Bennett v. Murphy

Opinions of the United

2001 Decisions States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

12-5-2001

Bennett v. Murphy

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 00-2667

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Recommended Citation

"Bennett v. Murphy" (2001). 2001 Decisions. Paper 282.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2001/282

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Filed December 5, 2001

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 00-2667

SALLY BENNETT, ADMINISTRATRIX OF

THE ESTATE OF DAVID BENNETT

v.

FRANCIS J. MURPHY, III, Individually and as a

Pennsylvania State Police Officer of the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania; MARK F. NOWAKOWSKI, Individually and

in his capacity as a Corporal of the Pennsylvania State

Police of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Francis J. Murphy, III,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civ. No. 94-cv-00214)

District Judge: Honorable Robert J. Cindrich

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

September 10, 2001

Before: MANSMANN, RENDELL and ALDISERT,

Circuit Judges.

(Filed December 5, 2001)

Vincent A. Coppola, Esquire

Pribanic & Pribanic

513 Court Place

First Floor

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Victor H. Pribanic, Esquire

Pribanic & Pribanic

1735 Lincoln Way

White Oak, PA 15131

Counsel for Appellee

D. Michael Fisher

Attorney General

John G. Knorr, III

Chief Deputy Attorney General

Chief, Appellate Litigation Section

Kemal A. Mericli

Senior Deputy Attorney General

Office of Attorney General

of Pennsylvania

Department of Justice

Strawberry Square

15th Floor

Harrisburg, PA 17120

Counsel for Appellant

OPINION OF THE COURT

MANSMANN, Circuit Judge:

In this Section 1983 civil rights action alleging use of

excessive force by a police officer in violation of the Fourth

Amendment, state trooper Francis J. Murphy, III, appeals

from the District Court's denial of his motion for summary

judgment based on qualified immunity. In its recent

decision in Saucier v. Katz, 531 U.S. 991, 121 S.Ct. 2151

(2001), the Supreme Court articulated a new framework for

analyzing qualified immunity claims which is applicable

here: the question of whether an officer is entitled to

qualified immunity is distinct from whether he used

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unreasonable force. Because the District Court did not have

the benefit of this framework when it considered Murphy's

entitlement to qualified immunity, we will vacate the order

of the District Court and remand this matter for

reconsideration in accordance with the principles

announced in Saucier.

I.

This case originated in a 1994 prolonged armed standoff

between David Bennett and police officers in a field near an

apartment complex in Greensburg, Pennsylvania. What

began as a domestic dispute culminated in Bennett's being

fatally shot by Trooper Murphy. Sally Bennett, David

Bennett's mother and the administratrix of his estate, filed

this action alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. S 1983.1 The

matter went to trial in September 1996 and the jury

returned a verdict in favor of Murphy. One year later,

Bennett filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 60, alleging that information in Murphy's personnel

records relevant to his credibility had been withheld from

Bennet during discovery. Because it was "satisfied that

Bennett was prejudiced by being denied the opportunity to

consider her use of this important information," the District

Court found that Bennett was entitled to a new trial.

Bennett v. Murphy, No. 94-cv-00214, mem. order at 14

(W.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2000). In granting Bennett's motion, the

District Court rejected Murphy's argument that a new trial

was precluded by Murphy's entitlement to qualified

immunity: "We must recognize . . . that the factfinding

process in a case of deadly force is usually more

complicated than that of an alleged search or seizure. We

find that the facts from which we would make such a ruling

must first be determined by a jury." Id. at 6.

Prior to the trial, Murphy filed a motion for

reconsideration and sought summary judgment based on

_________________________________________________________________

1. Originally Bennett, on behalf of herself and her son's estate, made

numerous state and federal law claims against Murphy and Corporal

Mark Nowakowski of the Pennsylvania State Police. All claims except

those of the estate against Murphy alleging violation of Section 1983

were ultimately dropped or dismissed.

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his assertion of qualified immunity. The District Court

denied these motions. Noting that it had "informally and

unfavorably addressed" Murphy's entitlement to qualified

immunity in its January 7th order granting Bennett's

motion for a new trial, the District Court addressed the

issue of qualified immunity at length. Bennett v. Murphy,

127 F. Supp.2d 689, 690 (W.D. Pa. 2001). Concluding

again that Murphy was not entitled to qualified immunity,

the District Court recounted the facts surrounding the

shooting in the light most favorable to Bennett. 2 The Court

then asked whether, given those facts, it was "indisputably

reasonable as a matter of law" for Murphy to have used

deadly force against Bennett. Id. at 690. The District Court

was unable to answer this question in the affirmative and

concluded that the determination was best left to the jury:

"[T]here is no clearly defined standard of reasonableness for

the court to apply and . . . such a standard should emerge

from the conscience of the community, not the mind of a

single judge." Id. at 699. The District Court took the

position that, as a general rule, qualified immunity is

unavailable in cases involving allegations of excessive force:

_________________________________________________________________

2. The District Court, "ignoring evidentiary disputes," summarized the

facts as follows:

The state police were called to the courtyard of a group of

apartment

buildings on the evening of January 4, 1994 to confront a man,

David Bennett, who they soon learned was distraught at being

unable to see his girlfriend. He was armed with a single shot

shotgun that he held vertically in front of him, with the barrel

pointed up at his head, and the stock facing down. He was "very

deliberate in holding [the gun] toward himself or in the air," and

did

not point the gun at anyone, including state troopers. . . . He

stated

that he wanted to kill himself. . . . As the troopers took up

positions

surrounding him in the open area between the apartment buildings,

he became agitated and began moving toward a group of them, but

stopped for perhaps four seconds before he was shot.. . . Murphy

was positioned 80 yards behind Bennett when he fired. Almost an

hour passed between the time the state troopers first arrived on

the

scene, and the time Bennet was shot.

Bennett admittedly was angry and defiant in the face of a group

of determined, armed state troopers.

Id. at 690-691. (Citations to the record omitted.)

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[E]xcessive force cases are typically riven with factual

disputes about key events. Even where they are not,

the decisive question is one of the reasonableness of

the officer's conduct in light of all the circumstances.

. . . [T]his is a quintessential jury question.

Id. at 694. The District Court concluded that the availability

of qualified immunity turned on Murphy's credibility:

[I]t is only from the mind and mouth of Murphy that

we can supply the crucial "facts and circumstances

confronting" our hypothetical, objectively reasonable

officer. It is only from the testimony of Murphy that we

can gather the information which he maintains creates

the justification for the use of deadly force -- i.e., the

belief that existed in his own mind that his fellow

officers were in imminent danger of death or serious

bodily injury at the hands of Bennett.

Id. at 692. Because this credibility determination could be

made only by a jury, the District Court reasoned that

Murphy was not entitled to summary judgment on the

basis of qualified immunity. Murphy's motion was denied

and this timely appeal followed.

Because this appeal involves solely a question of law and

does not turn on disputed issues of fact, we have

jurisdiction pursuant to the collateral order doctrine under

28 U.S.C. S 1291.3 See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313

(1995); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).

II.

While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court

issued its decision in Saucier v. Katz, 531 U.S. 991, 121

S.Ct. 2151 (2001), clarifying the analysis to be undertaken

by district courts and courts of appeals considering claims

of qualified immunity in cases alleging excessive use of force.4

_________________________________________________________________

3. The District Court did not identify facts in dispute, nor does this

appeal require that we evaluate the facts. Murphy's contention on appeal

is that even if all controverted facts are resolved in favor of Bennett,

his

actions were objectively legally reasonable.

4. The decision in Saucier addressed the qualified immunity defense in

the Bivens context. The analytical framework outlined in Saucier is,

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In Saucier, the Court held that the Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit erred when it adopted an approach to

qualified immunity which was very similar to the one taken

by the District Court in this case: "[T]he ruling on qualified

immunity requires an analysis not susceptible of fusion

with the question whether unreasonable force was used

. . . ." 121 S. Ct. at 2153. Unless the qualified immunity

inquiry is undertaken separately from the constitutional

inquiry, it will "become superfluous or duplicative when

excessive force is alleged." Id. at 2155.

The Supreme Court stressed that the qualified immunity

question must be resolved "at the earliest possible stage in

the litigation." Id. at 2156 (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502

U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam)). "Qualified immunity is

`an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens

of litigation.' " Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. at

526 (1985). "The privilege is `an immunity from suit rather

than a mere defense to liability, and like an absolute

immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously

permitted to go to trial.' " Id.

After Saucier it is clear that claims of qualified immunity

are to be evaluated using a two-step process. First, the

court must determine whether the facts, taken in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, show a constitutional

violation. If the plaintiff fails to make out a constitutional

violation, the qualified immunity inquiry is at an end; the

officer is entitled to immunity. In this case it is clear that

Bennett's submissions, viewed in the light most favorable to

her, do make out a constitutional violation. In Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the Supreme Court held that

the use of force contravenes the Fourth Amendment if it is

excessive under objective standards of reasonableness. If,

as the plaintiff 's evidence suggested, David Bennett had

stopped advancing and did not pose a threat to anyone but

himself, the force used against him, i.e. deadly force, was

objectively excessive.

_________________________________________________________________

however, applicable to cases under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents

of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and to those

brought pursuant to Section 1983. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609

(1999).

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Once it is determined that evidence of a constitutional

violation has been adduced, courts evaluating a qualified

immunity claim move to the second step of the analysis to

determine whether the constitutional right was clearly

established. That is, in the factual scenario established by

the plaintiff, would a reasonable officer have understood

that his actions were prohibited? The focus in this step is

solely upon the law. If it would not have been clear to a

reasonable officer what the law required under the facts

alleged, he is entitled to qualified immunity. If the

requirements of the law would have been clear, the officer

must stand trial.

Saucier's holding regarding the availability of qualified

immunity at the summary judgment stage does not mean

that an officer is precluded from arguing that he reasonably

perceived the facts to be different from those alleged by the

plaintiff. An officer may still contend that he reasonably,

but mistakenly, believed that his use of force was justified

by the circumstances as he perceived them; this

contention, however, must be considered at trial. As the

District Court noted:

[E]ven where the officer must stand trial, he still

benefits from the favorable law precluding

consideration of intent or motive, use of hindsight in

judging tense, unpredictable situations, and allowances

for mistaken judgments. . . .

Bennett, 127 F. Supp. at 694.

III.

The decision in Saucier clarified what was not apparent

before -- that the immunity analysis is distinct from the

merits of the excessive force claim. We have concluded that

the first prong of the two-step Saucier test is satisfied.

Given the District Court's thorough familiarity with all of

the aspects of this matter, it is appropriate that it be given

the first opportunity to apply the second part of the Saucier

analysis. We will, therefore, vacate the order of the District

Court and remand this matter for further consideration.

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A True Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

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