The opinion
Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 521
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. E-14-910
Opinion Delivered September 30, 2015
PAUL VOSS APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
APPELLANT BOARD OF REVIEW
[NO. 2014-BR-02107]
V.
DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF
WORKFORCE SERVICES AND
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF
MAGNOLIA
APPELLEES AFFIRMED
BRANDON J. HARRISON, Judge
Paul Voss appeals the Arkansas Board of Review’s finding that he voluntarily left
work without good cause connected with the work and is therefore disqualified from
collecting unemployment benefits. He argues that the Board’s finding is not supported by
substantial evidence. We affirm.
Voss quit his job as maintenance superintendent for the Magnolia Housing
Authority (MHA) on 19 May 2014 and applied for unemployment insurance benefits on 5
June 2014. In his claimant statement, he indicated that he quit his job due to “harassment
on the job” and that he did not take steps to resolve the problem or situation before he
quit. On June 23, the Department of Workforce Services (Department) notified Voss that
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he was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits because he left his work
voluntarily and without good cause connected with the work.
Voss appealed to the Arkansas Appeal Tribunal, which held a hearing on 1 August
2014. Voss testified that he worked for the MHA for fourteen years. He explained that
he had been suspended “without valid reason” in March 2014 and that when he returned
to work in May 2014, he found himself “in the midst of a hostile work environment.”
He also stated that he had a number of health issues and that he “just couldn’t handle the
pressure up there.” He explained that he only worked four days after his return to work
in May and that he left his resignation letter on the desk of his boss, Richard Wyse. Voss
stated that upon his return, Wyse had singled him out and scrutinized his actions
unjustifiedly. He also blamed Wyse for forcing him to cancel a doctor’s appointment in
2011 and stated that Wyse “had a history of giving me the third degree” whenever he had
to leave for a doctor’s appointment.
Voss testified that there was no authority beyond Wyse whom he could speak to
about his problems and that MHA policy prohibited him from speaking to the housing
authority board members. He also stated that Wyse gave him no opportunity to talk
about his issues and that he did not inform Wyse of his resignation before leaving the
resignation letter on Wyse’s desk.
Richard Wyse testified that in February 2014, the housing authority implemented a
new drug-testing policy for its employees, and Voss tested positive for hydrocodone.
Wyse advised Voss that the housing authority needed a letter from Voss’s doctor to verify
that he was able to do his job without interference from any medications he may be
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taking. Voss was suspended for a time, from March until May, but was ultimately allowed
to return to work and was paid for the time he was suspended. Wyse had a meeting with
Voss on May 14 and told him that he could not use a housing-authority vehicle until the
housing authority had documentation that he was not a safety risk. Wyse admitted calling
Voss but said it was to check on some reports that needed to be done, not to check up on
him. Wyse stated that Voss did not talk to him or lodge any complaints before he
resigned. Wyse also said that Voss could have talked to him or one of the housing
authority board members about any issues that he had.
On 8 August 2014, the Appeal Tribunal issued a decision affirming the
Department’s determination. Voss then appealed to the Board of Review, which affirmed
the Appeal Tribunal. In its decision the Board made the following findings:
Although the claimant indicated that he worked in a “hostile work
environment” and that Wyse treated him unfairly, the Board does not find
that the claimant presented sufficient evidence to show that he was treated
unreasonably by his supervisor. . . . The Board finds that the claimant did
not quit his employment for a cause which would impel the average, able-
bodied, qualified worker to give up employment. Further, the claimant
admitted that he left a resignation letter for Wyse without speaking to Wyse
about his concerns or reasons for quitting. . . . The claimant also indicated in
his statement to the Department that he did not take steps to resolve the
alleged problem prior to quitting. As such, the claimant did not take
appropriate steps to address his concerns prior to leaving his employment.
Voss appealed.
We review the Board’s findings in the light most favorable to the prevailing party
and affirm the Board’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Rodriguez v. Dir.,
2013 Ark. App. 361. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. Even when there is evidence
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upon which the Board might have reached a different decision, the scope of our review is
limited to a determination of whether the Board reasonably could have reached the
decision that it did based upon the evidence before it. Id. Issues of credibility of witnesses
and weight to be afforded their testimony are matters for the Board to determine. Ballard
v. Dir., 2012 Ark. App. 371.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-513 (Repl. 2012) provides that an
individual shall be disqualified for unemployment benefits if he “voluntarily and without
good cause connected with the work left his or her last work.” “Good cause” is defined
as “a cause that would reasonably impel the average able-bodied, qualified worker to give
up his or her employment.” Wilson v. Dir., 2013 Ark. App. 276, at 2. An employee is
required to make reasonable efforts to preserve her job rights in order to receive
unemployment benefits. Id.
Voss argues that the Board’s finding that he left work without good cause is not
supported by substantial evidence. He claims that the evidence showed “unequivocally”
that his employer “took pervasive discriminatory and retaliatory action” against him “that
persisted until his termination.” He cites to his “improper” suspension, his “demotion”
upon returning to work, and the “unreasonable” demand that Voss provide confirmation
from his doctor about his prescription medication as proof of a hostile work environment
and discrimination. He also asserts that this hostile work environment was “executed by
the highest levels of executive management” and “ratified by the board of directors,” so it
was apparent that taking measures to resolve the problems would be a “futile gesture.”
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We disagree. The record shows that Voss was suspended for a time after a positive
drug test but ultimately returned to work with full compensation for the time he was
suspended. His employer made the very reasonable request for a doctor’s verification that
Voss’s prescription medication would not interfere with his job duties, and until that
verification was received, Voss was asked not to perform certain work duties, such as
driving a company vehicle. Four days after his return, Voss terminated his own
employment without voicing any complaints or concerns to Wyse or any other person in
management. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision that Voss voluntarily left
work without good cause connected to the work and that he failed to take appropriate
steps to address his concerns prior to leaving work.
Affirmed.
ABRAMSON and BROWN, JJ., agree.
Sprinkle Firm, by: Maximillan R. X. Sprinkle, Esq., for appellant.
Phyllis A. Edwards, for appellee.
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