Rogers v. Powell

Opinions of the United

1997 Decisions States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

8-11-1997

Rogers v. Powell

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 96-7299

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iled August 11, 1997

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

NO. 96-7299

ROBERT EUGENE ROGERS,

Appellant

v.

OFFICER KEVIN POWELL; OFFICER JEFFREY STINE,

a/k/a Stiney; OFFICER TIMOTHY EILER;

OFFICER JAMES EDWARDS,

Appellees

On Appeal From the United States District Court

For the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civ. No. 95-cv-01204)

Argued: January 28, 1997

Before: BECKER, ROTH, Circuit Judges, and

ORLOFSKY, District Judge.*

(Filed August 11, 1997)

DONALD A. BAILEY, ESQUIRE

(ARGUED)

3540 Progress Avenue, Suite 209

Harrisburg, PA 17110

Attorney for Appellant

_________________________________________________________________

* Honorable Stephen M. Orlofsky, United States District Judge for the

District of New Jersey, sitting by designation.

THOMAS W. CORBETT, JR.,

ESQUIRE

Attorney General

JACQUELINE E. JACKSON-

DEGARCIA, ESQUIRE (ARGUED)

Deputy Attorney General

CALVIN R. KOONS, ESQUIRE

Senior Deputy Attorney General

JOHN G. KNORR, III, ESQUIRE

Chief Deputy Attorney General

Office of Attorney General

Strawberry Square, 15th Floor

Harrisburg, PA 17120

Attorneys for Appellees

OPINION OF THE COURT

CKER, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal by plaintiff Robert Rogers from a

district court final judgment in a civil rights action, 42

U.S.C. § 1983, in favor of four Pennsylvania state police

troopers who Rogers claims violated his civil rights by

arresting him without probable cause and by using

excessive force in connection with the arrest. The unlawful

arrest claim was disposed of by summary judgment. The

excessive force claim was tried to a jury which found for the

defendants. We find no error in connection with the trial,

and affirm summarily with respect to the excessive force

claim. However, we find the existence of a triable fact with

respect to aspects of the unlawful arrest claim against some

of the defendants.

More specifically, we conclude that the information

received by Trooper James Edwards from Probation Officer

Rita Miller about the supposed existence of an arrest

warrant for Rogers was too insubstantial to justify

detaining him. Moreover, because Edwards' reliance on the

vague and inconclusive statements of a parole officer was

not reasonable, he was not entitled to qualified immunity.

2

Thus, we reverse the grant of summary judgment as to

Edwards. With respect to Trooper Timothy Eiler, who

arrested Rogers along with Edwards based on Edwards'

representation that there was a valid arrest warrant, we

affirm the grant of summary judgment on the grounds that

he is properly held entitled to qualified immunity.

We also conclude that Troopers Jeffrey Stine and Kevin

Powell, whose detention of Rogers was also based on

Edwards' representation, are entitled to qualified immunity,

but only up to the point at which they were informed that

there was no reason to hold Rogers in custody. Their

qualified immunity disappeared when they continued to

detain him for approximately one hour thereafter. We

therefore affirm in part and reverse in part with respect to

Stine and Powell.

I. Facts and Procedural History

On September 25, 1994, Troopers James Edwards and

Timothy Eiler were working the midnight shift in Clinton

County, Pennsylvania.1 Edwards was assigned to the desk

while Eiler was on patrol with Trooper Dale Gillette. Prior to

starting his shift, Edwards claims that he had spoken with

Trooper Davy. During this conversation, Davy allegedly

mentioned that there was a "court paper out on Rogers."

The record, however, is devoid of any declaration or

deposition by Davy, so we cannot confirm exactly what he

said to Edwards.

Later that evening Edwards received a report of afight in

nearby Logantown in which Rogers was allegedly involved.

Edwards dispatched Eiler and Gillette to the scene of the

fight. When they arrived, Rogers was not present. Eiler and

Gillette then began to search for him. At this point, because

of Edwards' earlier conversation with Davy, as well as

Rogers' alleged involvement in the Logantown fight,

Edwards decided to determine if any warrants were pending

for Rogers.

Following Pennsylvania State Police procedure, Edwards

contacted the Clinton County Communications Center

_________________________________________________________________

1. The "midnight shift" began at 11 P.M. on September 25, and ended at

7 A.M. on September 26.

3

which informed him that there were two summary warrants

pending for Rogers. Additionally, Edwards said he was

informed that there might be other "open" paperwork on

Rogers from the Clinton County Probation Office. As a

result, Edwards called the probation office and requested

that the officer on duty that evening contact him. Edwards

then contacted Eiler and Gillette and told them not to pick

up Rogers if they found him because the only warrants of

whose existence Edwards knew were summary warrants.

When an individual is arrested for outstanding summary

offense warrants, he must be taken to appear before the

proper issuing authority "without delay." Pa. R. Cr. P.

76(b)(4). Therefore, officers typically do not arrest an

individual during the late evening or early morning hours

for outstanding summary offense warrants because they

are reluctant to awaken the district justice on duty.

Later that night, Rita Miller, from the Clinton County

Probation Office responded to Edwards' call. She too

advised Edwards of the two summary warrants. Miller also

stated that Trooper Davy wanted Rogers "because he [Davy]

said that Lycoming County said that they'll hold him as an

absconding witness."2 Edwards maintains that this

statement gave him the belief that there was a warrant for

Rogers' arrest in Lycoming County.

A transcript of the conversation between Edwards and

Miller, prepared by police communications officer Ruth

Eoute at the request of Sergeant Salinas of the

Pennsylvania State Police, the accuracy of which is not

disputed by any of the parties, supports Miller's claim that

she never confirmed the existence of a warrant for Rogers'

arrest in Lycoming County:

Edwards: State Police, Tpr. Edwards.

Miller: Hi, it's Rita Miller.

Edwards: Rita?

Miller: Yeah.

_________________________________________________________________

2. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5125 (West 1983) (dealing with

"absconding witnesses" and defining the offense as a misdemeanor of the

third degree).

4

Edwards: Do you want Robert Rogers?

Miller: There's a warrant out for him. It's a

summary warrant. Davy wants him.

Because he says that Lycoming County

said that they'll have him as an

absconding witness.

Edwards: Who will? Lycoming County?

Miller: Yeah. Because he's to testify against

Doctor Bender in the hearing.

Edwards: Mm Hm.

Miller: Okay. And also I think there's two

warrants out from Lycoming County.3 I

think they're both from Frazier's office.

One's for Hit and Run over at (inaudible)

and one's for assaulting that guy and they

charged him with harassment. So he has

two summary warrants. Do you have

them? Copies of the warrants.

Edwards: No. The Comm. Center does.

Miller: Okay. No. I don't have him on any more

because they left him off of probation after

giving him that deal. You know, if he would

testify?

Edwards: Yeah.

Miller: So I don't have anything on him any more.

Do you guys have him?

Edwards: No. He's with Mike Marshall tonight and

Gilly Stevenson and they're causing some

shit.

_________________________________________________________________

3. In her sworn deposition, Miller stated that she misspoke at this point

in the conversation with Edwards. Frazier is a district justice in Clinton

County, so it seems clear from the context of the conversation that Miller

intended to say "there's two warrants out from Clinton County" when in

fact she said "there's two warrants out from Lycoming County." We

conclude from Edwards' response that he, too, understood that Miller

meant to refer to Clinton County, rather that Lycoming County at this

point in the conversation. (Appellees' Supplemental Appendix, p. 169).

5

Miller: Mm Hm.

Edwards: So, uh, the one guy that was out on the

road (inaudible)

Miller: Mm Hm.

Edwards: So they went to look to get him again and

he had left. So they're going down to a

place in Flemington to see if they're down

there.

Miller: Okay.

Edwards: So then if they get him, definitely pick him

up. Yes?

Miller: Yeah. They can pick him up on the

warrants and then they can let Lycoming

County know and they were going to put

like high bail on him to hold him so that

he'd be able to testify at the trial.

Edwards: Okay. If we're going to pick him up for the

warrants, what are we to do, take him to

Lycoming County or take him here?

Miller: You better bring him here. And then get

ahold of Trooper Davy and let him get

ahold of Lycoming County and let them

know. Because he said (inaudible), Davy

did.

Edwards: This is Bob Rogers the third?

Miller: Yep.

Edwards: Okay. Okay.

Miller: Okay?

Edwards: Go back to sleep.

Miller: Thanks.

Edwards: Bye.

Miller: Bye.

After this conversation, Edwards radioed Gillette and Eiler

and told them that if they found Rogers, they should arrest

him. Gillette and Eiler did not locate Rogers that evening.

6

The following evening, Edwards, Eiler, and Gillette were

again working the midnight shift. This time Edwards and

Eiler were on patrol and Gillette was on desk duty. At

approximately 2:40 A.M., Gillette dispatched Eiler and

Edwards to Dr. Barry Bender's residence. When they

arrived at the residence, Bender informed the two troopers

that they were not needed. Edwards and Eiler left, but

returned within twenty minutes after Gillette again

dispatched them to Bender's residence because Rogers was

creating a disturbance inside Bender's house. After

receiving consent to enter, Edwards and Eiler arrested

Rogers inside. When Rogers demanded to see the warrant

for his arrest, Edwards replied that he did not have the

warrant and that Rogers would see it when he arrived at

the Montoursville State Police Barracks in Lycoming

County. Edwards and Eiler left Bender's residence with

Rogers at 3:19 A.M.

While en route to Lycoming County, Edwards contacted

Gillette and requested that Gillette arrange for a patrol car

to meet them at the Clinton/Lycoming County line. Gillette

then contacted the dispatch officer in Lycoming County,

Police Communications Officer James Pfleegor, to request

that he send a patrol car to the county line. Gillette

informed Pfleegor that Rogers was being transferred to their

custody because there was an outstanding warrant or

detainer waiting for him at Lycoming County Prison. At

approximately 3:54 A.M., Pfleegor dispatched Troopers

Stine and Powell to the county line to transport Rogers to

Lycoming County Prison. Edwards and Eiler took Rogers to

the county line and transferred him to the custody of Stine

and Powell. Stine and Powell did not personally know

Edwards or Eiler, or know of Rogers before this transfer.

When Stine and Powell took Rogers into their custody, they

noticed that he was belligerent and appeared to be

intoxicated.

While en route to the Lycoming County Prison, Stine and

Powell radioed Pfleegor and requested that he notify the

prison that they would be arriving shortly with Rogers and

that the prison should begin to prepare any necessary

paperwork. Pfleegor radioed back a short time later and

informed Stine and Powell that the prison could not locate

7

an outstanding warrant or detainer for Rogers' arrest.

According to Stine and Powell, they did not immediately

release Rogers after receiving Pfleegor's message because

they were unclear as to whether an outstanding warrant or

detainer for Rogers' arrest existed. Instead, they drove to

the Montoursville Barracks to clarify the situation.

Once they reached the barracks, both troopers took

Rogers upstairs to the patrol room. It was at this point that

the incident occurred between Stine and Rogers giving rise

to the excessive force claim. Stine then sat Rogers into a

chair, placed handcuffs on him, and connected him to a

chain on the floor. Rogers fell asleep.

While Rogers was sleeping, Powell spoke with Nancy

Butts, an assistant district attorney of Lycoming County.

Butts advised Powell that there was no outstanding bench

warrant or detainer for Rogers' arrest in Lycoming County

and that since they had no reason to hold Rogers they

should release him and transport him back to the county

line.

At some point after 5:45 A.M., notwithstanding Butt's

advice, Powell and Stine transported Rogers in handcuffs

back to the county line. Edwards, Eiler, and Davy met Stine

and Powell at the county line. Rogers remained in

handcuffs until he was released back to Edwards, Eiler,

and Davy at approximately 6:04 A.M. Rogers was finally

dropped off, at his request, at the Dunkin Donuts in Lock

Haven, Clinton County at approximately 6:25 A.M.

Rogers brought suit against Powell, Stine, Eiler, and

Edwards pursuant to § 1983, alleging that the officers

violated his right to be free from unlawful seizures under

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.4 The defendants

_________________________________________________________________

4. In addition to his unlawful seizure claims against all four defendants,

Rogers brought two claims solely against Stine. First, Rogers brought a

§ 1983 claim against Stine arising out of an incident at the Montoursville

Barracks alleging that Stine violated his right to be free from excessive

force under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Stine moved for

summary judgment as to this excessive force claim, but the District

Court denied Stine's motion. The claim went to trial and the jury entered

a verdict in favor of Stine. Rogers asserts that the district court erred in

8

moved for summary judgment on the grounds that no

genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to the

issue of whether the troopers had probable cause to arrest

Rogers without a warrant. The district court agreed, and

granted the defendants' motion.

The district court properly exercised its jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; we exercise appellate

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the

district court's grant of summary judgment is plenary.

Ersek v. Township of Springfield, 102 F.3d 79, 83 (3d Cir.

1996).

II. The Unlawful Arrest Claim

We begin our inquiry by examining the question whether

the arrest of Rogers was unlawful and thus violated his

Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unlawful

seizure. That the defendants may have violated the Fourth

Amendment does not end our inquiry, however. They will

be liable for damages only if the doctrine of qualified

immunity does not protect them.

A. The Applicable Rules

The Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer from

arresting a citizen except upon probable cause. Orsatti v.

New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995)

(citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156

(1972)). In Pennsylvania, "[n]o arrest warrant shall issue

but upon probable cause . . ." Pa. R. Cr. Pr. 119. The

gravamen of Rogers' claim is that he was arrested without

the requisite probable cause. The crux of the defendants'

argument is that Edwards' mistaken belief that an arrest

warrant had issued for Rogers supplied the probable cause

required by the Fourth Amendment.

_________________________________________________________________

refusing to allow him to offer evidence during the trial that he suffered

some type of injury or damage during the incident. We find this claim

patently without merit.

Rogers also brought a pendent state law assault claim against Trooper

Stine. The district court granted Stine's motion for summary judgment

as to this claim on sovereign immunity grounds. Rogers did not appeal

this ruling.

9

"[P]robable cause to arrest exists when the facts and

circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are

sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to

believe that an offense has been or is being committed by

the person to be arrested." Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 483. The

district court found that no genuine issue of material fact

existed with respect to whether the officers had probable

cause to arrest Rogers without a warrant because Edwards'

conversations with Davy and Miller supplied him with the

"facts and circumstances" necessary to support his finding

of probable cause to arrest Rogers.

The district court's conclusion was legally erroneous

because statements by fellow officers conveying that there

is probable cause for a person's arrest, by themselves,

cannot provide the "facts and circumstances" necessary to

support a finding of probable cause. Whitely v. Warden, 401

U.S. 560, 568 (1971) ("[A]n otherwise illegal arrest cannot

be insulated from challenge by the decision of the

instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the

arrest."). Probable cause exists only if the statements made

by fellow officers are supported by actual facts that satisfy

the probable cause standard. In United States v. Hensley,

469 U.S. 221 (1985) the Court held that the lawfulness of

a seizure made in reliance on the statements of fellow

officers

turns on whether the officers who issued the

[statements] possessed probable cause to make the

arrest. It does not turn on whether those relying on the

[statements] were themselves aware of the specific facts

which led their colleagues to seek their assistance.

Id. at 231.

Thus, the required basis for a lawful seizure where police

rely on the statements of fellow officers is as follows. The

legality of a seizure based solely on statements issued by

fellow officers depends on whether the officers who issued

the statements possessed the requisite basis to seize the

suspect. Id. at 231. Moreover, an officer can lawfully act

solely on the basis of statements issued by fellow officers if

the officers issuing the statements possessed the facts and

circumstances necessary to support a finding of the

requisite basis. Id. at 232.

10

We now apply these teachings to the facts to determine

whether Rogers' Fourth Amendment rights were violated as

a result of his arrest.

B. Lawfulness of the Arrest in this Case

We conclude that the arrest of Rogers was unlawful.

Edwards had no knowledge of any facts or circumstances to

support his own independent determination that probable

cause to arrest Rogers existed.5 He relied solely on the

statements made by Davy and Miller in arresting Rogers.

However, it is clear that neither Davy nor Miller had

knowledge of the requisite facts and circumstances

necessary to support a finding of probable cause to arrest

Rogers.

Edwards arrested Rogers on the basis of the supposed

Lycoming County arrest warrants. The undisputed facts

make clear that no warrant existed in Lycoming County for

Rogers' arrest. Miller did not confirm the existence of any

Lycoming County warrants. Miller did nothing more than

relate her awareness of rumors that were circulating about

the possibility that an arrest warrant had issued, or was

going to issue for Rogers in Lycoming County.6 At one

_________________________________________________________________

5. We reject the appellee's suggestion that because Edwards could have

lawfully arrested Rogers on the basis of two outstanding summary

warrants in Clinton County, he possessed the requisite probable cause.

It is clear from Edwards' signed declaration and the circumstances of

Rogers' arrest that the summary warrants were not the basis for the

arrest.

We acknowledge that an arrest is not rendered invalid by the fact that

the basis for the arrest, though legitimate, was merely pretextual. See

Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996). In other words,

had Edwards actually arrested Rogers on the basis of the summary

warrants, even though he had subjectively arrested Rogers based on a

non-existing Lycoming County warrant, he might have had the requisite

probable cause. However, Edwards did not articulate the legitimate basis

for the arrest (the Clinton County summary warrants) at the time of the

seizure, nor did he advance it as a justification for the arrest at any

point in the proceedings prior to this appeal. Although we do not reach

the issue, we would be troubled by an argument suggesting that a

legitimate basis for an arrest identified only after the arrest would

provide sufficient grounds therefor.

6. The only clear statement Miller made to Edwards concerning the

existence of arrest warrants for Rogers referred to the Clinton County

summary warrants, but those warrants were not the basis for Rogers'

arrest.

11

point, she said "So I don't have anything on him anymore."

There is no information in the record about Davy's

communication with Edwards, except that Miller said that

Davy said that Lycoming County said that they'll have him

as an absconding witness. That is "thin soup", as the old

saying goes. Therefore, Edwards relied solely on his fellow

officers' statements in arresting Rogers on the basis of a

Lycoming County arrest warrant, and none of those officers

had knowledge of facts and circumstances to support an

independent finding of probable cause.

Eiler, Stine, and Powell, like Edwards, had no knowledge

of facts or circumstances sufficient to support an

independent determination of probable cause to arrest

Rogers; all of them relied on the statements of others. Eiler,

Stine, and Powell relied solely on the statements of

Edwards in determining that there was probable cause.

Although there will be differences when we address the

question of qualified immunity, at this juncture the

significant question remains the same: did the officer

making the statements (in this case Edwards) have

knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant

a conclusion of probable cause? As we have already

concluded, the answer is no. Thus, under Whitely and

Hensley, Eiler, Stine, and Powell, like Edwards, did not

have probable cause to arrest Rogers, and as a result, the

arrest was unlawful and violated Rogers' Fourth

Amendment right to be free from unlawful seizures.

III. Qualified Immunity

A. The Applicable Rules

Despite unlawfully arresting Rogers and violating his

Fourth Amendment rights, the defendants may still be

shielded from civil liability by the doctrine of qualified

immunity.7 The doctrine of qualified immunity protects

"government officials performing discretionary functions . . .

_________________________________________________________________

7. The district court never reached the qualified immunity question

because it determined that the officers had lawfully arrested Rogers.

However, since the qualified immunity issue is primarily a question of

law and was raised by the defendants in both their motions for summary

judgment and their appeal, we will address the issue.

12

from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does

not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known."

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The

reasoning behind the doctrine is that "[r]eliance on the

objective reasonableness of an official's conduct, as

measured by reference to clearly established law, should

avoid excessive disruptions of government and permit the

resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary

judgment." Id. (footnote omitted).

Whether a government official is entitled to protection

under the doctrine of qualified immunity is a"purely legal

question." Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597, 609 (3d Cir.

1994). The appropriate inquiry is as follows:

On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may

determine, not only the currently applicable law, but

whether that law was clearly established at the time an

action occurred. If the law at that time was not clearly

established, an official could not reasonably be

expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments,

nor could he fairly be said to "know" that the law

forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful.

. . . If the law was clearly established, the immunity

defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably

competent public official should know the law

governing his conduct.

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19. Moreover, "[t]he contours of

the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official

would understand that what he is doing violates that right."

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).

The closest case to the one at bar is Capone v. Marinelli,

868 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1989). In Capone, a police officer

took an affidavit alleging probable cause for arrest based on

criminal conduct attributed to Capone. Id. at 103. An arrest

warrant was issued, the details of which were entered into

the National Crime Information Center computer system

which sent out an electronically transmitted bulletin across

the country. Id. The bulletin clearly stated that Capone was

wanted for kidnapping and other offenses, and that a

warrant had been issued for his arrest. Id. Two days later

13

a police officer from a different Pennsylvania county

arrested Capone in reliance on that bulletin. Id.

We granted summary judgment in favor of the officers,

holding that a "police officer who reasonably relies upon a

bulletin that establishes the existence of a warrant for

arrest is entitled to qualified immunity in a civil rights

action brought against him for unlawful arrest and

prosecution." Id. at 104. Our decision relied heavily on the

dicta in Whitely and Hensley. In Whitely, the Court stated:

We do not, of course, question that the . . . police were

entitled to act on the strength of the radio bulletin.

Certainly police officers called upon to aid other officers

in executing arrest warrants are entitled to assume

that the officers requesting aid offered the magistrate

the information requisite to support an independent

judicial assessment of probable cause.

401 U.S. at 568.

In Hensley, the Court wrote:

If the flyer has been issued in the absence of a

reasonable suspicion, then a stop in the objective

reliance upon it violates the Fourth Amendment. In

such a situation, of course, the officers making the

stop may have a good-faith defense to any civil suit. It

is the objective reading of the flyer or bulletin that

determines whether other police officers can defensibly

act in reliance on it.

469 U.S. 232-33 (emphasis added). Thus we concluded in

Capone:

Given that the . . . bulletin expressly states that a

warrant existed for the arrest of Capone, as well as the

nature of the alleged offenses . . . [the] officer['s]

reliance upon the bulletin cannot be said to have been

unreasonable. Therefore, as a matter of law, the

protection of qualified immunity . . . extends to[the

officer].

868 F.2d at 106. These cases teach us that the actions of

a police officer acting in reliance on what proves to be the

flawed conclusions of a fellow police officer may be

14

reasonable nonetheless and thus protected by the doctrine

of qualified immunity.

Although Capone dealt with the objective reading of a

written flyer or bulletin, we see no reason why the same

analysis should not be used in considering oral statements.

Therefore, we hold that where a police officer makes an

arrest on the basis of oral statements by fellow officers, an

officer will be entitled to qualified immunity from liability in

a civil rights suit for unlawful arrest provided it was

objectively reasonable for him to believe, on the basis of the

statements, that probable cause for the arrest existed.

B. Immunity in this Case

1. Edwards

Edwards acted in reliance on statements made by Davy

and Miller concerning the existence of an outstanding

arrest warrant for Rogers in Lycoming County. The relevant

question is whether it was objectively reasonable for him to

believe, on the basis of the statements, that probable cause

existed for the arrest. Unlike the officers in Capone,

Edwards never received a clear statement from a fellow law

enforcement officer confirming the existence of probable

cause for the suspect's arrest. The content of the

statements made by Davy and Miller merely related rumors

that were circulating about Rogers. The statements never

confirmed the existence of an arrest warrant for Rogers in

Lycoming County. Statements made by Miller regarding the

existence of summary warrants in Clinton County were

sufficiently clear; however those statements are not relevant

since the summary warrants were not the basis for

Edwards' arrest of Rogers.

Given the facts before us and in the absence of any

statement confirming the existence of probable cause or a

warrant itself, we do not believe that Edwards' reliance on

the statements was reasonable. Thus, as a matter of law it

was not objectively reasonable for Edwards to believe that

probable cause existed for the arrest and hence Edwards is

not protected against Rogers' § 1983 claim by the doctrine

of qualified immunity. Accordingly, we will reverse the

15

district court's order granting summary judgment as to

Edwards.8

2. Eiler

Eiler acted in reliance on the statements of Edwards.

Unlike the vague statements of Davy and Miller, the

statements made by Edwards to the other troopers involved

were clear, and unambiguously related the existence of an

arrest warrant for Rogers in Lycoming County. The

circumstances surrounding Eiler's participation in Rogers'

arrest are very similar to the circumstances in Capone and

as a matter of law we find that it was objectively reasonable

for Eiler to believe that probable cause existed for the

arrest.

Although the district court wrongly granted summary

judgment as to Eiler on the basis of a finding of probable

cause for the arrest, we will affirm the order on the

alternative grounds that having participated in the unlawful

arrest of Rogers, Eiler is nonetheless shielded from civil

liability for the § 1983 claim by the doctrine of qualified

immunity. See Williams v. Stone, 109 F.3d 890, 891 (3d

Cir. 1997) (affirming the judgment of the district court,

although on different grounds than those relied upon by

the district court).

3. Powell and Stine

Our holding as to Eiler largely controls our analysis of

qualified immunity for Powell and Stine. Powell and Stine

acted on the basis of the statements made by Edwards and

conveyed by the Lycoming County dispatcher Pfleegor,

stating that Rogers needed to be transported to the

_________________________________________________________________

8. Despite our conclusions that the arrest of Rogers was unlawful and

that Edwards is not shielded from liability by the doctrine of qualified

immunity, we do not enter summary judgment for Rogers. The district

court never ruled on Rogers' motion for summary judgment, and hence

Rogers was not able to appeal the issue to this court. We recognize

precedent which, broadly construed, suggests that we could

appropriately enter summary judgment for Rogers in this instance. See

Schmidt v. Farm Credit Services, 977 F.2d 511, 513 n.3 (10th Cir. 1992).

However we decline to do so and instead remand the matter to the

district court for decision in the first instance.

16

Lycoming County Prison pursuant to an arrest warrant. It

was objectively reasonable for Powell and Stine to believe,

on the basis of those statements, that probable cause

existed for the arrest of Rogers. Thus, for the initial period

of time that Powell and Stine held Rogers, they are

protected from Rogers' § 1983 claim by the doctrine of

qualified immunity.

Powell and Stine do not enjoy qualified immunity,

however, beyond the time at which assistant district

attorney Butts communicated to them that there was no

reason to hold Rogers in custody. Continuing to hold an

individual in handcuffs once it has been determined that

there was no lawful basis for the initial seizure is unlawful

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See United

States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1507 (10th Cir. 1996). Of

course, we recognize the possibility of some additional

basis, independent of that claimed to support the initial

seizure, that could support an official continuing to hold an

individual in handcuffs. However, no such basis exists here.9

As noted, Powell and Stine failed to remove the handcuffs

from Rogers when they learned from their conversation with

Butts that there was no basis for holding him, but rather

detained him for an additional period time. For this reason

they are not immunized from a § 1983 claim by Rogers

regarding this final interval of time. Accordingly, we affirm

in part and reverse in part the district court's order

granting summary judgment as to Powell and Stine. The

precise length of the additional holding period cannot be

determined from the evidence contained in the record and

will have to be decided on remand.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons the district court's grant of

summary judgment in favor of Eiler will be affirmed. The

court's order granting summary judgment as to Edwards

_________________________________________________________________

9. Even assuming, without so holding, that the officers might have been

justified in leaving the handcuffs on Rogers while transporting him to

Clinton County had Rogers' behavior posed a threat of some kind during

that time, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Rogers posed

such a threat, nor did the appellees raise such an argument in these

proceedings.

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will be reversed. The grant of summary judgment as to

Powell and Stine will be affirmed in part but also reversed

in part, and the cases against Edwards, Powell, and Stine

will be remanded to the district court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A True Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

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