as well as the annual Islamic

festival of Eid at the end of Ramadan. Although Williams had

access to his religious books as well as books from the prison law

library, he was forced to miss his Arabic Studies classes, which

prevented him from obtaining his certification in that subject. At

the conclusion of his cell restriction, Williams was reassigned to

serve as a janitor in the kitchen, a position that, at 19 cents per

hour, provided half the compensation of his previous job as a cook.

SCI-Rockview staff placed the misconduct citation in Williams’s

2

The chaplain contacted by the prison officials was not the

one suggested by Williams. According to Williams, the prison

chaplain he sought to call as a witness did not believe that the

Muslim religion permitted adherents to handle pork at all,

regardless of whether they wore gloves.

5

institutional disciplinary record, and raised his security

classification from “low” to “medium.”

B. Procedural Background

In November 2001, Williams brought this action under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his rights under the Religious Land

Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5, and the First and Fourteenth Amendments

to the United States Constitution. Williams seeks compensatory

damages, lost wages, and injunctive relief in the form of

expungement of the misconduct citation, reinstatement of his pre-

misconduct pay level, and cessation of similar religious

harassment.

The Prison Officials filed a motion to dismiss the amended

complaint, which the District Court denied. Williams v. Bitner,

285 F. Supp. 2d 593 (M.D. Pa. 2003). At the conclusion of

discovery, the Prison Officials moved for summary judgment,

arguing that Williams had not put forward sufficient evidence to

sustain his claims. The District Court granted in part and denied in

part the summary judgment motion: the District Court dismissed

Williams’s claim that the Prison Officials deprived him of his right

to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, but held that

Williams had offered sufficient evidence to establish a deprivation

of his rights under the RLUIPA and the First Amendment. See

Williams v. Bitner, 359 F. Supp. 2d 370 (M.D. Pa. 2005). In

addition, the District Court held that the Prison Officials were not

entitled to qualified immunity because Williams had adduced

sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the Prison Officials

violated a “clearly established” statutory or constitutional right.3

The Prison Officials appealed.

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

3

The Prison Officials had previously sought qualified

immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage, which the District Court

denied for substantially the same reasons.

6

The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over this

action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. A district court’s ruling

denying qualified immunity is reviewable on appeal where the

dispute does not turn upon “which facts the parties might be able

to prove, but, rather, whether or not certain given facts showed a

violation of ‘clearly established’ law.” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S.

304, 311 (1995). Because the material facts here are not in dispute

and the issues before this Court are purely legal, we have appellate

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the District

Court’s denial of qualified immunity. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472

U.S. 511, 530 (1985).

We exercise plenary review of orders rejecting qualified

immunity at the summary judgment stage. See Wright v. City of

Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 599 (3d Cir. 2005). We apply the same

standard that district courts apply at summary judgment. See

Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir. 2002). Thus, we draw

all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and we

will reverse a denial of summary judgment only when “‘there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. at 276-77 (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).

III. Discussion

The Prison Officials assert that the District Court erred by

refusing to grant their summary judgment motion on the basis of

qualified immunity with respect to Williams’s First Amendment

claim because the right asserted by Williams was not “clearly

established” at the time of the incident. The Prison Officials also

contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity from

Williams’s RLUIPA claim.

A. Qualified Immunity

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person

who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of his or her

federal rights. However, when a public official’s actions give rise

to a § 1983 claim, the privilege of qualified immunity can serve as

a shield from civil suit in certain circumstances. See Hunter v.

7

Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991). The primary purpose of

affording public officials the privilege of qualified immunity “is to

protect them ‘from undue interference with their duties and from

potentially disabling threats of liability.’” Elder v. Holloway, 510

U.S. 510, 514 (1994) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,

806 (1982)).

Qualified immunity shields state officials from suit where

their conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. The Supreme Court, in Saucier

v. Katz, explained the analytical process for determining when the

privilege of qualified immunity has been overcome:

A court required to rule upon the qualified

immunity issue must consider, then, this threshold

question: Taken in the light most favorable to the

party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show

the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?

This must be the initial inquiry. . . .

If no constitutional right would have been

violated were the allegations established, there is no

necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified

immunity. On the other hand, if a violation could be

made out on a favorable view of the parties’

submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask

whether the right was clearly established.

533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (citation omitted).

Thus, the qualified immunity analysis requires a two-step

inquiry. First, the court must determine whether the facts alleged

show that the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional or

statutory right. If so, the court must then determine whether the

constitutional or statutory right allegedly violated by the defendant

was “clearly established.” If the court concludes that the

defendant’s conduct did violate a clearly established constitutional

or statutory right, then it must deny the defendant the protection

afforded by qualified immunity. See id.; Curley, 298 F.3d at 277.

8

As a general matter, a right is clearly established for

purposes of qualified immunity when its contours are “‘sufficiently

clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is

doing violates that right.’” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202 (quoting

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). To find that a

right is clearly established, “the right allegedly violated must be

defined at the appropriate level of specificity.” Wilson v. Layne,

526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999). As the Supreme Court explained in

Hope v. Pelzer, in some cases “a general constitutional rule already

identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to

the specific conduct in question, even though the very action in

question has [not] previously been held unlawful.” 536 U.S. 730,

741 (2002) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271

(1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Indeed,

“officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates

established law even in novel factual circumstances.” Id.

B. Williams’s First Amendment Claim

The Prison Officials argue that the District Court erred when

it held that they are not entitled to qualified immunity from

Williams’s First Amendment claim.4 The Prison Officials do not

challenge the District Court’s ruling with respect to the first prong

of the qualified immunity analysis—whether the Prison Officials’

alleged conduct violated Williams’s rights under the First

Amendment.5 They do, however, challenge the District Court’s

4

The District Court discussed whether the First Amendment

right asserted by Williams was clearly established on two

occasions: in its opinion denying the Prison Officials’ motion to

dismiss, and in its opinion denying in part the Prison Officials’

motion for summary judgment. The District Court employed

approximately the same analysis in each opinion.

5

The Prison Officials state in their brief that they “will

accept [the District Court’s] finding [that Williams has established

a First Amendment violation] for purposes of this argument.”

(Appellants’ Br. at 11.) Counsel for the Prison Officials reaffirmed

this position at oral argument. Notwithstanding the Prison

Officials’ position, by our decision today we conclude that, viewed

9

ruling as to the second prong of the qualified immunity

analysis—whether the Prison Officials’ alleged conduct violated a

“clearly established” First Amendment right.

Neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit has directly

addressed whether requiring a Muslim inmate to handle pork

violates his or her First Amendment right to free exercise of

religion. As the District Court pointed out, however, “[t]he few

courts to consider the precise question have uniformly held that

prison officials must respect and accommodate, when practicable,

a Muslim inmate’s religious beliefs regarding prohibitions on the

handling of pork.” Williams, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 377. Specifically,

the Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, as well as a district court in

the Eighth Circuit, have so held. See Hayes v. Long, 72 F.3d 70,

72-74 (8th Cir. 1995) (denying qualified immunity because Muslim

inmates had a clearly established right not to be forced to handle

pork); Kenner v. Phelps, 605 F.2d 850, 851 (5th Cir. 1979) (per

curiam) (finding that Muslim inmates’ claim that they were forced

to handle pork stated a cause of action); Chapman v. Kleindienst,

507 F.2d 1246, 1251-52 (7th Cir. 1974) (finding that Muslim

inmate’s claim that he was forced to handle pork made out a prima

facie First Amendment claim); Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251,

270 (E.D. Ark. 1976) (enjoining prison officials from exposing

Muslim inmates to food contaminated by pork), aff’d on other

grounds, 548 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1977), aff’d, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).

The District Court also observed correctly that “[d]ecisions

from the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals

affirm [the principles that support Williams’s First Amendment

claim], albeit in different factual scenarios.” Williams, 359 F.

Supp. 2d at 377. For example, in Thomas v. Review Board, 450

U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981), and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,

404-06 (1963), the Supreme Court explained that a burden on

religious exercise is “substantial” and, therefore, impermissible

when it influences an adherent to act in a way that violates his or

in the light most favorable to Williams, the evidence establishes a

violation of Williams’s First Amendment rights, thus satisfying the

first prong of the qualified immunity analysis.

10

her sincerely held religious beliefs. Moreover, we have examined

First Amendment claims based on the failure of prison officials to

accommodate inmates’ religion-based dietary restrictions.6 See

DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 52 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding

that an inmate requesting a special diet on the basis of a sincerely

held religious belief has “a constitutionally protected interest upon

which the prison administration may not unreasonably infringe”);

Johnson v. Horn, 150 F.3d 276, 283 (3d Cir. 1998), overruled in

part by DeHart, 227 F.3d at 53-57.

On appeal, the Prison Officials contend that they are entitled

to qualified immunity because, at the time of the incident, Williams

did not have a clearly established First Amendment right not to be

forced to handle pork. According to the Prison Officials, the right

was not clearly established because neither the Third Circuit nor

any district courts within the Third Circuit had expressly held that

such a right exists, and there was a “split among the other Circuits

concerning this issue.” (Appellants’ Br. at 12.) Thus, the Prison

Officials assert that, as in Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309 (3d Cir.

2001), “the absence of binding precedent in this circuit, the doubts

expressed by the most analogous appellate holding, together with

the conflict among a handful of district court opinions, undermines

any claim that the right was clearly established.” Id. at 321

(footnote omitted).

We do not find the Prison Officials’ arguments persuasive.

First, although the Third Circuit has not ruled on the specific right

asserted by Williams, we have observed that “[i]f the unlawfulness

of the defendant’s conduct would have been apparent to a

reasonable official based on the current state of the law, it is not

necessary that there be binding precedent from this circuit so

advising.” Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 211-12 &

n.4 (3d Cir. 2001) (denying qualified immunity despite absence of

6

In addition, as the District Court pointed out, district courts

within the Third Circuit have recognized that Muslim inmates are

entitled to a pork-free diet. See Muslim v. Frame, 854 F. Supp.

1215, 1224 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Masjid Muhammad-D.C.C. v. Keve,

479 F. Supp. 1311, 1318 (D. Del. 1979).

11

Third Circuit precedent establishing the right asserted by plaintiff);

see also Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 777-78 & n.6 (3d Cir. 2004)

(finding right clearly established even though neither the Supreme

Court nor the Third Circuit had ruled on the issue); Delie, 257 F.3d

at 321 & n.11 (granting qualified immunity but observing that

“[t]he absence of circuit precedent does not mean an official will

always retain the immunity defense”). To that end, we routinely

consider decisions by other Courts of Appeals as part of our

“clearly established” analysis when we have not yet addressed the

right asserted by the plaintiff. See, e.g., Kopec, 361 F.3d at 778;

Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 263 (3d Cir. 2003); Brown, 269

F.3d at 211-12 n.4; cf. Johnson, 150 F.3d at 286 (choosing not to

resolve the “difficult question” of whether and to what extent

decisions from sister circuits may be considered in the qualified

immunity analysis).7

Furthermore, the Prison Officials’ characterization of other

Courts of Appeals’ rulings on this issue as “split” at the time of the

incident is not accurate. As noted above, as of 2001, the only three

Courts of Appeals to have considered the right asserted by

Williams in a precedential opinion had held that prison officials

violate Muslim inmates’ First Amendment rights when they force

the inmates to handle pork. See Hayes, 72 F.3d at 72-74; Kenner,

605 F.2d at 851; Chapman, 507 F.2d at 1251-52. In support of

their contention that the circuits were divided, the Prison Officials

point to the Sixth Circuit’s rejection of a somewhat similar claim

in Robinson v. Jordan, 900 F.2d 260 (table), 1990 WL 47551 (6th

Cir. 1990) (unpublished opinion). But Robinson is an unpublished

opinion that has little or no precedential value in the Sixth Circuit.

7

In addition, although the Delie majority stated that district

court opinions cannot establish the law of the circuit, it conceded

that such opinions nonetheless may be relevant to the “clearly

established” determination. See Delie, 257 F.3d at 321 & n.10

(“district court opinions do play a role in the qualified immunity

analysis”); but cf. Brown, 269 F.3d at 212 n.4 (observing that Delie

“holds only that conflicting and materially distinguishable district

court decisions did not render a right clearly established in the

Third Circuit”).

12

See 6th Cir. R. 28(g). As a result, Robinson does not preclude a

finding that the right asserted by Williams was clearly established.8

The Prison Officials also call our attention to two cases that

the District Court did not reference in its analysis, neither of which

is availing. In Grant v. Matthews, No. 89-3194, 1992 WL 160926

(D. Kan. June 12, 1992), a district court dismissed a § 1983 suit by

a Rastafarian inmate who was disciplined after refusing to serve

soup containing meat (even though he was supplied with plastic

gloves), based on qualified immunity. Grant is of no help to the

Prison Officials, however, because the district court there

conducted its “clearly established” inquiry prior to, and without the

benefit of, the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Hayes, which found that

a right identical to the one asserted by Williams was clearly

established. The Prison Officials also cite the Tenth Circuit’s

decision in Searles v. Dechant, 393 F.3d 1126 (10th Cir. 2004), in

which a Jewish inmate claimed that prison officials violated his

First Amendment right to free exercise when they ordered him to

work in a non-kosher kitchen. The Tenth Circuit dismissed most

of the appeal as untimely, but in affirming the denial of the

plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, the court held that, under its

“extremely limited standard of review,” it could not conclude that

the district court improperly dismissed the plaintiff’s First

Amendment claim on summary judgment. Id. at 1132. Searles

does not influence our analysis, however, because it was decided

three years after the incident involving Williams. See Brosseau v.

Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 200 n.4 (2004) (per curiam) (noting that

8

Even if our sister circuits had in fact split on the issue, we

would not necessarily be prevented from finding that the right was

clearly established. See Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1292 (3d

Cir. 1996) (finding that split between the Fifth and Fourth Circuits

at the time of the defendant’s actions did not preclude a finding that

the right was clearly established); Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445,

1458-59 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding a right to be clearly established

despite a circuit split, as long as “no gaping divide has emerged in

the jurisprudence such that defendants could reasonably expect this

circuit to rule” to the contrary), abrogated on other grounds by

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996).

13

the parties had pointed the Court to “a number of . . . cases . . . that

postdate the conduct in question” and that “[t]hese decisions, of

course, could not have given fair notice to [the state official] and

are of no use in the clearly established inquiry”).

Lastly, the Prison Officials maintain that the fact that

Williams was offered gloves to wear while preparing the pork

rations weighs against a finding that they violated a clearly

established First Amendment right. We disagree. Williams claims

that his religious beliefs prohibit him from handling pork

regardless of whether he wears gloves, and the Prison Officials do

not dispute the sincerity of his beliefs. Thus, the offer of gloves

did not diminish any impingement on Williams’s rights under the

First Amendment.

In sum, we hold that the Prison Officials are not entitled to

qualified immunity from Williams’s First Amendment claim.

Although we had not yet addressed the issue raised here at the time

of the incident, the Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits had

addressed First Amendment claims similar to Williams’s and held

that prison officials must respect and accommodate, when

practicable, a Muslim inmate’s religious beliefs regarding

prohibitions on the handling of pork. Moreover, decisions from the

Supreme Court and this Court support the principles underlying the

right asserted by Williams. We therefore conclude that the state of

the law at the time the violation occurred gave the Prison Officials

“fair warning” that their alleged treatment of Williams was

unconstitutional. Hope, 536 U.S. at 741. Accordingly, we will

affirm the District Court’s denial of qualified immunity with

respect to Williams’s First Amendment claim.

C. Williams’s RLUIPA Claim

The Prison Officials also argue that the District Court erred

in denying qualified immunity with respect to Williams’s RLUIPA

claim. According to the Prison Officials, their alleged conduct

could not have violated Williams’s clearly established rights under

RLUIPA because the statute was passed only about six months

prior to the incident. Williams does not oppose the Prison

Officials’ qualified immunity claim with respect to RLUIPA, but

14

notes that it is irrelevant to his request for relief under the statute

because he seeks only injunctive relief, not monetary damages.9 In

their reply brief, the Prison Officials withdraw their qualified

immunity argument with respect to Williams’s RLUIPA claim “[t]o

the extent that Williams agrees to not seek any monetary damages

under [RLUIPA].” (Appellants’ Reply Br. at 8 n.1.) Accordingly,

because the amended complaint seeks only injunctive relief under

RLUIPA, we need not address the District Court’s denial of

qualified immunity with respect to Williams’s RLUIPA claim.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District

Court’s denial of qualified immunity with respect to Williams’s

First Amendment claim and remand the case for proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

9

Williams’s initial complaint sought both monetary damages

and injunctive relief under the First Amendment and RLUIPA.

Thereafter, Williams filed an amended complaint seeking both

monetary damages and injunctive relief under the First

Amendment, but only injunctive relief under RLUIPA.

15