Michaels v. State of NJ

Opinions of the United

2000 Decisions States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

6-6-2000

Michaels v. State of NJ

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 99-5486

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000

Recommended Citation

"Michaels v. State of NJ" (2000). 2000 Decisions. Paper 120.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000/120

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2000 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Filed June 5, 2000

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 99-5486

MARGARET KELLY MICHAELS

Appellant

v.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY; ATTORNEY GENERAL'S

OFFICE; COUNTY OF ESSEX; ESSEX COUNTY

PROSECUTOR; GEORGE L. SCHNEIDER, ESQ. ;

HERBERT TATE, ESQ.; JOHN MASTROANGELO; JOHN

NOONAN; GLENN GOLDBERG, ESQ.; SARAH SPENCER-

MCARDLE; EILEEN C. TREACY, M.A.; THE ESSEX

COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT; NEWARK POLICE

DEPARTMENT; DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY

SERVICES; LOUIS FONNELARAS; SUSAN ESQUILLAN;

"JOHN DOES", 1 THROUGH 20 (FICTITIOUS PERSONS);

"JOSEPH DOES", 1 THROUGH 20 (FICTITIOUS

PERSONS); "JAMES DOES"; "JANE DOES", 1 THROUGH

20 (FICTITIOUS PERSONS); "HARRY DOES", 1 THROUGH

20 (FICTITIOUS PERSONS); GEORGE MCGRATH

SUSAN ESQUILLAN

Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff

v.

THE HEALTH CARE INSURANCE COMPANY

Third-Party Defendant

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civ. No. 96-03557)

District Judge: Honorable Maryanne Trump Barry

* The Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon, Senior Judge of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.

Argued: March 21, 2000

Before: MANSMANN and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges

and ALARCON, Senior Circuit Judge*

(Filed: June 5, 2000)

Louis J. Santore [Argued]

Santore & Kenny

300 Harmon Meadow Boulevard

Secaucus, NJ 07094

Attorney for Appellant

Juan C. Fernandez

Essex County Counsel

Steven C. Mannion [Argued]

Assistant County Counsel

County of Essex

Hall of Records, Room 530

Newark, NJ 07102

Attorneys for Appellees George

McGrath and Richard

Mastroangelo

Jacqueline A. DeGregorio [Argued]

Robert D. Laurino

Weiner Lesniak

629 Parsippany Road

Parsippany, NJ 07054-0438

Attorneys for Sara Sencer-McArdle

John J. Farmer, Jr.

Attorney General of New Jersey

2

Mary C. Jacobson

Assistant Attorney General of

Counsel

Valerie L. Egar [Argued]

Deputy Attorney General

Office of Attorney General of

New Jersey

Department of Law & Public Safety

Division of Law

Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex

Trenton, NJ 08625

Attorneys for Louis Fonnelaras

Terri A. Smith [Argued]

Stevens & Minter

300 Lighting Way

2nd Floor

Secaucus, NJ 07096

Attorney for Susan Esquilin

OPINION OF THE COURT

ALARCON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Margaret Kelly Michaels ("Michaels") appeals from the

order granting the defendants' motion for summary

judgment and dismissing her S 1983 claims against them.

Michaels alleged that the defendants violated her

constitutional rights by employing coercive interview

techniques with child witnesses while investigating

allegations of child abuse made against her. The district

court granted the defendants' motions for summary

judgment on three alternative grounds. First, the district

court found that the defendants were entitled to qualified

immunity because Michaels's allegations that the

defendants engaged in an improper investigation did not

allege a violation of her constitutional rights. The district

court then ruled that even if the improper investigation did

violate her constitutional rights, the defendants would

nonetheless be entitled to qualified immunity because those

3

rights were not clearly established at the time of the

investigation such that a reasonable person in the

defendants' position would have known that they were

violating her rights. Finally, the district court concluded

that, putting the issue of qualified immunity aside,

Michaels's S 1983 malicious prosecution claim must be

dismissed for failure to state a claim. Michaels contends

that each one of the district court's conclusions was

erroneous. We agree with the district court that the use of

improper interview techniques in questioning the children

did not violate any of Michaels's constitutional rights. We

conclude that the district court correctly determined that

Michaels failed to demonstrate that her constitutional

rights were violated. We do not consider its alternative

grounds for granting summary judgment.

I

A child who attended the Wee Care Nursery School in

Maplewood, New Jersey, reported to a nurse at his

pediatrician's office that he had been sexually abused by

Michaels. Michaels was employed at the nursery school as

a teacher. On April 30, 1985, Louis Fonnelaras, an

investigator with the Institutional Abuse Investigation Unit

of the Division of Youth and Family Services, was assigned

to investigate the merits of the child's allegation. Mr.

Fonnelaras informed John Mastroangelo, an investigator

with the Essex County Prosecutor's Office, of the child's

accusation. Mr. Mastroangelo notified Sarah Sencer-

McArdle, the director of the Child Abuse Unit of the

Prosecutor's Office, of the sexual abuse report. Shortly

thereafter, four other children made similar allegations

regarding Michaels's conduct. Ms. Sencer-McArdle

interviewed each of the children. The evidence she

discovered induced a grand jury to return an indictment

against Michaels.

Following the return of the first indictment, other

children reported additional allegations of sexual

misconduct by Michaels at the nursery school. After

interviewing the children, Ms. Sencer-McArdle presented

the results of her investigation to a second grand jury. The

Essex County Prosecutor's Office continued to receive

4

reports of sexual misconduct committed against children at

the Wee Care Nursery School. Ms. Sencer-McArdle

presented this evidence to a third grand jury after

conducting additional interviews. During the course of

these investigations, Mr. Mastroangelo and George

McGrath, another investigator with the Essex County

Prosecutor's Office, Susan Esquilin, a psychologist, and Mr.

Fonnelaras also participated in questioning the children. A

total of one hundred and sixty-three charges werefiled

against Michaels in three separate indictments.

On June 22, 1987, the trial regarding these charges was

commenced in the Superior Court of New Jersey. On April

15, 1988, the jury convicted Michaels of 115 counts of

aggravated assault, sexual assault, endangering the welfare

of children, and terroristic threats. On March 26, 1993, the

Appellate Division reversed the convictions and remanded

for a new trial. The court questioned the reliability of the

methods used to interview the children. The court held

that, "courts must provide a remedy where the record

demonstrates that an accuser's testimony is founded upon

unreliable perceptions, or memory caused by improper

investigative procedures if it results in a defendant's right

to a fair trial being irretrievably lost. . . .[and that a]

factual hearing would be required for this purpose." See

State v. Michaels, 264 N.J. Super. 579, 631-32 (App. Div.

1993). The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the

reversal of the judgment of conviction. See State v.

Michaels, 136 N.J. 299 (1994). On December 1, 1994, the

Essex County Prosecutor's Office dismissed all charges

against Michaels.

On June 13, 1996, Michaels filed a complaint in the

Superior Court of New Jersey. On July 25, 1996, the

defendants removed the action to the United States District

Court, District of New Jersey. Numerous claims and

defendants were dismissed, either voluntarily or by court

order, leaving only the claims of malicious prosecution and

violation of S 1983 against five defendants: Louis

Fonnelaras, John Mastroangelo, Sarah Sencer-McArdle,

George McGrath, and Susan Esquilin (collectively"the

defendants"). The defendants filed motions for summary

judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity. In

5

May, 26, 1999, the district court granted the motions and

dismissed the S 1983 claims. The district court remanded

the common law malicious prosecution claim to the

Superior Court of New Jersey. Michaels timely filed this

appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 1291.

II

We review a district court's grant of a motion for

summary judgment de novo. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200

F.3d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is

appropriate where, viewing the record in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine

issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. See Jones v. School Dist. of

Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403, 409 (3d Cir. 1999).

In analyzing whether a defendant is entitled to the

dismissal of an action based on the defense of qualified

immunity, we must first determine "whether the plaintiff's

claims make out a violation of a constitutional right." Assaf

v. Fields, 178 F.3d 170, 174 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Siegert v.

Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991)). If we conclude that the

plaintiff has alleged a violation of a constitutional right, we

must then determine whether the defendant violated a

clearly established right such that a reasonable official in

the defendant's position would know that his conduct was

unlawful. See id.; see also Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810,

826 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Government officials performing

discretionary functions are `shielded from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.' ") (quoting Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). These inquiries are

questions of law that the court must resolve. See Sharrar,

128 F.3d at 828.

Michaels contends that the district court erred in

concluding that the defendants were entitled to qualified

immunity because the interview techniques they employed

did not violate her constitutional right to due process under

the Fourteenth Amendment. Michaels argues that the

rationale of the district court, adopted from the Seventh

6

Circuit's holding in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789

(7th Cir. 1994), is flawed because it "leaves a Section 1983

Plaintiff, such as Michaels, without recourse."

In Buckley, the plaintiff brought S 1983 claims against

police officers for allegedly coercing witnesses, and paying

them money to make false statements against him, in order

to implicate him in the crime for which he was tried. Id. at

794. The court held in Buckley that "[c]oercing witnesses to

speak . . . is a genuine constitutional wrong" that violates

"the right of the person being interrogated to be free from

coercion." Id. The court further held, however, that the

plaintiff could not "complain that the prosecutors may have

twisted [the witness's] arm" because "[r]ights personal to

their holders may not be enforced by third parties." Id. at

794-95 (citations omitted). The court in Buckley ruled that

"using one person's coerced confession at another's trial

violates his rights under the due process clause," but that

"[p]rosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for actions

as advocates before the grand jury and at trial even if they

present unreliable or wholly fictitious proofs." Id. at 795;

see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976)

(holding that a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity

from a civil suit for damages under S 1983 in initiating a

prosecution and in presenting the state's case, including

deciding which evidence to present).

Consistent with the analysis of the Seventh Circuit in

Buckley, the district court in this matter held that the

techniques used to interview the children during the course

of the investigation did not violate Michaels's constitutional

rights. The district court decided that Ms. Sencer-McArdle

was entitled to absolute immunity in offering the unreliable

evidence.

Michaels is correct in noting that such a rule leaves a

plaintiff like herself without recourse. Indeed, the court in

Buckley recognized this dilemma. 20 F.3d at 795 ("[T]he

only way Buckley can establish a violation of the

Constitution is to plead himself out of court."). The United

States Supreme Court, in upholding absolute prosecutorial

immunity, also noted that absolute prosecutorial immunity

may "leave the genuinely wronged defendant without civil

redress," but concluded that the policies served by granting

7

absolute prosecutorial immunity outweighed any gap in a

plaintiff's recovery. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427. This court

has acknowledged that a person harmed by the actions of

a prosecutor would not be without any redress, because

"[h]arm to a falsely-charged defendant is remedied by

safeguards built into the judicial system - probable cause

hearings, dismissal of the charges - and into the state

codes of professional responsibility." Kulwicki v. Dawson,

969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir. 1992).

Michaels suggests that a but for causation analysis

would be more appropriate to resolving the issue of

qualified immunity in this instance. To support this

proposition, Michaels cites to the dissenting opinion in

Buckley. The dissent in Buckley suggested that prosecutors

are not immune from liability for their non-advocacy

wrongful conduct if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the

indictment and trial would not have occurred but for the

wrongful conduct. 20 F.3d at 800 (Fairchild, J., dissenting).

Judge Fairchild reasoned that the investigation techniques

employed by the officers in Buckley were the same as

manufacturing evidence and suborning perjury, actions

that would be non-advocacy wrongful conduct. See id.

We are persuaded by the reasoning set forth in the

majority opinion of Buckley. While we recognize that this

rule may seem harsh to plaintiffs, we are satisfied that the

remedies set forth in Kulwicki for a falsely-charged

defendant are sufficient to discourage prosecutors from

coercing witnesses to make unreliable statements against a

defendant. Here, for example, Michaels's conviction was

reversed and the serious charges against her were

dismissed because the children's testimony was unreliable.

Michaels also attempts to support her argument that her

constitutional rights were violated by the improper

techniques used to interview the children by relying on the

decision in Clanton v. Cooper, 129 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir.

1997). Michaels asserts that the court in Clanton held that

the plaintiff had standing to assert a constitutional

violation of his rights based upon a witness's coerced

confession. Citing Buckley, the court in Clanton held that "a

person may challenge the government's use against him or

her of a coerced confession given by another person." Id. at

8

1157-58 (emphasis added). It recognized a plaintiff's

constitutional right not to have another person's coerced

statement used against him in an affidavit for an arrest

warrant. See id.

The distinction between Buckley and Clanton is the use

of the improperly obtained statements. In Buckley, the

witness's coerced testimony was presented at trial. The

court held that the prosecutor was absolutely immune from

an action for damages under S 1983 under Imbler. See 20

F.3d at 795. In Clanton, on the other hand, the police used

another person's coerced confession in an affidavit to

obtain an arrest warrant for Clanton. 129 F.3d at 1151. In

using a coerced statement in this manner, the court held in

Clanton that the officers were not entitled to qualified

immunity. See id. at 1159; see also Malley v. Briggs, 475

U.S. 335, 343 (1986) (holding that an officer applying for a

warrant without probable cause may be entitled to qualified

immunity but is not entitled to absolute immunity). Here,

the only use of the improperly obtained statements against

Michaels was the presentation of the children's testimony

before the grand jury and at the criminal trial. Until the

children testified against her, Michaels's constitutional right

to due process was not violated by the techniques used to

interview the children.

The district court did not err in concluding that Michaels

did not demonstrate a violation of her constitutional rights

when the defendants employed improper interview

techniques with the children. Thus, all of the defendants

are entitled to qualified immunity for those acts.

Furthermore, Ms. Sencer-McArdle is entitled to absolute

immunity for offering the testimony of the children against

Michaels before the grand jury in that trial.

III

Michaels also contends that she was denied the

opportunity to discover evidence as to the proper interview

techniques for interviewing children regarding allegations of

sexual abuse in order to demonstrate that the defendants

violated her clearly established constitutional rights.

Because we conclude that the questioning of the children

9

did not violate Michaels's constitutional rights, we need not

consider this question. Furthermore, Michaels'sfinal

contention, that the district court erred in dismissing her

malicious prosecution S 1983 claim for failure to state a

claim, is also unavailing. The district court properly

dismissed her claims on the basis that the remaining

defendants were entitled to immunity. Any discussion in

the district court's order as to whether Michaels stated a

S 1983 malicious prosecution claim was superfluous. The

order granting summary judgment can be upheld without

reaching the court's alternative basis for dismissing the

action.

IV

The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for

their acts in interviewing the children because Michaels did

not demonstrate a violation of her own constitutional

rights. Ms. Sencer-McArdle is entitled to absolute immunity

for presenting the children's testimony against Michaels

before the grand jury and at trial. We therefore AFFIRM the

order granting the defendants' motion for summary

judgment and dismissing Michaels's federal claims.

A True Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

10