Carroll v. Rochford

Opinions of the United

2003 Decisions States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-30-2003

Carroll v. Rochford

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 02-3771

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 02-3771

WILLIAM AND ANNE MARIE CARROLL

v.

EDWARD ROCHFORD, individually and in his official capacity as Morris County

Sheriff; JACK DEMPSEY, individually and in his capacity as Morris County

Undersheriff; MORRIS COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; JOHN B. DANGLER,

in his official capacity as Morris County Prosecutor; MICHAEL LOWE, individually and

in his capacity as Internal Affairs Officer with the Morris County Sheriff’s Office;

RICHARD ROSE, individually and in his capacity as Detective of the Morris County

Prosecutor’s Office; ANTHONY CALAMITO, individually and in his capacity as

Detective of the Morris County Prosecutor’s Office; MORRIS COUNTY

PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE; COUNTY OF M ORRIS; JOHN DOES 1-6; fictitious names

for individuals as yet unknown,

Edward V. Rochford and Jack Dempsey,

Appellants

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

(Dist. Court No. 99-CV-05669)

District Court Judge: William H. Walls

Argued on June 16, 2003

Before: ALITO, ROTH, HALL,* Circuit Judges

*

The Honorable Cynthia Holcomb Hall, Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting

by designation.

Opinion Filed: July 30, 2003

Dennis A. Durkin, Esquire

John A. Testa, Esquire

Durkin & Durkin

1120 Bloomfield Avenue

Suite 204

West Caldwell, NJ 07007

Counsel for Appellees

Frederic M. Knapp

Stephen E. Trimboli

Courter, Kobert, Laufer & Cohen

23 Cattano Avenue

Morristown, NJ 07960

Counsel for Appellants

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM:

Edward V. Rochford, the Sheriff of Morris County, and Undersheriff Jack

Dempsey contend that the District Court erred in denying their qualified-immunity

summary judgment motion as to William Carroll’s 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim alleging a

violation of his constitutional right to freedom of association. As a pure question of law

is at issue, we exercise plenary review over a District Court’s decision. McLaughlin v.

Watson, 271 F.3d 566, 570 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. den., 535 U.S. 989 (2002).

Government officials performing discretionary functions are afforded qualified

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immunity from civil damages in suits brought pursuant to Section 1983. Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982). A two-part standard is used to determine whether

public officials are entitled to qualified immunity. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.194, 200-02

(2001). First, a court must determine (based on the view of the facts that is pertinent to

the procedural stage at which the motion is made) whether the official’s conduct violated

a constitutional right. Id. at 201. Second, if the facts show that a right has indeed been

violated, a court must determine, as a matter of law, whether the constitutional right was

“clearly established” at the time of the official’s action. Id.1 This second step of the

analysis requires a court to both define the right at issue with a sufficient degree of

specificity, Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987), and to analyze the facts of

the case in light of relevant case law extant at the time of the alleged conduct.

McLaughlin v. Watson, 271 F.3d 566, 572 (2001). If a motion for summary judgment

based on qualified immunity is denied, the defendant may under some circumstances take

an immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S.

304, 312 (1995).

1

A government official may be held personally liable for an official action only

where the contours of the particular right allegedly violated are “sufficiently clear that a

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson

v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1982). The clarity of the right at issue is evaluated at the

time the official’s allegedly unlawful action was taken, Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, and an

official may be entitled to immunity if “based on the information available to them they

could have believed that their conduct would be consistent with” contemporaneous

governing legal principles. Good v. Dauphin County Social Services for Children and

Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1092 (3d Cir. 1989).

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In Forbes v. Township of Lower Merion, 313 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir. 2002), we

announced a supervisory rule that applies when a District Court denies a qualified

immunity summary judgment motion. This rule requires District Courts to “specify those

material facts that are and are not subject to genuine dispute and explain their

materiality.” Id. As we discussed in Forbes, this rule is designed to assist us in

determining whether we have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Under Jones, “a

defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense, may not appeal a district

court’s summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the

pretrial record sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for trial.” Id. at 319-20. Rather, a

defendant may appeal the District Court’s collateral order only as to the purely legal

question of whether the Court made an error of law, in which case “the court of appeals

can simply take, as given, the facts that the district court assumed when it denied

summary judgment for that (purely legal) reason.” Id. at 319.

The rule announced in Forbes is applicable in the matter now before us as the

District Court rejected the defendant’s summary judgment motion, which was based on

qualified immunity, upon a determination that “there was a genuine issue of material fact

regarding the issue of political retaliation by Defendants.” App. at 9 (Dist. Ct. Letter

Order, September 25, 2002, at 3). Our review of the record reveals that the District Court

did not identify the particular facts that are in dispute or explain the materiality of those

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facts in relation to the qualified immunity issue.2

The District Court’s order was entered prior to our opinion in Forbes, and we do

not fault the District Court for failing to comply with a rule that had not yet been

announced, but in order to ensure that we do not exceed our jurisdiction, we vacate the

order of the District Court and remand for compliance with the Forbes rule. Upon

complying with that rule, the District Court should enter a new order granting or denying

the motion. If aggrieved, the current appellants can take a new appeal at that time and

raise any issues that are properly within our jurisdiction.

2

In denying the appellant’s motion, the District Court simply stated that “[t]aken in

the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Rochford and Dempsey’s conduct could show that

they violated Carroll’s First Amendment Right to not be harassed for his political

beliefs.” App. at 10 (Dist. Ct. Letter Order, September 25, 2002, at 4). The court went on

to note that

[b]oth Rochford and Dempsey were direct superiors to Carroll and were

allegedly the political rivals of John Fox. According to Plaintiff, they

caused him to be demoted, harassed at work, wrongfully charged and

terminated. It is reasonable to conclude that a reasonable officer would

comprehend the unlawfulness of basing any hiring decision of a public

employee on party affiliation and support when party affiliation is not a

requirement for the position.

Id.