Hubbard v. Taylor

Opinions of the United

2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

2-23-2005

Hubbard v. Taylor

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 03-2372

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005

Recommended Citation

"Hubbard v. Taylor" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 1500.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005/1500

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2005 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No: 03-2372

GREGORY HUBBARD; ALVIN PHILLIPS;

JULIAN PAYNE; CURTIS GIBBS;

GREGORY J. BOLLING; LEONARD GARNER;

GREGORIO TOM AS; DESMOND BROWN;

THELLIE CHAM BLEE; SPUD M. BURNS, JR.;

ROBERT WARD; CHRISTOPHER VAVALA;

KRISTOFER JACKSON; TIMOTHY THOM AS;

PAUL C. WOODWARD; JOSEPH MICHAEL CREEGAN,

JR.; JAVARI WILLIAMS; FLOYD HUNT; BRYANT

CHARLES; CLAUDE JONES; EDDIE A. CARTER;

THEODORE JACKSON; ANDRE MURRAY; ATIF

MOHAM MAD; PEDRO RIVERA, JR.;

ANDREW P. BLAKE; LINWOOD WILSON;

WILLIAM T. DAVIS; WILL T. GRAHAM;

KEVIN M. AGNEW; NOEL SANTIAGO;

WALTER KRAUSE, III; BARRY J. GREEN;

WEDUS MADDOX, a/k/a Wedus Moddo;

RAYM OND STEVENS; JAM ES A. WILSON;

MATTHEW MAJOR, JR.; PERCY OSBORNE;

KEVIN KETCHUM,

Appellants

v.

STANLEY TAYLOR, Commissioner;

RAPHAEL W ILLIAMS, Warden;

M. JANE BRADY, Attorney General

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Delaware

(Civ. No. 00-cv-00531)

District Judge: Hon. Sue L. Robinson

Argued: February 12, 2004

Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, ROTH and

McKEE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: February 23, 2005 )

PAUL E. CRAWFORD, ESQ. (Argued)

HELENA RYCHLICKI, ESQ.

Connolly Bove Lodge & Hutz

P.O. Box 2207

Wilmington, DE 19899

Attorneys for Appellants

RICHARD W. HUBBARD, ESQ. (Argued)

GREGORY E. SMITH, ESQ.

Deputy Attorneys General

State of Delaware

Department of Justice

820 North French Street, 6th Floor

Wilmington, DE 19801

2

Attorneys for Appellees

OPINION

McKEE, Circuit Judge.

Pre-trial detainees housed at a correctional facility in

Delaware ask us to review the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of prison officials and the state’s Attorney

General. The detainees claim that certain conditions of their

confinement deprive them of liberty without due process of law

in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Inasmuch as we

conclude that the district court improperly analyzed their claim

under the Eighth Amendment, rather than the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, we will reverse and

remand for an appropriate due process analysis.

I. FACTS

The Multi-Purpose Criminal Justice Facility commonly

known as “Gander Hill,” is located in Wilmington, Delaware.

It was constructed in 1982 and enlarged when a new wing was

added in 1992. Stanley Taylor has been the Commissioner of

the Delaware Department of Corrections (the “DOC”) since the

fall of 1995, Raphael Williams is the warden at Gander Hill,

and M. Jane Brady is the Attorney-General of Delaware.

On May 30, 2000, a number of pre-trial detainees at

Gander Hill filed a handwritten pro se complaint against Taylor,

Williams, and Brady. The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 and alleged that various conditions of the detainees’

confinement violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

3

Amendment.1 An amended complaint was filed following

appointment of counsel. The amended complaint sought

declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, attorneys’ fees and

costs; and it added Kevin Ketchum and Percy Osbourne as

plaintiffs. Like the original plaintiffs, Ketchum and Osbourne

alleged a due process violation based upon conditions of their

confinement, but they added a claim under the Americans with

Disabilities Act.2

Pre-trial detainees are housed in the West Wing of

Gander Hill, and convicted inmates are generally housed in the

East Wing.3 The typical West wing modular unit or “pod”

1

The complaint also named the Delaware Department of

Corrections as a defendant. The Department moved for

judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c)

arguing that it was immune from suit under the Eleventh

Amendment. The district court granted that motion and the

plaintiffs have not appealed that ruling.

2

For clarity, we will refer to the pre-trial detainees

collectively as “plaintiffs” and refer to Osbourne and Ketchum

individually. It is not clear whether Ketchum and Osbourne are

pre-trial detainees or convicted inmates; however the amended

complaint prays for relief based upon plaintiffs’ status as pre-

trial detainees. We therefore must analyze their claims on that

basis.

3

In their brief, the defendants suggest that at least some of

the plaintiffs may actually be convicted inmates and not pre-trial

4

contains two housing units connected by a control room from

which correctional officers can observe the two units. Each unit

contains a large dayroom of approximately 3,900 square feet,

containing a sink, tables, chairs and a television. Twenty cells

surround the dayroom. With some minor variation, they are all

approximately the same size.

A. The Conditions of Confinement Claim.

Plaintiffs’ conditions of confinement claim rests upon

detainees. As we will explain, that classification determines the

analysis that applies to the conditions of confinement claim.

Defendants state: “[d]ue to the extensive criminal history of the

Plaintiffs and their lack of memory, it is difficult to ascertain

whether any of them was a detainee or a sentenced inmate

during any particular period of incarceration at Gander Hill.

Many of them were jailed for new crimes and violations of

probation or parole for a previous crime.” Appellees’ Br. at 2.,

n.3.

However, it is difficult to determine if defendants are

sincerely challenging plaintiffs’ classification as pre-trial

detainees or merely attempting to undermine the merits of their

claims by disparaging plaintiffs’ character. The defendants

concede that pre-trial detainees are housed in the West wing,

where the challenged conditions exist. The defendants state:

“[t]he Amended Complaint is focused specifically on the West

wing. . . and the gymnasium. Generally, detainees are housed in

the West wing and sentenced inmates are housed in the East

wing.” See Appellees’ Br. at 6.

5

their challenge to the practice of housing three detainees in cells

intended and designed for one person (“triple-celling”). 4

Plaintiffs claim that triple-celling requires someone to sleep on

a mattress that must be placed on the cell floor adjacent to a

toilet. Plaintiffs allege that this violates the Fourteenth

Amendment by depriving them of their liberty without due

process of law.5

The defendants concede that an inmate must sleep on a

floor mattress when three are housed in a given cell. When that

happens, the newest arrival is required to sleep on a mattress on

the floor until one of his cellmates is released or moved. That

frees a bunk for the inmate who had been on the floor mattress,

and any new arrival in that cell would then take his place on the

4

In their amended complaint, plaintiffs allege a number of

other unconstitutional conditions of confinement including:

being housed in the gym and fitness center because of

overcrowding; cold food; lack of access to the law library;

frequent lockdowns resulting in confinement in cells for 8 to 16

hours a day; inadequate access to medical care; and deliberate

indifference to prisoners’ conditions by failing to provide basic

necessities of life, including health care, exercise, personal

safety, food and habitable space. Hubbard v. Taylor, 2003 WL

1697537 at *1 (D.Del. March 28, 2003). However, in the

district court, the plaintiffs limited their claim to being required

to sleep on mattresses on the floor. Id. at *4.

5

Prison officials began triple celling in 1999.

6

floor mattress.6

The cells range in size from 69 to 76 square feet, and the

net unencumbered space in the cell (gross footage of 69-76

square feet less space required for a bed, mattress, desk and

toilet) is less than 50 square feet or 16 square feet per occupant

of each tripled cell. Plaintiffs claim that the bunk bed and floor

mattress leave extremely limited space for three adult men to

move about in the cell. They claim that these cramped

conditions have caused injuries including some as serious as a

broken leg. For example, Darrin Moon was a detainee at Gander

Hill in June 2000. He claims that his leg was broken when a

cellmate jumped off the bunkbed in the middle of the night and

landed on Moon’s leg. Another detainee, Gregory Bolling

alleges a similar mishap. Bollling claims he sustained numerous

injuries including an infected shin as a result of attempting to

navigate the one foot clearance between the bunkbed and his

cellmate’s mattress,

Plaintiffs claim that the deprivations are exacerbated

because sleeping on the floor forces detainees to sleep very near

the open toilet. This has purportedly resulted in urine and feces

regularly splashing on whomever is relegated to the floor

mattress. For example, detainee Gregory Hubbard stated, “one

of the primary things that I felt was degrading was the sleeping

on the floor and having to sleep on the floor next to a urinal or

toilet as long as I did when other arrangements could have been

6

The mattress can be placed under the lower bunk during the

day.

7

made to provide me with a bunk like the other two individuals

in my room.”

Plaintiffs claim that pre-trial detainees typically spend a

minimum of 2 months, and most spend 3 to 7 months, sleeping

on a floor mattress before a cellmate leaves and a bunk becomes

available. They also argue that they have to deal with the

extreme discomfort and disease associated with sleeping on a

concrete floor. According to them, a Prison Facilities Audit

supports their claim that the foam mattresses provided by the

prison officials are thin, worn-out and filthy. The Prison

Facilities Audit described the conditions in pertinent part as

follows:

In most housing units – many mattresses are used

on the floor without protective covers. Since the

institution does not have mattress sanitizing

facilities, some sort of protective cover should be

used. If covers are not feasible, then perhaps a

sheet of plastic or a cloth sheet should be placed

on the floor to help keep the mattress clean.

Plaintiffs insist that conditions were no better five months later

when a report noted that “[t]here are no facilities available for

cleaning of those mattresses.” Still later, in May 2001, the

unsanitary conditions were purportedly still being noted in the

official internal reports. According to plaintiffs, these floor

mattresses were not only unsanitary, they were also so thin,

worn and uncomfortable that sleeping on them was tantamount

to actually sleeping on the bare floor.

8

Plaintiffs insist that prison officials could have prevented

“triple bunking”7 and its associated problems. They claim that

these problems would have been avoided had Commissioner

Taylor added the additional 2500 beds that had been envisioned

as part of a “Master Plan”that was devised in response to

litigation that has been ongoing for 20 years. The earliest suit

was filed in March 1980 and was resolved in a 1988 Settlement

Agreement. There, prison officials agreed to stop “double

bunking” and return to placing a single inmate in cells at state

prisons. Dickerson v. Castle, Civ. Act. No. 10256, Delaware

Court of Chancery. However, plaintiffs claim that the

additional beds were never occupied because prison officials

failed to train enough correctional officers to properly respond

to an increase in the prison population. Thus, in plaintiffs’

view, the prison officials are responsible for the overcrowded

conditions at Gander Hill.

B. The Americans With Disabilities Act Claim.

As noted above, the amended complaint added the ADA

claims of Kevin Ketchum and Perry Osbourne. However,

Osbourne has since died of cancer and the plaintiffs concede

7

This term is misleading. “Triple bunking” actually refers to

confining three people in a cell with each being provided with

a permanent bunk-type bed. See Union County Jail Inmates v.

BiBuono, 713 F.2d 984, 994 n.12 (3d Cir. 1983). As we have

explained, in Gander Hill, two detainees have bunk beds and the

third has to sleep on a mattress on the floor. Accordingly, we

refer to the practice as “triple-celling.” Id.

9

that his death moots his claim. Ketchum has end-stage renal

failure and loss of kidney function. He has been on dialysis

since 1994 and allegedly requires a kidney transplant that

officials purportedly refuse to facilitate.8 However, he can not

receive a kidney transplant unless he is first placed on the

transplant waiting list maintained by the United Network for

Organ Transplants (“UNOS”).

According to plaintiffs, Ketchum has been petitioning

prison officials to start the process for getting a kidney

transplant since 1977 when he first asked them to release

documents so that he could be placed on the transplant list as

his physician recommended. According to plaintiffs, Ketchum

has a compelling need to get on the transplant list quickly

because he is reaching the outer limits of the time he can

tolerate dialysis.9

C. The Defendants’ Response.

Gander Hill receives approximately 18,000 admissions

8

The plaintiffs claim that Delaware law requires that inmates

be afforded medical care without regard to cost. See 11

Delaware Code § 6536(b) (“an inmate shall not be refused

medical treatment for financial reasons. . . .”).

9

Ketchum has apparently been confined at Gander Hill since

1997. We therefore assume that he is a convicted prisoner, and

not a pre-trial detainee. However, as we have noted above, the

amended complaint seeks redress for conditions of confinement

of plaintiffs as pre-trial detainees. See note 2, supra.

10

per year, and the defendants maintain that neither Taylor nor the

warden have any control over that number. The officials

concede that triple-celling is used at Gander Hill, and that this

forces some detainees to sleep on a floor mattress. However,

they deny that the mattresses are adjacent to toilets. Officials

claim that there is ample room to arrange a mattress so that the

toilet is at the resident’s foot and several feet away. Thus, say

the defendants, there is no reason for anyone to worry about

unsanitary and unhealthy conditions as a result of sleeping on

the floor. They draw support for their position from the

deposition testimony of detainees Moon and Wilson.

Moon testified in relevant part as follows:

I chose to sleep with my head towards the

window and my feet towards the toilet. Let’s say,

from my waist down where their beds are.

Because if I slept the other way, and somebody

used the bathroom, I would have to worry about

him standing over top of me and water and urine

splashing over me.

The officials note that Moon did not say that urine and feces

splashed on him as plaintiffs’ claim suggests. Rather, he only

said that he worried about that happening. Moon also stated

that he could address that concern by simply sleeping with his

head away from the toilet.

Defendants also cite the exchange during detainee

Wilson’s deposition that defendants claim further demonstrates

that plaintiffs’ claims are exaggerated:

11

Q: So it is your contention that you’re not being

treated like a human being?

A: On that west side? Yes, sir. If you got to

sleep down beside the toilet and feces and you

got to use the bathroom when the C.O. not come

in and there’s a couple other inmates in there with

you; yes. Yes. Food cold. Whew. Yes.

Officials point out that Wilson did not say that urine and feces

splashed on him either. Rather, he said that he had to “sleep

down beside the toilet and feces.” The defendants argue that it

can be assumed that any feces remained inside the toilet and

they note that Wilson’s testimony is not to the contrary. The

defendants also point out that even if one assumes Wilson was

sleeping with his head next to the toilet, the record does not

explain why he chose to sleep in that position when he

apparently did not have to.

Moreover, according to the defendants, the detainees

who must sleep on floor mattresses are not near the toilets in

any event. In his affidavit, Acting Deputy Warden Phelps

claims that most mattresses in cells in the West Wing of Gander

Hill are two and one-half feet from the toilet. Although

plaintiffs estimate that distance, Phelps actually measured it and

Moon’s testimony is not inconsistent with Phelps’ testimony

because Moon did not specify a distance. Moreover, defendants

point out that the record further undermines plaintiffs’ claims of

disease because Moon’s deposition is the only record of disease

and he only testified that he caught a cold.

12

As noted earlier, the plaintiffs allude to official records

that purportedly documented allegations regarding old and dirty

mattresses. The defendants claim that this is a distortion.

According to defendants, plaintiffs fail to mention that those

mattresses were replaced after prison officials realized the

condition the old mattresses were in.

The defendants refute Ketchum’s ADA claim by noting

that Ketchum never suffered any injury while in the care of the

DOC and that Ketchum’s own physician disapproved his

placement on the kidney transplant list. According to the

defendants, the plaintiffs admitted in the district court that

Ketchum’s own physician and the prison health care provider

told Ketchum that he was not eligible for the National

Transplant List. Furthermore, defendants claim that Ketchum

admitted that the Chief of the Bureau of Prisons told him that

the DOC would pay for a transplant if the doctors said it was

medically necessary.

II. DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS

The district court issued a Memorandum Order granting

summary judgment to the prison officials on both claims. The

court also denied a motion for class certification that plaintiffs

had filed in an attempt to represent a class of over 3,000 pre-

trial detainees. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 2003 WL 1697537

(D.Del. March 28, 2003).10 This appeal followed.11

10

The district court’s opinion contains a discussion of the

conditions of confinement claim. However, it does not contain

13

III. DISCUSSION12

A. Applicable Legal Principles.

The Supreme Court first discussed the application of the

Due Process Clause to pre-trial detainees in Bell v. Wolfish, 441

U.S. 520 (1979). There, federal pre-trial detainees claimed that

a number of the conditions of their confinement violated various

provisions of the Constitution. The challenged conditions

included the practice of confining two inmates in a cell intended

and designed for one. That practice was the only condition that

implicated their due process rights. 441 U.S. 530.13 In

any discussion of the ADA claim.

11

Plaintiffs have not appealed the district court’s refusal to

certify the putative class. That issue is, therefore, not before us.

12

We exercise plenary review over the district court’s grant

of summary judgment. Caprio v. Bell Atlantic Sickness and

Accident Plan, 374 F.3d 217, 220 (3d Cir. 2004). In reviewing

the grant of summary judgment, we must view the facts in the

light most favorable to appellant and affirm only if there was no

genuine issue as to any material fact and appellees are entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Consol. Rail Corp.,

297 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 2002).

13

The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause was implicated

in Bell because the plaintiffs were federal pre-trial detainees.

Inasmuch as we are here concerned with state pre-trial

detainees, any applicable constraints must arise from the Due

14

resolving the issue, the Court stated:

[i]n evaluating the constitutionality of conditions

or restrictions of pretrial detention that implicate

only the protection against deprivation of liberty

without due process, we think that the proper

inquiry is whether those conditions amount to

punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt in

accordance with law. For under the Due Process

Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an

adjudication of guilt in accordance with due

process of law.

Id. at 535 (citations omitted). Of course, the government “may

. . . incarcerate a person charged with a crime but not yet

convicted to ensure his presence at trial[.]” Id. at 531.

“Traditionally, this has meant confinement in a facility which,

no matter how modern or how antiquated, results in restricting

the movement of a detainee in a manner in which he would not

be restricted if he simply were free to walk the streets pending

trial[.]” Id. at 537. There nevertheless remains “a distinction

between punitive measures that may not be constitutionally

imposed prior to a determination of guilt and regulatory

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Fuentes v.

Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 344 (3d Cir. 2000). However, the

Court’s due process analysis under the Fifth Amendment in Bell

nevertheless controls that inquiry. See, e.g., Union County Jail

Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d 984, 991-92 (3d Cir. 1983).

15

restraints that may.” 14 Id. (citations omitted).

In order to determine whether the challenged conditions

of pre-trial confinement amount to punishment,

[a] court must decide whether the disability is

imposed for the purpose of punishment or

whether it is but an incident of some other

legitimate governmental purpose. Absent a

showing of an expressed intent to punish on the

part of the detention facility officials, that

determination generally will turn on whether [it

has] an alternative purpose . . . and whether it

appears excessive in relation to [that] purpose . .

. . Thus, if a particular condition or restriction of

pretrial detention is reasonably related to a

legitimate governmental objective, it does not,

without more, amount to “punishm ent.”

Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not

14

For example, in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.

144 (1963), the Court examined the automatic forfeiture-of-

citizenship provisions of the immigration laws to determine

whether that sanction was punishment or a regulatory restraint.

It held that because forfeiture of citizenship traditionally had

been regarded as punishment and because the legislative history

of the provisions conclusively showed that forfeiture was

intended to be punitive, automatic forfeiture was punishment

that could not constitutionally be imposed without due process

of law. Id. at 167-170.

16

reasonably related to a legitimate goal – if it is

arbitrary or purposeless – a court may permissibly

infer that the purpose of the governmental action

is punishment that may not constitutionally be

inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.

Id. at 538-39 (citations, brackets and internal quotations

omitted). However, the Court did not “detail the precise extent

of the legitimate governmental interests that may justify

conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention[.]” In Bell, the

Court reasoned that it need only

recognize that in addition to ensuring the

detainees’ presence at trial, the effective

management of the detention facility once the

individual is confined is a valid objective that may

justify imposition of conditions and restrictions of

pretrial confinement and dispel any inference that

such restrictions are intended as punishment.

Id. at 540. In determining whether conditions or restrictions are

reasonably related to the Government’s interest in

maintaining security and order and operating the

institution in a manageable fashion, courts must

heed our warning that such considerations are

peculiarly within the province and professional

expertise of corrections officials, and, in the

absence of substantial evidence in the record to

indicate that the officials have exaggerated their

response to these considerations, courts should

17

ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such

matters.

Id. at 540 n.23 (citations and internal quotations omitted).

The Court held that double-bunking under the

circumstances there did not constitute punishment. Accordingly,

it did not violate the pre-trial detainees’ due process rights. Id.

at 541-543. More precisely, the Court found no due process

violation where pre-trial detainees who were detained for

generally less than sixty days were housed in 75 square feet of

space containing a double bunk for six to seven hours a day,

primarily for sleeping purposes. However, the Court offered a

significant caveat. It cautioned that “confining a given number

of people in a given amount of space in such a manner as to

cause them to endure genuine privations and hardship over an

extended period of time might raise serious questions under the

Due Process Clause as to whether those conditions amounted to

punishment.” Id. at 542. It did not, however, elaborate upon the

duration of confinement that could constitute “an extended

period of time,” nor did it elaborate upon the kind of “privations

and hardship” that could constitute punishment in violation of

the Due Process Clause.

Those issues were, however, present four years later

when we decided Union County Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 713

F.3d 984 (3d Cir. 1983). There, pre-trial detainees alleged that

admittedly serious overcrowding in the county jail resulted in

conditions of confinement that constituted punishment in

violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

18

Amendment. 15 After discussing Bell v. Wolfish at some length,

we distilled its teachings into the following two-step test:

we must ask, first, whether any legitimate

purposes are served by these conditions, and

second, whether these conditions are rationally

related to these purposes. In assessing whether

the conditions are reasonably related to the

assigned purposes, we must further inquire as to

whether these conditions “cause [inmates] to

endure [such] genuine privations and hardship

over an extended period of time, that the adverse

conditions become excessive in relation to the

purposes assigned to them.

713 F.3d at 992 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 542) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Our inquiry into whether given conditions

constitute “punishment” must therefore consider the totality of

circumstances within an institution. Id. at 996; see also Jones

v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981) (“In

determining whether conditions of confinement are

unconstitutional under . . . the fourteenth amendment, we do not

assay separately each of the institutional practices, but look to

the totality of the conditions.”), overruled in part on other

grounds, Int’l Woodworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. Champion

15

In Union County, sentenced inmates also challenged the

conditions of their confinement. However, the discussion of

sentenced inmates’ claims is not relevant here because those

claims were analyzed under the Eighth Amendment. 713 F.2d

at 997.

19

Int’l Corp., 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc).

B. Effect of Union County Jail Inmates v. DiBuono on

the Plaintiffs’ Condition of Confinement Claim.

Plaintiffs argue that Union County Jail Inmates controls

our analysis and requires that we conclude that requiring pre-

trial detainees to sleep on floor mattresses constitutes a due

process violation. The district court rejected that argument based

upon its conclusion that the relevant discussion there was

dictum. 2003 WL 1697537 at *4. Plaintiffs’ strongly disagree

and forcefully argue that our inquiry is controlled by the

precedent of Union County. The defendants just as forcefully

disagree. Since Union County could potentially determine the

outcome here, we will examine that decision in some detail.

As noted earlier, in Union County, pre-trial detainees

brought a class action under § 1983 against various county

officials alleging that certain of the conditions of their

confinement violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. The county admitted that pre-trial detainees were

being held in the overcrowded conditions specified in the

complaint. However, the county filed a third party complaint

against the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections

alleging that the overcrowding resulted from the

Commissioner’s refusal to house prisoners who had been

sentenced to state prison, as required by statute. According to

the county, that refusal caused the overcrowding by requiring

the county to house inmates who would otherwise have been

housed in state facilities

20

Thereafter, the Governor issued an executive order

declaring that overcrowding in state prisons and county jails

constituted a state of emergency. The Governor’s order also

suspended operation of the statute requiring him to accept

county prisoners who had been sentenced to state prison.

Instead, it gave the Commissioner the authority to designate the

place of confinement for both county and state inmates whether

they were pre-trial detainees or convicted prisoners. Union

County Jail was designated as the place of confinement for state

prisoners sentenced in Union County because the Commissioner

had determined that certain modifications would allow it to

exceed its rated capacity of inmates.

In time, the county inmates entered into a consent decree

with the county specifying that prison capacity would not

exceed one inmate per cell.16 The district court approved the

agreement and entered a consent decree based upon it even

though the Commissioner of Corrections was not a party to it.

Nevertheless, the court directed the Commissioner to show

cause why he should not be compelled to accept custody of all

state prisoners in the county jail, and the court subsequently

appointed a Special Master to investigate jail conditions and

monitor compliance with the consent decree.

16

The agreement also established a procedure whereby the

county could request an immediate hearing before the district

court if the jail population approached or reached the maximum

capacity of 238. The court could then order the release or

transfer of enough inmates to reduce the population to below

the specified maximum.

21

Thereafter, the Special Master found six specific

violations that he believed constituted violations of the pre-trial

detainees’ constitutional rights. These included: (1) housing

several inmates in detention cells for more than a few days

without adequate sleeping arrangements; (2) requiring detainees

to sleep on floor mattresses adjacent to toilets, for more than a

few days; (3) requiring detainees to sleep on floor mattresses in

other parts of the jail, for more than a few days; (4) requiring

detainees to wear the same clothing for several weeks, [in

violation of a state statute]; (5) failing to screen for

communicable diseases; and (6) depriving detainees of any

meaningful opportunity for recreation.

The Master concluded that overcrowding resulted from

housing two inmates in cells designed for one, and requiring the

second inmate to sleep on “mattresses placed on the floors of

these 5' x 7' cells next to the toilet.” 713 F.2d at 988. The

Commissioner objected to the Master’s report. The

Commissioner claimed that since housing more than one inmate

in a cell had not been declared unconstitutional, the

overcrowding could be solved by using bunk beds instead of

floor mattresses. According to the Commissioner, this would

satisfy the mandate of Bell v. Wolfish.

The district court adopted the Special Master’s findings

without modification. The court held “that the totality of the

circumstances resulting from overcrowding at the Jail, and most

notably forcing pre-trial detainees to sleep on mattresses placed

on the floor, constituted a violation of the detainees’ due

process rights.” 713 F.2d at 989. The district court rejected the

Commissioner’s suggestion for bunk beds. The court reasoned

22

that, given space limitations, double-celling amounted to

punishment in violation of the pretrial detainees’ due process

rights. Since bunk beds would only perpetuate housing two

inmates in cells designed for one, the district court invalidated

the governor’s executive order. The court also voided the

Commissioner’s designation of Union County jail as the place

of confinement for state prisoners sentenced in Union County.

Accordingly, the Commissioner had to transfer all state

prisoners to state prisons.

On appeal, the Commissioner objected to the following

provisions of the consent decree: ¶ (f) (establishing a maximum

capacity at the jail [at] one inmate per general population cell);

¶ (g) (giving the defendants until July 1, 1982 to reduce the

inmate population to 238); and ¶ (h) (authorizing the county to

notify the department of corrections to remove any state

prisoners who remained at the county jail beyond the statutorily

allowed period of time).17 The gist of the Commissioner’s

objection to the consent decree was that state law gave him the

authority to determine inmate population levels in the Union

County Jail.

In reviewing the district court’s decision, we noted that

the district court’s conclusion that the jail overcrowding was

rationally connected to the objective of detaining inmates who

17

See 713 F.2d at 990 n.8, (“[o]ther than the provisions of

(f), (g) and (h) noted herein, we do not understand the

Commissioner to object to any provision of the consent

judgment.”).

23

could not make bail. The fact that the policy served both state

and county governmental interests was not contested on appeal.

713 F.2d at 993. Therefore, “[t]he only question . . . remaining

[under Bell was] whether the conditions and restrictions

resulting from inmate overcrowding [could] be considered

excessive in relation to the purposes assigned to them.” Id. In

conducting that analysis, we noted that two conclusions

emerged from the proceedings in the district court:

First, from the positions taken by the County and

the Commissioner, we do not understand either of

them seriously to contest the unconstitutionality,

in the context of overcrowded conditions, of

forcing pre-trial detainees to sleep for more than

a few days on mattresses placed on the floor of a

5' x 7' cell adjacent to an open toilet which both

cellmates must use. Indeed, the County

conceded, at oral argument . . . that conditions as

found by [the Special Master] were

unconstitutional. Thus, the district court’s

implicit holding that conditions as found by the

Special Master are “excessive in relation to the

purposes assigned to them,” is not questioned on

this appeal.

Our second conclusion is that, of all the various

conditions challenged as being unconstitutional,

the most significant, and indeed the only

condition not meeting constitutional standards,

was the practice of placing a mattress on the

floor for the second occupant of a cell designed

24

for but one inmate. It is not surprising, therefore,

that the Commissioner focused on an alleviation

of this latter condition by recommending double-

bunking in such cells. The Commissioner

contended that if, by providing double bunks, . .

. constitutional objections to overcrowding could

be overcome, then the Commissioner’s discretion

in determining where state prisoners should be

placed, should not be overridden. We therefore

turn to a consideration of the two-in-a-cell or

double-bunking practice.

Id. at 994 (emphasis added).

The district court had concluded that double-bunking of

pre-trial detainees was a constitutional violation because it

imposed hardships tantamount to punishment. Accordingly, the

court had ruled that practice an unconstitutional denial of the

detainees’ right to due process. However, we rejected the

district court’s spatial analysis and found that the

Commissioner’s recommended double-bunking would not only

alleviate the problem resulting from floor mattresses, but would

also free recreational space where detainees had previously had

to sleep. We acknowledged that, even with double-bunking, the

cells at issue would remain “cramped and overcrowded” and

“very far from ideal[.]” However, we also noted that pre-trial

detainees would have adequate room for sleeping and

recreation. Id. at 996. We therefore “reject[ed] the district

court’s holding of unconstitutional conditions based solely on

considerations of space.” Id. at 996 (citation and internal

quotations omitted). We explained:

25

First, and most importantly, providing double

bunks will avoid the unsanitary and humiliating

practice of forcing detainees to sleep on

mattresses placed either on the floor adjacent to

the toilet and at the feet of their cellmates, or

elsewhere in the Jail. Second, double-bunking

will avoid the practice of having more than two

detainees without adequate sleeping arrangements

in the detention cells. Third, double-bunking will

make it possible for recreational areas at the Jail

to be cleared and dedicated to their original

function. Thus, the remedial scheme put forth by

the Commissioner, combining double-bunking

with discharge of the County’s obligations under

the consent judgment, would effectively cure all

of the conditions that were of particular concern

to the Special Master. . . .

Thus, although the question is not without

difficulty, we are satisfied that, if the

Commissioner’s proposals. . . were fully

implemented, conditions at the Jail would pass

constitutional muster.

Id. at 996 (emphasis added). We also noted that pre-trial

detainees were confined at the jail “for generally a maximum

period of 60 days.” Id. at 997 (citation omitted). We held that

the district court had abused its discretion in rejecting the

Commissioner’s proposed remedies and ordered the district

court to vacate portions of the consent decree that had rejected

the Commissioner’s proposed remedy. Id. at 1003. We

26

therefore concluded that the Commissioner’s plan would

alleviate the constitutional violations.

Plaintiffs’ condition of confinement claim here is largely

based upon the following language in Union City: “ [O]f all the

various conditions challenged as being unconstitutional, the

most significant, and indeed the only condition not meeting

constitutional standards, was the practice of placing a mattress

on the floor for the second occupant of a cell designed for but

one inmate. 713 F.2d at 994.18 However, the district court here

properly recognized that statement was dictum because the

Commissioner (the appellant in Union County) had conceded

the unconstitutionality of the practice. In Union County, we

specifically noted that “[t]he State does not assert that it is

proper for the County to require inmates to sleep on mattresses

on the floor . . . . So the Special Master properly recommended

that the floor mattresses practice should be eliminated.” Id. at

994. Thus, we did not have to consider the constitutionality of

the practice because both parties agreed that it was

unconstitutional. Accordingly, the issue of the constitutionality

of placing floor mattresses adjacent to a toilet was simply not

before us and we did not decide it. Therefore, it was dictum. See

Cerro Metal Products v. Marshall, 620 F.2d 964, 978 (3d Cir.

1980) (statements pertaining to issues not decided are dictum

18

The plaintiffs then note that the “various conditions” we

were referring to were the six overcrowding conditions that we

have set forth above. Id. at 993-94 n.11.

27

because “the precise issue [is not] before the court.”). 19

Therefore, the district court here did not err in

concluding that it was not bound by our holding in Union City.

That does not, however, end our inquiry because the district

court did not then proceed to conduct a proper analysis of these

plaintiffs’ due process claim given their status of pre-trial

detainees.

19

The nature of this statement in Union County became even

more evident three years after Union County when we decided

Anela v. City of Wildwood, 790 F.2d 1063 (3d Cir. 1986).

There, we referred to this portion of our opinion in Union

County as a “comment[]” rather than a “holding.” Id. at 1069

(citation omitted). Although that reference does not, by itself,

conclusively establish that our “comment” was dictum, it is

certainly consistent with our conclusion that it was dictum. We

also note that one judge in responding to the municipality’s

petition for rehearing in Anela, referred to this language in

Union County as dictum.

The judge wrote: “while Union County did state in

dictum that requiring detainees to sleep on mattresses on cell

floors could constitute unconstitutional punishment under the

fourteenth amendment, its observations were expressly limited

to the situation in which detainees were subjected to such

conditions ‘for more than a few days.’” Anela v. City of

Wildwood, 793 F.2d 514, 515 (3d Cir. 1986) (emphasis added).

28

C. The district court’s analysis of the conditions of

confinement claim.

In resolving the plaintiffs’ conditions of confinement

claim, the district court wrote: “In order to prevail on their

claim that they are being punished, [the pre-trial detainees] must

show that sleeping on mattresses on the floor deprived them of

the ‘minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities.’” 2003 WL

1697537 at *5 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,

347 (1981)). The court then explained that, in reviewing the

claim, it must examine the “totality of the circumstances . . . in

order to discover whether the overall conditions at Gander Hill

deprived [the pre-trial detainees] of ‘an identifiable human

need, such as food, warmth, or exercise.’” Id. (quoting

Dickinson v. Taylor, 2000 WL 1728363 (D. Del. May 19,

2000). The court cited Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304-05

(1991)).20 The court then rejected plaintiffs’ claim relying upon

its own prior decisions. It reasoned:

Under an Eighth Amendment analysis, this court

has previously held that having to sleep on a

mattress on the floor does not rise to the level of

a constitutional violation. For example, in

20

Wilson v. Seiter did not address pre-trial detainee’s due

process rights. Indeed, the Court in Seiter, could not logically

determine whether a condition of confinement constitutes

punishment by applying a test that assumes the propriety of

punishment but prohibits punishment only when it becomes

cruel and unusual.

29

[another case], the court held that in light of the

prison overcrowding problem and the need for

prison authorities to take interim measures to

house inmates within a limited space, the fact that

an inmate had to sleep on the floor in crowded or

dirty conditions is insufficient to state a claim

under Section 1983.

2003 WL 1687537 at *5 (citations and internal quotations

omitted). The district court observed that “sleeping on the floor

is not ideal,” as we did in Union County. However, the court

reasoned that, since “prison overcrowding in now a fact of life,”

sleeping on the floor “is not a violation of the Eight

Amendment” “[a]s long as plaintiff is receiving adequate food,

shelter, and clothing[.]” Id. at *5 n.2. The district court then

reasoned that, since there was no constitutional violation, “the

issue of whether [the prison officials] acted with deliberate

indifference need not be reached.” Id. at *6.

Given our discussion of Bell v. Wolfish, supra, it is clear

that the district court’s analysis of the pre-trial detainees’ claim

is fatally flawed. The Eighth Amendment “was designed to

protect those convicted of crimes and consequently the Clause

applies only after the State has complied with constitutional

guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.”

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318 (1986) (citation and

internal quotations omitted). Thus, the Eighth Amendment’s

Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not apply until

30

“after sentence and conviction.”21 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

392 n.6 (1989).

In Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991), the Supreme

Court set forth the standard for alleged violations of the Eighth

Amendment while addressing non-medical conditions of

confinement. The Court held that the prisoner must prove that

prison officials acted with deliberate indifference that deprived

him/her of “‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities.’” Id. at 298-99, 301-05 (quoting Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). Here, the district court

correctly cited the standard that governs plaintiffs’ claims as

follows:

The U.S. Supreme Court set the standard for

determining whether a condition of confinement

of pretrial detainees violated their constitutional

rights in Bell v. Wolfish. Whether there is a

constitutional violation turns on whether the

disability is imposed for the purpose of

punishment or wether it is but an incident of

some other legitimate governmental purpose.

The government may detain an individual; the

necessary inquiry is whether the conditions and

restrictions of the detention amount to

21

The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, and indeed the

entire Eighth Amendment, is made applicable to the states

through the Fourteenth Amendment. Robinson v. California,

370 U.S. 660 (1962).

31

punishment.

2003 WL at *3 (citation omitted, emphasis added). However,

the court then relied upon our decision in Kost v. Kozakiewicz,

1 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 1993) in concluding that, “[n]evertheless,

in Bell v. Wolfish and later cases, it is clear that when a court is

considering general, non-medical conditions of confinement,

the standard is the same for both pretrial detainees and

sentenced inmates.” Hubbard v. Taylor, 2003 WL 1697537, *3

(D. Del. 2003). More specifically, the district court cited our

statement that “Pretrial detainees . . . are entitled to at least as

much protection as convicted prisoners, so the protections of the

Eighth Amendment would seem to establish a floor of sorts.”

Kost, 1 F.3d at 188 n. 10. (emphasis added).

In Kost, we relied upon Wilson v. Seiter to conclude that

“the standard for violations of the Eighth Amendment based on

nonmedical conditions of confinement . . . would also apply to

appellants as pretrial detainees through the . . . Due Process

Clause.” Kost, 1 F.3d at 188. Our analysis then became

somewhat misleading as we proceeded to adopt a “deliberate

indifference” inquiry to conclude that “[p]laintiffs have

therefore stated a claim sufficient to withstand dismissal under

the Seiter standard. . . .” Id.

The district court was clearly mislead by our Kost

analysis. The court concluded that Kost was consistent with its

own prior holdings in similar cases where the district court had

applied an Eighth Amendment analysis to conditions of

confinement claims of pre-trial detainees. The court reasoned:

“[t]his court likewise has found that pre-trial detainees are

32

afforded essentially the same protection as convicted prisoners

and that the Eighth Amendment analysis is appropriate for

determining if the conditions of confinement rise to the level of

a constitutional violation.” 2003 WL at * 3 (citing Ellegood v.

Taylor, No. 01-213 , 2002 WL 449758 (D. Del March 18,

2002).

The court also relied upon City of Revere v. Mass. Gen.

Hosp., 436 U.S. 239 (1983), stating: “Case law has established,

however, that pretrial detainees are afforded essentially the same

level of protection under the Fourteenth Amendment; therefore,

an Eighth Amendment analysis is still appropriate.” 2003 WL at

*3, n.1. However, that is an overstatement of the holding in City

of Revere. There, the Court stated that “[t]he Eighth

Amendment’s proscriptions of cruel and unusual punishments

is violated by ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs

of prisoners.’” 463 U.S. 239, 244. The issue there involved a

municipality’s liability for medical costs of treating a suspect

police had wounded as he was attempting to flee. The Court

reiterated that “Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only

after . . . [conviction].” Id. It therefore viewed the Eighth

Amendment as relevant to conditions of pre-trial detainees only

because it established a floor. The Court explained: “the due

process rights of a [pre-trial detainee] are at least as great as the

Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted

prisoner.” Id. (citing Bell v. Wolfish).

Thus, although the district court correctly stated the

appropriate test here, it overlooked the context and limitations

of the relevant statements in City of Revere and Kost. The

district court then erred in concluding that “pretrial detainees are

33

afforded essentially the same protection as convicted prisoners

and that an Eighth Amendment analysis is appropriate for

determining if the conditions of confinement rise to the level of

a constitutional violation.”

The district court’s error is understandable given our

discussion in Kost. There, we were discussing medical and

nonmedical conditions of confinement. Although we specifically

stated that the Eighth Amendment provided a floor for our due

process inquiry into the medical and nonmedical issues, much of

our discussion focused on whether the plaintiffs had established

the “deliberate indifference” that is the hallmark of cruel and

unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Moreover, we failed to cite Bell

v.Wolfish which, as we have explained, distinguishes between

pretrial detainees’ protection from “punishment” under the

Fourteenth Amendment, and convicted inmates’ protection from

punishment that is “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth

Amendment. 22

22

Even before Kost, we had analyzed a pre-trial detainee’s

claim of inadequate medical treatment under the Eighth

Amendment standards articulated in Estelle v. Gamble. For

example, in Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612

F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979), we held that “at a minimum, the

‘deliberate indifference’ standard of Estelle v. Gamble, must be

met” at an institution housing pre-trial detainees, and in Boring

v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468, 472 (3d Cir. 1987), we noted that

even though the constitutional protections afforded prisoners

and pre-trial detainees against inadequate medical care arise

34

Nevertheless, it is clear that plaintiffs here “are not

within the ambit of the Eighth Amendment[‘s],” prohibition

against cruel and unusual punishment. Boring v. Kozakiewicz,

833 F.2d 468, 471 (3d Cir. 1987). They are not yet at a stage of

the criminal process where they can be punished because they

from different textual sources, the standards governing the

provision of medical care to each class are similar. We have

continued this practice after Kost. See, e.g., Natale v. Camden

County Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581-82 (3d Cir.

2003) (“In previous cases, we have found no reason to apply a

different standard than that set forth in Estelle . . . We therefore

evaluate Natales’ Fourteenth Amendment claim for inadequate

medical care under the standard used to evaluate similar claims

brought under the Eighth Amendment.”).

The analysis is further confused because Kost suggests

a separate and distinct analysis governs nonmedical and medical

claims under the Eighth Amendment. However, in Seiter, the

Court stated:

Whether one characterizes the treatment received

by [the prisoner] as inhumane conditions of

confinement, failure to attend to his

medicalneeds, or a combination of both, it is

appropriate to apply the deliberate indifference

standard articulated in Estelle.

501 U.S. at 304 (brackets in original) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

35

have not as yet been convicted of anything. As the Supreme

Court explained in Bell, pre-trial detainees cannot be punished

at all under the Due Process Clause.

As we have already explained, Bell v. Wolfish

established that standard. The district court therefore relied

upon seemingly applicable language in Kost without

considering its context, or the controlling authority of Bell v.

Wolfish.23 Accordingly, we must reverse the district court’s

23

In Kost, we evaluated claims by pretrial detainees that the

conditions of their confinement were unconstitutional.

Although we focused on whether the plaintiffs had established

the “deliberate indifference” that characterizes cruel and

unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, see

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), we specifically

distinguished between the protections of the Due Process

Clause and those of the Eighth Amendment. Kost, 1 F.3d at

188 (“Pretrial detainees are not within the ambit of the Eighth

Amendment but are entitled to the protections of the Due

Process clause.”) (quoting Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d

468, 471 (1987)). Moreover, we recognized that pretrial

detainees are entitled to greater constitutional protection than

that provided by the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 188 n.10.

Although we did not specifically cite Bell v. Wollfish, our

analysis in Kost is consistent with Bell’s distinction between

pretrial detainees’ protection from “punishment” under the

Fourteenth Amendment, on the one hand, and convicted

inmates’ protection from punishment that is “cruel and unusual”

under the Eighth Amendment, on the other.

36

grant of summary judgment to the prison officials on the pre-

trial detainees’ conditions of confinement claim and remand for

a proper analysis of that claim under the standard announced in

Bell v. Wolfish.24

24

The prison officials claim that this action is barred by the

Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). That Act provides

in part:

No Federal civil action may be brought by a

prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other

correctional facility, for mental or emotional

injury suffered while in custody without a prior

showing of physical injury.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). However, the plaintiffs do allege

physical injury. Accordingly, there is a factual dispute for the

district court to resolve on remand.

Moreover, § 1997e(e) does not bar all such claims absent

physical injury as claims for declaratory relief as well as

nominal and punitive damages for violations of constitutional

rights are not barred by § 1997e(e). See Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d

309, 314 n.13 (3d Cir. 2001) (“However, § 1997e(e) does not

bar claims seeking nominal damages to vindicate constitutional

rights, nor claims seeking punitive damages.”); Allah v. Al-

Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 251-52 (3d Cir. 2000) (Holding that §

1997e(e) does not bar nominal and punitive damages for

37

In their motion for summary judgment, the prison

officials also argued that they were entitled to qualified

immunity from the conditions of confinement claim. Abdul-

Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 210-02 (3d Cir. 1993). The prison

officials argued they acted reasonably and are therefore immune

from suit because every district court judge in the District of

Delaware has ruled that having pre-trial detainees sleep on

mattresses on the floor at Gander Hill is constitutionally

permissible.25 The district court addressed the merits of the

plaintiffs’ claim without reaching defendants’ entitlement to

qualified immunity.

If, on remand, the prison officials again assert qualified

immunity, we remind the district court that the immunity claim

must be resolved first. Since qualified immunity is “an

immunity from suit, rather than a mere defense to liability, it is

imperative to resolv[e] immunity questions at the earliest

violations of constitutional rights even in the absence of

physical injury).

25

The prison officials cite to the following cases: Renn v.

Taylor, 2001 WL 657591 (D.Del. March 2, 2001) (Robinson,

J.); Bagwell v. Brewington-Carr, 2000 WL 1728148 (D.Del.

April 27, 2000) (Sleet, J.); Jackson v. Brewington-Carr, 1999

WL 27124 (D.Del. Jan. 14, 1999) (Farnan, J.); Bartley v. Taylor,

Civ. A. No. 98-503 (D.Del. Sept. 10, 1999) (McKelvie, J.);

Torres v. Brewington-Carr, Civ. A. No. 98-159 (D.Del. Nov.

29, 1999) (Longobardi, J.).

38

possible stage in litigation.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,

200-01 (2001) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

D. The ADA claim.

The district court also failed to address Ketchum’s ADA

claim. Rather, the court simply granted summary judgment to

the prison officials on that claim with no analysis. The district

court’s failure to explain why it granted summary judgment to

the prison officials on the ADA claim is contrary to the

requirements set forth in Valdino v. A. Valey Engineers, 903

F.2d 253, 259 (3d Cir. 1990). There, we explained that “we

will exercise our supervisory power to require the district courts

in this circuit to accompany grants of summary judgment

hereafter with an explanation sufficient to permit the parties and

this court to understand the legal premise for the court’s order.”

We will also remand the ADA claim to the district court for

compliance with the directive of Valdino.26

E. Class certification.

Although the district court did not explain why it denied

the motion for class certification “as moot,” 2003 WL 1697537

at *6, we assume that the motion was denied because the court

dismissed the underlying conditions of confinement claim and

26

The prison officials claim that Ketchum is no longer

incarcerated at Gander Hill. If that is true, we assume that the

prison officials will properly inform the district court on

remand.

39

therefore saw no need to entertain the motion for class

certification. Since we are reversing the grant of summary

judgment and remanding for analysis under Bell v. Wolfish, we

will also reverse the district court’s denial of the class

certification motion. The district court can address that motion

as it deems appropriate if the motion is renewed on remand.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we will vacate the grant of

summary judgment to the defendants and remand the conditions

of confinement claim for consideration under Bell v. Wolfish.27

We will also remand the ADA claim and, the denial of the class

certification motion for compliance with Valdino v. A. Valey

Engineers.

27

The defendants claim that no named plaintiff is still housed

at Gander Hill as a pre-trial detainee. Therefore, they contend

that any request for injunctive relief is moot. However, even if

no named plaintiff remains at Gander Hill as a pre-trial detainee,

because of the “temporary nature of confinement” at Gander

Hill, “the issues presented are . . . ‘capable of repetition, yet

evading review.’” Bell, 441 U.S. at 527 n.5 (citations omitted).

Therefore, we do not believe that the request for injunctive relief

is moot.

40