Opinion

Wendell Terry Rogers v. Department of Defense

  • 2015 MSPB 5
Court
Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed
Sep 30, 2015
Status
Published
Cited by
1 cases
Authority
More cited than 67.9%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

2015 MSPB 54

Docket No. AT-0752-14-0682-I-1

Wendell Terry Rogers,

Appellant,

v.

Department of Defense,

Agency.

September 30, 2015

Wendell Terry Rogers, Huntsville, Alabama, pro se.

Dean Korsak, Esquire, and James J. Delduco, Esquire, Redstone Arsenal,

Alabama, for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

OPINION AND ORDER

¶1 The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision that

reversed the appellant’s indefinite suspension based on the suspension of his

access to classified information pending final adjudication of his security

clearance. For the reasons set forth below, we GRANT the petition for review

and REVERSE the initial decision. The appellant’s indefinite suspension

is SUSTAINED.

2

BACKGROUND

¶2 The appellant is an NH-1515-III Operations Research Analyst for the

agency. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 4 at 27. Operations Research Analyst is a

noncritical sensitive position that requires the incumbent to maintain a secret

security clearance. Id. at 49-50. On August 13, 2013, the agency suspended the

appellant’s access to classified information pending a final security determination

by the Department of Defense (DOD) Central Adjudication Facility (CAF)

concerning whether to revoke his security clearance. 1 Id. at 45-47. That same

day, the agency proposed the appellant’s indefinite suspension based on the

suspension of his access to classified information. Id. at 41-44. After receiving

the appellant’s response, id. at 36-40, the agency indefinitely suspended him

effective October 10, 2013, id. at 27-30.

¶3 The appellant filed a Board appeal, and the administrative judge reversed

the indefinite suspension, finding that the agency committed harmful procedural

error. 2 IAF, Tab 19, Initial Decision (ID). Specifically, he found that the agency

1

Under DOD regulations, the term “security clearance” refers to a determination that a

person is eligible for access to classified information. IAF, Tab 4 at 89-90

(DOD 5200.2-R § DL1.1.21). The issuance of a security clearance is distinct from the

determination to grant access to classified information, which is made solely on the

basis of the individual’s need for classified information in order to perform official

duties. Id. at 87 (DOD 5200.2-R § C7.1.1.1); see id. at 89 (DOD 5200.2-R § C7.1.1.17)

(stating that “[a]ccess . . . to classified information shall not be afforded to any

individual solely by virtue of the individual’s . . . security clearance”). Although

clearance determinations are within the purview of an authorized adjudicatory entity,

e.g., the CAF, access to classified information is granted by command to cleared

individuals on a need-to-know basis. See King v. Alston, 75 F.3d 657, 659 (Fed. Cir.

1996); Jones v. Department of the Navy, 120 M.S.P.R. 607, ¶ 2 n.1 (2014); 32 C.F.R.

§§ 154.48, 154.49.

2

The appellant did not request a hearing, and the case was decided on the basis of the

written record. IAF, Tab 12 at 1.

3

violated its regulations when it indefinitely suspended the appellant before

affording him its unfavorable administrative action procedures. 3 ID at 4-5.

¶4 The agency has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR) File,

Tab 1. It argues that the administrative judge erred in interpreting its regulations.

According to the agency, it was not required to afford the appellant the

unfavorable administrative action procedures because they do not apply to

adverse actions based on the suspension of access to classified information

pending final adjudication of a security clearance. Id. at 7-16. Although the

appellant inquired into the status of his appeal, he did not file a substantive

response. PFR File, Tab 3.

ANALYSIS

¶5 An indefinite suspension lasting more than 14 days is an adverse action

appealable to the Board under 5 U.S.C. § 7513 (d). 5 U.S.C. § 7512 (2). An

agency may indefinitely suspend an employee when his access to classified

information has been suspended and he needs such access to perform his job.

Gonzalez v. Department of Homeland Security, 114 M.S.P.R. 318 , ¶ 13 (2010)

(listing this type of situation among the limited circumstances in which the Board

and its reviewing court have permitted the use of indefinite suspensions). The

Board lacks authority to review the merits of the decision to suspend access.

Jones v. Department of the Navy, 48 M.S.P.R. 680 , 690 (finding that the Board

lacks authority to review the merits of an agency’s suspension of security access

in an indefinite suspension appeal), aff’d as modified on recons., 51 M.S.P.R.

607 (1991), aff’d, 978 F.2d 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Rather, in an appeal of an

adverse action based on the denial, revocation, or suspension of a security

clearance, the Board will generally only review whether: (1) the employee’s

position required a security clearance; (2) the clearance was denied, revoked, or

3

These procedures are described below. Infra ¶ 8 n.4.

4

suspended; and (3) the employee was provided with the procedural protections

specified in 5 U.S.C. § 7313 . Hesse v. Department of State, 217 F.3d 1372 ,

1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 ,

530-31 (1988)).

¶6 The appellant does not dispute the administrative judge’s findings that his

position required access to classified information and that his access was

suspended. ID at 2; see IAF, Tab 4 at 51. We adopt those findings herein and

find that the agency proved its charge. See Buelna v. Department of Homeland

Security, 121 M.S.P.R. 262 , ¶ 23 (2014). Further, there is no dispute that the

agency provided the procedural protections required by section 7513 prior to

indefinitely suspending him.

¶7 Section 7513, however, is not the only source of procedural protections for

employees subject to adverse actions; the Board also has the authority under

5 U.S.C. § 7701 (c)(2)(A) to review whether an agency taking an adverse action

complied with required procedural protections for security clearance

determinations, including those set forth in its own regulations. Romero v.

Department of Defense, 527 F.3d 1324 , 1329-30 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Schnedar v.

Department of the Air Force, 120 M.S.P.R. 516 , ¶¶ 7-8 (2014). Thus, under

5 U.S.C. § 7701 (c)(2)(A), the Board will not sustain an agency decision if the

appellant proves the affirmative defense of harmful error in the agency’s

application of its procedures in arriving at such decision. Schnedar,

120 M.S.P.R. 516 , ¶ 8. To prove this affirmative defense, the appellant must

show both that the agency committed procedural error and that the error was

harmful. Parker v. Defense Logistics Agency, 1 M.S.P.R. 505 , 513 (1980). An

agency error is harmful only where the record shows that it was likely to have

caused the agency to reach a conclusion different from the one it would have

reached in the absence or cure of the error. Stephen v. Department of the

Air Force, 47 M.S.P.R. 672 , 681, 685 (1991).

5

¶8 We begin by analyzing the agency’s procedures set forth in DOD

regulation 5200.2-R. Section C8.2.2 of DOD 5200.2-R provides, with exceptions

not applicable here, that the agency may not take an “unfavorable administrative

action” based on a “personnel security determination” without affording the

subject employee “unfavorable administrative action procedures.” 4 IAF, Tab 4

at 72, 154 (DOD 5200.2-R § C8.2.2); see id. at 87, 91 (DOD 5200.2-R

§§ DL1.1.2, DL1.1.29-.30). It is undisputed that the appellant was not afforded

unfavorable administrative action procedures prior to the suspension of his access

to classified information by local command. IAF, Tab 4 at 46; see PFR File,

Tab 1 at 8-9. The administrative judge determined that this constituted harmful

procedural error. We disagree.

¶9 The agency’s regulations define an “unfavorable administrative action” as

an “[a]dverse action taken as the result of personnel security determinations and

unfavorable personnel security determinations as defined in this Regulation.”

IAF, Tab 4 at 91 (DOD 5200.2-R § DL1.1.29). Adverse actions covered by the

regulation include those appealable to the Board under chapter 75 of title 5,

including a suspension of more than 14 days. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512 (1)-(5), 7513(d);

IAF, Tab 4 at 87, 91 (DOD 5200.2-R §§ DL1.1.2, DL1.1.29). Only if the

indefinite suspension in this case was “taken as a result of [an] unfavorable

personnel security determination[],” however, would it constitute an “unfavorable

administrative action” under the agency’s regulations.

¶10 As stated above, the indefinite suspension in this case was taken as a result

of the interim suspension of access pending final adjudication of the appellant’s

security clearance. Suspension of access to classified information is not the same

4

“Unfavorable administrative action procedures” include written notice of the reasons

for the action, an opportunity to respond to the appropriate CAF, a decision by the CAF,

an opportunity to appeal that decision to the Personnel Security Appeals Board (PSAB),

and a final decision by the PSAB. Schnedar, 120 M.S.P.R. 516, ¶ 10 (interpreting the

regulatory provisions); IAF, Tab 4 at 154-56 (DOD 5200.2-R §§ C8.2.2.1-C8.2.2.5).

6

as a suspension for eligibility pending final adjudication of a security clearance.

We therefore turn to the question of whether a suspension of access pending final

adjudication of a security clearance constitutes an “unfavorable personnel

security determination” under the agency’s regulations.

¶11 An “unfavorable personnel security determination” includes both “[a]

denial or revocation of clearance for access to classified information” and a

“denial or revocation of access to classified information.” IAF, Tab 4 at 91

(DOD 5200.2-R § DL.1.1.30). As the agency correctly notes, however, a

“suspension” of access to classified information pending final adjudication of a

security clearance is not included in the definition of “unfavorable personnel

security determination.” PFR File, Tab 01 at 10 n.2; IAF, Tab 4 at 91

(DOD 5200.2-R § DL.1.1.30); see id. at 148 ( DOD 5200.2-R § DL.1.1.1) (stating

that “[e]xcept for suspension of access pending final adjudication of a security

clearance, access may not be finally denied for cause without applying”

unfavorable administrative action procedures) (emphasis added).

¶12 Furthermore, section C8.1.3 of DOD 5200.2-R sets forth separate

procedures for access suspensions pending final adjudication of security

clearances . IAF, Tab 4 at 152-53 (D OD 5200.2-R § C8.1.3). Thus,

section C8.1.3.1 provides that, upon the receipt of derogatory information, local

command must determine whether to take interim action to suspend an

employee’s access to classified information. Id. Local command must report

such access suspensions promptly to the CAF, which will make a final

determination on the employee’s security clearance. Id. at 152-53

(DOD 5200.2-R §§ C8.1.3.3, C8.1.3.5). The access suspension decision itself

is not subject to CAF review. See IAF, Tab 4 at 148 (DOD 5200.2-R,

§ C7.1.1.1). Rather, the CAF undertakes a separate review of whether to revoke

the employee’s security clearance, i.e., his eligibility for access to classified

information. Id. at 148 (DOD 5200.2-R § C7.1.1.1), 151-53 (DOD 5200.2-R

§§ C.8.1.2.1, C8.1.3.5). Although the CAF may not make a final determination

7

on an employee’s security clearance without first applying unfavorable

administrative action procedures, no similar restriction appears in the agency’s

regulations concerning local command’s determination to take interim action to

suspend access. 5

¶13 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that a suspension of access pending

final adjudication of a security clearance is not an “unfavorable personnel

security determination” under the agency’s regulations. It follows that the

adverse action in this case—an indefinite suspension—was not “taken as the

result of [an] unfavorable personnel security determination[].” IAF, Tab 4 at 91

(DOD 5200.2-R § DL1.1.29). Therefore, the indefinite suspension was not an

“unfavorable administrative action” under DOD 5200.2-R, sections DL1.1.2 and

DL1.1.29, and the agency’s unfavorable administrative action procedures did not

apply. Accordingly, the appellant failed to establish that the agency committed

harmful procedural error by failing to afford him such procedures prior to

suspending his access pending final adjudication of his security clearance. See

Hylick v. Department of the Air Force, 85 M.S.P.R. 145 , ¶ 13 (2000) (the

appellant failed to show that the agency committed any procedural error, and

therefore failed to prove his harmful error defense).

¶14 The appellant does not dispute the agency’s penalty determination, and we

find no basis to mitigate the penalty. See Ryan v. Department of Homeland

Security, 793 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding that, in the absence of a statute

or regulation creating a substantive right to reassignment, the Board is precluded

5

We are not presented in this case with the circumstances before the Board in Ulep v.

Department of the Army, 120 M.S.P.R. 579 (2014). In Ulep, the agency’s proposal

notice stated that the appellant’s indefinite suspension was based on local command’s

informal suspension of his security clearance, not interim suspension of his access to

classified information. Id., ¶ 2. Here, by contrast, local command suspended the

appellant’s access to classified information, not his clearance.

8

from requiring the agency to transfer the appellant to a position not requiring a

security clearance).

¶15 For these reasons, we reverse the initial decision and sustain the indefinite

suspension.

ORDER

¶16 This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this

appeal. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.113(c) ( 5 C.F.R.

§ 1201.113 (c)).

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS

You have the right to request review of this final decision by the

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. You must submit your

request to the court at the following address:

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, DC 20439

The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar

days after the date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703 (b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec.

27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has

held that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline

and that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See

Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to

court, you should refer to the Federal law that gives you this right. It is found in

Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 ( 5 U.S.C. § 7703 ) (as rev. eff.

Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the

United States Code, at our website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode/htm .

Additional information is available at the court’s website,

9

www.cafc.uscourts.gov . Of particular relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se

Petitioners and Appellants,” which is contained within the court’s Rules of

Practice , and Forms 5, 6, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our

website at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono

representation for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal

Circuit. The Merit Systems Protection Board neither endorses the services

provided by any attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation

in a given case.

FOR THE BOARD:

______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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