United States v. Campbell, George

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________

No. 06-3606

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

GEORGE CAMPBELL,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 04 CR 751—Joan B. Gottschall, Judge.

____________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 12, 2008—DECIDED JULY 15, 2008

____________

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and RIPPLE and

ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. George Campbell was charged

with one count of possessing with the intent to distribute

cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); and with

four counts of using a telephone in the commission of a

felony drug offense, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). A

jury convicted Mr. Campbell of all five counts. The dis-

trict court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms of

48 and 120 months, followed by eight years of super-

vised release.

2 No. 06-3606

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the

judgment of the district court.

I

BACKGROUND

A.

In early 2004, Raul Montenegro, a known drug dealer,

had several telephone conversations with Mr. Campbell

about the possibility of Mr. Campbell’s purchasing co-

caine from him. On July 7, 2004, Montenegro called Mr.

Campbell1 and stated: “Uh, my friend call me. Probably

they they’re gonna meet tomorrow for, the, the remem-

ber I told you? Probably the one, they want tickets for

the, the Big Game.” Appellee’s App. at 2. Mr. Campbell

responded, “Yeah, one ticket or two tickets?” Montenegro

said, “Probably one,” and explained, “He wanna, he

wanna make sure how it, how it is, okay?” Id. Mr. Camp-

bell responded, “Gotcha,” and Montenegro told him

that he would call him the next day. Id.

On July 8, 2004, after having numerous conversations

with Miguel Diaz, his drug supplier, Montenegro called

Mr. Campbell and said, “Yeah. Uh, according to every-

thing, I’m going to pick up my lady. You know, my

girlfriend, take it with me.” Id. at 28. Montenegro and

1

The Government obtained court authorization to intercept

many of the telephone conversations between Mr. Campbell

and Montenegro and between Montenegro and Miguel Diaz,

Montenegro’s drug supplier. These conversations were re-

corded, and both the recordings and transcripts of the calls

were admitted into evidence.

No. 06-3606 3

Mr. Campbell then made arrangements to meet at

Mr. Campbell’s residence. In the interim, Montenegro

met with Diaz and picked up one kilogram of cocaine.

Later that night, Montenegro called Mr. Campbell and

told him that he was about to arrive at Mr. Campbell’s

residence. Mr. Campbell told Montenegro that he would

be home shortly and that he would tell someone at his

residence to let Montenegro in.

At trial, Montenegro testified that he entered Mr. Camp-

bell’s residence with the one kilogram of cocaine. Accord-

ing to Montenegro, when Mr. Campbell arrived at the

residence he explained that there was an unfamiliar car

in a nearby parking lot. He asked Montenegro if

Montenegro had arrived at the residence alone.

Montenegro assured Mr. Campbell that he had done so.

Mr. Campbell pointed to the unfamiliar car from the

window of the residence, but Montenegro could not

identify the vehicle. Still unsatisfied, Mr. Campbell made

Montenegro accompany him outside in an effort to have

Montenegro identify the unfamiliar vehicle. Montenegro

nevertheless could not identify the car.

Prior to leaving Mr. Campbell’s residence to inspect

the car, Montenegro left the kilogram of cocaine in

Mr. Campbell’s house, either on a table or on his couch.

At trial, Montenegro testified:

AUSA: At some point while you were in

the apartment with George Camp-

bell, did you give him the kilo-

gram of cocaine?

MONTENEGRO: Well, actually I left I think on the

table or in the couch, something

like that. I don’t remember where.

4 No. 06-3606

I put it there because we went out-

side. I wasn’t—I wasn’t—not carry-

ing that thing with me outside the

house because we were thinking

like maybe there was police or

something else, so—or rob or

something. So I left it there.

***

AUSA: [W]as George Campbell there at

the table when you took the co-

caine out?

MONTENEGRO: When I took it? No, I didn’t took

it, actually. But he was there but he

was—actually we were talking

about who was in that car, you

know, who could that be. So we

didn’t pay attention to the—just

got out, tried to identify the car.

AUSA: So at any point did you give

George Campbell the cocaine while

you were in the house?

MONTENEGRO: You mean hand him?

AUSA: Yes.

MONTENEGRO: No.

AUSA: Did you give it to him?

MONTENEGRO: No, we just put it there. I mean,

I put it there, actually. He was not

worried about who was in. . . .

R.219 at 142-43.

No. 06-3606 5

The Government then impeached Montenegro with

statements that he had made at his change of plea hearing:

AUSA: [During the change of plea hear-

ing], the Court asked you . . . “then

you actually went inside of Mr.

Campbell’s residence and deliv-

ered the kilo of cocaine to Mr.

Campbell? And then the two of

you left Mr. Campbell’s residence?

Is that what happened?” And

you answered, “yes”?

MONTENEGRO: Yes, correct.

AUSA: But your testimony today is, you

didn’t give the kilogram—

Id. at 145. Mr. Campbell’s counsel objected on the ground

that Montenegro’s testimony from the change of plea

hearing did not contradict his trial testimony. The dis-

trict court overruled the objection, and the testimony

continued:

AUSA: When you pled guilty to these

charges and you took an oath be-

fore this Judge, you told her under

oath that you went inside of Mr.

Campbell’s residence, and you

delivered the kilo of cocaine to

Mr. Campbell.

MONTENEGRO: Yes.

AUSA: And you said yes.

MONTENEGRO: Yes.

Id. at 145-46.

6 No. 06-3606

After Montenegro and Mr. Campbell went outside to

look at the car, Mr. Campbell left the area. Drug Enforce-

ment Administration (“DEA”) Special Agent Ryan

Rapaszky, who had conducted surveillance at Mr. Camp-

bell’s residence throughout the day, confirmed that

Montenegro and Mr. Campbell looked closely at the two

DEA surveillance vehicles parked in the nearby lot, that

Mr. Campbell got into his car for approximately ten

minutes and that Mr. Campbell then left the parking lot at

approximately 10:40 p.m.

At 10:45 p.m., Mr. Campbell called Montenegro, explain-

ing: “Yea, I’m being followed right now. So I don’t know

what the hell is going on here man. . . . So you might as

well leave.” Appellee’s App. at 46. Montenegro responded,

“Should I leave?” and Mr. Campbell responded, “you

might . . . Yeah, you better. I just said I’m being followed.”

Id. Mr. Campbell did not instruct Montenegro to take the

cocaine with him, and Montenegro testified that he left the

cocaine on Mr. Campbell’s table.

Later that same night and the following day, July 9, 2004,

Montenegro and Diaz exchanged several calls. In these

phone calls, Diaz, using coded language, inquired about

the cocaine. Montenegro could not give Diaz an update

because he had not yet spoken to Mr. Campbell.

Montenegro had several short telephone conversations

with Mr. Campbell, but Mr. Campbell did not give

Montenegro an update about the status of the deal. At one

point, Montenegro left Mr. Campbell a message: “You

there? Call me every five minutes. They want a simple

question, you still give me a simple answer. Yes, or not.

That’s all I want to know. Okay, bye.” Id. at 62.

At 1:43 p.m., Mr. Campbell called off the drug deal. Mr.

Campbell spoke to Montenegro and stated, “Just, I’m

No. 06-3606 7

saying no, period.” Id. at 66. Montenegro then explained,

“Alright, I have to pick it up now. Okay?” Id. Mr. Campbell

responded, “Alright, I’m gonna hit you back in half an

hour,” to which Montenegro replied, “Okay.” Id.

On the following day, DEA Task Force Officer George

Wodka conducted surveillance at Mr. Campbell’s resi-

dence, and he discovered in a dumpster near Mr. Camp-

bell’s residence a cereal box wrapped in a clear plastic bag.

The dumpster was approximately 50 feet from the resi-

dence, and there was a clear, unobstructed view of the area

from the second floor windows of Mr. Campbell’s resi-

dence. Officer Wodka testified that there was a brick-

shaped object wrapped in duct tape—approximately 978.5

grams of cocaine—inside the cereal box.

The jury also heard the testimony of Task Force Officer

Robert Coleman. Officer Coleman testified as to his exten-

sive experience in investigating narcotics offenses, includ-

ing his knowledge of the use of coded language by narcot-

ics organizations, the means by which narcotics are

bought and sold, the wholesale and retail pricing of

powder cocaine and the quantities of cocaine that are

considered distribution quantities.2 Officer Coleman

explained to the jury that when narcotics are “fronted” to

a customer, it means that the narcotics are provided on

credit and are paid for after the customer resells the

narcotics. The wholesale price of a kilogram of cocaine in

the Chicago area, explained Officer Coleman, was between

$17,000 and $25,000. Officer Coleman also testified that

one kilogram of cocaine was a distribution quantity.

2

Officer Coleman was qualified as an expert without any

objection from Mr. Campbell.

8 No. 06-3606

Officer Coleman further explained to the jury that

Montenegro’s use of the term “tickets” in conversation

with Mr. Campbell meant “kilograms” and that when Mr.

Campbell asked Montenegro “one ticket or two,” he was

asking whether Montenegro had one or two kilograms.

R.219 at 86. With regard to another conversation between

Mr. Campbell and Montenegro, Officer Coleman opined

that Montenegro’s use of the phrase “I’m going to pick up

my lady . . . [y]ou know my girlfriend” meant that

Montenegro was going to go pick up the cocaine, and

that Montenegro’s reference to picking up the “tickets”

meant that he wanted to pick up money from Mr. Camp-

bell. Id. at 92.

B.

At the close of the Government’s case, Mr. Campbell

moved for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 29. The district court reserved the

motion. A jury convicted Mr. Campbell of all five counts

asserted in the superseding indictment: namely, one count

of possessing with the intent to distribute cocaine, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and four counts of using

and causing to be used a telephone in the commission of

a felony drug offense, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).

Mr. Campbell filed his renewed motion for judgment of

acquittal and a motion for a new trial. R.105, 106. In

support of these motions, Mr. Campbell challenged the

sufficiency of the Government’s evidence with respect to

his possession and intent to distribute the cocaine. Essen-

tially, Mr. Campbell asserted that he did not have the

intent to distribute at the time that he possessed the

cocaine. The district court denied the motions. It held that

No. 06-3606 9

the Government had introduced sufficient evidence to

allow a reasonable jury to find that Mr. Campbell pos-

sessed and intended to distribute the cocaine that

Montenegro had left at his residence. R.136.

After the district court’s denial of these post-trial mo-

tions, Mr. Campbell’s counsel, with the district court’s

leave, withdrew. Mr. Campbell obtained new counsel, who

remains his counsel on appeal. Mr. Campbell’s new

counsel made an oral motion for permission to file a

motion for reconsideration; the district court granted the

motion, although it expressed skepticism about its ability

to consider new issues raised by Mr. Campbell’s new

counsel.

Counsel then filed a motion for reconsideration, which

the district court denied. The court ruled that, although

the motion for reconsideration challenged the sufficiency

of the Government’s evidence, it did so on grounds

different from those presented in Mr. Campbell’s original

motions. Specifically, the district court noted that Mr.

Campbell’s original motions had not challenged the

sufficiency of the evidence with respect to Montenegro’s

delivery of cocaine to Mr. Campbell or Mr. Campbell’s

constructive possession of the cocaine. R.162 at 2. The court

accordingly determined that these new arguments were

untimely, and it denied reconsideration of arguments that

the court had addressed in its denial of Mr. Campbell’s

previous post-trial motions. Id.

The district court sentenced Mr. Campbell to concurrent

sentences of 120 months’ imprisonment for the violation

of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 48 months’ imprisonment

for the violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).

10 No. 06-3606

II

DISCUSSION

A.

Mr. Campbell challenges the sufficiency of the Govern-

ment’s evidence solely with respect to whether he pos-

sessed the cocaine that Montenegro left at his residence.3 A

3

Mr. Campbell was charged with possession with intent to

distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and, therefore, in addition to

proving that he possessed the cocaine, the Government was

required to prove that Mr. Campbell intended to distribute it.

See United States v. Orozco-Vasquez, 469 F.3d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir.

2006). There is an argument that the Government’s proof

with respect to intent was lacking because it (arguably) did not

establish that Mr. Campbell intended to distribute the cocaine

at the same time that he possessed it. Mr. Campbell, however,

does not make the argument before us. Mr. Campbell’s briefs

contend solely that the Government’s proof with respect to

possession or constructive possession (that is, whether he

intended to exercise dominion or control over the contraband).

There is one, lone sentence in Mr. Campbell’s main brief that

asserts: “The evidence was insufficient to prove defendant

possessed about one kilogram of cocaine with intent to dis-

tribute.” Appellant’s Br. at 11. The sentences that follow,

however, make clear that Mr. Campbell is challenging just the

possession aspect of the offense, rather than the intent to

distribute element. Id. at 12. Mr. Campbell’s reply brief also

does not provide any argumentation as to the intent to distrib-

ute element.

At oral argument, counsel’s presentation focused solely on the

possession element of the Government’s case. Indeed, one of

the judges on the panel commented that Mr. Campbell

should be arguing that the Government’s evidence was legally

(continued...)

No. 06-3606 11

3

(...continued)

insufficient to prove that he intended to distribute the cocaine.

In response, counsel stated that he believed that the argument

regarding intent to distribute had not been preserved by

Mr. Campbell’s previous counsel. In other words, counsel

believed that Mr. Campbell’s previous counsel had forfeited

this argument.

Our review of the record indicates that counsel’s recollection

was not accurate. Mr. Campbell’s former counsel in fact chal-

lenged the sufficiency of the evidence as to possession and intent

to distribute as well as the argument that possession and intent

were not simultaneous. R.105 at 2-4 (memorandum in sup-

port of Mr. Campbell’s motion for judgment of acquittal); R.112

at 2-5 (reply memorandum). These issues, therefore, were

preserved for appellate review. Moreover, the district court

clearly treated former counsel’s submissions as raising the

issue of whether Mr. Campbell possessed the drugs at the

same time that he had the intent to distribute them. R.136 at 2-4.

After reviewing Mr. Campbell’s submissions in this court,

however, we must conclude that he has not raised any argument

on appeal regarding the sufficiency of the Government’s

evidence as to intent to distribute, and therefore that issue is

not before us. United States v. Feinberg, 89 F.3d 333, 340-41 (7th

Cir. 1996); see also Lear v. Cowan, 220 F.3d 825, 828-29 (7th Cir.

2000) (noting that issues raised for the first time by the judges

at oral argument are “waived”).

In any event, the Government introduced sufficient evidence

for a reasonable jury to conclude that Mr. Campbell intended to

distribute the cocaine and that his intent to distribute coincided

with his possession of the narcotics. The Government’s evidence

established that Mr. Campbell, after discussing the details with

Montenegro, agreed to participate in a drug fronting scheme; the

cocaine would be provided on credit to Mr. Campbell, after

(continued...)

12 No. 06-3606

defendant making an insufficiency of the evidence argu-

ment faces a difficult task. See United States v. Pulido,

69 F.3d 192, 205 (7th Cir. 1995) (characterizing the burden

as a “nearly insurmountable hurdle”). In reviewing a

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not

weigh the evidence, United States v. Bowman, 353 F.3d 546,

552 (7th Cir. 2003), make credibility determinations,

United States v. Woolfolk, 197 F.3d 900, 904 (7th Cir. 1999),

or resolve testimonial inconsistencies, see United States v.

Hodges, 315 F.3d 794, 799 (7th Cir. 2003). Taking the evi-

dence in the light most favorable to the Government, we

“will overturn a conviction based on insufficient evid-

ence only if the record is devoid of evidence from which a

reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.” United States v. Stevens, 453 F.3d 963, 965 (7th

Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

B.

The three elements required for a conviction under 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) are: (1) knowing or intentional possession

3

(...continued)

which Mr. Campbell would pay for the cocaine once he resold

it. Mr. Campbell directed Montenegro to deliver a distribution

quantity of cocaine to his residence, and he made arrangements

for someone to admit Montenegro if he arrived at the residence

before Mr. Campbell. Montenegro delivered the cocaine to Mr.

Campbell, and the cocaine remained in Mr. Campbell’s control

until the following day. Regardless of whether Mr. Campbell

subsequently decided to return the cocaine, the Government’s

evidence was sufficient to establish that, when Montenegro

made the delivery to his residence, Mr. Campbell simulta-

neously possessed and intended to distribute the cocaine.

No. 06-3606 13

of cocaine; (2) possession of cocaine with intent to distrib-

ute it; and (3) knowledge that the material is a con-

trolled substance. United States v. Banks, 405 F.3d 559, 569

(7th Cir. 2005). A defendant violates 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) if he

“knowingly and intentionally use[s] a communications

facility, e.g., a telephone, to facilitate the commission of a

narcotics offense.” United States v. Alvarez, 860 F.2d 801, 813

(7th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Proof of an underlying narcotics offense is an

element of a section 843(b) conviction. Id.; see also United

States v. Mueller, 112 F.3d 277, 281-82 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[A]

defendant cannot be convicted of using a telephone to

facilitate a drug offense unless the defendant also aids or

abets, or attempts to commit, the drug offense itself.”).

Therefore, the validity of Mr. Campbell’s conviction on

these counts depends on the sufficiency of the Govern-

ment’s evidence with respect to the section 841(a)(1)

offense. As to that offense, Mr. Campbell challenges

the sufficiency of the Government’s evidence only with

respect to whether he knowingly or intentionally possessed

cocaine, and therefore we shall confine our discussion to

that element of the Government’s case.

The Government may satisfy this element by proving

either actual possession or constructive possession. United

States v. Starks, 309 F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2002). Con-

structive possession may be proven using either direct

or circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Parra,

402 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2005). It requires proof that

the defendant had the “power and intent to exercise

control” over the illegal drugs. United States v. Moses, 513

F.3d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). A defendant may exercise “ownership,

dominion, authority, or control” over the drugs himself

14 No. 06-3606

or through intermediaries. Starks, 309 F.3d at 1022; see also

Moses, 513 F.3d at 733. Accordingly, “an accused . . . has

control of narcotics when he has the authority—not legal

authority, but the recognized authority in his criminal

milieu—to possess and determine the disposition of them.”

United States v. Windom, 19 F.3d 1190, 1200 (7th Cir. 1994)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In previ-

ous cases, for example, we have framed our inquiry by

asking whether the defendant “likely had some appreciable

ability to guide the destiny of the drug.” United States v.

Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir. 1986) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

This court, nevertheless, has exercised vigilance in

ensuring that the doctrine of constructive possession

does not ensnare innocent bystanders, especially when

possession is not exclusive. United States v. Harris, 325 F.3d

865, 869 (7th Cir. 2003). To guard against this risk, the

Government must “establish a nexus between the accused

and the contraband.” Parra, 402 F.3d at 762. “Mere proxim-

ity to the drug, mere presence on the property where it is

located, or mere association, without more, with the per-

son who does control the drug or property on which it is

found, is insufficient to support a finding of possession.”

United States v. DiNovo, 523 F.2d 197, 201 (7th Cir. 1975)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

To convince us that the Government’s evidence of

possession is legally insufficient to support the jury’s

verdict, Mr. Campbell asserts that, because Montenegro’s

testimony established that Mr. Campbell had a deep

suspicion that the police were surveilling his residence, “it

is logical to conclude that [Mr. Campbell] at the time” had

no intention to exercise dominion or control over the

cocaine. Reply Br. at 5. Mr. Campbell also focuses on

No. 06-3606 15

the absence of evidence indicating that Montenegro

physically delivered the cocaine to him and on the absence

of fingerprints on the packaging of the cocaine that was

found in the dumpster.

We believe that the Government introduced sufficient

evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude beyond a

reasonable doubt that Mr. Campbell possessed the co-

caine. The jury listened to, and read transcripts of, the

numerous recorded phone calls between Mr. Campbell and

Montenegro and between Montenegro and Diaz,

Montenegro’s drug supplier. The Government intro-

duced the testimony of Officer Robert Coleman, who

testified that, in those calls, Mr. Campbell, Montenegro and

Diaz were using coded language to negotiate a drug

deal—or, more specifically, a drug fronting scheme. In a

fronting scheme, Officer Coleman explained to the jury,

narcotics are provided on credit to a customer, who

then pays for the narcotics once he resells them.

On July 7, 2004, for example, Montenegro called Mr.

Campbell and told him that his friend had “one ticket” to

the “Big Game,” meaning one kilogram of cocaine. R.219

at 86. The next day, Montenegro called Mr. Campbell to

tell him that he was going to pick up his “lady,” “you

know, my girlfriend, take it with me,” again referring to

the cocaine. R.219 at 92. Shortly thereafter, Montenegro

called Mr. Campbell to inform him that he had picked up

his “wife,” that he was “close to” Mr. Campbell’s resi-

dence, R.219 at 93, and that he had to “pick up the kid, the

tickets for Saturday’s games,” meaning that he wanted to

16 No. 06-3606

pick up money from Mr. Campbell.4 In a subsequent

call, Mr. Campbell told Montenegro to call him when he

arrived at Mr. Campbell’s residence, and Mr. Campbell

explained that he would have someone let Montenegro

inside.

The jury also heard the testimony of Montenegro.

Montenegro admitted that, while in Mr. Campbell’s

presence, he had left the cocaine on Mr. Campbell’s table or

on his couch.5 He also testified about Mr. Campbell’s

behavior regarding the presence of an unfamiliar vehicle

parked nearby. Mr. Campbell repeatedly asked

Montenegro whether he had been followed. Indeed, Mr.

Campbell went outside with Montenegro in an effort to

determine whether Montenegro could recognize the

4

Counsel for the Government asked Officer Coleman: “[I]s

there anything about that particular conversation or that

particular context that causes you to have the opinion that

tickets means money here as opposed to kilograms of cocaine?”

R.219 at 93. Officer Coleman responded: “Well, the context of the

conversation, he’s referring to ‘I got my wife with me,[’]

meaning he’s got a kilo with him, and [’]is going to pick up

the kid, the tickets for Saturday’s game,’ meaning money.” Id.

5

Mr. Campbell points out that Montenegro testified that he

did not physically hand the drugs over to Mr. Campbell.

Montenegro’s testimony, along with the telephonic negotiations

about the drug delivery, are fatal to such an assertion. The

Government, moreover, introduced Montenegro’s prior state-

ment that he had delivered the cocaine to Mr. Campbell when

he arrived at Mr. Campbell’s residence. Mr. Campbell objected

to the introduction of this latter testimony on the ground that

it was not impeaching of Montenegro’s testimony, but the

district court overruled the objection; Mr. Campbell does not

challenge this evidentiary ruling on appeal.

No. 06-3606 17

vehicle. After Montenegro stated that he could not iden-

tify the vehicle, Mr. Campbell went inside his car, called

Montenegro and told him to leave because he believed that

they were being followed. Despite knowing that

Montenegro, at his direction, had just brought a kilogram

of cocaine to his residence, at no point did Mr. Campbell

tell Montenegro to take the cocaine with him; rather,

Mr. Campbell permitted the cocaine to remain on the

premises for some period of time. The following day,

Officer Wodka found approximately one kilogram of

cocaine wrapped inside a cereal box in a nearby dumpster.

Officer Wodka explained to the jury that the dumpster

could be seen without obstruction from the second floor

windows of Mr. Campbell’s residence.

Given the evidence of Mr. Campbell’s prior negotia-

tions with Montenegro, the jury was entitled to find that

Mr. Campbell was orchestrating the purchase of a kilo-

gram of cocaine from Montenegro and that Mr. Campbell

had directed Montenegro to deliver the cocaine to his

residence once Montenegro obtained the cocaine from

Diaz. Additionally, the jury reasonably could have con-

cluded that Mr. Campbell intentionally possessed the

cocaine after Montenegro, at Mr. Campbell’s instruction,

left Mr. Campbell’s residence without any instructions to

take the cocaine with him. See Windom, 19 F.3d at 1200. The

numerous phone calls between Montenegro and Mr.

Campbell regarding the fronting scheme and Mr. Camp-

bell’s apprehension about the unidentified vehicle parked

nearby dispel the notion that Mr. Campbell was a mere

innocent bystander who was uninvolved in Montenegro’s

drug dealings. See Harris, 325 F.3d at 869.

Mr. Campbell claims that “it is logical to conclude” that,

because Mr. Campbell had suspicions that the police

18 No. 06-3606

were surveilling his residence, he had no intention to

exercise dominion or control over the cocaine. Reply Br. at

5. That conclusion, however, is not the only logical one;

it is one that the jury was entitled to reject. See Harris,

325 F.3d at 865 (discussing arguments that ask “the trier

of fact to ascribe a particular significance to the adjudica-

tive facts of record” but “do not require that the trier of

fact accept such an explanation”). Consequently, we

hold that the jury was entitled to find that Montenegro

and Diaz had “fronted” the kilogram of cocaine to Mr.

Campbell and that, after Montenegro delivered the co-

caine to his residence, Mr. Campbell had taken possession

of the illegal drugs.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

USCA-02-C-0072—7-15-08