Opinion

Boyle v. County of Allegheny

  • 139 F.3d 386
Court
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed
Mar 23, 1998
Author
Ackerman
On the bench
Ackerman, Lewis, Scirica
Cited by
101 cases
Authority
More cited than 87.6%

The opinion

Opinions of the United

1998 Decisions States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

3-23-1998

Boyle v. County of Allegheny

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 97-3222

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Filed March 23, 1998

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 97-3222

PATRICK J. BOYLE,

Appellant,

v.

COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY PENNSYLVANIA; LARRY DUNN,

COMMISSIONER, in his individual capacity;

BOB CRANMER, COMMISSIONER, In his

individual capacity,

Appellees

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(Dist. Ct. Civil Action No. 96-141)

Argued November 17, 1997

BEFORE: SCIRICA and LEWIS, CIRCUIT JUDGES, and

ACKERMAN, DISTRICT JUDGE*

(Filed: March 23, 1998)

Samuel J. Cordes, Esq. (Argued)

OGG, JONES, CORDES & IGNELZI,

L.L.P.

245 Fort Pitt Boulevard

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Attorney for Appellant

_________________________________________________________________

* Honorable Harold A. Ackerman, Senior Judge of the United States

District Court for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation.

Kurt A. Miller, Esq. (Argued)

Terrence M. Lewis, Esq.

THORP, REED & ARMSTRONG

One Riverfront Center

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Attorneys for Appellees

OPINION OF THE COURT

HAROLD A. ACKERMAN, Senior District Judge:

This appeal arises out the employment termination of

appellant Patrick J. Boyle ("Boyle") by the County of

Allegheny, Pennsylvania from his position as Deputy

Director of Marketing and Communications in the county's

Department of Aviation. Boyle, a Democrat, alleged in his

complaint that he was terminated based on his political

affiliation in violation of the First and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution and 42

U.S.C. S 1983. Boyle sought reinstatement to the position of

Deputy Director, various other equitable relief and

compensatory and punitive damages for pain, suffering,

emotional distress and humiliation resulting from his

allegedly unlawful termination.

While denying that he was terminated for his political

affiliation, defendants/appellees moved for summary

judgment in the district court contending that even if he

were, such a termination was proper under Elrod v. Burns,

427 U.S. 347 (1976), Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1979),

and their progeny. Boyle opposed the motion, relying in

large measure on the deposition testimonies of two of the

three members of the Board of Commissioners of Allegheny

County. These Commissioners testified that political

affiliation was not an appropriate requirement for the

position of Deputy Director of Marketing and

Communications.

The district court granted defendants' motion for

summary judgment, concluding that the deposition

testimonies of the two Commissioners were not significantly

probative on the question of whether political affiliation was

2

an appropriate requirement for the position held by Boyle

under Supreme Court and Third Circuit case law. This

Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291.

We reverse.

I. Factual Background

The Board of Commissioners of Allegheny County has

traditionally been a stronghold for the Democratic Party.

For nearly fifty years, until 1995, the three-member Board

was comprised of a Democratic majority. In 1995, however,

two Republican Commissioners, Larry Dunn and Bob

Cranmer,1 were elected, and the Board became a

Republican majority.

Boyle was hired by Allegheny County as Deputy Director

in its Department of Aviation on January 21, 1986. By

letter, dated December 21, 1995, Dunn and Cranmer, as

Commissioners-elect, demanded plaintiff 's resignation

based upon their belief that "those in management and

leadership positions, appointed to our new administration,

share our priorities of government." When the new

Republican-dominated Board took office in January, 1996,

the county terminated the employment of a number of

directors and deputy directors, including Boyle. Boyle

contends in his suit that he was terminated because he

was a registered Democrat and he supported the election

campaigns of Democratic candidates for county

Commissioner.

A. Job Duties and Responsibilities

The Deputy Director position was a third level

management position in the governmental hierarchy in

Allegheny County with respect to the Department of

Aviation. Boyle reported directly to the Director, who in

turn, reported to the Board of Commissioners. The

positions reporting directly to the Deputy Director included

the manager of public relations, senior administrative

officer/capital projects, marketing analyst, information

clerk supervisor and senior secretary.

_________________________________________________________________

1. The lone Democrat remaining on the Board was Michael Dawida.

3

At some time during his employment, Boyle drafted a job

description for the position of Deputy Director of Marketing

and Communications.2 Boyle characterized his position as

a management level staff position "designed to carry out

policy decisions by the Director of Aviation and the County

Commissioners . . . [and to] interpret policy requirements,

act and sign documents on behalf of the director, speak to

news media on the record, and initiate or respond to public

affairs activities as required." He was "responsible for

planning, preparing, and executing all communications,

marketing and development programs for the aviation

system, as well as coordinating public affairs and

community relations activities, and the airport public

information program."

The job description listed the Deputy Director's "Major

Duties" as follows:

(1) Supervise and manage all activities of the

marketing, community relations, and public

information functions of the aviation system.

(2) Develop and prepare written material for public

dissemination, including news releases, marketing

reports, newsletters and correspondence.

(3) Maintain contact with prospective and present

clients and tenants.

(4) Develop and coordinate program to deal with

complaints, passenger relations with airport tenants,

and other travelers' concerns, especially insofar as

these activities affect airport operations and

maintenance.

(5) Monitor and review any airport problem that may

be apparent to the public, and advise the appropriate

section of such problems and any public relations

ramifications.

(6) Observe and interpret accidents, emergencies, and

disaster scenes to determine how best to handle the

response by news media.

_________________________________________________________________

2. Boyle testified in his deposition that the job description, in general,

accurately described the duties he had as Deputy Director.

4

(7) Coordinate and authorize news coverage of any

activity in the airport, assist the news media in

covering events and staff the emergency

communications center when necessary and provide

needed logistical support to media.

(8) Serve as authorized airport spokesman.

(9) Manage or assist special projects required to

support airport mission, for instance, dedicating new

buildings, hosting VIP tours, sponsoring seminars, etc.

(10) Coordinate airport initiatives and responses in

rate cases, new service opportunities, development

projects, etc.

(11) Oversee information clerks and disbursal of

information from airport information desks. Regulate

material given out at information desks.

(12) Prepare correspondence for director and

commissioners.

(13) Advise Director and Commissioners about

protocol, background and ramifications of events,

opportunities, proposals, etc.

(14) Develop and manage programs for airport tours

and speakers' bureau. Liaison with tenants to include

wide array of resources for public information.

(15) Stand in for the Director at Commissioners'

meetings in his absence.

(16) Develop in-service training programs and other

educational programs to educate staff and maintain

current awareness of significant issues.

(17) Approve all information from the Department that

will be disseminated to the public.

(18) Maintain logs of tours, visitors, speakers,

meetings, events and airport business, and prepare

reports reflecting all airport activities on a regular basis

for Director and Commissioners.

(19) Liaison with regional groups such as Penns

Southwest, Chamber of Commerce, R.I.D.C.,

Convention & Visitors Bureau, and business groups.

5

(20) Manage contracts and programs to market and

promote the airports, the County or the region,

including supervision of consultants for advertising,

marketing, promotion, etc.

In addition, Boyle completed a "Job Evaluation

Questionnaire" in May, 1994 which, among other things,

asked him to describe "the specific duties and

responsibilities involved in doing your job." The top five

duties and responsibilities were as follows: (1) Crisis

Management/Problem Solving; (2) Media Relations;

(3) Internal Communications/Information Services;

(4) Policy Implementation/Advice; and (5) Community

Relations/Public Affairs. Boyle also acknowledged that a

crucial part of his job was to "influence, promote and sell"

to community and professional contacts. With regard to the

level of guidance necessary to perform his job, Boyle

checked the category "Broad," which was defined as:

With managerial responsibility, there is latitude for

decision making and setting of priorities. Long range

projects (over one year) are assigned which are

reviewed through achievement of objectives, according

to predefined goals.

Boyle also acknowledged that "the effect of typical errors

made in the course of performing the duties of this job"

would have a "[s]ignificant impact affecting major programs,

or corporate objectives, impairing the performance of the

Department of Aviation," and that he had "[c]omplete

freedom for independent judgment and discretion."

A further glimpse into Boyle's duties and responsibilities

is provided by letters sent by him to prospective employers.

For instance, in a letter, dated November 24, 1995, to a

general manager at the Metropolitan Washington Airports

Authority, Boyle stated that he was hired by Allegheny

County to "assist in lobbying, planning, building and

dedicating a new billion dollar airport." This project,

according to Boyle, involved "extensive negotiations with

Federal and State officials, airlines, and the construction

industry, and included considerable interaction with

community groups." In another letter seeking a position at

the Pittsburgh Foundation, dated May 23, 1996, Boyle

6

stated that as Deputy Director, he "served as airport

spokesman and managed all public affairs, marketing and

communications."

A letter of recommendation from the chairman of the

county Commission, Tom Foerster, which was drafted by

Boyle himself, stated that Boyle joined the chairman's staff

in 1986 "to line up state funding for Strategy 21 and

persuade USAir to build the Midfield Terminal." He further

stated that Boyle "has been of great value . . . for many

years as a speech writer, corresponding secretary, and

trouble-shooter at the airport."

After his termination, Boyle applied for unemployment

benefits. In a questionnaire completed by Boyle, he stated

that his duties as Deputy Director were to "manage

communications and public relations for [the] airport," that

he had "full discretion and responsibility," and that he "had

full authority to make and implement decisions."

In deposition testimony, Boyle acknowledged that as

Deputy Director, he would report to the Commissioners on

various matters, including the ramifications of various

policies and proposed policies of the Commissioners. Boyle

would also occasionally sit in on county Board meetings on

behalf of the Director. The Board's minutes reveal that

Boyle engaged in discussions with the Commissioners on

various issues affecting the Department of Aviation. The

minutes further reflect that Boyle at times made formal

Requests for Board Action on behalf of the Director.

Significantly, in a letter, dated October 31, 1995, Boyle

stated that "[f]or the past 10 years, I have been deputy

director of Pittsburgh International Airport, and have served

informally as Commissioner Tom Foerster's director of

correspondence."

At the time of his termination, Boyle's annual salary was

$57,035.52.

B. Deposition Testimonies of Commissioners

In his deposition, Cranmer, one of the new Republican

Commissioners on the Board, testified that the position of

Deputy Director did not require a certain political

affiliation:

7

Q. If you were listing requirements for the deputy

director of marketing and communications at the

aviation department, would affiliation with one

political party or another be a requirement for

that?

A. No.

Q. Would support of one candidate in the last election

or not --

A. No.

Q. You've got to let me finish. Would support of one

candidate in the last election be an appropriate

requirement for the position of deputy director of

marketing and communications?

A. No.

Mr. Cranmer further testified that there was no "rational

connection between political affiliation" and the position of

Deputy Director, contradicting the defendants' answers to

interrogatories on this issue. Mr. Cranmer stated in no

uncertain terms that he did not "agree with the fact that a

political affiliation has anything to do with this job, has

nothing to do with it."

Michael Dawida, the lone Democratic Commissioner on

the Board, provided similar testimony:

Q. Commissioner, does the position of deputy director

of marketing and communications for the

Department of Aviation require that a person have

a certain political affiliation?

A. No. Absolutely not.

Q. Does the fact that one is either a Democrat or

Republican affect that person's ability to do the

job?

A. Absolutely not.

Q. Does the fact that the person in that position

supported one political party of the other political

party affect his or her ability to do the job?

A. No.

8

Q. Does the fact that the person in that position

supported one candidate over another in a prior

election affect his or her ability to do that job?

A. No.

Confronted with seemingly strong evidence that Boyle's

position allowed him to have meaningful input into

significant issues affecting the county, on the one hand,

and the deposition testimonies, on the other, the district

court chose the former, and granted the defendants' motion

for summary judgment:

[T]he undisputed facts demonstrate that plaintiff 's

duties as Deputy Director were of broad scope, that

plaintiff acted as an advisor to policymakers and that

plaintiff participated in discussions and other meetings

with policymakers and had the authority in some

instances to act and speak on behalf of policymakers.

The Court, therefore, finds as a matter of law that the

duties inherent in the position of Deputy Director are

such that political ideology is an appropriate

requirement for the effective performance of that

position. Accordingly, terminating plaintiff from the

Deputy Director position because of plaintiff 's political

affiliation would not offend the First Amendment.

Memorandum Op. at 19.

The significance of the deposition testimonies of Cranmer

and Dawida was disposed of in a footnote as follows, in its

entirety:

Plaintiff's reliance on the deposition testimony of two

County Commissioners, that is, Cranmer and Dawida,

in that those individuals testified that party affiliation

is not an appropriate requirement for the Deputy

Director position does not affect the Court's conclusion.

In light of the undisputed evidence regarding plaintiff's

authorized and actual duties as Deputy Director, the

Court finds that the cited deposition testimony does

not create a genuine issue of material fact. See

Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir.

1994) ("There must be sufficient evidence for a jury to

return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party; if the

9

evidence is merely colorable or not significantly

probative, summary judgment should be granted.").

Id. at 20 n.7.

Had the district court been sitting as the finder of fact,

we would have little trouble in affirming its decision.

However, at the summary judgment stage, the district court

improperly weighed conflicting evidence in granting the

defendants' motion. The deposition testimonies of two of the

three members of the Board of Commissioners, which

constituted the relevant hiring authority in this case,

created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the

position of Deputy Director of the Department of Aviation

was subject to the Elrod/Branti exception. Accordingly, this

court is constrained to reverse the district court's decision

and remand for further proceedings.

II. Discussion

This Court exercises plenary review of the district court's

granting of summary judgment. See Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42

F.3d 825, 830 (3d Cir. 1994). Accordingly, "the appellate

court is required to apply the same test the district court

should have utilized." Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814

F.2d 893, 896 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S.

1052 (1987); see also Sempier v. John & Higgins, 45 F.3d

724, 727 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1159 (1995).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a

motion for summary judgment will be granted

if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine

issue of material fact and that the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

See also Todaro v. Bowman, 872 F.2d 43, 46 (3d Cir. 1989);

Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 896. In other words, "summary

judgment may be granted if the movant shows that there

exists no genuine issue of material fact that would permit

a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party." Miller v.

Indiana Hosp., 843 F.2d 139, 143 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,

488 U.S. 870 (1988). All facts and inferences are construed

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Peters

10

v. Delaware River Port Auth. of Pa. and N.J., 16 F.3d 1346,

1349 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 811 (1994).

The substantive law will identify which facts are

"material." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

247-48 (1986). Therefore, "[o]nly disputes over facts that

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment."

Id. An issue is "genuine" if a reasonable jury could possibly

hold in the nonmovant's favor with regard to that issue. Id.

However, at the summary judgment stage, a court may

not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations;

these tasks are left to the fact-finder. Petruzzi's IGA

Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., Inc., 998 F.2d

1224, 1330 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 994 (1993).

Therefore, to raise a genuine issue of material fact, " `the

[summary judgment] opponent need not match, item for

item, each piece of evidence proffered by the movant,' but

simply must exceed the `mere scintilla' standard." Id.; see

also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 ("The mere existence of a

scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant's]

position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on

which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmovant].").

It is clear, however, that if a moving party satisfies its

initial burden of proving a prima facie case for summary

judgment, the opposing party "must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material

facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, "[t]here must be

sufficient evidence for a jury to return a verdict in favor of

the non-moving party; if the evidence is merely colorable or

not significantly probative, summary judgment should be

granted." Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d

Cir. 1994).

The primary issue raised on appeal is fairly

straightforward: whether the district court erred in

discounting the statements made by two of the three

Allegheny County Commissioners--to the effect that

political affiliation was not an important factor for the job

of Deputy Director of Marketing and Communications in

the county's Department of Aviation--in granting the

11

defendants' motion for summary judgment. Boyle argues in

his appeal that the district court engaged in an improper

weighing of the evidence. The statements made by the two

Commissioners, Boyle contends, constitute admissions, and

thus, the district court erred in finding that they lacked any

probative significance. We agree.

In arguing for affirmance of the district court's decision,

appellees characterize the deposition testimonies as

"probative of nothing." Appellee's Brf. at 38. Appellees argue

that whatever statements may have been made by the two

Commissioners, the legal test remains whether the

authorized duties and functions of the employee's position

is confidential or policymaking. The statements by the

Commissioners, according to the appellees, shed no light on

the factors which both the Supreme Court and this court

have held to be relevant.

While it is true that both the Supreme Court and this

court have developed various formulations to be applied in

political patronage cases in general, those cases did not

involve statements made by the relevant hiring authority to

the effect that a particular political affiliation was not an

appropriate requirement for the particular position. Indeed,

the precise issue raised in this appeal is one of first

impression in this circuit. While the ever evolving

formulations developed by the Supreme Court and this

court are to be applied in cases which present no

conflicting testimony from members of the hiring authority,

we believe that a rigid application of such tests under the

circumstances of this case would render the relevant

analysis overly formalistic and not consonant with the

principles and rationales underlying the development of the

law in the area of political patronage.

Political patronage is a practice as old as the American

Republic. See Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 95

(1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (commenting that political

patronage "bears the endorsement of a long tradition of

open, widespread, and unchallenged use that dates back to

the beginning of the Republic"). It has been argued by

commentators that political patronage, while at times

possessing a pejorative connotation, has been a basic and

accepted element in the development of the American form

12

of democratic government, essential to maintain loyalty and

strength in the political party system. See R. Hofstadter,

The Idea of a Party System, 225-26 (1969). While political

patronage has certainly been embedded in the fabric of the

American political process, the case law concerning its

limitations in the face of countervailing First Amendment

rights is of more recent vintage.

In Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), the Supreme

Court, in a plurality opinion, held that the discharge of a

government employee because of his political affiliation

violates the freedom of association clause of the First

Amendment. Id. at 373. The case arose from the election of

a Democratic Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois who, upon

taking office, terminated the employment of deputy sheriffs

who were not members or who did not otherwise support

the Democratic party. In finding that such a practice

violated the First Amendment, the Supreme Court generally

ended the practice of "cleaning house," whereby the

prevailing political party would fire many employees who

were members of the losing party, and give the vacant

positions to loyal supporters as the spoils of victory.

The Elrod Court recognized that termination based solely

on political affiliation, on its face, was at war with First

Amendment principles. 427 U.S. at 359. The Court,

however, did not completely do away with the practice, but

recognized that political affiliation was relevant to the

performance of the duties of certain positions. Id. at 367.

The Court justified this exception by weighing the

governmental benefit of considering political affiliation

as a criterion in employment decisions against the

encroachment on an employee's First Amendment

right to political association. Id. A plurality of

the Court distinguished between "policymaking" and

"nonpolicymaking" positions in determining when political

affiliation was relevant for employment decisions. Id. at

367-68. Those positions falling into the former category

were held to be exempt from the general prohibition against

terminating employees based on political affiliation. Id. at

372. Accordingly, a "nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential

government employee" could not be discharged on the sole

ground of his political beliefs. Id. at 375 (Stewart, J.,

concurring). The plurality acknowledged that

13

[n]o clear line can be drawn between policymaking and

nonpolicymaking positions. While nonpolicymaking

individuals usually have limited responsibility, that is

not to say that one with a number of responsibilities is

necessarily in a policymaking position. The nature of

the responsibilities is critical . . . . An employee with

responsibilities that are not well defined or are of broad

scope more likely functions in a policymaking position.

In determining whether an employee occupies a

policymaking position, consideration should also be

given to whether the employee acts as an adviser or

formulates plans for the implementation of broad goals.

Id. at 367-68.

The Court also made clear that the intermediate

"exacting" level of scrutiny must be applied. Id. at 362.

Thus, the "interest advanced must be paramount, one of

vital importance, and the burden is on the government to

show the existence of such an interest." Id.

Three years later, the Supreme Court reformulated the

Elrod test. In Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1979), two

county assistant public defenders brought a civil rights

action alleging that their imminent termination by the

newly appointed Democratic public defender was based

solely on the fact that they were Republicans. The Court

reiterated the general principle that if an employee's

"private political beliefs would interfere with the discharge

of his public duties, his First Amendment rights may be

required to yield to the State's vital interest in maintaining

governmental effectiveness and efficiency." Id. at 517.

The Branti Court was clearly dissatisfied with the

categorical approach enunciated in Elrod, which

distinguished between "policymaking" and

"nonpolicymaking" positions, and sought to clarify that test.

445 U.S. at 518. Accordingly, the Branti Court held that

"the ultimate inquiry is not whether the label `policymaker'

or `confidential' fits a particular position; rather, the

question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate

that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the

effective performance of the public office involved." 445 U.S.

at 518.

14

In Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1981), Judge

Gibbons, writing for this court in its first foray into the

political patronage issue, proceeded to adopt a standard

which further refined the Elrod/Branti test by using what

the court termed a "functional analysis" approach. Under

this test, should a difference in party affiliation be "highly

likely to cause an official to be ineffective in carrying out"

the duties of the position, then dismissal for that reason

would not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 521. Applying

that test to the city solicitors in the case, the court found

that a lawyer's duties--e.g., rendering legal opinions,

drafting ordinances, negotiating contracts--defined a

position for which party affiliation was an appropriate

requirement.

In Brown v. Trench, 787 F.2d 167, 168 (3d Cir. 1986),

this court sought to further refine and clarify the

Elrod/Branti test in this circuit by making clear that the

"relevant inquiry is to the function of the public office in

question and not the actual past duties of the particular

employee involved." This court also noted that the

fact that an employee is in a policymaking or

confidential position is relevant to the question of

whether political affiliation is a necessary job

requirement but this fact is no longer dispositive after

Branti.

Id. at 168-69. After reviewing a number of cases arising

under Elrod and Branti in other jurisdictions, the Brown

court concluded that the "key factor" seemed to be "not

whether the employee was a supervisor or had a great deal

of responsibility but whether the employee has `meaningful

input into decisionmaking concerning the nature and scope

of a major township program.' " 787 F.2d at 169-70

(quoting Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164, 1170 (7th Cir.

1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982)). Factors relevant

in this inquiry include

whether the employee's duties are simply . . .

nondiscretionary or technical, . . . whether the

employee participates in . . . discussions or other

meetings, whether the employee prepares budgets or

has authority to hire or fire employees, the salary of

15

the employee, and the employee's power to control

others and to speak in the name of policymakers.

Id. at 169 (citations omitted).

To a great degree, the evolution of political patronage law

in the Third Circuit as embodied in the case law discussed

above, set the stage for this court's watershed opinion in

Zold v. Township of Mantua, 935 F.2d 633 (3d Cir. 1991).

Zold's significance lies in its synthesis of prior decisions up

to that point and articulation of the intermediate level of

scrutiny in political patronage cases, consistent with the

principle first enunciated in Elrod by Justice Brennan. See

Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362. In Zold, this court acknowledged

that "[i]t is not always easy to determine whether affiliation

is a legitimate factor to be considered for a particular job,"

and that each decision is "fact specific for that case." 935

F.2d at 635. The court found, however, that although a

"nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government employee

cannot be discharged on the sole ground of his or her

political beliefs," he or she can be dismissed on that ground

if he or she "acts as an advisor or formulates plans for the

implementation of broad goals." Id. at 635. Of course, as

stated in Branti, the ultimate inquiry is not whether a

position can be termed policymaking or confidential, but

whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party

affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective

performance of the public office involved.3 Id.

The Zold decision is significant for its explicit adoption of

the special scrutiny standard. But as with Elrod and Branti,

and their progeny, the adoption of the special scrutiny

_________________________________________________________________

3. Significantly, this court held that because the case implicated the

First

Amendment, it would "make an independent examination of the whole

record." Zold, 935 F.2d at 636. Relying on New York Times v. Sullivan,

376 U.S. 254 (1964), the court concluded that when an issue on appeal

turns on a "constitutional fact"--those whose determination is decisive of

a constitutional issue--appellate courts are obligated to review such

facts with "special scrutiny." Zold, 935 F.2d at 636. Moreover, an

appellate court "may draw its own inference from facts in the record." Id.

We have accordingly undertaken an independent examination of the

record developed in the district court and have drawn our own

inferences from those facts.

16

standard does not in and of itself provide a great deal of

guidance in the practical application of that test, and thus,

Zold reaffirms the limitations inherent in attempting to

establish factors to be used by courts in analyzing political

patronage claims.

The lack of explicit guidance from the Supreme Court

and this court thus far, however, results in a greater

flexibility on the part of lower courts to determine each case

under its own facts and in its own context. Thisflexibility

may serve the dual goals of the Elrod/Branti exception: to

permit governmental entities to use political affiliation

where the governmental interest is "overriding" and of "vital

importance," while concomitantly protecting the individual's

right to freedom of association guaranteed by the First

Amendment. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362, 368; Branti, 445 U.S.

at 515-16.

To this end, Elrod, Branti and their progeny have

established certain principles of law which constitute the

general parameters by which the analysis must be guided.

These cases require courts to focus on various factors,

including whether an employee is a "nonpolicymaking,

nonconfidential government employee," Elrod, 427 U.S. at

375 (Stewart, J., concurring), whether a difference in party

affiliation would be "highly likely to cause an official to be

ineffective in carrying out" the duties of the position, Ness,

660 F.2d at 521, whether "the employee has meaningful

input into decision making concerning the nature and

scope of a major . . . program," Brown, 787 F.2d at 169-70,

or whether the employee "acts as an advisor or formulates

plans for the implementation of broad goals," Zold, 935

F.2d at 635; Peters, 16 F.3d at 1354.

The "burden of proof is on the defendant to demonstrate

`an overriding interest' in order to validate an encroachment

on an employee's First Amendment rights." Zold, 935 F.2d

at 635 (quoting Elrod, 426 U.S. at 368); see also Rosenthal

v. Rizzo, 555 F.2d 390, 394 n.5 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434

U.S. 894 (1977). This burden is "substantial." Burns v.

County of Cambria, 971 F.2d 1015, 1022 (3d Cir. 1992),

cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1081 (1993). Moreover, the court

must apply the intermediate "exacting" level of scrutiny.

Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362; Zold, 935 F.2d at 636.

17

In general, courts are also advised to look to the

"function[s] of the office in question and not the actual past

duties of the particular employee involved." Peters, 16 F.3d

at 1353; Brown, 787 F.2d at 168; O'Connor v. Steeves, 994

F.2d 905, 911 (1st Cir.) ("[T]he actual past duties of the

discharged employee are irrelevant if the position inherently

encompasses more expansive powers and more important

functions that would tend to make political affiliation an

appropriate requirement for effective performance."), cert.

denied, 510 U.S. 1024 (1993). Although actual past duties

are not determinative, they may be informative. Waskovich

v. Morgano, 2 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d Cir. 1993).

The question of whether an employee falls within the

Elrod/Branti exception is generally one of fact. Furlong v.

Gudknecht, 808 F.2d 233, 235 (3d Cir. 1986); Rosenthal,

555 F.2d at 393 n.5. However, summary judgment may be

appropriate in certain circumstances. Ness, 660 F.2d at

521.

The above described principles are certainly applicable to

ordinary political patronage cases. However, the existence

of the deposition testimonies in this case takes this case,

we believe, out of the ordinary realm. The case law

developed in this area has generally not involved a similar

situation where a hiring authority specifically testifies that

political affiliation is not an appropriate requirement for a

particular position. In resolving this issue, then, it is

important to keep in mind that the touchstone of political

patronage analysis is that the "hiring authority [must]

demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate

requirement for the effective performance of the public

office involved." Branti, 445 U.S. at 518 (emphasis

supplied).

Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, the "corporate

power of the county [is] vested in a board of county

commissioners." 16 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. S 3203. Accordingly,

Boyle argues, and appellees do not dispute, that a majority

of the Board of County Commissioners are the only officials

vested with the authority to appoint or dismiss Boyle. When

a majority of the Board--and thus, a majority of the "hiring

authority"--testifies that political affiliation is not an

appropriate requirement for the position of Deputy Director,

18

it is difficult to see how this fact can be considered "merely

colorable or not significantly probative."4

In support of the district court's decision, the appellees

rely on Waskovich v. Morgano, 2 F.3d 1292 (3d Cir. 1993).

In that case, plaintiff, a Republican, alleged that he was

terminated from his position as Director of Veterans'

Administrative Services for the State of New Jersey on the

basis of his political affiliation after Governor Florio took

office. The district court granted summary judgment in

favor of the defendants, finding that the plaintiff occupied

a confidential, policymaking position from which he could

be dismissed on the basis of political affiliation. Waskovich

v. Morgano, 800 F. Supp. 1220 (D.N.J. 1992). On appeal,

this court affirmed.

The plaintiff argued on appeal that summary judgment

was inappropriate because two government officials had

testified that political affiliation was not a proper

requirement for the position of Director of Veterans'

Administrative Services. The Deputy Adjutant General had

testified that "party affiliation is not a qualification for the

job of [D]irector of veterans' Administrative Services."

Waskovich, 2 F.3d at 1301. In addition, the Deputy

Commissioner testified that political affiliation did not play

a part in whether the Director retains his job. Id.

This court held that these deposition testimonies did not

create a genuine issue of material fact based on the

absence of such testimony favorable to the plaintiff by the

Adjutant General himself, "the only official who is vested

with the statutory authority to appoint or dismiss the

Director." Id. at 1302. The question, this court reasoned,

must focus on whether the Adjutant General, as the hiring

_________________________________________________________________

4. Moreover, although the district court disposed of the significance of

the testimonies in conclusory fashion, the language employed by the

court reveals that it may have crossed the threshold into inappropriate

weighing of the evidence. The district court found the testimonies to be

insignificant "[i]n light of the undisputed evidence regarding plaintiff

's

authorized and actual duties as Deputy Director . . . ." The court did not

merely note the existence of contradictory evidence, but rather,

measured the weight of the deposition testimonies with what it regarded

as overwhelming evidence on the other side.

19

authority, had a valid basis to prefer an individual of one

political party over another.5Id.

_________________________________________________________________

5. The Waskovich court also noted that the two government officials had

also testified to the importance of the Director's sharing the same

general philosophy as his superiors. 2 F.3d at 1301-02. One government

official had testified that "[i]t is extremely important that . . . we are

all

in concurrence in regard to the philosophy that the Department has

adopted, to [e]nsure that the policy has been carried out." The other

official testified stressed the importance of the Director and his

superiors

sharing the same "philosophical judgment."

Appellees in this case point to what they describe as similar favorable

testimony by Cranmer:

Q: Third: "Coordinating the airport public information program." Is

there a rational connection between party affiliation and doing

that, those duties?

A: Well, again, there is not. Now certainly, there is a

relationship

between -- Certainly want people working for you that share the

same goals and objectives and the manner in which you are

going to arrive at those objectives in those positions. Whether

they be Democrats or Republicans is irrelevant, but certainly,

the previous administration and majority of the people that

worked for the previous administration, there was a different

ideology, there was a different mind set. They had different

objectives, so to say if someone is a Democrat or Republican at

face value, that those two labels mean anything isn't the case,

but certainly, what they believe does.

* * *

Q: Is it a legitimate consideration for placement or retention the

fact that someone voted Democrat or Republican or voted for

you?

A: I am saying in some cases, it could be; in some cases, it

wouldn't be. It all depends on that individual.

Q: So it's an individual decision, is that what you are saying?

A: It's still based upon that person and what they believe and what

they stand for; and because of that, they vote one way or they

vote the other. Generally, there probably could be a line that

could be drawn down party-by-party affiliation, but that doesn't

always hold true.

This testimony is notable for its utter vagueness and ambiguity. It seems

that the only clear statement made by Cranmer is that there is no

20

Waskovich is readily distinguishable. In the case at bar,

Cranmer and Dawida were not merely government officials

who lacked hiring authority. Rather, they were two out of

three Commissioners who had the actual authority to

appoint or dismiss Boyle. Indeed, their testimonies relate

directly to whether the "hiring authority" had a valid basis

to prefer an individual of one political party over another.

Case law in this circuit and elsewhere6 supports the

conclusion that statements by a hiring authority to the

effect that political affiliation is not a proper requirement

for a particular governmental position are indeed

significant. In Rosenthal v. Rizzo, 555 F.2d 390 (3d Cir.),

cert. denied, 434 U.S. 894 (1977), for example, plaintiff had

been appointed to a position as an Administrative Assistant

II in a department of the Redevelopment Authority of

Philadelphia. When a new Executive Director took office,

plaintiff was terminated. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that,

inter alia, he was terminated for his political affiliation in

violation of his First Amendment rights. Id. at 391-92.

Evidence adduced through discovery was conflicting. On

the one hand, deposition testimony revealed that plaintiff

was merely a "soldier;" that he only oversaw bidding

practices to uncover corruption and to ensure that policies

implemented by others were carried out; that he had no

power to decide which bids for relocation work would be

accepted; and that he only worked for the actual

policymaker in the department. Id. at 392. At one point, the

Executive Director himself testified that the plaintiff's

primary duty was to act as a spy for the former Director of

the Authority. Id. On the other hand, evidence also showed

_________________________________________________________________

rational connection between party affiliation and performing the duty of

"Coordinating the airport public information program." At best, Cranmer

testified that similar ideology, in general, is desirable, but he makes no

reference to Boyle's duties in this context. Such vague statements cannot

measure against the rather clear statements at issue in Waskovich.

6. See, e.g., Burchett v. Cheek, 637 F. Supp. 1249, 1251 (W.D. Va. 1985)

(ordering reinstatement of assistant registrar of county based, inter

alia,

on trial testimony of general registrar that political affiliation was

irrelevant to position), aff'd, 829 F.2d 1319 (4th Cir. 1987), cert.

denied,

486 U.S. 1006 (1988).

21

that the plaintiff helped rewrite the "relocation code"; that

he was a "top line" employee; and that he oversaw work

and reviewed bids. Id. In reversing the district court's grant

of summary judgment, the court stated that

the determination of status as a policymaker vel non

presents a difficult factual question. Where there is

evidence to support the employee's claim that he does

not make policy, as there is here, he is entitled to a full

trial on the issue. Indeed, the state bears the burden of

persuasion on that question at trial. Certainly, then, it

was improper for the district court to weigh the

evidence and rule against [plaintiff] on this issue on a

Rule 56 motion.

Id. at 394 n.5.

This court went on to find that "two of the defendants

admitted [plaintiff's] status as a non-policymaker, while as

to the other two defendants, [plaintiff 's] status represented

a genuine issue of material fact." Id. This court held that

the district court erred in granting summary judgment to

defendants on these facts, finding that the lower court had

improperly engaged in weighing the evidence. Id. at 392-93.

In Furlong v. Gudknecht, 808 F.2d 233, 235 (3d Cir.

1986), the plaintiff, a Second Deputy to the Recorder of

Deeds and a Democrat, brought an action in the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania to preliminarily enjoin the newly

elected Republican Recorder of Deeds from terminating her

position. The district court granted the plaintiff's motion for

a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction

based, in part, upon the following testimony of the

defendant Recorder of Deeds:

[Q.] Mr. Gudknecht, is political party affiliation of the

first or second deputy important with respect to

the performance of their official duties?

[A.] No, it's not.

Id. The defendant, in later testimony, attempted to change

his answer, but the district court, while allowing it into

22

evidence, discredited the later testimony. Id. This court

affirmed.7

The notion that statements made by members of a hiring

authority--to the effect that political affiliation is not a

proper consideration in hiring or firing--constitute

probative evidence is consonant with the rationale and

policy underlying the Elrod/Branti exception. We do not

dispute that political patronage has traditionally played an

important role in the political process, and as has been

vigorously argued by various judges and legal

commentators, political patronage has proven to be a

necessary and beneficial practice. As a practical matter,

however, political patronage provides benefits which inure

primarily to the elected officials invoking the privilege.

Indeed, as Justice Brennan writing for the plurality in Elrod

persuasively argued, the benefits derived from political

patronage should not be overstated.8 As noted by the Court

_________________________________________________________________

7. It should be noted that Furlong dealt specifically with the issue of

whether the possibility of an employee's statutory ascension to a

superior's elected office in itself is sufficient to qualify the

employee's

position for an Elrod/Branti exception. Accordingly, this case is not

directly on point with the facts of the case at bar. However, it is

instructive to note how both the district court and this court addressed

the admission by the Recorder of Deeds that political affiliation was not

important with respect to the position of second deputy. In contrast to

the district court in this case, both courts found that particular

evidence

extremely probative.

8. In his opinion, Justice Brennan identified three separate governmental

interests arguably served by political patronage dismissals: (1) the

interest in effective and efficient government; (2) the need for loyal

employees to implement the programs of a democratically elected

administration; and (3) the preservation of strong and broad-based

political parties. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 364-68.

With regard to the first identified interest, Justice Brennan noted that

rather than promoting efficiency, "the wholesale replacement of large

numbers of public employees every time political office changes hands

belies this justification." Id. at 364. Moreover, it is not clear at all,

Justice Brennan continued, that political patronage dismissal will result

in replacement by a person "more qualified to do the job since

appointment often occurs in exchange for the delivery of votes, or other

party service, not job capability." Id. at 364-65. Justice Brennan

23

in O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake, ___ U.S.

___, 116 S.Ct. 2353, 2361 (1996), the "absolute right to

enforce a patronage scheme . . . has not been shown to be

a necessary part of a legitimate political system in all

instances." Thus, while the general public certainly derives

benefits from political patronage--insofar as strong political

parties are an important aspect of the American democratic

process--these benefits are, at best, indirect.9 As Justice

_________________________________________________________________

concluded by commenting that "[m]ore fundamentally, . . . the argument

does not succeed because it is doubtful that the mere difference of

political persuasion motivates poor performance; nor do we think it

legitimately may be used as a basis for imputing such behavior." Id. at

365.

In response to the loyalty argument, Justice Brennan acknowledged

that it possessed some force, but was ultimately unavailing. The

government's interest in loyalty can be adequately protected by

"[l]imiting

patronage dismissals to policymaking positions . . .." Id. at 367.

With regard to the third justification for political patronage, Justice

Brennan first acknowledged that the preservation of the democratic

process was an interest the protection of which may in certain

circumstances justify limitations on First Amendment rights. Id. at 368.

But however important preservation of the two-party system or any

system involving a fixed number of parties may or may not be, . . .

we are not persuaded that the elimination of patronage practice or,

as is specifically involved here, the interdiction of patronage

dismissals, will bring about the demise of party politics.

Political

parties existed in the absence of active patronage practice prior

to

the administration of Andrew Jackson, and they have survived

substantial reduction in their patronage power through the

establishment of merit systems.

Id. at 369 (citations omitted).

9. As intimated previously, this court recognizes that this somewhat

narrow view of political patronage as fundamental to the democratic

process, as espoused by Justice Brennan, is not universally accepted. In

his dissent in Branti, Justice Powell admonished that "[p]atronage

appointments help build stable political parties by offering rewards to

persons who assume the tasks necessary to the continued functioning of

political organizations." 445 U.S. at 528. Justice Powell emphasized the

historic role of political patronage in democratizing the political

process,

stimulating political activity over a wider pool of the American

population

24

Brennan cogently noted, "[p]artisan politics bears the

imprimatur only of tradition, not the Constitution." Elrod,

427 U.S. at 369 n.22.

Moreover, whatever benefits the "tradition" of political

patronage may provide surely is counterbalanced by the

resulting limitation on First Amendment freedoms. In Elrod,

Justice Brennan noted that "[p]atronage . . . to the extent

it compels or restrains belief and association is inimical to

the process which undergirds our system of government

and is `at war with the deeper traditions of democracy

_________________________________________________________________

and contributing to the maintenance of strong and accountable political

parties. Elrod, 427 U.S. 377-79 (Powell, J., dissenting); Branti, 445 U.S.

522 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting). These themes are shared with equal

conviction by Justice Scalia who, in a dissenting opinion in Rutan,

concluded that "[s]uch a venerable and accepted tradition [as political

patronage] is not to be laid on the examining table and scrutinized for

its

conformity to some abstract principle of First Amendment adjudication

devised by this Court. To the contrary, such traditions are themselves

the stuff out of which the Court's principles is to be formed." 497 U.S.

95-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Similarly, former Chief Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert has been extremely

critical of the Elrod/Branti decisions, noting that his only reason for

following them was his strong loyalty to stare decisis. Loughney v.

Hickey, 635 F.2d 1063, 1065 (3d Cir. 1980) (Aldisert, J., concurring)

(characterizing his disagreement with Elrod and Branti as "vehement

disagreement"). In Judge Aldisert's view, Elrod and Branti

reflect the apogee of a process that seeks to "constitutionalize"

the

entire fabric of American society. This process transmutes the

United States Constitution from a broad statement of moral values

into a detailed code of conduct, ignoring Chief Justice Marshall's

admonition that "we must never forget, that it is a constitution we

are expounding."

Id. (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819)).

Judge Aldisert is not the only member of this court to hold a critical

view

of the limitations imposed on the practice of political patronage by the

Elrod/Branti line of decisions. See,e.g., Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96,

105-10 (3d Cir. 1996) (Becker, J., concurring).

We believe, however, that such views--which essentially raise the

"tradition" of political patronage above the fundamental rights provided

in the First Amendment--remain in the minority.

25

embodied in the First Amendment.' " 427 U.S. at 357

(quoting Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis , 473 F.2d

561, 576 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973)).

"Thus, if patronage contributes at all to the elective

process, that contribution is diminished by the practice's

impairment of the same." Id. at 369. And whatever "the

gain to representative government provided by the practice

of patronage, if any, would be insufficient to justify its

sacrifice of First Amendment rights."10 Id.

That whatever benefits derived from political patronage

are "diminished by the practice's impairment of "

fundamental First Amendment principles is manifested in

the very structure of political patronage analysis mandated

under Elrod, Branti and their progeny. For instance, the

burden, characterized as a substantial one, is placed

squarely upon defendants to prove that political affiliation

is an appropriate requirement for a particular position.

Moreover, courts must apply the intermediate "exacting"

level of scrutiny in such cases.

Accordingly, political patronage is a practice which

primarily benefits those political entities that invoke the

privilege. When those political entities themselves testify

that political affiliation is or should not be an important

consideration, as in this case, such evidence, at the very

least, creates a genuine issue of material fact precluding

summary judgment. Put another way, if the hiring

authority is obligated to demonstrate that political

affiliation is an appropriate requirement for a particular

position, then we cannot see how its own statements

relating directly on the issue can be considered anything

less than probative. The appellees' argument, to the effect

that the testimonies of the two Commissioners should be

ignored and the court should rely solely on the inherent

functions of the position in question, exalts form over

_________________________________________________________________

10. That the Supreme Court's expansive view of First Amendment rights

in the context of political patronage cases remains intact is exemplified

by its decision last year in O'Hare Truck Service, in which the Court

extended the protections of Elrod and Branti to independent contractors.

O'Hare Truck Service thus overruled this court's prior decision in Horn v.

Kean, 796 F.2d 668 (3d Cir. 1986) (en banc).

26

substance in the context of this case, rendering the

analysis called for under Elrod, Branti and their progeny

overly formalistic. The significant encroachment upon First

Amendment rights by the practice of political patronage

does not justify such an approach.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the district court's order

granting defendants' motion for summary judgment is

reversed, and this matter will be remanded to the district

court for further proceedings.

A True Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

27

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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