Churchill v. Star Enterprises

Opinions of the United

1999 Decisions States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

6-28-1999

Churchill v. Star Entr

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 98-1491,98-1632,98-1700

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Recommended Citation

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Filed June 28, 1999

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Nos. 98-1491, 98-1632, and 98-1700

MARY CHURCHILL,

Appellant in No. 98-1491

v.

STAR ENTERPRISES, a/k/a STAR STAFF

INCORPORATED; JOSEPH JANTORNO, a/k/a STAR

STAFF INCORPORATED; DAVID SMITH, a/k/a STAR

STAFF INCORPORATED; BERNADINE LANE, a/k/a STAR

STAFF INCORPORATED

MARY CHURCHILL,

Appellant in No. 98-1632

v.

STAR ENTERPRISES

a/k/a STAR STAFF INCORPORATED;

JOSEPH JANTORNO; DAVID SMITH

MARY CHURCHILL,

v.

STAR ENTERPRISES

a/k/a STAR STAFF INCORPORATED;

JOSEPH JANTORNO; DAVID SMITH,

Appellants in No. 98-1700

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle, III

(D.C. Civ. Nos. 97-03527 and 98-01751)

Argued May 26, 1999

BEFORE: GREENBERG and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges ,

and DOWD,* District Judge

(Filed: June 28, 1999)

Thomas M. Holland (argued)

437 Chestnut Street

The Lafayette Building

Philadelphia, Pa. 19106

Attorney for Mary Churchill

Irving L. Hurwitz (argued)

Gary S. Prish

Carpenter, Bennett & Morrissey

100 Mulberry Street

Three Gateway Center

Newark, New Jersey 07102

Attorneys for Star Enterprises

a/k/a Star Staff Incorporated,

Joseph Jantorno, and David Smith

_________________________________________________________________

*Honorable David D. Dowd, Jr., Senior Judge of the United States

District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.

2

OPINION OF THE COURT

GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case involves a question of claim preclusion: what

steps must a plaintiff take to bring about the consolidation

of her consecutively filed cases in the district court so that

claims in the later case are not precluded by the earlier

action? In particular, the district court barred appellant

Mary Churchill by a judgment on the pleadings from

proceeding with a law suit, Churchill v. Star Enterprises, 3

F. Supp.2d 625 (E.D. Pa. 1998) ("Churchill II"), alleging

claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the

Pennsylvania Human Relations Act because she already

had brought a suit, Churchill I, based on the same facts

and related issues against the defendants in Churchill II,

asserting claims in Churchill I under the Family and

Medical Leave Act. See Churchill v. Star Enters., 3 F.

Supp.2d 622 (E.D. Pa. 1998) ("Churchill I").

We will affirm the district court's judgment on the

pleadings in Churchill II because the two cases involved the

same parties and germane facts, as well as related issues,

and for claim preclusion purposes constituted a single

cause of action that should have been joined in a single

case. We also will affirm the district court's order on the

Appellees' cross-appeal from the denial of an order under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 seeking sanctions against Churchill for

filing Churchill II. Finally, we will affirm on Churchill's

separate appeal from an order denying in part her

application for attorney's fees in Churchill I.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Background

The facts that we find material to our disposition of these

appeals are not contested. Churchill began work at Star

Enterprises, a.k.a. Star Staff Inc. ("Star Staff"), in July

3

1991 managing a food mart at a Texaco station in

Pennsylvania. In June 1996, Churchill was diagnosed with

oral cancer. She then notified her temporary supervisor,

Walter Schreiber, of her condition and of her need to

undergo treatment. During the next two months she

underwent three surgical procedures and between August

and October 1996, she received radiation treatments.

Churchill was limited substantially in performing major life

activities, and thus was disabled, but nevertheless

continued to work. Churchill made numerous requests to

Star Staff for reasonable accommodations during this time,

communicating these requests to David Smith, her

manager, and Joseph Jantorno, her regional manager, but

they were unresponsive. On January 29, 1997, Churchill

made a final request for accommodation, and put Star Staff

on notice that due to her medical needs she qualified for

leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29

U.S.C. SS 2601-2654 ("FMLA"). Jantorno then instructed

Smith to evaluate Churchill and then Jantorno and Smith

consulted with Deborah Cox of Star Staff's Human

Resources Department regarding the case. Star Staff

terminated Churchill on February 5, 1997, because of her

disability. Churchill I and II and these appeals followed.

B. Procedural History

1. Churchill I

Churchill initiated Churchill I on May 20, 1997, against

Star Staff and three of its employees: Jantorno, Smith, and

Bernadine Lane, who replaced her as the station manager.

Churchill alleged that Star Staff, Jantorno, and Smith

violated the FMLA when they discharged her and also were

liable to her on common law claims for bad faith and

wrongful discharge.1 She charged Lane with defamation,

_________________________________________________________________

1. FMLA grants an "eligible employee" the right to 12 work weeks of

leave, over any 12-month period: (1) because of the birth of the

employee's child, in order to take care of the child; (2) because of the

placement of a child with the employee for adoption or foster care; (3) in

order to care for the employee's child, spouse, or parent, if the child,

spouse or parent has a serious health condition; or (4) because of a

serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the

4

but dropped that count on December 19, 1997, and

dismissed Lane as a defendant.

The district court entered judgment on January 27,

1998, for the three remaining defendants on the state law

claims because FMLA preempted them. Trial began on the

other counts on February 11, 1998, and on February 13,

1998, the jury rendered its verdict for Churchill, holding

the defendants jointly and severally liable for damages of

$8,609.02, plus interest at 6.5%, or $559.59. The court

doubled the award as liquidated damages, finding that the

defendants' violation of FMLA was not in good faith. On

February 17, 1998, the court entered judgment for

$18,337.22, and ordered that Churchill be reinstated to a

position equivalent to her prior position with equivalent

wages and benefits.

Churchill then sought attorney's fees of $52,018.20, as

well as costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. S 2617(a)(3). On April

17, 1998, the district court issued a Memorandum and

Order partially granting and partially denying Churchill's

fee application and ordering the defendants to pay

$37,062.50 for attorney's fees and $9,410.19 costs.

Churchill filed a motion for reconsideration of that order,

which the court denied by an order entered on May 28,

1998. On this appeal, Churchill seeks reversal of the

portion of the order denying attorney's fees for (1) time

spent in connection with an unemployment compensation

hearing on March 26, 1997, on a claim Churchill brought

after her discharge and (2) for time to prepare for and

conduct a deposition of Lane.

_________________________________________________________________

functions of the employee's position. 29 U.S.C.S 2612(a)(1). After a

period of qualified leave, an employee is entitled to reinstatement to her

former position or an equivalent one with the same benefits and terms.

29 U.S.C. S 2614(a). FMLA declares it "unlawful for any employer to

interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to

exercise,

any right provided" in the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. S 2615(a)(1). FMLA similarly

declares it "unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other

manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice

made unlawful" under the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. S 2615(a)(2). Section 2917(a)

of FMLA authorizes civil damage actions by employees. 29 U.S.C.

S 2617(a).

5

2. Administrative Claims

Churchill pursued her claims against Star Staff along

parallel courses. Thus, on February 26, 1997, Churchill

filed an administrative complaint alleging disability

discrimination with the Pennsylvania Human Relations

Commission ("PHRC"), and at that time her administrative

complaint was dual filed with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") asserting an American

with Disabilities Act claim. The PHRC dismissed the

disability discrimination claim on or about November 14,

1997, and on April 26, 1998, Churchill received a right to

sue letter dated April 24, 1998, from the EEOC. As we will

discuss, she had not requested a right to sue letter.

3. Churchill II

On April 2, 1998, about two months after the jury

reached its verdict in Churchill I, Churchill filed a complaint

against the Appellees, Star Enterprises, Jantorno, and

Smith, under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),

42 U.S.C. SS 12101 et seq. (Counts I and II); the

Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), 43 Pa. Cons.

Stat. Ann. SS 951 et seq. (1991 & Supp. 1998) (Counts III

and IV); and the New Jersey Family Leave Act, N.J. Stat.

Ann. SS 34:11-B1 et seq. (West Supp. 1999) (Counts V and

VI).2 The Appellees answered the complaint on April 23,

1998, including as an affirmative defense the contention

that Churchill's claims were "barred by the doctrine of res

judicata," and that Appellees had "fully satisfied the court's

judgment entered February 17, 1998 . . . ." There is no

doubt that the Appellees' answer raised the res judicata

defense in reliance on the proceedings in Churchill I and

Churchill does not contend otherwise.

The district court on Appellees' motion to dismiss entered

a judgment for the Appellees on the pleadings on June 23,

1998, on claim preclusion principles because Churchill II

and Churchill I "involved the same cause of action."

Churchill II, 3 F. Supp.2d at 628. On July 21, 1998,

_________________________________________________________________

2. Churchill's complaint was apparently premature with respect to her

ADA claim as she brought it before she received the right to sue letter.

6

Churchill appealed in Churchill II, seeking reinstatement of

her ADA and PHRA Counts.3

4. Star Staff's Rule 11 Motion

On May 1, 1998, the Appellees served Churchill with

notice that they intended to seek sanctions against her for

filing Churchill II and unless she withdrew that case within

21 days they would file the motion for sanctions. Obviously,

Churchill did not comply with their request and on May 29,

1998, when the Appellees filed their motion to dismiss

Churchill II on res judicata grounds, they also moved for

sanctions in the form of reimbursement of attorneys' fees

and costs incurred in bringing the motion. Although, as we

have indicated, the district court granted the Appellees

judgment on the pleadings, it denied their motion for

sanctions "under the totality of the circumstances."

Churchill II, 3 F. Supp.2d at 631.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We exercise plenary review of the order for judgment on

the pleadings, see Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways,

Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 290 (3d Cir. 1988), and thus of the

application of claim preclusion in Churchill II, see Rider v.

Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d 982, 988-95 (3d Cir. 1988), and we

review the denial of Rule 11 sanctions for abuse of

discretion, see Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Federal

Agents, Employees or Officers, 855 F.2d 1080, 1091 (3d Cir.

1988). On Churchill's appeal from the partial denial of her

attorney's fee application in Churchill I we exercise an

abuse of discretion standard. See EEOC v. L.B. Foster Co.,

123 F.3d 746, 750 (3d Cir. 1997).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Claim Preclusion

This case seems to present the first application in any

_________________________________________________________________

3. Churchill does not appeal from the dismissal of the New Jersey Family

Leave Act counts. She apparently brought that claim because Star

Staff's office is in New Jersey.

7

court of appeals of claim preclusion barring the assertion of

claims following a case already litigated under FMLA.4 Yet

while the constellation of facts in this case is new, the

principles of the doctrine of claim preclusion are familiar.

Moreover, the circumstance that FMLA and the interests it

protects are involved in this case does not mean that we

should honor Churchill's request that we depart from those

principles. In particular, this case implicates issues

involving Churchill's failure to seek a stay of Churchill I so

that her claims in Churchill II could have been joined in

that action. It also involves consideration of Churchill's

failure to seek a right to sue letter from the EEOC so that

she could have expedited bringing Churchill II.

The district court decided that the fact that there are

administrative procedures that a plaintiff must follow before

she pursues a PHRA or ADA claim in court did not justify

the court in refusing to apply claim preclusion principles.

The court in reaching its decision indicated that Churchill

could have expedited the administrative procedures and

sought a stay of Churchill I so that the PHRA and ADA

claims could have been included in that case.

Churchill argues that she should not have been required

to seek a stay of Churchill I because a stay, by delaying her

opportunity to obtain relief under FMLA, would have

prejudiced her and frustrated public policy. She alternately

argues that she did move for a stay in Churchill I. She

further argues that she should not have been required to

request that the EEOC expedite issuance of the right to sue

letter in order to exhaust the administrative claims. For the

reasons that follow we reject those arguments, and uphold

the district court's application of claim preclusion

principles.

_________________________________________________________________

4. We have found only one other opinion which applied claim preclusion

to a suit involving an FMLA allegation; however, that case involved

preclusion of the reasserted FMLA claim itself, not allegations under

other statutes. Solien v. Physicians Business Network, Inc. 22 F. Supp.2d

1237 (D. Kan. 1998) (res judicata precluded plaintiff 's FMLA suit where

defendant prevailed on motion for summary judgment).

8

1. The claims in Churchill II required administrative

exhaustion.

As we have indicated the court granted Appellees' motion

for judgment on the pleadings on Churchill's ADA and

PHRA claims in Churchill II.5 Unlike the FMLA, both the

ADA and the PHRA require pursuit of administrative

remedies before a plaintiff may file a complaint in court.

Thus, a party who brings an employment discrimination

claim under Title I of the ADA must follow the

administrative procedures set forth in Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5. See Bishop v.

Okidata, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 416, 424 (D.N.J. 1994).

Accordingly, a party must wait 180 days after filing a

charge with the EEOC for ADA violations before being able

to forego the administrative process and file suit in court.

See 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(e)(1). After 180 days, "[i]f a

complainant is dissatisfied with the progress the EEOC is

making on his or her charge of employment discrimination,

he or she may elect to circumvent the EEOC procedures

and seek relief through a private enforcement action in a

district court." Occidental Life Ins. Co. of California v. EEOC,

432 U.S. 355, 361, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 2451 (1977).

_________________________________________________________________

5. At the oral argument before us a question was raised as to whether

the district judge who heard Churchill I could dismiss Churchill II on the

pleadings on the basis of the record. We are satisfied that the judge's

review of the complaints in Churchill I and II and the answer in Churchill

II adequately supported dismissal based on the face of the pleadings and

that the outcome of this case did not hinge in the district court on the

circumstance that the same judge heard Churchill I and Churchill II and

thus had a special insight into the case. While we recognize that the

Appellees did not attach copies of the pleadings from Churchill I to their

answer in Churchill II as they might have pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

10(c), still in view of the circumstance that the operative facts are

those

in the pleadings in the two cases which are matters of public record, we

decline to remand the matter to the district court so that the Appellees

can amend their answer in Churchill II to include the pleadings from

Churchill I which then would be "part [of the answer] for all purposes."

Id. See Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. White Consolidated Indus., Inc.,

998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) ("To decide a motion to dismiss,

courts generally consider only the allegations contained in the complaint,

exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record.)

(emphasis added); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 339 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989).

9

Similarly, a party must wait one year after filing charges

with the PHRC for alleged PHRA violations before having

the option to forego the state administrative process and file

suit in court. PHRA provides that the PHRC shall have

exclusive jurisdiction of an administrative claim for one

year after its filing, unless the PHRC resolves the claim

before the one year has elapsed. See 43 Pa. Cons. Stat.

Ann. S 962(c)(1).6

As we discuss below, Churchill should have moved to

consolidate Churchill I and Churchill II for they advanced

the same cause of action. Churchill could have filed both

the PHRA and ADA claims presented in Churchill II in time

to join them with her FMLA claim in Churchill I. In the case

of the PHRA claim, no special steps were needed to preserve

that claim and join it to the FMLA action. On May 20,

1997, the date Churchill filed Churchill I, the PHRC still

was investigating her PHRA claim. The EEOC charge was

held in abeyance pending the PHRC's investigation. The

PHRC made a finding of no probable cause on the PHRA

charge on November 14, 1997. Thus, prior to the start of

the trial in Churchill I, Churchill knew that the PHRC had

dismissed her PHRA complaint, and accordingly she could

have brought an action on that claim about three months

before Churchill I went to trial.

_________________________________________________________________

6. The PHRA provides in relevant part:

If within one (1) year after the filing of a complaint with the

Commission, the Commission dismisses the complaint or has not

entered into a conciliation agreement to which the complainant is a

party, the Commission must so notify the complainant. On receipt

of such a notice the complainant shall be able to bring an action

in

the courts of common pleas of the Commonwealth based on the

right to freedom from discrimination granted by this act. If the

court

finds that the respondent has engaged in or is engaging in an

unlawful discriminatory practice charged in the complaint, the

court

shall enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful

discriminatory practice and order affirmative action which may

include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of

employees,

granting of back pay, or any other legal or equitable relief as the

court deems appropriate.

43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 962(c)(1).

10

As for the ADA claim, Churchill could have requested a

right to sue letter after 180 days had passed from the filing

date of her EEOC charge. "At the end of the 180-day period

the employee is entitled to sue, regardless of EEOC

proceedings." Waiters v. Parsons, 729 F.2d 233, 237 (3d

Cir. 1984). Thus, on August 25, 1997, well before the

Churchill I trial, she could have requested a right to sue letter.7

The EEOC must issue the letter upon request. See

McNasby v. Crown Cork and Seal Co., 888 F.2d 270, 274

n.3 (3d Cir. 1989). Churchill did not request a right to sue

letter, instead waiting for the EEOC to issue it. Thus, she

"sat on her rights" when she could have attempted to join

the ADA claim to the FMLA claim in consolidated litigation.

While Churchill argues that in some cases the EEOC may

not respond promptly and correctly to such requests, we

will not address the argument because she did not attempt

to obtain the letter.

Moreover, the district court correctly alternatively held

that Churchill could have requested the court to stay

Churchill I, while she waited for the right to sue letter, and

by that procedural step preserved the PHRA and ADA

claims now precluded. See Churchill II, 3 F. Supp.2d at

630. Churchill points out that the court in Churchill I was

aware of her pending administrative claims, and asserts

that the court improperly and unfairly put "the

responsibility of promoting the ideas of claim preclusion

and judicial economy solely on [her] back." We reject that

argument summarily. Attorneys should organize litigation

that they are pursuing to avoid claim preclusion.

Accordingly, the mere fact that the district court was aware

of Churchill's administrative claims and sua sponte might

_________________________________________________________________

7. The district court believed that because of the application of 42

U.S.C.

S 2000e-5(c) the 180-day period did not begin to run until after 60 days

following Churchill's PHRA filing. See Churchill II, 3 F. Supp.2d at 630.

We need not explore this point further because Churchill did not request

a right to sue letter at any time and the addition of the 60 days to the

180-day period would not affect our result as the extended period would

have expired several months before the trial in Churchill I. We described

the relationship between PHRA and EEOC proceedings in Trevino-Barton

v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 919 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1990). See also Berkoski

v. Ashland Reg'l Med. Ctr., 951 F. Supp. 544 (M.D. Pa 1997).

11

have stayed Churchill I did not relieve Churchill of the

necessity to take steps to preserve her claims. See, e.g.,

Nernberg v. United States, 463 F. Supp. 752 (W.D. Pa.

1979).

Churchill argues that she made a motion for a stay at

trial. In support of this assertion she refers to a side bar

conference during Churchill I, in which the court excluded

references to the administrative claims. The court did not

permit reference to the PHRA and ADA claims because they

were not being litigated along with the FMLA claim. While

these evidentiary proceedings demonstrate that the court

was aware of the administrative claims, they surely do not

include a motion for a stay. In any event, if Churchill

desired that the court stay Churchill I so that she could

include her PHRA and ADA claims in that action, she

should have asked for the stay before the trial.

Churchill also argues that if the court stayed Churchill I

she would have been prejudiced because FMLA offers

equitable relief, such as reinstatement and resumption of

benefits, which should not be delayed for reasons of judicial

economy. Arguing that she sought a "prompt

determination" of her FMLA claims, she contends that she

now has been prevented unjustly from pursuing her rights

under the ADA and PHRA.

In considering this argument, we address the policy

concerns behind FMLA which Congress enacted to promote

job stability when workers confront illness or family

emergencies. The FMLA history evinces Congress's intent to

pass FMLA as an addition to federal labor laws establishing

minimum standards for employment:

The [FMLA] accommodates the important societal

interest in assisting families, by establishing a

minimum labor standard for leave. The bill is based on

the same principle as the child labor laws, the

minimum wage, Social Security, the safety and health

laws, the pension and welfare benefit laws, and other

labor laws that establish minimum standards for

employment.

S. Rep. No. 103-3 at 4, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6-7.

12

Congress stated that the purposes of FMLA include the

following: "(1) to balance the demands of the workplace with

the needs of families, to promote the stability and economic

security of families, and to promote national interests in

preserving family integrity; [and] (2) to entitle employees to

take reasonable leave for medical reasons, for the birth or

adoption of a child, and for the care of a child, spouse or

parent who has a serious health condition; . . ." FMLA

S 2(b)(1), (2), 29 U.S.C. S 2601(b)(1), (2).

In support of its decision to enact FMLA, Congress made

several findings, including the recognition that"the primary

responsibility for family caretaking often falls on women,

and such responsibility affects the working lives of women

more than it affects the working lives of men; . . ." FMLA

S 2(a)(2), (3), (5), 29 U.S.C. S 2601(a)(2), (3), (5). Given this

background, it is clear that FMLA is intended to aid

workers --especially but not exclusively working mothers

like Churchill--maintain job stability when they must care

for themselves or their family. Nevertheless, despite the

substantive protection FMLA provides, we see no reason to

hold that Congress intended in enacting FMLA that

proceedings under the statute are not to be given preclusive

effect in later litigation. Thus, while FMLA provides for

equitable relief, including reinstatement, we cannotfind

that this important legislative goal "trumps" long standing

preclusive effect doctrines.

Case law dealing with FMLA is limited. Churchill does not

cite any case law to buttress her contention that an FMLA

plaintiff is somehow due greater latitude than other

plaintiffs with respect to the need to delay litigation in order

to consolidate separate cases. To the contrary, federal

courts thus far have viewed FMLA as similar to Title VII,

the ADA, and other laws which protect employees. See, e.g.,

Holmes v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 1998 WL 564443, at *8

(E.D. Pa. 1998) (FMLA, PHRA and ADA "protect the same

interests and provide relief for the same violations").

We may look to case law under Title VII in assessing the

situation of plaintiffs who do not seek a stay of an FMLA

suit as they wait for an EEOC right to sue letter before

asserting an ADA claim, or who for some other reason delay

bringing an ADA claim. Three courts of appeals have held

13

that a plaintiff in an employment discrimination case may

have to forego administrative remedies and obtain an early

right to sue letter. See Heyliger v. State Univ. and

Community College Sys. of Tenn., 126 F.3d 849, 855 n.2

(6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1054 (1998);

Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Assocs., Inc., 999 F.2d 223, 225

(7th Cir. 1993); and Woods v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 972 F.2d

36, 40 (2d Cir. 1992). We agree with these persuasive

decisions.

In Heyliger, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

held that an employee's prior state court lawsuit against his

employer under a state civil rights law prevented the

employee from suing the employer in federal court for

allegedly violating Title VII. The court determined that the

state and federal claims arose out of the employer's

decision not to renew the employee's contract, the state

court had entered a valid and final judgment on merits of

state claims, and the Title VII claim could have been added

to the state claims. The court of appeals concluded that

requiring a plaintiff in the circumstances in Heyliger to

seek a right to sue letter and to amend his complaint to

add the federal claim would not impose a burden on him

beyond that of a due diligence standard. Id. at 856.

Similarly, in Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Assoc., Inc., 999

F.2d at 225-26, the court held that the plaintiff, in order to

avoid claim preclusion, had been obliged to seek a right to

sue letter and join his Title VII claim with another,

sufficiently related, pending federal action. Finally, in

Woods v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 972 F.2d at 40-41, the court

precluded a Title VII action where the plaintiff could have

sought a right to sue letter and an order to file an amended

complaint in a pending federal case to include the Title VII

claim.

Thus, courts have rejected favoring "the language and

policy of Title VII" as "against application of well-settled

claim preclusion principles." Woods, 972 F.2d at 39. We do

not find that the language and policy of FMLA is so

different from that of Title VII as to "trump" the claim

preclusion principles. Title VII, like FMLA, provides for back

pay and front pay or reinstatement. 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e et

seq. See Marinelli v. City of Erie, 25 F. Supp.2d 674, 678

14

(W.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed, 135 F.3d 765 (3d Cir. 1998).

Accordingly, the harm to a successful plaintiff under both

FMLA and Title VII will be mitigated in many cases by the

accrual of back pay and prejudgment interest if she

prevails.

We recognize the burden placed upon working, single

parents like Churchill in confronting their own serious

illness or that of a family member, and acknowledge the

protection offered by FMLA and the important interests it

addresses. Yet Title VII similarly addresses injuries

sustained by employees suffering discrimination, who

wrongly may be forced from work and required to wait for

redress in the form of reinstatement or back pay as they

pursue their claims. Persons pursuing rights under these

statutes must preserve their ability to seek redress in a

manner compatible with longstanding principles of judicial

economy: requesting a right to sue letter is not an onerous

burden, and we believe that in many cases a motion to stay

an FLMA action will preserve all legal claims without undue

prejudice to the plaintiff. We believe that district courts are

likely to look favorably on applications for stays of FMLA

proceedings while plaintiffs promptly pursue administrative

remedies under Title VII and similar state laws and we urge

them to do so.8

It is also important to bear in mind another point.

Churchill I and II involved statutes with fee-shifting

provisions. See 29 U.S.C. S 2617(a)(3) (FMLA); 43 Pa. Cons.

Stat. Ann. S 962(c.2) (PHRA); 42 U.S.C. S 12205 (ADA).

Thus, an employer held liable in consecutive actions

without doubt will be confronted with multiple motions for

attorney's fees and costs. Moreover, employers defending

consecutive actions, whether or not the actions are

successful, will incur greater attorney's fees and other

expenses for their defenses than they would incur if

defending only a single case. Surely it is only fair that such

applications and expenses be avoided as the purpose of

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8. Obviously we are not concerned here with a situation in which a court

denied a diligent plaintiff's application for a stay in an FMLA action and

thus precluded her from asserting her various claims in a single case. In

those circumstances we might reach a different result.

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statutes such as the FMLA, the PHRA, and the ADA is to

provide protection for employees and to allow them to

recover damages or other relief for employers' conduct if the

employees can establish liability under the applicable

statute. Congress did not pass the statutes for the purpose

of generating legal fees for plaintiffs' and defendants'

attorneys. We are not so naive that we do not recognize that

if we reached a different result on the claim preclusion

issue we would be encouraging knowledgeable plaintiffs'

attorneys to bring separate cases to generate additional

attorney's fees in situations in which a single case would

suffice. Applying claim preclusion principles as we do will

further the legitimate policy of avoiding unnecessary legal

expenses.

Overall, then, we are satisfied that in this case we should

apply ordinary claim preclusion principles. Thus, we

address the question of whether Churchill I and Churchill II

involved the same cause of action so that Churchill II is

precluded.

2. The cause of action.

The purpose of claim preclusion is to avoid piecemeal

litigation of claims arising from the same events. See Board

of Trustees of Trucking Employees of North Jersey Welfare

Fund, Inc. v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495, 504 (3d Cir. 1992). "[A]

final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the

parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or

could have been raised in that action." Rivet v. Regions

Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 473, 118 S.Ct. 921, 925

(1998) (internal citation omitted). A determination of

whether two lawsuits are based on the same cause of

action "turn[s] on the essential similarity of the underlying

events giving rise to the various legal claims." Board of

Trustees, 983 F.2d at 504, quoting U.S. v. Athlone Indus.,

Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983 (3d Cir. 1984). Because the courts

have not defined precisely "causes of action," for claim

preclusion purposes, we take a broad view, focussing on

the underlying events of the two actions. Athlone, 746 F.2d

at 984.

Claim preclusion gives dispositive effect to a prior

judgment if "a particular issue, although not litigated, could

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have been raised in the earlier proceeding. Claim preclusion

requires: (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit

involving; (2) the same parties or their privities; and (3) a

subsequent suit based on the same cause of action." Id.

"Courts should not apply this conceptual test mechanically,

but should focus on the central purpose of the doctrine, to

require a plaintiff to present all claims arising out the same

occurrence in a single suit." Id.

The Appellees clearly demonstrated the presence of the

first two requirements set forth in Athlone when they

sought judgment in their favor in Churchill II and Churchill

acknowledges this point. There had been a final judgment

on the merits in Churchill I, and Churchill I and II involved

the same parties. As for the third requirement, i.e., whether

the cause of action was the same, the district court

properly concluded that the case "involve[d] the same cause

of action because the underlying events in both cases are

the same," as the acts complained of were the same, and

the evidence at the trial would have been the same. While

Churchill cited different statutes to support her two cases,

the FMLA in Churchill I and the ADA and PHRA in Churchill

II, the court correctly observed that the fact that Churchill

advanced different legal theories does not mean that her

second action will not be precluded.

Churchill contends that Churchill II differs from Churchill

I because the Churchill II complaint introduced "new

material facts" and "new elements of . . . damages." She

argues in particular that the following "new material facts"

were presented as "additional allegations" in the Churchill II

complaint: (1) David Smith replaced temporary supervisor

Walter Schreiber in October 1996; (2) in Churchill II she

listed side effects including fatigue, depression, weight loss,

loss of appetite, difficultly swallowing, dry mouth, sores in

the mouth, and limited range of movement in the neck;

(3) Smith informed Jantorno of her requests for

accommodation; (4) Jantorno then scheduled an "untimely"

evaluation of Churchill and asked Smith to conduct an

evaluation; and (5) Smith and Jantorno consulted with

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Deborah Cox of the Human Resources Department of Star

Staff, as to how to deal with the situation.9

Indeed, these were new allegations but the thrust of the

two complaints remained practically identical. See Harding

v. Duquesne Light Co., 1995 WL 916926 at *3 (W.D. Pa.

1995) (no showing of different "causes of actions" where

complaints "practically identical"). In each complaint,

Churchill stated where, when and for whom she worked,

that she was diagnosed for cancer in the summer of 1996,

had three surgeries and radiation treatment, that she

sought staff assistance as an accommodation to her

medical condition, that several requests for accommodation

were ignored and that she was fired as a result of her

disability and medical needs and efforts to receive the

accommodation she claimed was due. Moreover, in

Churchill II she was seeking a recovery for essentially the

same wrongful conduct for which she obtained a recovery

in Churchill I.

Thus, we conclude that the district court properly found

that the claims were the same under Athlone, and that

claim preclusion should apply. There is simply no escaping

from the fact that Churchill has relied on different legal

theories to seek redress from the Appellees for a single

course of wrongful conduct. Because the claims were the

same, Churchill asserted a single cause of action in both

cases that the doctrine of claim preclusion required her to

have joined in one suit. Thus, this case at bottom is simply

a classic example of splitting a cause of action. 10

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9. Specifically, Churchill I's complaint does not specify that Smith

replaced Schreiber, but merely identifies Schreiber as her temporary

supervisor, and identifies Smith as "at all times [Churchill's] Manager";

states that Churchill had and was treated for cancer, but does not

specify the side effects suffered; states that on January 29, 1997,

"[Churchill] provided sufficient notice to Defendant Smith that she had

a serious medical need which qualified [Churchill] for Family Medical

Leave," but otherwise does not describe how the Appellees became aware

of her condition, and does not include information about the evaluation

and how Cox was involved.

10. It should not be thought that by artful pleading of unnecessary

allegations in a second complaint a plaintiff can avoid the result we

reach.

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B. The Remaining issues

As we indicated, the Appellees have filed a cross-appeal

from the denial of sanctions under Rule 11 and Churchill

has filed an appeal from the denial of certain attorney's fees

and costs in Churchill I. We have reviewed these appeals

carefully and have concluded that they are without merit.

Thus, we will affirm on these appeals without further

discussion.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the order entered

May 28, 1998, on appeal in No. 98-1491, denying

reconsideration of the order with respect to counsel fees

and costs, and will affirm the order entered June 23, 1998,

on appeal on Nos. 98-1632 and 98-1700, granting the

Appellees judgment on the pleadings but denying their

motion for sanctions.

A True Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

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