United States v. David Wescott

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 08-1211

U NITED STATES OF A MERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

D AVID L. W ESCOTT,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.

No. 06 CR 50008—Frederick J. Kapala, Judge.

A RGUED O CTOBER 31, 2008—D ECIDED A UGUST 3, 2009

Before F LAUM, R OVNER and W OOD , Circuit Judges.

R OVNER, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted David L.

Wescott of two counts of unlawful possession of fire-

arms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). Wescott com-

plains that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his

conviction, that the court erred in admitting certain

evidence, that prosecutorial misconduct prevented him

from receiving a fair trial, and that the statute under

which he was convicted is unconstitutional. We affirm.

2 No. 08-1211

I.

In 2004, Glenda Wescott sought an order of protection

against her former husband, David Wescott.1 Wescott

received notice of his ex-wife’s petition and appeared with

counsel at the June 25, 2004 hearing on the petition. R. 103,

Gov’t Ex. 1. At that hearing, an Illinois state court judge

entered an Order of Protection (hereafter “Order”) prohib-

iting Wescott from committing “further acts of abuse

or threats of abuse” towards Glenda, and ordering him

to stay away from her. The Order was entered on a stan-

dardized form and Glenda’s attorney filled in the

blanks and checked off boxes as the court ruled on the

petition. On the first page of the Order, in a section identi-

fying Wescott as the respondent, a box is checked next

to the warning: “Caution: Weapon Involved.” The Order

indicates that Wescott had abused Glenda and would

likely continue to abuse her unless the Order was en-

tered. The court granted Glenda exclusive possession of

a home the two had shared at 8850 Hales Corner in

Stillman Valley, Illinois (hereafter “the Hales Corner

house”). The court found that “there is a danger of the

illegal use of firearms” and ordered Wescott to turn

over “any and all firearms” including any registered to

him and any located at 2710 Centerville in Rockford,

Illinois, Wescott’s residence at that time. The Order

specified that Wescott was to turn over the firearms to

the Ogle County Sheriff’s Office by June 28, 2004, for

1

For the sake of clarity, we will refer to David Wescott as

“Wescott” and to Glenda Wescott as “Glenda.”

No. 08-1211 3

safekeeping. This part of the Order expressly referenced

18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the provision of federal law under

which Wescott was eventually charged. The Order was

to remain in effect for two years, until June 24, 2006. The

face of the Order indicated that Wescott was served

with a copy of the Order in open court on June 24, 2004.

On November 29, 2005, just before midnight, a red Chevy

Lumina caught the eye of Officer Timothy Stec of the

Rockford Police Department as he was patrolling his

assigned area. The Lumina was the only other car on

the road at that hour, and Officer Stec noticed that the

trunk was riding unusually low. He ran the license plate

on his squad car computer and determined that the car

was registered to Wescott and that Wescott’s driver’s

license had expired in June 2005. The computer also

indicated that there was an Order of Protection entered

against Wescott that prohibited him from possessing

firearms and ammunition. Because the driver of the

Lumina matched the description of Wescott given by the

computer, Officer Stec decided to pull the car over. In

order to avoid passing traffic and because the Order

indicated that a weapon was involved, Officer Stec

initially approached Wescott’s car from the passenger

side of the vehicle. Wescott turned over his expired

license at the officer’s request, and the officer explained

that he was issuing a citation for driving on an expired

license. Wescott told the officer that he was heading

home from work, and was concerned about the cost of

the citation. Officer Stec returned to his squad car to

complete the traffic citation for driving on an expired

license, and then approached the driver’s side of the car

to give Wescott the ticket.

4 No. 08-1211

At that time, the officer noticed that there were

several bullets lying loose on the floor of the car. He

informed Wescott that the Order prohibited him from

possessing firearms or ammunition and asked him if he

had those items in the car. Wescott denied that he did.

Officer Stec than asked Wescott to step out of the car, and

secured him in the back of his squad car. He asked

Wescott again whether there were any weapons in the

car and Wescott replied that “it was possible.” Officer Stec

searched the passenger compartment of the car and

found 427 bullets, some rolling around loose and some

secured in plastic baggies. He then ran a check on

Wescott’s Firearms Owner Identification card (“FOID

card”) and learned that Wescott’s FOID card had been

revoked. He advised Wescott that he was arresting him

for possessing ammunition and having a lapsed FOID

card. Wescott then told the officer that he was in the

process of moving from a house on Bavarian Lane to a

house in Stillman Valley that had previously been

covered by the Order. He told the officer that he still

owned a few rifles, despite the Order. When Wescott

again asked about the cost of his bond, Officer Stec told

him that, unless he found firearms in the car, the bond

would be the same as the original citation. Wescott took

a deep breath and told the officer “he was going to need

a whole lot more money.” R. 86, Tr. at 60.

Subsequent to the arrest, police officers impounded

Wescott’s car and conducted an inventory search. In the

trunk of Wescott’s car, the officers found almost enough

guns to arm a platoon. Immediately on opening the trunk,

the officers saw two new shotguns, still in the original

No. 08-1211 5

boxes. Inside two duffel bags, the officers found seventeen

pistols and revolvers. A subsequent search of the Hales

Corner house resulted in the confiscation of two more

rifles and another pistol as well as an astonishing amount

of ammunition. The officers who searched the Hales

Corner house took photographs of the guns and ammuni-

tion that they found there, documenting the location of

these items before they were removed.

During an interview with police officers following

his arrest, Wescott said he was moving from the Hales

Corner house to a house on Bavarian Lane. He told the

officers he had not lived at Hales Corner for approxi-

mately two years, that he was aware of the Order of

Protection, that he knew it was still active and that he

had placed the duffle bags in his car trunk a few days

before the traffic stop. A detective prepared a written

statement for Wescott based on his oral admissions. He

asked Wescott to initial before and after each paragraph

if he agreed with the contents. Wescott made a few cor-

rections and initialed before and after each paragraph,

but balked when he was asked to sign the statement.

Instead, he tore the paper in half.

Wescott was charged with two counts of violating

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), one related to the weapons found

in the car and one for the weapons found at the Hales

Corner house. Section 922(g)(8) declares that it shall

be unlawful for any person—

who is subject to a court order that—(A) was issued

after a hearing of which such person received actual

notice, and at which such person had an opportunity

6 No. 08-1211

to participate; (B) restrains such person from

harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner

of such person or child of such intimate partner or

person, or engaging in other conduct that would place

an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily

injury to the partner or child; and (C)(i) includes a

finding that such person represents a credible threat

to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child;

or (ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, at-

tempted use, or threatened use of physical force

against such intimate partner or child that would

reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury; . . . to

ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce,

or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or

ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammuni-

tion which has been shipped or transported in inter-

state or foreign commerce.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). A jury found Wescott guilty on both

counts and the court sentenced him to thirty-nine months’

imprisonment, three years of supervised release and

a $7500 fine. Wescott appeals.

II.

On appeal, Wescott first claims that the evidence

was insufficient to convict him on the charged offense

because the Order of Protection was not valid and was

void on its face. Second, he complains that the court erred

in admitting unfairly prejudicial evidence regarding the

number of firearms and the amount of ammunition

recovered. Third, he maintains that prosecutorial mis-

No. 08-1211 7

conduct prevented him from receiving a fair trial. Fourth,

he contends that Section 922(g) is an unconstitutional

exercise of federal power over a matter traditionally

regulated by the states. And finally, he faults the district

court for admitting into evidence the torn, initialed,

edited and unsigned statement drafted by the detective

who interviewed him.

A.

The thrust of Wescott’s first argument is that he could

not have violated Section 922(g)(8) unless there was a

“valid” order of protection entered against him. Instead,

he claims, he was not “subject to a court order” as

required by the statute because the Order here con-

tained inconsistencies and impossibilities and was thus

void as a matter of law. As an example of these incon-

sistencies, Wescott notes that, in the part of the Order

dedicated to remedies involving property, boxes

indicating the court’s findings are checked for every

category including (1) “Petitioner, but not Respondent,

owns the property”; (2) “The property is jointly owned

by the parties, and sharing it would risk abuse or is

impracticable and the balance of hardships favors tempo-

rary possession by Petitioner”; (3) “Petitioner claims

property as marital property, and a proceeding has

been filed under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of

Marriage Act (‘IMDMA’).” Because it is a legal impossi-

bility for the property to be owned solely by Glenda and

also jointly by Wescott and Glenda, Wescott contends

that the Order was void. He also complains that the

8 No. 08-1211

Order directed him to turn over to the sheriff all of his

firearms by June 28, 2004, but also prohibited him from

entering the Hales Corner house as of June 25, 2004, the

date the Order was entered. It was thus impossible for

him to turn over any guns that were at the Hales Corner

house at that time. Finally, he protests that the Order

was amended on November 17, 2005, to allow him to

enter the Hales Corner house to remove his personal

property and to prepare the property for sale, but the

amendment made no mention of any firearms on the

premises.

We cannot see the relevance of Wescott’s complaint

about the amendment to the Order. Nothing in the amend-

ment affected the original Order’s prohibition on posses-

sion of firearms, and the original Order remained in

effect until its termination date of June 24, 2006. Indeed,

the attorney who represented Wescott at the state court

hearing on the Order testified at the federal trial that

the prohibition on possession of firearms and ammuni-

tion remained in effect following the amendment. R. 87,

Tr. at 301-02. The remaining arguments amount to an

attempt to collaterally attack the validity of the state

court Order. Wescott does not cite a single case in sup-

port of this argument. He does not argue that the Order

or the process leading to its issuance failed to comport

with any of the requirements set forth in Section 922(g)(8).

For example, he does not contest that the Order was

issued after a hearing, of which he had actual notice, and

at which he had an opportunity to participate. Rather

he argues that he was not “subject to a court order”

because the Order was void ab initio due to internal

No. 08-1211 9

contradictions. Although our circuit has not yet directly

addressed whether a defendant may collaterally attack

the validity of the order of protection underlying a

Section 922(g)(8) violation, every court to consider the

issue has rejected Wescott’s argument.2 See United States v.

Young, 458 F.3d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 2006) (declining to

entertain a collateral inquiry into the constitutionality

of the state court restraining order proceedings in a

Section 922(g)(8) case except to the extent that the

federal statute explicitly requires certain procedural

protections); United States v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514, 534-35 (5th

Cir. 2004) (refusing to consider in a Section 922(g)(8) case

a collateral attack on a protective order issued by a state

court, where the defendant argued that the order was

void ab initio because the state court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over the application for the order); United

States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 264 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding

that the court in a Section 922(g)(8) prosecution may

not engage in collateral review of the validity of the

underlying state court order, at least where that order

is not so “transparently invalid” as to have “only a frivo-

lous pretense to validity”); United States v. Baker, 197

F.3d 211, 216-17 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that the nature

of the underlying state proceeding has no effect on the

constitutionality of a Section 922(g)(8) prosecution, and

2

The Ninth Circuit assumes that we answered this question

in United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280 (7th Cir. 1998), but, as we

explain below, we have not taken a conclusive position on

the issue until today. See United States v. Young, 458 F.3d

998, 1004 n.14 (9th Cir. 2006).

10 No. 08-1211

that no matter how a defendant became subject to a

domestic violence protective order, the defendant must

comply with Section 922(g)(8)). See also United States v.

Calor, 340 F.3d 428, 430 (6th Cir. 2003) (rejecting defen-

dant’s claim that the court order upon which his prosecu-

tion under Section 922(g)(8) was based was not issued

after a hearing that is within the scope of Section 922(g)(8),

and finding that the minimum requirements for a

hearing set forth in Section 922(g)(8) comport with the

requirements of due process).

The Supreme Court considered a similar issue in Lewis

v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980). In 1977, Lewis was

charged with knowingly receiving and possessing a

firearm after having been convicted of a felony in a

state court, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1). The

underlying state court felony was a 1961 conviction for

breaking and entering. Lewis was not represented by

counsel at the 1961 trial and had not waived his right to

counsel. He contended in his federal prosecution that,

under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), a violation

of Section 1202 could not be predicated on a prior convic-

tion obtained in violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights. Lewis, 445 U.S. at 56-57. The Court

looked to the language of Section 1202 and determined

that there was no modifier or limitation on the scope

of the term “convicted.” Instead, the language of

Section 1202 was sweeping, and the fact of a felony con-

viction therefore imposed a firearm disability until the

conviction was vacated or the felon was relieved of the

disability by some affirmative action, such as a pardon.

Turning to the legislative history, the Court saw “nothing

No. 08-1211 11

to suggest that Congress was willing to allow a defendant

to question the validity of his prior conviction as a

defense to a charge under § 1202(a)(1).” Lewis, 445 U.S.

at 62. The Court noted that a convicted felon must chal-

lenge the validity of a prior conviction, or otherwise

remove the firearms disability, before obtaining a firearm.

Lewis, 445 U.S. at 67. The Court therefore held that a

firearms prosecution under § 1202(a)(1) “does not open

the predicate conviction to a new form of collateral

attack.” Lewis, 445 U.S. at 67.

We applied the holding of Lewis to prosecutions under

Section 922(g)(1), the current statute prohibiting

possession of firearms by felons. See United States v.

Wallace, 280 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 2002). After Wallace pled

guilty to violating Section 922(g)(1) but before he was

sentenced, the Illinois Supreme Court vacated his under-

lying Illinois felony conviction that had served as the

predicate for the Section 922(g)(1) charge. Wallace moved

to dismiss the case and the district court denied the

motion. On appeal, we noted that, under Lewis, “an

offense may be predicated upon a prior state court

felony conviction, even though the predicate conviction is

subject to collateral attack.” Wallace, 280 F.3d at 784 n.1.

Thus, “the only relevant question is the defendant’s

status at the time he was charged with unlawfully pos-

sessing the firearm.” Id. Wallace possessed the firearm

while the state court conviction was still valid, and thus

violated Section 922(g)(1) even though the predicate

felony was later vacated.

Similarly, in United States v. Lee, 72 F.3d 55 (7th Cir. 1995),

a defendant sought to overturn his conviction under

12 No. 08-1211

Section 922(g)(1) because his predicate state court con-

viction had been expunged after his arrest for firearm

possession but before his trial. The expungement voided

Lee’s conviction ab initio, and Lee thus argued that he

was not a felon when he possessed a firearm and

certainly was not a felon by the time his trial was held. We

found that, because Lee’s conviction had not been ex-

punged at the time he possessed the firearm, the evidence

was sufficient to demonstrate that Lee was a convicted

felon at the relevant time. We therefore affirmed the

conviction. Lee, 72 F.3d at 58.

We see no reason to treat Section 922(g)(8) differently

from Section 922(g)(1). True, Section 922(g)(1) requires

only a that a person has been “convicted in any court of, a

crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding

one year,” and Section 922(g)(8) contains a number of

procedural requirements that must have been met in the

court issuing the predicate order. The procedural

protections available to defendants in criminal actions

are not necessarily present in a civil proceeding that

results in the issuance of a protective order, and that

difference is reflected in the additional protections re-

quired in Section 922(g)(8). But Wescott does not claim

that the government failed in proving that those proce-

dural safeguards were met here. The Order was in

fact issued after a hearing. Wescott received actual

notice of that hearing at which he had the opportunity

to participate. He does not dispute that the Order con-

tained the findings required under subsections 922(g)(8)(B)

and (C). Any internal inconsistencies in the Order are

irrelevant to the fact of the Order, just as any constitu-

No. 08-1211 13

tional infirmities in a predicate felony conviction are

irrelevant to the fact of the conviction in a Section 922(g)(1)

case. So long as the Order was in effect, Wescott could not

lawfully possess firearms or ammunition. We join our

sister circuits in so holding.

The Ninth Circuit reads our opinion in United States v.

Wilson, 159 F.3d 280 (7th Cir. 1998), as implicitly con-

cluding that the state court hearing at which the order

of protection is issued must comport with the require-

ments of the Due Process Clause. United States v. Young,

458 F.3d 998, 1004 n.14 (9th Cir. 2006). The Young court

rejected what it characterized as our “view that the defen-

dant could challenge the constitutionality of the state

court proceedings in federal court” because that view is

in tension with the Supreme Court’s holding in Lewis. In

Wilson as in the present case, the defendant was

convicted of violating Section 922(g)(8). After the gov-

ernment presented its evidence at trial, Wilson moved

for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the state

court hearing at which the order of protection was

issued did not comport with due process. The district

court denied the motion and we affirmed. We noted that,

under Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), “some

form of hearing is required before an individual is finally

deprived of a property interest.” Wilson, 159 F.3d at 289

(quoting Matthews, 424 U.S. at 323). We also remarked

that, to meet the requirements of due process, a hearing

must afford an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful

time and in a meaningful manner. We proceeded to

analyze whether Wilson had notice of the hearing,

whether the hearing was held at a meaningful time, and

14 No. 08-1211

whether Wilson had an opportunity to participate in a

meaningful manner, finding ultimately that the hearing

comported with the requirements of due process. Wilson,

159 F.3d at 290. However, we did not address, and were

not asked to address, whether Wilson could challenge

the constitutionality of the hearing that resulted in the

order of protection. The issue was simply not presented.

Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Wilson,

there is no circuit split, and we have never held that a

defendant in a Section 922(g)(8) case may wage a

collateral challenge to the predicate state court hearing.

All of the courts to consider the issue, as we

noted above, have determined a defendant may not

collaterally attack the predicate protective order, and

we now adopt that rule.

Wescott belatedly argues in his reply brief that the

government presented insufficient evidence that he was

“subject to” a “court order.” He contends that the jury

concluded that Government Exhibit 1 (to which we

have been referring as the “Order”) was a court order to

which he was subject simply from the face of the docu-

ment. The document alone, he maintains, is not suf-

ficient for a jury to conclude that the “defective instru-

ment” was in fact a court order or that he was subject to

it. He suggests that one way for the government to prove

its case was to call as a witness the state court judge

who signed the Order. Wescott also muses that, under

the government’s proposed method of proof, a person

might be “subject to” a blank order form, or an incom-

plete form or even a blank piece of paper. Arguments

raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived. Porco

No. 08-1211 15

v. Trustees of Indiana University, 453 F.3d 390, 395 (7th Cir.

2006). Even if we were to consider these arguments, any

claim that the Order was not a “court order” or that

Wescott was not “subject to” the Order would be frivo-

lous. The government authenticated and entered

into evidence a certified copy of the Order through

Glenda’s attorney, who had filled in the blanks on the

Order as the state court judge ruled. The attorney who

represented Wescott at the state court hearing also testi-

fied. He confirmed that the Order required Wescott to

turn over to the sheriff’s office any and all firearms, and

that the firearms provision of the Order remained in

effect after the Order was modified to allow Wescott to

enter the Hales Corner house. R. 87, Tr. at 303-04. We

reject any challenge to the sufficiency of this evidence.

See United States v. Groves, 470 F.3d 311, 323-24 (7th Cir.

2006) (holding that we will overturn a jury verdict for

insufficiency of the evidence only if, after viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the government,

the record is devoid of evidence from which a rea-

sonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).

B.

We dispense with Wescott’s other arguments in short

order because all are baseless. He complains that the

district court should not have allowed the government

to introduce into evidence the amount of firearms and

ammunition that were seized from his home and car. We

review evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion. United

States v. Millbrook, 553 F.3d 1057, 1062 (7th Cir. 2009).

16 No. 08-1211

Wescott apparently thought it was sufficient to allow

evidence of only one firearm and protested that evidence

of the remaining firearms was unduly prejudicial. The

court limited the government to introducing evidence

only of the firearms charged in the indictment. Wescott

would not stipulate to possession of the firearms, and so

the government, in order to meet its burden of proof,

presented evidence regarding each of the twenty-two

firearms listed in the indictment. This was not, as Wescott

characterizes it, propensity evidence but was direct

evidence of the crime itself and there was nothing im-

proper about its admission. The district court also found

that the presence in the house of ammunition that fit

the guns was relevant to Wescott’s knowing possession

of the guns. Because there was an eye-popping, jaw-

dropping amount of ammunition found in the house (the

district court judge was not, unfortunately, exaggerating

when he said during a sidebar that there was a “ton and a

half” of ammunition found at the house) the court

limited the government’s evidence to the presence and

type of ammunition found there. As part of this evi-

dence, the government introduced certain photographs

taken at the house before the ammunition and firearms

were removed. Although the pictures were prejudicial,

they were not unfairly so. The most alarming pictures

were never shown to the jury, and the government con-

fined its argument about the ammunition to the proper

purpose of demonstrating Wescott’s knowing possession

of the firearms. The court did not abuse its discretion

in allowing a limited amount of evidence regarding

the ammunition for a proper purpose.

No. 08-1211 17

Wescott next contends that prosecutorial misconduct

prevented him from having a fair trial. As an example of

prosecutorial misconduct, Wescott again cites the intro-

duction of evidence regarding ammunition, which we

have already found was properly admitted. He also

protests that the government improperly introduced

witnesses who testified that some of the firearms origi-

nated outside the United States. This evidence, he says,

“clearly was an attempt to play on fears of overseas

terrorism.” He also complains about Officer Stec’s testi-

mony that he first approached Wescott’s car from the

passenger side, contending that the prosecutor elicited

this testimony in order to convey to the jury that Wescott

is a dangerous man. In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial

misconduct, we consider first whether the challenged

remark by the prosecutor was improper, and second,

whether it prejudiced the defendant. United States v.

Corley, 519 F.3d 716, 727 (7th Cir. 2008). Wescott cannot

get past the first part of this test. The prosecutor made

no references to “overseas terrorism.” Any nefarious

connection between foreign manufacture of firearms and

“overseas terrorism” exists only in Wescott’s mind. The

argument is friviolous. The government was obliged to

show that the guns had been “shipped or transported in

interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). See

also United States v. Lee, 502 F.3d 691, 700 (7th Cir. 2007)

(evidence that a firearm was manufactured in Spain

was sufficient to demonstrate movement in interstate

commerce as required by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)). Evidence

that some of the guns had been manufactured outside the

United States was an appropriate way to prove that

18 No. 08-1211

element of the crime. As for the testimony about Officer

Stec’s approach to the vehicle, there was nothing

improper about the prosecutor’s question or the officer’s

answer. None of Wescott’s claims of prosecutorial mis-

conduct have merit.

We also reject Wescott’s argument that Section 922(g)(8)

is an unconstitutional exercise of federal power under

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). In fact, we

have already rejected this argument multiple times. See

United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d at 285-87 (distinguishing

Lopez because, unlike the former Section 922(q), Section

922(g) contains a jurisdictional element which establishes

the requisite nexus with interstate commerce); United

States v. Lee, 72 F.3d 55, 58-59 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that

Section 922(g) survives a constitutional challenge under

Lopez); United States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495, 497-98 (7th Cir.

1995) (holding that Section 922(g)(1) is immune from

constitutional attack under Lopez because it explicitly

requires that a nexus to interstate commerce be estab-

lished). Wescott offers no good reason to reassess our

prior holdings and we decline to do so.

Finally, we turn to the admissibility of the torn state-

ment. After receiving Miranda warnings and waiving

his right to remain silent, Wescott made a number of

incriminating statements to the police officers who inter-

viewed him. One of those officers prepared a written

version of Wescott’s oral statements and asked Wescott

to review it, edit it as he wished, and sign it. Wescott

reviewed the statement and initialed the beginning and

end of each paragraph, editing parts of the statement. In

No. 08-1211 19

the end, he refused to sign the statement and instead

tore it in half. The government sought to admit the docu-

ment as a confession and to suggest to the jury that

Wescott’s action in tearing the paper demonstrated con-

sciousness of guilt. Wescott sought to exclude the use of

the document entirely as irrelevant and as a violation of

his right against self-incrimination. Again Wescott

did not cite a single case in support of his argument. He

does not contest the government’s claim that he

received appropriate Miranda warnings and waived his

right to remain silent. He makes no argument that he

was coerced into making the statement or initialing the

paragraphs. It is difficult to discern from his cursory

argument the nature of the error he is claiming. “Unsup-

ported and undeveloped arguments like this are consid-

ered waived.” United States v. Tockes, 530 F.3d 628, 633

(7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Warren, 454 F.3d 752, 764

(7th Cir. 2006). We see no obvious error in the district

court’s decision to admit this evidence, and we decline

to consider the issue further.

A FFIRMED.

8-3-09