David Armato v. Randy Grounds

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 13-1995

DAVID ARMATO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

RANDY GROUNDS, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois.

No. 3:11-cv-03023-RM-BGC — Richard Mills, Judge.

ARGUED MAY 29, 2014 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 4, 2014

Before BAUER, KANNE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant David Armato filed

a four-count complaint against five defendants employed by

the Illinois Department of Corrections at the Robinson Correc-

tional Center: Randy Grounds, Michele Littlejohn, Glenn

Jackson, Dion Dixon, and Edward Huntley. Counts one, two,

and three claimed that the defendants violated Armato’s

constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count

four, a state law claim, alleged that the defendants falsely

2 No. 13-1995

imprisoned Armato. The district court granted defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment on all counts, finding that no

rational trier of fact could find that Armato was unlawfully

detained beyond his court-ordered release date. Armato

appeals to this court seeking review of the district court’s

judgment in favor of defendants on his § 1983 claims.

I. DISCUSSION

Armato, a convicted sex offender, committed two theft

offenses in Illinois in 2005, the first on May 7, and the second

on December 30. He was convicted of both crimes in separate

cases in the Circuit Court of Lake County (Nos. 05 CF 1661 and

05 CF 5015, respectively). On March 6, 2006, Armato was

sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment for the second theft, to

run concurrently with his sentence on the prior charge. The

judicial orders of that sentence did not impose a term of

mandatory supervised release (“MSR”) and stated that the

Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) shall administer

good time credit to Armato “for time served in the Lake

County Jail and while awaiting transport to the Department of

Corrections.” When the IDOC first processed Armato, he was

projected to be released on May 9, 2010, with the mistaken

understanding that he had entered state custody on May 9,

2005.

A. Armato’s Detainment at the Robinson Correctional

Center

Armato arrived at the Robinson Correctional Center in

2007. His sentence was recalculated to reflect the good time

credit he earned for his time already served. His new projected

release date was November 9, 2009.

No. 13-1995 3

Defendant Littlejohn was an office administration specialist

and the acting supervisor of the records office at Robinson

Correctional Center. One of her primary responsibilities was to

calculate every prisoner’s release date. In September 2009,

Littlejohn began reviewing Armato’s paperwork in anticipa-

tion of his release. Littlejohn noticed that Armato’s file lacked

reliable information pertaining to the time he spent in Lake

County Jail: it stated that Armato had been incarcerated since

May 9, 2005; this was impossible since Armato had committed

his second theft offense on December 30, 2005. Using the two

criminal judgments sent from the Lake County Jail, Littlejohn

recalculated Armato’s release to be September 6, 2010. Little-

john informed Armato of these changes and told him that his

release date could again be recalculated if the sentencing court

issued a new order detailing any applicable credit. The IDOC

advised Armato to seek judicial clarification of his release date.

In February 2010, Armato sought an order to clarify his

release date. On February 18, 2010, the Circuit Court of Lake

County entered three documents related to Armato: two typed

judgments and one handwritten agreed-upon order. The two

typed orders were in reference to each of Armato’s cases; both

orders were signed by Judge Theodore S. Potkonjak and stated

in relevant part, “It is further ordered that [w]ith credit for 373

days served in the Lake County Jail—credit for time awaiting

transport to the Department of Corrections—good time credit

as administered by the Department of Corrections—def to be

released from the Department of Corrections without a term of

Mandatory Supervised Release.” The typed orders did not

reference a specific date for Armato’s release.

4 No. 13-1995

The Assistant Public Defender representing Armato, C. P.

Haran, prepared a handwritten order captioned “Agreed

Order” that was signed by Judge Potkonjak. The Agreed Order

read:

It is hereby ordered that:

1) Mr. Armato shall receive credit on 05 CF 5015 &

05 CF 161 [sic] for 69 days for time in custody

from 12/30/05 (date of offense of 05 CF 5015)

through March 6, 2006. Defendant had not

previously received this credit. (Defendant

receives this in addition to original credit for

time served[.])

2) Mr. Armato was not admonished on the record

regarding any term of Mandatory Supervised

Release.

3) Mr. Armato’s mittimus shall be amended to

include the additional 69 days credit in para-

graph (1) and NO term of Mandatory Supervised

Release.

4) Mr. Armato shall be released from the Depart-

ment of Corrections, without a term of MSR, on

Friday, May 28, 2010.

(emphases in original).

B. The Defendants Believe Armato’s Typed Sentencing

Orders are Against State Law and Seek Guidance

from the Office of the Attorney General

No. 13-1995 5

On February 22, 2010, Littlejohn received the two typed

orders and recalculated Armato’s release date to be August 23,

2009.1 As a result, Armato was eligible for release. However,

Littlejohn was concerned that the orders stated Armato should

be released without a term of MSR; Littlejohn believed that

Illinois law required a term of MSR in Armato’s case (At the

time of Armato’s sentencing, § 5-8-1(d) of the Unified Code of

Corrections provided, “Except where a term of natural life is

imposed, every sentence shall include as though written

therein a term in addition to the term of imprisonment … .

[S]uch term shall be identified as a mandatory supervised

release term.”). Littlejohn understood that when a previously-

convicted sex offender is released from custody, he is subject

to strict MSR conditions such as electronic monitoring and a

suitable host location approved by the IDOC. If Armato was

subject to a term of MSR, he would need to find an approved

host location for electronic monitoring before he could be

released. While efforts had been made to find a suitable host

location for Armato, none could be found. Littlejohn deter-

mined that even if Armato was subject to release, the IDOC

could not release him without first finding a suitable host

location.

That same day, Littlejohn contacted the Lake County

Assistant State’s Attorney who confirmed that the sentencing

1

Littlejohn testified that she only relied upon the two typed court orders

dated February 18, 2010, to recalculate Armato’s projected release to be on

August 23, 2009. It is unclear whether anyone at IDOC received the

handwritten order or whether it was used by other IDOC officials while

making subsequent decisions about Armato’s release.

6 No. 13-1995

judge had in fact intended no term of MSR be imposed.

Littlejohn then informed her IDOC colleagues of her concerns

about Armato’s case. By February 23, 2010, the following

employees at the IDOC Headquarters were made aware of the

situation: Defendant Glenn Jackson, Chief Records Officer and

Littlejohn’s supervisor; Defendant Edward Huntley, Chief

Legal Counsel and Special Litigation Counsel; the coordinator

for sex offender services; and one other attorney within IDOC.

An attorney for the Prisoner Review Board was also informed

of the matter. These individuals agreed with Littlejohn that a

term of MSR was mandatory for Armato by operation of state

law. The attorney at the IDOC Headquarters advised the

defendants that it was necessary to contact the Illinois Office of

the Attorney General (“AG’s Office”) for assistance. In a group

email, the attorney wrote, “The Court in my opinion cannot

legally sentence the offender without a term of MSR. Unless

we challenge the order through the AG’s Office, I think we are

bound to follow the order.”

Jackson informed Littlejohn that based on her most recent

calculation of Armato’s release date and the fact that a suitable

host site was not secured, the appropriate line of action would

be to “violate [Armato] at the door.”2 Armato was first violated

2

Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(j), the AG’s Office provided this court with

clarification on the practice of “violations at the door” in a letter dated

June 20, 2014. A “violation at the door,” also called the “turnaround

practice” of the IDOC, is the result of (1) the authority granted to the

Prison Review Board to set out the conditions for a parolee’s release

and determine whether a violation of his MSR conditions should result in a

revocation of his release, and (2) the IDOC’s responsibility to determine

(continued...)

No. 13-1995 7

at the door on February 23, 2010. Defendant Dixon, the

Supervisor of the Sex Offender Unit in the Parole Division at

Robinson Correctional Center, prepared the violation report

and notice of charges against Armato. Dixon was unaware that

the court had not imposed a term of MSR for Armato.

Littlejohn again contacted Huntley on February 26, 2010,

seeking an update on Armato’s case. That day, Huntley

contacted the AG’s Office to challenge the sentencing orders

and have the court amend them to include a term of MSR. On

several occasions, Huntley spoke with the AG’s Office in an

attempt to persuade them to seek relief on behalf of the IDOC

in the Circuit Court of Lake County. The AG’s Office did not

make an immediate decision as to whether it would take up the

case; IDOC officials waited through spring to receive a re-

sponse. During this time, Huntley was in contact with Jackson

and told him not to release Armato until the issue was re-

solved.

On March 9, 2010, Armato submitted an emergency

grievance in regard to his continued detainment to the War-

den, defendant Randy Grounds. Grounds was responsible for

enforcing all of Robinson Correctional Center’s policies and

procedures, including the review of emergency grievances.

Since emergency grievances are limited to special circum-

stances involving health, injury, or other medical issues,

Grounds denied Armato’s emergency grievance. Grounds

2

(...continued)

whether a parolee is in compliance with the conditions of his MSR. 730

ILCS § 5/3-3-1, 3-14-2 (2012); Murdock v. Walker, No. 08 C 1142, 2014

WL 916992 at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 2014).

8 No. 13-1995

authorized Armato to instead pursue a regular grievance

through normal channels, which he did later that month. The

reviewing grievance officer concluded that the issue raised in

Armato’s grievance would have to be resolved by the IDOC’s

Administrative Review Board because a “legal opinion will

have to be rendered regarding the validity” of the judge’s

sentencing orders requiring release without a term of MSR.

Grounds never reviewed the second grievance, but the

Assistant Warden, with authority, signed Grounds’ name

indicating that the Warden agreed with the grievance officer’s

decision.

On April 7, 2010, the Prison Review Board held a hearing

with Armato in relation to his first violation at the door. The

Prison Review Board declined to find a technical violation of

Armato’s MSR because his situation was actually a “placement

issue.” The order from the Prison Review Board further stated

that Armato’s release was “contingent upon execution of

Parole or Mandatory Supervised Release.”

Nonetheless, since IDOC officials were still awaiting a

decision from the AG’s Office, and Armato still did not have a

suitable host location, they violated Armato at the door for a

second time on April 29, 2010. Dixon prepared the violation

report and notice of charges; he remained unaware that

Armato’s sentencing orders did not impose a term of MSR.

Meanwhile, Littlejohn sought updates on Armato’s case by

repeatedly emailing Jackson (she emailed Jackson ten times

between February 26 and May 21, 2010). Jackson contacted

Huntley on May 21 asking whether the AG’s Office made a

decision. Huntley responded in an email:

No. 13-1995 9

Glenn, the AG’s Office has declined to pursue a request

to the court that the sentencing orders be modified or

otherwise move for leave to intervene on behalf of the

Department in this case. That being so, I believe we

have exhausted the potential alternatives and will have

to let Armato go as a discharge. I suppose we should

show it as a court-ordered discharge as that is exactly

what it is.

Armato was released later that day on May 21, 2010,

without a term of MSR.

C. The District Court Proceedings

Armato initiated the present action on January 24, 2011,

alleging violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a state law claim for false

imprisonment under federal supplemental jurisdiction.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of

the defendants on all claims for six reasons: (1) the February 18,

2010, Agreed Order provided a release date of May 28, 2010;

Armato was in fact released one week earlier and was not

harmed; (2) Armato’s Eighth Amendment claim fails because

the defendants had a colorable belief that the other court

orders were void for failure to impose MSR and were not

deliberately indifferent to Armato’s incarceration; (3) even

so, qualified immunity applies to the defendants because they

did not know that they were violating clearly established

constitutional rights; (4) Grounds and Dixon were not suffi-

ciently involved to be liable under § 1983; (5) Armato’s due

process claim fails because he had other remedies available to

him in the court system; and (6) Armato’s state claim for false

10 No. 13-1995

imprisonment is banned by the Eleventh Amendment and

should be brought in state court.

Armato appealed to this court seeking review of the district

court’s judgment only in relation to his § 1983 claims.

II. DISCUSSION

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment

de novo. Pagel v. TIN Inc., 695 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir. 2012).

Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed

in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, shows that

there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322–23 (1986). While the evidence is viewed in a light most

favorable to the non-moving party, “the nonmoving party

must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation omit-

ted). Inferences that rely upon speculation or conjecture are

insufficient. Stephens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir.

2009). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a

rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is

no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 475

U.S. at 587 (citing First Nat. Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Service Co., 391

U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).

To survive summary judgment of a claim brought under

§ 1983, this court focuses on “(1) whether the conduct com-

plained of was committed by a person acting under color of

state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or

No. 13-1995 11

laws of the United States.” Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535

(1981). The defendants here clearly acted under state law since

they are employed by the IDOC and were following state law

procedures when making decisions about Armato’s release.

Armato must therefore establish that a reasonable trier of fact

could find that he was deprived of his constitutional rights by

being detained beyond his release date.

A. Armato’s Claims Fail on the Merits

Armato’s claims fail on the merits because IDOC officials

complied with the handwritten Agreed Order entered

on February 18, 2010, and Armato never challenged the dis-

positive nature of the order. The Agreed Order, prepared by

the Assistant Public Defender and signed by the sentencing

judge, expressly stated, “Mr. Armato shall be released from the

Department of Corrections, without a term of MSR, on Friday,

May 28, 2010.” Armato was in fact released one week earlier

without a term of MSR on May 21, 2010.

This court reviews the effect of an Illinois state judgment by

looking to state law. See DeGuelle v. Camilli, 724 F.3d 933, 937

(7th Cir. 2013) (Federal courts are required “to give state court

judgments the same preclusive effect that the state courts that

issued the judgments would give them.”). Under Illinois law,

the meaning of an agreed order “should be determined by the

language chosen by the parties.” Clark v. Standard Life & Acc.

Ins. Co., 386 N.E.2d 890, 896 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979). Here, the plain

language of the February 18, 2010, Agreed Order stated that

Armato should be released on May 28, 2010. To elaborate:

[A]n agreed order is conclusive on the parties and can

not be amended or set aside by one of the parties

12 No. 13-1995

without a showing that the order resulted from fraudu-

lent representation, coercion, incompetence of one of

the parties, gross disparity in the position or capacity of

the parties, or newly discovered evidence.

Olsen v. Staniak, 632 N.E.2d 168, 173 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). Armato

has not provided arguments or authority challenging the

agreed order or requesting it be amended.

Instead, Armato points to the two typed judgments also

entered on February 18, 2010, to show that his release date was

earlier than May 28, 2010. The two judgments stated that

Armato would receive certain credit to be included in his

sentence. The district court found that these two typed orders

were of “little consequence.” We are compelled to agree.

The two typed judgments were not labeled “Agreed” and

do not indicate any knowledge or participation on behalf of

Armato or the state in their construction. The district court

accurately noted, “On February 18, 2010, the judge, the

prosecutor, and the public defender [representing Armato]

were only absolutely certain of one thing—that Armato was to

be released on May 28, 2010.” While the first portion of the

Agreed Order mentions that Armato shall receive credit for

time served, nothing in the Agreed Order indicated that the

explicit date for Armato’s release listed on the page should be

further modified. The plain, unambiguous language of the

agreed order clearly set a release date for May 28, 2010, and the

defendants did not detain Armato beyond that date. Since

IDOC officials fully complied with the terms of the court’s

order, Armato did not suffer any injury.

No. 13-1995 13

B. Even Without the Handwritten Order, Armato’s

Eighth Amendment Claim Fails as a Matter of Law

It is important to note that Littlejohn, Huntley, and Jackson

testified that they were relying on the two typed orders, not

the handwritten Agreed Order, when determining Armato’s

release date. Even without the court’s handwritten order,

however, Armato’s constitutional claims must still fail as a

matter of law.

To defeat summary judgment on his Eighth Amendment

claim, Armato needs to prove that the defendants held him

beyond the term of his incarceration without penological justi-

fication, and that the prolonged detention was the result of the

defendants’ “deliberate indifference.” Campbell v. Peters, 256

F.3d 695, 700 (7th Cir. 2001). Deliberate indifference requires

more than negligence, rather the defendant “must meet

‘essentially a criminal recklessness standard, that is, ignoring

a known risk.’” McGee v. Adams, 721 F.3d 474, 480–81 (quoting

Johnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 585 (7th Cir. 2006). Armato

failed to show that the defendants deliberately held him

beyond the term of his incarceration.

The defendants were not deliberately ignoring Armato’s

detainment without penological justification. Huntley, Jackson,

and Littlejohn testified that they believed releasing Armato, a

convicted sex offender, without a term of MSR was contrary to

state law. In making determinations about a prisoner’s release,

prison officials are permitted to rely upon “a reasonable

interpretation of a state statute,” even if they are ultimately

mistaken. Campbell, 256 F.3d at 701. Littlejohn testified that her

concern about Armato’s sentencing orders was that “by Illinois

14 No. 13-1995

statute, you are supposed to have an MSR term, so it is

basically against the law to not have an MSR term.” After

Littlejohn expressed this concern to her colleagues, an IDOC

attorney informed them that he also believed the court “cannot

legally sentence this offender without a term of MSR.”

The record amply demonstrates that IDOC officials were

actively pursuing assistance from the AG’s Office from the

moment they discovered that Armato’s release appeared

contrary to state law: Huntley testified that he spoke with the

AG’s Office on several occasions, Littlejohn repeatedly con-

tacted Jackson and Huntley, and Jackson was continuing to

pressure Huntley in efforts to clear up the issue. Huntley

testified that he believed he was “on sound legal footing” in

holding Armato until the IDOC received a response from the

AG’s Office and that he was aware that the AG’s Office had

successfully “gone to court a number of times” to alter the

conditions of a prisoner’s sentence. As soon as the AG’s Office

informed the defendants that it would not be pursuing the

matter, the defendants knew they had exhausted the remedies

available to them and promptly released Armato without a

term of MSR.

C. Armato’s Fourteenth Amendment Claim Fails as a

Matter of Law and is Precluded by the Available State

Court Remedies

Armato’s Fourteenth Amendment claim of a violation of his

right to procedural due process also fails as a matter of law. A

procedural due process claim requires the plaintiff to show (1)

that he was deprived of a protected liberty or property interest,

and (2) that he did not receive the process that was due to

No. 13-1995 15

justify the deprivation of that interest. See McKinney v. George,

726 F.2d 1183, 1189 (7th Cir. 1984). We have already deter-

mined that Armato was not deprived of a protected liberty

interest because he was released prior to the agreed-upon

release date written in the Agreed Order. Even if the defen-

dants had in fact incarcerated Armato beyond his proper

release date, however, Armato received the process that was

due in the circumstances.

Here, the processes undertaken by the defendants were

sufficient to address Armato’s situation and justify his pro-

longed detention. Armato argues that “[t]he defendants here,

knew, or should have known, that the only reasonable pro-

cesses were to seek court intervention, rely on the Parole Board

decision or have a meaningful internal grievance procedure.”

In fact, the defendants relied on all three of these options. The

defendants immediately and persistently contacted the AG’s

Office to pursue court intervention on behalf of the IDOC to

amend Armato’s sentences in accordance with Illinois law. The

decision of the Prison Review Board merely stated that

Armato’s release was contingent upon his MSR and did not

resolve the issue of whether Armato could be released without

MSR. Armato also availed himself to the internal grievance

procedure, where he was told the issue could only be resolved

by a legal opinion. Armato’s prolonged incarceration was

justified by the fervent efforts of the defendants to receive

assistance from the AG’s Office to pursue court intervention to

amend his sentence.

Furthermore, Armato had numerous sufficient remedies

available to him in the state court including a writ of habeas

corpus, a writ of mandamus to correct the Agreed Order

16 No. 13-1995

stating his exact release date, and a claim of false imprison-

ment. In Toney-El v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1224, 1225 (7th Cir. 1985),

an inmate claimed a violation of his right to due process when

the Department of Corrections improperly held him in prison

for an additional 306 days due to confusion in calculating his

release date. The district court found in favor of the inmate, but

this court reversed. Id. at 1226. We found that the state court

remedies giving the inmate “the right to seek a writ of manda-

mus from the state court to correct the error” and “a cause of

action in Illinois courts for false imprisonment” were both

“adequate and available” remedies, precluding a claim for due

process for a state prisoner in Armato’s particular situation.

Id. at 1228.

III. CONCLUSION

Armato did not suffer any injury because he was released

prior to the precise date in the “Agreed Order,” the defendants

were not deliberately indifferent to Armato’s incarceration

because they diligently pursued relief from the AG’s Office for

clarification, and Armato’s due process claims fail as a matter

of law and are precluded by the remedies available to him in

state court. The district court decision is AFFIRMED.