Humphries, Hedrick G v. CBOCS West, Inc

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________

No. 05-4047

HEDRICK G. HUMPHRIES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CBOCS WEST, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 03-C-3765—Charles P. Kocoras, Judge.

____________

ARGUED MARCH 28, 2006—DECIDED JANUARY 10, 2007

____________

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and POSNER and

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Hedrick Humphries filed a

suit alleging claims of discrimination and retaliation

under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against CBOCS West,

Inc., based upon his discharge as an associate manager at

one of defendant’s Cracker Barrel restaurants. After

dismissing Humphries’s Title VII claims as procedurally

barred, the district court granted summary judgment in

favor of CBOCS West, Inc. (hereinafter “Cracker Barrel”),

holding that Humphries could not establish his prima

facie burden of showing that a similarly situated individ-

ual in a non-protected class was treated more favorably.

2 No. 05-4047

We reverse the district court’s grant of summary judg-

ment as to Humphries’s retaliation claim because

Humphries made a sufficient showing under the indirect

method to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under

section 1981. We affirm the judgment as to Humphries’s

discrimination claim because Humphries forfeited this

claim by failing to present an adequate argument before

the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are recounted in the light most

favorable to Humphries, the non-movant. Humphries, an

African-American male, was an associate manager at a

Cracker Barrel restaurant in Bradley, Illinois. Associate

managers at Cracker Barrel are supervised by a general

manager, who in turn is supervised by a district manager.

In this case, three general managers cycled through dur-

ing Humphries’s three-year tenure: Don Sessions, Steve

Cardin and Ken Dowd. His performance during his first

two-and-a-half years (roughly February 1999 through mid-

July 2001) was generally excellent. For instance, he re-

ceived annual merit raises and bonuses, and his supervisor

(Sessions) testified that he considered Humphries to be

his best associate manager. Circumstances changed for

Humphries when Cardin took over (as a temporary re-

placement) for Sessions. According to Humphries, Cardin

routinely made racially derogatory remarks, such as

stating that all African-Americans are “drunk or high on

drugs” or that “all Mexicans have a bunch of kids.”

Humphries alleges that other employees confirmed

Cardin’s inappropriate comments, and told Humphries

that Cardin had stated that he was there “for the white

people” and was “going to take care of the white people.”

Within Cardin’s initial month of being the general

manager, he issued Humphries five disciplinary reports,

No. 05-4047 3

called Employee Counseling Reports (ECRs). The ECRs

covered a wide range of alleged misconduct, including

bank deposit shortages and inappropriate use of Gold

Cards to provide complaining customers a free meal.

Humphries claims that the ECRs were groundless and

reflected Cardin’s racial animus. In response, in August

or September 2001, Humphries complained to Cardin’s

supervisor, district manager William Christensen.

Christensen, however, appears not to have conducted any

investigation of Humphries’s claims, contrary to Cracker

Barrel policies.

In September 2001, Ken Dowd became general manager

(Cardin returned, as planned, to his store). Shortly there-

after, Joe Stinnett, one of Humphries’s fellow associate

managers, fired an African-American food server, Venis

Green, because she purportedly failed to show up for a

shift. Humphries complained to both Dowd and

Christensen that Stinnett’s firing of Green was discrimina-

tory because, among other things, Green had informed

both Humphries and another associate manager that

she could not work that shift. Moreover, according to

Humphries, a white employee had failed to appear at work

on several occasions without notice, but was not fired.

Humphries also reminded Christensen of his earlier

complaints regarding former-general manager Cardin.

According to Humphries, Christensen berated him for

“going outside the management group” (i.e., turning to

Christensen, rather than Dowd, to complain) and de-

manded that Humphries schedule a meeting with Dowd

for the following week.

This scheduled meeting never occurred because on

December 5, 2001 (the day before Humphries’s scheduled

meeting with Dowd), Christensen fired Humphries, based

upon Stinnett’s complaint that Humphries had left the

store safe unlocked during the evening—a charge that

Humphries disputes. Humphries also claims that prior to

4 No. 05-4047

his firing (and before his alleged failure to lock the safe),

a cashier warned him that he should watch himself

because Christensen and Stinnett were “up to something.”

After being informed by Stinnett that Humphries had left

the safe unlocked, Christensen immediately terminated

Humphries—without interviewing him or investigating

the incident to determine whether Humphries had actu-

ally left the safe open.

Humphries subsequently brought claims of discrimina-

tion and retaliation under Title VII and section 1981. The

district court dismissed Humphries’s Title VII claims due

to procedural deficiencies (and Humphries does not ap-

peal this determination). The district court also granted

summary judgment in favor of Cracker Barrel on

Humphries’s section 1981 claims, finding that Humphries

failed to establish his prima facie case under either the

direct or indirect method. Humphries now appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Historical Overview of Retaliation Claims under

Section 1981

Before we turn to the merits of this appeal, we must

decide whether Humphries’s retaliation claim is cog-

nizable under section 1981. Although Cracker Barrel

failed to raise this issue in the district court, it now claims

that our decision in Hart v. Transit Management of Racine,

Inc., 426 F.3d 863 (7th Cir. 2005), precludes Humphries’s

retaliation claim. In the normal course, when a party

fails to present an argument in the trial court, it forfeits

the argument on appeal. See Republic Tobacco Co. v.

N. Atl. Trading Co., 381 F.3d 717, 728 (7th Cir. 2004);

McKnight v. Gen. Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 107-10 (7th

Cir. 1990). At oral argument, counsel for Cracker Barrel

explained that he did not raise this issue in the district

No. 05-4047 5

court because Hart, which he contended created a change

in the law in this circuit, had not yet been issued. Al-

though (as we will explain later), we do not believe that

Hart changed our jurisprudence regarding section 1981

retaliation claims, we will not penalize Cracker Barrel for

failing to raise its argument below.1

Of course, we retain the right to consider forfeited

arguments, and may choose to do so “in the interests of

justice.” Mass. Bay Ins. Co. v. Vic Koenig Leasing, Inc., 136

F.3d 1116, 1122 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Amcast Indus.

Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 749-50 (7th Cir. 1993)

(holding that “[i]n the rare case in which failure to pre-

sent a ground to the district court has caused no one—not

the district judge, not us, not the appellee—any harm of

which the law ought to take note, we have the power and

the right to permit it to be raised for the first time to us”).

In this instance, given that our recent Hart decision

1

We note that there is some confusion in this circuit as to

whether an appellee—as opposed to an appellant—who failed to

raise to a particular argument in the district court in support

of his motion for summary judgment is precluded from raising

new arguments in this court to affirm the district court’s ruling.

Compare, e.g., Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 409 (7th Cir. 1989)

(holding that appellees waived a claim by failing to raise it in

the district court), and Baskin v. Clark, 956 F.2d 142, 146 (7th

Cir. 1992) (same), with Transamerica Ins. Co. v. South, 125 F.3d

392, 399 (7th Cir. 1997) (“We certainly agree that the failure of

an appellee to have raised all possible alternative grounds for

affirming the district court’s original decision, unlike an appel-

lant’s failure to raise all possible grounds for reversal, should not

operate as a waiver. The urging of alternative grounds for

affirmance is a privilege rather than a duty.” (quoting Schering

Corp. v. Ill. Antibiotics Co., 89 F.3d 357, 358 (7th Cir. 1996))). We

need not resolve this question because we choose to review this

issue, irrespective of whether Cracker Barrel forfeited the issue

or not.

6 No. 05-4047

appears to have created some confusion in the district

courts and has already been misapplied in several deci-

sions, it is in the interests of justice to clarify the issue

of whether retaliation claims are cognizable under section

1981 (and, in so doing, clarify our ruling in Hart). See

Amcast, 2 F.3d at 749-50 (reaching issue not raised be-

low because it was fully briefed on appeal, rested “entirely

on a pure issue of statutory interpretation, as to which

the district judge’s view, while it would no doubt be

interesting, could have no effect on our review, which is

plenary on matters of law[, and] there is no reason to de-

fer its resolution to another case. There will be no better

time to resolve the issue than now.”); Mass. Bay Ins. Co.,

136 F.3d at 1122 (reaching forfeited choice-of-law issue

because “we clearly think it is in the interest of justice to

insure that district courts conduct choice-of-law analyses

when conflicts questions are presented to them”).

1. Section 1981’s Origin in the Civil Rights Act of 1866

The language codified in section 1981 derives from

section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, a Reconstruction-

era statute that is generally recognized as the first signifi-

cant civil rights legislation enacted by Congress, and is

considered the “initial blueprint of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment.” Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania,

458 U.S. 375, 389 (1982); see generally Jones v. Alfred H.

Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422-37 (1968) (discussing legisla-

tive history and historical context of the Civil Rights Act

of 1866); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701,

711-22 (1989) (same); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,

491 U.S. 164, 192-200 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring

in part and dissenting in part) (same); Robert J.

Kaczorowski, Comment, The Enforcement Provisions of

the Civil Rights Act of 1866: A Legislative History in Light

of Runyon v. McCrary, 98 Yale L.J. 565 (1989). The

No. 05-4047 7

legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is

complicated—and not without substantial interpretive

disagreement. See generally George Rutherglen, The

Improbable History of Section 1981: Clio Still Bemused

and Confused, 2003 Sup. Ct. Rev. 303. The Civil Rights

Act of 1866 was passed pursuant to section 2 of the

Thirteenth Amendment, which provided Congress with

the legislative power to enforce the Thirteenth Amend-

ment’s prohibition on slavery. U.S. Const. amend. XIII,

§ 2. The Act was a direct response to the so-called “Black

Codes,” a series of legislative acts by many southern (and

some northern) states in protest of, and as a tacit attack

upon, the recently enacted Thirteenth Amendment. The

Black Codes imposed onerous legal limitations on newly-

freed former slaves in an attempt to circumvent the

requirements of the Thirteenth Amendment, and essen-

tially continued a pattern of legal enslavement. See

Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70 (1873)

(noting that following the passage of the Thirteenth

Amendment, “[a]mong the first acts of legislation adopted

by several of the States in the legislative bodies which

claimed to be in their normal relations with the Federal

government, were laws which imposed upon the colored

race onerous disabilities and burdens, and curtailed

their rights in the pursuit of life, liberty, and property to

such an extent that their freedom was of little value”); see

generally Robert J. Kaczorowski, Congress’s Power to

Enforce Fourteenth Amendment Rights: Lessons from

Federal Remedies the Framers Enacted, 42 Harv. J. on

Legis. 187, 240-46 (2005) (discussing the Black Codes).

In response to the states’ attempts to circumvent the

requirements of the Thirteenth Amendment, section 1 of

the Civil Rights Act of 1866 conferred a series of legal

rights, including the right to contract, and to hold and

8 No. 05-4047

convey property, equally to citizens.2 Portions of section 1

are now codified in section 1981, which states, in pertinent

part:

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States

shall have the same right in every State and Territory

to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give

evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws

and proceedings for the security of persons and prop-

erty as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be

subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,

licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.

42. U.S.C. § 1981(a). Other portions of section 1 are now

codified in section 1982, which states:

All citizens of the United States shall have the same

right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by

2

In 1870, after ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth

Amendments, Congress re-enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866

(via the Enforcement Act of 1870), and then codified it in sections

1977 and 1978 of the Revised Statutes of 1874. The 1870 re-

enactment, which followed passage of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment, has caused significant debate regarding whether sec-

tions 1981 and 1982 apply to private actors or, instead, are

limited to state actors, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.

Compare, e.g., Jones, 392 U.S. at 436 (concluding that “it

certainly does not follow that the adoption of the Fourteenth

Amendment or the subsequent readoption of the Civil Rights

Act were meant somehow to limit its application to state ac-

tion”), and Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168-69 n.8 (1976)

(same), with Jones, 392 U.S. at 449-76 (Harlan, J., dissenting)

(evaluating the legislative history and concluding that the

Act was intended to reach only state actors), and Runyon, 427

U.S. at 195-205 (White, J., dissenting) (same). In any event, it is

now well-settled that section 1981 applies to private actors. See

Patterson, 491 U.S. at 171-76 (refusing to overturn Runyon’s

determination that section 1981 applied to private conduct).

No. 05-4047 9

white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,

hold, and convey real and personal property.

42 U.S.C. § 1982.

2. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc. Leads Courts

To Conclude that Section 1981 Protects Against

Retaliation

The Supreme Court has interpreted section 1981 as

providing a broad-based prohibition (and federal remedy)

against racial discrimination in the making and enforcing

of contracts. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160

(1976); Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454,

459-62 (1975). The issue of what types of adverse actions

are subsumed under the “make and enforce contracts”

provision in section 1981 is not without complication,

particularly with respect to so-called “postformation

conduct” (i.e., adverse acts, such as harassment or re-

taliation, that occur after an initial contractual relation-

ship has been established). Before its decision in Patterson,

491 U.S. 164 (which we shall address below), the Supreme

Court had not clearly determined whether section 1981

applied to retaliatory conduct. The closest it came to

deciding this issue was in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,

Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). In Sullivan, a Virginia nonprofit

corporation, created to operate a community park and

playground facilities for the benefit of residents, refused a

proposed assignment of a membership interest to an

African-American man. Id. at 234-35. The white home-

owner who intended to assign his membership interest

protested the corporate board’s refusal, and the board

expelled him from the corporation. Id. at 235. He, along

with the would-be assignee, brought suit under sections

1981 and 1982. Id. The Court initially noted the “broad

and sweeping nature of the protection meant to be afforded

by § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, from

10 No. 05-4047

which § 1982 was derived.” Id. at 237. Relying on the

broad protective nature of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the

Court held that the white homeowner had standing to

bring a claim under section 1982 (the companion statute to

section 1981 pertaining to property rights):

We turn to Sullivan’s expulsion for the advocacy of

Freeman’s cause. If that sanction, backed by a state

court judgment, can be imposed, then Sullivan is

punished for trying to vindicate the rights of minori-

ties protected by § 1982. Such a sanction would give

impetus to the perpetuation of racial restrictions on

property. That is why we said in Barrows v. Jackson,

346 U.S. 249, 259, 73 S. Ct. 1031, 1036, 97 L. Ed. 1586,

that the white owner is at times “the only effective

adversary” of the unlawful restrictive covenant. Under

the terms of our decision in Barrows, there can be no

question but that Sullivan has standing to maintain

this action.

Id. at 237. Although the Sullivan court did not explicitly

use the term “retaliation” in its decision, it was clear that

the white landowner’s basis for standing was that he had

suffered retaliation for asserting the rights of another (i.e.,

he had been “punished for trying to vindicate the rights of

minorities”). Id. (And, indeed, as will be discussed further

below, the Supreme Court later interpreted Sullivan

precisely in this manner in Jackson v. Birmingham Board

of Education, 544 U.S. 167 (2005).)

Following Sullivan, and prior to Patterson, the general

consensus among the circuits was that section 1981

broadly prohibited discrimination in all contractual facets

of the employment relationship, including “postformation”

adverse acts, such as retaliation. See, e.g., Choudhury v.

Polytechnic Inst. of New York, 735 F.2d 38, 42-43 (2d Cir.

1984) (retaliation cognizable under section 1981); Goff v.

Cont’l Oil Co., 678 F.2d 593, 597-99 (5th Cir. 1982) (same);

No. 05-4047 11

Winston v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 558 F.2d 1266, 1268-70 (6th

Cir. 1977) (same); Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 638 F.2d 1137,

1147 (8th Cir. 1981) (same); London v. Coopers & Lybrand,

644 F.2d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 1981) (same). This court,

however, did not definitively decide this issue in the pre-

Patterson era. See Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305,

1313 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that although “[t]here is a

substantial body of court of appeals precedent” holding

that section 1981 forbids retaliation, there was “nothing

in this circuit”).

3. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union Narrows the

Reach of Section 1981

In 1989, the Supreme Court issued its decision in

Patterson, which severely curtailed the reach of section

1981 claims. The Patterson court held that section 1981

protections applied exclusively to two types of rights: the

right to make contracts and the right to enforce them. 491

U.S. at 176. The first right is violated by a “refusal to enter

into a contract with someone, as well as the offer to make

a contract only on discriminatory terms.” Id. at 177.

Importantly, however, that right “extends only to the

formation of a contract, but not to problems that may

arise later from the conditions of continuing employment.”

Id. at 176. The second right, the right to enforce contracts,

“does not . . . extend beyond conduct by an employer which

impairs an employee’s ability to enforce through legal

process his or her established contract rights.” Id. at 177-

78. Thus, section 1981’s prohibition did not include so-

called “postformation” discriminatory conduct of an em-

ployer, including the breach of the terms of the contract or

imposition of discriminatory working conditions, such as

racial harassment. Id. at 178-82. Patterson, however, was

silent as to the issue of retaliation.

Even though Patterson involved only racial harassment

and the term “retaliation” appears nowhere in the opinion,

12 No. 05-4047

several circuits—including this one—interpreted Patterson

as precluding retaliation claims under section 1981

because such employer behaviors purportedly involved

now-unprotected postformation conduct. See, e.g., Gonzalez

v. Home Ins. Co., 909 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1990); Carter v.

South Cent. Bell, 912 F.2d 832, 838-41 (5th Cir. 1990);

McKnight v. Gen. Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 107-10 (7th

Cir. 1990); Courtney v. Canyon Television & Appliance

Rental, Inc., 899 F.2d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 1990); Sherman v.

Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d 1527, 1535 & n.17 (11th

Cir. 1990); Gersman v. Group Health Ass’n, Inc., 931 F.2d

1565 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also Foley v. Univ. of Houston

Sys., 355 F.3d 333, 339 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that

Patterson “marked a dramatic change in § 1981 juris-

prudence”); but see Hicks v. Brown, 902 F.2d 630, 635-38

(8th Cir. 1990) (holding that Patterson did not address

retaliation claims and should not be read as foreclosing

such claims under section 1981). In the immediate after-

math of Patterson, we decided Malhotra v. Cotter & Co.,

885 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1989), in which we observed that

“Patterson might be thought to foreclose any suggestion

that retaliation could be actionable under” section 1981.

Malhotra, 885 F.2d at 1312. Specifically, we noted that

“retaliation and discrimination are separate wrongs. A

white person who opposes discrimination against blacks

and is fired in retaliation for doing so is not being discrimi-

nated against because of his race . . . .” Id. (citations

omitted). At the same time, we also observed that “it can

be argued that someone who retaliates against a person

who has a claim of employment discrimination that

might be actionable under section 1981 . . . is interfering

with the person’s ability to make or enforce contracts on

the same footing with white persons and such interference

could be thought itself a violation of section 1981.” Id. at

1313 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Of particu-

lar note here, we did not decide whether Patterson defini-

No. 05-4047 13

tively precluded retaliation claims, and even hinted that

such claims “may well survive Patterson.” Id.

In a concurring opinion in Malhotra, Judge Cudahy

concluded that Patterson did not preclude retaliation

claims.3 Specifically, Judge Cudahy observed that there

was “little parallel between harassment and retaliation.

Hence, the refusal of Patterson to countenance harass-

ment claims under section 1981 has only the most super-

ficial application to claims for retaliation.”4 Id. at 1314

(Cudahy, J., concurring); see also Hicks, 902 F.2d at 635-

38 (holding that Patterson applied solely to the unique

context of racial harassment and did not preclude retalia-

tion claims). And, in prescient comments that anticipated

the Supreme Court’s result in Jackson, 544 U.S. 167,

Judge Cudahy stated:

A prohibition against retaliation is a necessary adjunct

to the anti-discriminatory provision itself. If an em-

ployee may be fired for complaining of discrimination,

3

See also Mozee v. Am. Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 940 F.2d

1036, 1053 (7th Cir. 1991) (suggesting that Patterson may not

have foreclosed all retaliation claims).

4

Judge Cudahy also noted that “to the limited extent Patterson

is relevant here, it would appear to support the recognition of

a cause of action for retaliatory conduct” because the Patterson

court recognized that section 1981’s right to “enforce contracts”

prohibits efforts to “impede access to the courts or obstruct

nonjudicial methods of adjudicating disputes about the force of

binding obligations.” Malhotra, 885 F.2d at 1314 n.1 (citations

omitted). “Clearly, when an employer punishes an employee

for attempting to enforce her rights under section 1981, this

conduct ‘impairs the employee’s ability to enforce her contract

rights.’ ” Id. This is an intriguing argument, but one that we

need not re-visit in light of our conclusion that retaliation claims

are now covered under section 1981’s “make and enforce con-

tracts” provision.

14 No. 05-4047

his right not to be discriminated against is surely

vitiated. . . . The recognition of a right of action for

retaliation under section 1981 is simply another

application of a straightforward syllogism: if an

employee is granted certain substantive rights against

his or her employer, the employer may not punish

the employee’s assertion of those rights, since this

would allow the employer to take away a right to

protection conferred by statute.

Id. at 1314-15.

Judge Cudahy’s view in Malhotra did not carry the day

in this circuit during the brief post-Patterson era. Shortly

thereafter, we issued our McKnight decision, where we,

like most other circuits, interpreted Patterson as foreclos-

ing section 1981 coverage of retaliation claims. See

McKnight, 908 F.2d at 107-08; see also Von Zuckerstein v.

Argonne Nat’l Lab., 984 F.2d 1467, 1471-72 (7th Cir. 1993);

McCarthy v. Kemper Life Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 683, 688 (7th

Cir. 1991). But see Hicks, 902 F.2d at 635-38 (holding

that Patterson did not foreclose retaliation claims). In

McKnight, the plaintiff brought suit under section 1981

and Title VII, claiming that his employer had discrimi-

nated against him based on his race and had fired him in

retaliation for complaining about the discrimination.

McKnight, 908 F.2d at 107-08. Although we noted that

“Patterson was a racial-harassment case rather than a

discharge case,” we nonetheless held that Patterson’s

“wide-ranging reexamination of section 1981 indicated

(as it seems to us) that claims of racially motivated dis-

charge are not actionable under that statute.” Id. at 108.

Judge Fairchild, however, concurred and dissented in

part from the majority’s opinion, because, in his view,

Patterson “did not expressly assert that a racially dis-

criminatory termination would not be a violation of

§ 1981.” Id. at 117. Instead, he reasoned that the analysis

No. 05-4047 15

in Patterson was limited to the narrow issue of whether a

change in the conditions of employment following the

formation of the employment contract (specifically, racial

harassment)—but not a termination—violated section

1981. Id. As a result, Judge Fairchild concluded that

the right to make contracts established in section 1981

protected “the right to continue to work, in the face of

racially discriminatory termination”—a result unaltered

by Patterson. Id. But see Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc.,

511 U.S. 298, 312 (1994) (noting that “Patterson did not

overrule any prior decision of this Court; rather, it held

and therefore established that the prior decisions of the

Courts of Appeals which read § 1981 to cover discrimina-

tory contract termination were incorrect.” (emphasis in

original)).

4. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 Supercedes Patterson

Whether the majority opinion in McKnight or Judge

Cudahy’s or Judge Fairchild’s reading of Patterson was

correct is now irrelevant because Patterson’s influence

was short-lived. Unhappy with the result issued in

Patterson, Congress legislatively superceded the Patter-

son decision by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See

Rivers, 511 U.S. at 305-06, 305 n.5 (noting that the Civil

Rights Act of 1991 was based on Congressional and

Presidential disapproval of the Patterson decision); Walker

v. Abbott Labs., 340 F.3d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting

that “Congress, however, quickly responded [to Patterson]

with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which, inter alia,

overruled Patterson”). The legislative history of the Civil

Rights Act of 1991 makes clear that Congress was dis-

satisfied with the Supreme Court’s narrow reading of

section 1981, which strongly curtailed claims that had

been cognizable in the pre-Patterson period. See Rivers,

511 U.S. at 306 n.6 (citing S. Rep. No. 101-315, pp. 12-14

16 No. 05-4047

(1990)). Among other things, Congress added subsection (b)

to section 1981, which made clear that section 1981 was to

be read broadly to include all aspects of the contractual

relationship between parties, including the postforma-

tion conduct, which Patterson had concluded was not

actionable under section 1981:

For purposes of this section, the term “make and

enforce contracts” includes the making, performance,

modification, and termination of contracts, and the

enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and

conditions of the contractual relationship.

42 U.S.C. § 1981(b). And the legislative history pertain-

ing to this subsection confirms that Congress intended

retaliation to be included under this provision. See An-

drews v. Lakeshore Rehab. Hosp., 140 F.3d 1405, 1411 n.12

(11th Cir. 1998) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 40(I), 102d Cong., 1st

Sess. 92 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,

630, which states, in part, “[t]he list set forth in subsec-

tion (b) is intended to be illustrative rather than exhaus-

tive. In the context of employment discrimination, for

example, this would include, but not be limited to, claims

of harassment, discharge, demotion, promotion, transfer,

retaliation, and hiring.” (emphasis added)).

The Civil Rights Act of 1991 led several circuits to

reverse course (again) and to allow retaliation claims

under section 1981. See Foley v. Univ. of Houston Sys., 355

F.3d 333, 339 (5th Cir. 2003); Hawkins v. 1115 Legal Serv.

Care, 163 F.3d 684, 693 (2d Cir. 1998); Andrews, 140 F.3d

at 1412-13; see also Barge v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 87 F.3d

256, 259 (8th Cir. 1996) (listing the elements for a prima

facie case of retaliation under section 1981). For instance,

in Andrews, the Eleventh Circuit noted that prior to

Patterson, circuits interpreting section 1981’s “make and

enforce contracts” provisions had held that it “encom-

passed an employee’s claims for an employer’s race-based

No. 05-4047 17

retaliation during the employment contract.” 140 F.3d at

1410. It observed that while Patterson “drew into question

many circuit court decisions recognizing post-hiring

discrimination claims under section 1981,” the Civil Rights

Act of 1991 reversed whatever limits Patterson placed

on imposing liability for postformation conduct. Id. at

1410-12. As a result, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that

retaliation claims remained viable under section 1981. Id.

at 1412.

B. Humphries’s Retaliation Claim Is Cognizable Under

Section 1981

1. We Hold that Section 1981 Protects Against Retalia-

tion

This is the first opportunity we have had since the

enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to re-visit the

issue of whether section 1981 forbids all retaliatory

discharge claims.5 Cracker Barrel contends that our

decision in Hart has already foreclosed retaliation claims

under section 1981. See Hart, 426 F.3d at 866. This is

incorrect. Unfortunately, Hart has already been cited for

this inaccurate proposition. See Williamson v. Denk &

Roche Builders, Inc., No. 04 C 4051, 2006 WL 1987808,

at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 2006) (citing Hart for the proposi-

tion that “the Seventh Circuit has made clear that a

retaliation claim is not viable under Section 1981”);

5

In Von Zuckerstein v. Argonne Nat’l Lab., 984 F.2d 1467, 1472

n.2 (7th Cir. 1993) we noted that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 had

“overruled” Patterson, but nonetheless applied the holding of

Patterson because the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not have

retroactive reach. We also noted, however, that, as a result, “this

case represents one of the few in which we still apply the

Patterson standards.” Id.

18 No. 05-4047

Franklin v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 2:04 CV 246, 2006 WL

905914, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 7, 2006) (same); Welzel v.

Bernstein, 436 F. Supp. 2d 110, 117 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing

Hart for the proposition that this circuit, unlike other

circuits, precludes retaliation claims under section 1981).

Our analysis in Hart was limited to the narrow issue of

whether an individual who was not the subject of dis-

crimination could assert claims of retaliation for com-

plaining about the discrimination of others.6 We held that

section 1981 did not protect against retaliation in such

circumstances. Hart, 426 F.3d at 866. But Hart has no

application to the facts here, where the plaintiff is plainly

asserting retaliation stemming from discriminatory acts

targeting him. (And, as we shall see below, even Hart’s

limited holding is no longer good law in light of the

Supreme Court’s Jackson decision.)

Thus, the issue before us is whether section 1981, as

amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, applies to claims

of retaliation. We hold that it does. The plain text of the

statute, as amended in 1991, makes clear that section 1981

encompasses the “termination of contracts,” and there

can be no doubt that a retaliatory discharge is indeed a

termination of the employment contract.7 Indeed, the

Supreme Court subsequently interpreted the amended

provisions of section 1981 as protecting against “discrimi-

natory contract terminations.” Rivers, 511 U.S. at 302

6

Our decision in Hart was initially issued as an unpublished

order, but, upon motion to publish it filed by a member of the

bar, the order was converted to a published opinion.

7

The at-will nature (i.e., no formal written contract and no

specific terms of employment) of the plaintiff ’s employment here

does not preclude the plaintiff from relying on section 1981’s

provisions pertaining to contracts. See Walker, 340 F.3d at 475-77

(holding that at-will employees can state claims under sec-

tion 1981).

No. 05-4047 19

(stating that “Section 101 of that Act provides that § 1981’s

prohibition against racial discrimination in the making

and enforcement of contracts applies to all phases and

incidents of the contractual relationship, including dis-

criminatory contract terminations”). Now, it may be that,

strictly speaking, a discriminatory “termination of con-

tract” is not the same thing as a retaliatory discharge—for

instance, analytically, retaliation need not have a discrimi-

natory intent behind it. See Malhotra, 885 F.2d at 1312;

Jackson, 544 U.S. at 185-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But

the Civil Rights Act of 1991 dispensed with this height-

ened degree of formalism, and the legislative history

confirms that Congress intended retaliation to be included

within section 1981. See Andrews, 140 F.3d at 1411 n.12.

As a result, whatever concerns Patterson raised about

the postformation nature of retaliatory discharges evapo-

rated with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See

id.; Rivers, 511 U.S. at 306 n.6. But see Rivers, 511 U.S. at

309 n.8 (noting that the “legislative history of the 1991 Act

reveals conflicting views about whether § 101 would

‘restore’ or instead ‘enlarge’ the original scope of § 1981”)

and id. at 305 (“A legislative response does not necessarily

indicate that Congress viewed the judicial decision as

‘wrongly decided’ as an interpretive matter. Congress may

view the judicial decision as an entirely correct reading of

prior law—or it may be altogether indifferent to the

decision’s technical merits—but may nevertheless decide

that the old law should be amended, but only for the

future.”).

2. Our Holding Is Consistent with Jackson v. Birming-

ham Board of Education, which Affirmed Sullivan’s

Continuing Validity

Even if the statute were unclear on this issue—after all,

the specific word “retaliation” still does not appear in

20 No. 05-4047

section 19818—and without turning to the pertinent

legislative history, the Supreme Court’s recent decision

in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S.

167 (2005) compels the same result. In Jackson, the male

coach of a girls’ high school basketball team sued the

Birmingham Board of Education under Title IX of the

Education Amendments of 1972, claiming that the Board

retaliated against him for complaining about sex discrimi-

nation in the high school’s athletic program. Id. at 171.

Title IX prohibits sex discrimination by recipients of

federal education funding, but, like section 1981, it con-

tains no express mention of “retaliation.” Id. at 173.

Instead, Title IX simply prohibits “discrimination.” The

Supreme Court, however, determined that Title IX’s

proscription on discrimination necessarily subsumed (and

implied) acts of retaliation, which it viewed as simply

different forms of discrimination:

Retaliation against a person because that person has

complained of sex discrimination is another form of

intentional sex discrimination encompassed by Title

IX’s private cause of action. Retaliation is, by defini-

tion, an intentional act. It is a form of “discrimination”

because the complainant is being subjected to dif-

ferential treatment. Moreover, retaliation is discrimi-

nation “on the basis of sex” because it is an inten-

tional response to the nature of the complaint: an

allegation of sex discrimination. We conclude that

when a funding recipient retaliates against a person

because he complains of sex discrimination, this

8

Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (Title VII) (providing that it is an

“unlawful employment practice” for an employer to retaliate

against an employee because he has “opposed any practice

made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or be-

cause he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated

in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing.”).

No. 05-4047 21

constitutes intentional “discrimination” “on the basis

of sex,” in violation of Title IX.

Id. at 173-74 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

The Jackson court relied heavily on its prior decision

in Sullivan, 396 U.S. 229, where it held that section 1981’s

companion statute, section 1982, which prohibits dis-

crimination with respect to property rights, contained an

implied prohibition against retaliation. Jackson, 544 U.S.

at 176. Specifically, the Jackson court interpreted Sullivan

as holding that section 1982’s general prohibition on racial

discrimination, which, like section 1981, makes no men-

tion of retaliation, nonetheless covered “retaliation against

those who advocate the rights of groups protected by

that prohibition.” Id. The Jackson court also observed

that the statutory objective of preventing discrimination

would be severely hampered if retaliatory practices were

not also banned: “If recipients were permitted to retaliate

freely, individuals who witness discrimination would be

loathe to report it, and all manner of Title IX violations

might go unremedied as a result.” Id. at 180 (citing

Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237). “Indeed, if retaliation were

not prohibited, Title IX’s enforcement scheme would

unravel.” Id.

Thus, the Jackson court appears to have jettisoned our

prior observation that “retaliation and discrimination are

separate wrongs.” Cf. Malhotra, 885 F.2d at 1312; see

Jackson, 544 U.S. at 185-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting)

(noting that “[a] claim of retaliation is not a claim of

discrimination on the basis of sex” and that “[r]etaliation

therefore cannot be said to be discrimination on the

basis of anyone’s sex, because a retaliation claim may

succeed where no sex discrimination ever took place”).

Instead, at least for the purpose of interpreting broad

statutory discrimination prohibitions that omit specific

retaliation provisions, the Supreme Court has determined

22 No. 05-4047

that retaliation is simply a different form of discrimina-

tion, and one that is included within broad-based prohibi-

tions of discrimination. See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 175

(distinguishing between the structure of Title VII, which

includes express retaliation provisions, and Title IX’s

“implied” cause of action). Moreover, the Jackson court

noted that a statute targeting discrimination would

necessarily be undercut if retaliatory acts evaded its

purview. Id. at 180. And although Jackson directly tar-

geted Title IX, there is no meaningful analytic distinction

that renders the conclusion in Jackson inapplicable to

section 1981.9 That is, like Title IX, section 1981 broadly

prohibits discrimination (although only Title IX, enacted

roughly a century after section 1981, contains the more

contemporary term of “discrimination”), fails to list

specific discriminatory practices, and omits specific ref-

erences to retaliation. See id. at 175-76.

9

Our colleague in dissent argues that the analysis in Jackson

was particularized to Title IX and thus not applicable to our

discussion of section 1981. We disagree. In Jackson, the Supreme

Court relied in large part upon Sullivan, a case concerning

section 1982. See, e.g., Jackson, 544 U.S. at 176 (“Congress

enacted Title IX just three years after Sullivan was decided, and

accordingly that decision provides valuable context for under-

standing the statute.”); id. at 177 (“Retaliation for Jackson’s

advocacy of the rights of the girls’ basketball team in this case

is discrimination on the basis of sex, just as retaliation for

advocacy on behalf of a black lessee in Sullivan was discrim-

ination on the basis of race.”). Therefore, Jackson’s reasoning

did not depend upon features unique to Title IX, and Jackson

has implications for cases involving section 1982 and its com-

panion statute—section 1981. Moreover, the Jackson Court’s

reliance upon Sullivan affirms Sullivan’s continuing validity.

Irrespective of our impression of Sullivan’s interpretive method,

then, we are bound by its holding. That holding, in part, leads

us to conclude (as has every circuit to address the question) that

a retaliation claim is cognizable under section 1981.

No. 05-4047 23

Indeed, the fact that Title IX omitted any mention of

retaliation, even though it was enacted in 1972, eight years

after Title VII and its specific inclusion of retalia-

tion provisions, did not trouble the Jackson court nor

lead it to conclude that Congress must have intended to

exclude retaliation from Title IX’s coverage. See id. To the

contrary, the Court looked to its Sullivan decision (which

was issued three years before the passage of Title IX) and

concluded that it provided “a valuable context for under-

standing” Title IX. Id. at 176. Specifically, the Court stated

“it is not only appropriate but also realistic to presume

that Congress was thoroughly familiar with [Sullivan] and

that it expected its enactment [of Title IX] to be inter-

preted in conformity with [it].” Id. (quoting Cannon v.

Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 699 (1979)).

Thus, the foundation of the Jackson decision is built

squarely upon the Court’s prior determination in Sullivan

that section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was in-

tended as a broad prohibition on discrimination that

contained an implied cause of action for retaliation. Id.; see

Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237 (“A narrow construction of the

language of § 1982 would be quite inconsistent with the

broad and sweeping nature of the protection meant to

be afforded by § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat.

27, from which § 1982 was derived.”). And there can be no

doubt that Sullivan’s examination of section 1982 with

respect to implied prohibitions on retaliation readily

applies to its companion statute, section 1981, given that

sections 1981 and 1982 are simply carve-outs of the same

section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, sharing identical

historical origins and concerns. See, e.g., Gen. Bldg.

Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 384

(1982) (noting the shared legislative history between

section 1981 and its “companion” section 1982); Runyon,

427 U.S. at 170-71 (noting that the holding in Jones, 392

U.S. at 437 pertaining to section 1982 necessarily impli-

24 No. 05-4047

cated section 1981, given their shared legislative history);

Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass’n, Inc., 410 U.S.

431, 440 (1973) (holding that “[i]n light of the historical

interrelationship” between sections 1981 and 1982, there

was no reason to construe the sections differently solely

on the basis that the defendant was a private party); see

also Winston v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 558 F.2d 1266, 1270 (6th

Cir. 1977) (holding that “in view of both Sections 1981 and

1982 being derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and

in view of the similarity in language and intent, no reason

is seen not to apply the rationale of Sullivan in inter-

preting Section 1981”); DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co.,

511 F.2d 306, 312 n.9 (2d Cir. 1975) (same).

3. Our Holding Is Sensible and Aligned with the

Weight of Authority

Accordingly, we join the other circuits that have ad-

dressed this issue in the post-Civil Rights Act of 1991

era—all of whom uniformly conclude that retaliation

claims are cognizable under section 1981. See Foley, 355

F.3d at 339; Hawkins, 163 F.3d at 693; Andrews, 140 F.3d

at 1410-11; Barge, 87 F.3d at 259. Not only is this result

compelled by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and correspond-

ing Supreme Court authority, but it is also the sensible

result. To hold that section 1981 allows unfettered retalia-

tion is to invite wholesale circumvention (and eventual

undermining) of the statute, and it would create perverse

incentives for the employer to fire complainants as quickly

as possible to thereby limit (or entirely avoid) damages

under section 1981. See, e.g., Goff, 678 F.2d at 598 (noting

that “Section 1981 would become meaningless if an

employer could fire an employee for attempting to enforce

his rights under that statute”). This is not an insignificant

issue, as section 1981 damages often have more teeth

than those available under Title VII.

No. 05-4047 25

There is no traction in observing that Title VII provides

a back-up or competing statutory regime to the plaintiff.

See generally Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726, 732

(7th Cir. 2004) (noting the significant overlap and differ-

ences in the two statutory schemes). Although the sub-

stantive overlap and procedural inconsistencies between

section 1981 and Title VII animated the Court’s concerns

in Patterson, Congress is not bothered by this parallel

statutory scheme. See Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459 (“ ‘[T]he

legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional

intent to allow an individual to pursue independently

his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state

and federal statutes.’ In particular, Congress noted ‘that

the remedies available to the individual under Title VII

are co-extensive with the indiv[i]dual’s right to sue under

the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981, and that the two procedures augment each other

and are not mutually exclusive.’ ” (quoting Alexander v.

Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 48 and H.R. Rep. No. 92-

238, at 19 (1971)); see also Patterson, 491 U.S. at 201-12

(Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (citing

and discussing legislative history indicating that Congress

intended to maintain section 1981 and Title VII as “sepa-

rate, distinct, and independent”); Randolph, 368 F.3d at

732. Nor is it our role to attempt to harmonize these

statutes or seek to channel particular causes of action

toward one or the other statute. Congress has unmistak-

ably provided for two separate regimes to redress, in

many instances, identical discriminatory practices in the

employment context. The resolution of any inefficiencies

resulting from the existence of two parallel (but quite

different) statutory regimes that cover similar harms, but

contain differing procedural requirements, limitations

periods, and remedies, resides with Congress, not us.

26 No. 05-4047

4. We Overturn Hart to the Extent that it Conflicts

with Sullivan and Jackson

We must now briefly return to Hart, where we held that

a white employee who alleged that he suffered retalia-

tion for supporting his co-worker’s charge of discrimina-

tion could not maintain such a claim because section 1981

“encompasses only racial discrimination on account of the

plaintiff ’s race and does not include a prohibition against

retaliation for opposing racial discrimination.” Hart, 426

F.3d at 866. In so holding, we relied solely on the Eleventh

Circuit’s decision in Little v. United Technologies, Carrier

Transicold Division, 103 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 1997), which

held that a white employee who opposed a co-worker’s

racially derogatory remark could not bring a section 1981

retaliation claim because he did not contend that the

employer “discriminated against him because he was

white” (i.e., did not claim direct discrimination). Id. at 961.

The Little decision, however, cited no authority for this

proposition, nor did it provide reasoning for this declara-

tion.10 Id. We likely placed too much reliance on Little,

given that its holding runs squarely against the Supreme

Court’s Sullivan decision, as well as the Court’s subse-

quent decision in Jackson, which further solidified

Sullivan’s holding. See Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237; Jackson,

544 U.S. at 173-74; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,

514 n.22 (1975) (citing Sullivan for the proposition that

sections 1981 and 1982 are examples of “exceptions” that

allow parties “to raise putative rights of third parties,”

10

In addition, the Eleventh Circuit subsequently hinted that

Little may conflict with its decision in Jackson v. Motel 6

Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999 (11th Cir. 1997), which held that

a class of employees could proceed on a section 1981 retaliation

claim based on allegations that they were fired for refusing to

participate in an employer’s discrimination against non-white

customers. See Andrews, 140 F.3d at 1412 n.14.

No. 05-4047 27

including such situations where a party is “punished” for

entering into a contractual relationship with an individual

protected under the statute). Jackson, which was issued

after Little, but while the Hart appeal was pending, made

clear that Sullivan prohibits “retaliation against those

who advocate the rights of groups protected” by section 1

of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 176.

Thus, Sullivan stands for the proposition that a “white

owner could maintain his own private cause of action

under § 1982 if he could show that he was ‘punished for

trying to vindicate the rights of minorities.’ ” Id. at 176 n.1.

Aside from conflicting with Sullivan and Jackson, the

Little decision is plainly the minority view among the

circuits: the great weight of authority is that individuals

who suffer retaliation for opposing the racial discrimina-

tion suffered by others have standing to assert retaliation

claims under section 1981.11

11

See, e.g., Des Vergnes v. Seekonk Water Dist., 601 F.2d 9, 14

(1st Cir. 1979) (holding that corporation had standing to bring

section 1981 claim and that “to invoke § 1981 or § 1982 one

need not be a member of the racial class protected by the statute

and one need not even be able to identify any specific member

of the class who suffered or may suffer discrimination”);

DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 511 F.2d 306, 312 (2d Cir.

1975) (white plaintiff could bring section 1981 claim based upon

allegation that his employer “ ‘forced’ him into retirement

solely because he had sold his house to a black person”); Liotta v.

Nat’l Forge Co., 629 F.2d 903, 906-07 (3d Cir. 1980) (summary

judgment inappropriate where material issues of fact remained

regarding section 1981 claim brought by plaintiff who claimed he

was discharged for supporting rights of African-American co-

workers); Fiedler v. Marumsco Christian Sch., 631 F.2d 1144,

1149 (4th Cir. 1980) (white student protected under section 1981

from retaliation by school because of her association with a black

schoolmate); Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, a Div. of Pullman,

(continued...)

28 No. 05-4047

As a result, it is clear that our decision in Hart cannot

survive scrutiny under Sullivan, as expanded by the

Court in Jackson. Moreover, our decision is out-of-step

with the outcomes reached in the vast majority of cases

outside of our circuit. Accordingly, we overrule our hold-

ing in Hart on this limited issue.12 We now hold that a

plaintiff may maintain a cause of action under section

11

(...continued)

Inc., 678 F.2d 1211, 1229 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (retaliatory

discharge claim allowed under section 1981 where evidence

showed plaintiff was discharged for lawful advocacy of minority

and union rights); Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561,

575 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that it was clear under “well-settled”

law that a plaintiff “need not have alleged discrimination

based upon his race as an African American in order to satisfy

the protected status requirement of his claims[,]” but rather

plaintiff ’s advocacy on behalf of minorities was sufficient to

allege retaliation under section 1981); Winston v. Lear-Siegler,

Inc., 558 F.2d 1266, 1270 (6th Cir. 1977) (white plaintiff had

standing under section 1981 for claim that employer fired him

because he objected to discriminatory discharge of an African-

American co-worker); Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d

1439, 1446-47 (10th Cir. 1988) (white employee fired for helping

African-American co-worker file an EEOC claim could state a

claim under section 1981); see also Malhotra, 885 F.2d at 1316

(Cudahy, J., concurring) (noting that “a white person who is

discharged for espousing the rights of minorities could establish

that the employer acted with discriminatory intent (as required

to state a claim under section 1981); that the racial discrimina-

tion was directed at another, rather than directly at the plaintiff,

is irrelevant, since it is the plaintiff who is suffering due to the

employer’s racial discrimination” and citing Sullivan and cases

from other circuits in support).

12

Because this opinion overrules a prior case, it has been

circulated in advance of publication to all judges of this court in

regular active service pursuant to Seventh Circuit Rule 40(e). A

majority did not favor a rehearing en banc on the question of

overruling Hart, 426 F.3d 863.

No. 05-4047 29

1981, where the plaintiff has suffered retaliation for

advocating the rights of those protected under section

1981. See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 179-80.

C. Humphries Presented a Claim of Retaliation Sufficient

to Survive Summary Judgment

Turning to the merits of Humphries’s retaliation claim

under section 1981, we generally have applied the same

prima facie requirements to discrimination claims brought

under Title VII and section 1981. See, e.g., Alexander v.

Wis. Dep’t of Health & Family Servs., 263 F.3d 673, 682

(7th Cir. 2001) (applying same standard to Title VII and

section 1981 discrimination claims); Johnson v. City of

Fort Wayne, Ind., 91 F.3d 922, 940 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Al-

though section 1981 and Title VII differ in the types of

discrimination they proscribe, the methods of proof and

elements of the case are essentially identical.”); Randle v.

LaSalle Telecomms., Inc., 876 F.2d 563, 568 (7th Cir. 1989)

(“It is well settled that the methods and order of proof

applicable to a claim of disparate treatment under Title

VII are equally availing under § 1981.”); see also Patterson,

491 U.S. at 186 (applying McDonnell Douglas framework

to section 1981 claims). We see no reason to apply dif-

ferent requirements between the statutes with regard to

retaliation claims. See Foley, 355 F.3d at 340 n.8 (approv-

ing of the same standard applied to retaliation claims

under Title VII and section 1981); see also Hasan v. U.S.

Dep’t of Labor, 400 F.3d 1001, 1003-04 (7th Cir. 2005)

(applying Title VII prima facie requirements to retaliation

cases brought under the Energy Reorganization Act);

Larimer v. I.B.M. Corp., 370 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 2004)

(applying Title VII prima facie requirements to retalia-

tion claim under ERISA).

To overcome Cracker Barrel’s motion for summary

judgment, Humphries may proceed under either the

30 No. 05-4047

direct or indirect methods. See Sitar v. Ind. Dep’t of

Transp., 344 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Stone v.

City of Indianapolis Pub. Util. Div., 281 F.3d 640 (7th Cir.

2002)). Under the direct method, Humphries must pre-

sent direct evidence of (1) a statutorily protected activ-

ity; (2) a materially adverse action taken by the employer;

and (3) a causal connection between the two. Id.; Burling-

ton Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405,

2415 (2006). Under the indirect method, he must show

that after opposing the employer’s discriminatory prac-

tice only he, and not any similarly situated employee who

did not complain of discrimination, was subjected to a

materially adverse action even though he was performing

his job in a satisfactory manner. See Sylvester v. SOS

Children’s Villages Ill., Inc., 453 F.3d 900, 902 (7th Cir.

2006); White, 126 S. Ct. at 2415. Thus, the indirect

“method of establishing a prima facie case requires proof

both of similarly situated employees and of the plaintiff ’s

performing his job satisfactorily.” Sylvester, 453 F.3d at

902.

Under the district court’s view (which, naturally,

Cracker Barrel echoes on appeal), Humphries’s prima facie

case failed because, among other reasons, he did not

present sufficient evidence to meet the similarly situated

requirement under the indirect method.13 According to

Cracker Barrel, similarly situated comparators must

have the same supervisors, the same job duties, the same

work performance histories, and must have engaged in the

same bad conduct as the plaintiff. In other words, they

must be essentially identical to the plaintiff, and, under

Cracker Barrel’s view, Humphries’s two comparators,

Stinnett and Dowd, fail that test.

13

We need not decide whether Humphries has enough evidence

under the direct method because he meets the requirements

of the indirect method.

No. 05-4047 31

Cracker Barrel’s view of our similarly situated require-

ment is too rigid and inflexible. This requirement “should

not be applied mechanically or inflexibly.” Hull v.

Stoughton Trailers, LLC, 445 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2006).

True, we have sometimes stated the similarly situated

requirement in the “must” terms that Cracker Barrel

argues, but a more sensitive reading of our cases indicates

that we have often stated that the similarly situated

requirement “normally entails a showing that the two

employees dealt with the same supervisor, were subject

to the same standards, and had engaged in similar con-

duct without such differentiating or mitigating circum-

stances as would distinguish their conduct or the em-

ployer’s treatment of them.” Radue v. Kimberly-Clark

Corp. 219 F.3d 612, 617-18 (7th Cir. 2000) (emphasis

added); see also Keri v. Bd. of Trs. of Purdue Univ., 458

F.3d 620, 644 (7th Cir. 2006); Ezell v. Potter, 400 F.3d

1041, 1049-50 (7th Cir. 2005); McDonald v. Vill. of

Winnetka, 371 F.3d 992, 1002 (7th Cir. 2004); Lucas v. Chi.

Transit Auth., 367 F.3d 714, 733 (7th Cir. 2004);

Appelbaum v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 340 F.3d

573, 580 (7th Cir. 2003); Peters v. Renaissance Hotel

Operating Co., 307 F.3d 535, 546 (7th Cir. 2002); Snipes v.

Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 291 F.3d 460, 463 (7th Cir. 2002); Peele

v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 288 F.3d 319, 330 (7th Cir. 2002).

In other words, we have emphasized that the similarly

situated inquiry is a flexible one that considers “all

relevant factors, the number of which depends on the

context of the case.” Radue, 219 F.3d at 617. “As to the

relevant factors, an employee need not show complete

identity in comparing himself to the better treated em-

ployee, but he must show substantial similarity.” Id. at

618; see also Goodwin v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 442

F.3d 611, 619 (7th Cir. 2006); Ezell, 400 F.3d at 1050.

In addition, our case law does not provide any “magic

formula for determining whether someone is similarly

32 No. 05-4047

situated.” Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 636 (7th

Cir. 2001) (discussing the similarly situated requirement

in the equal protection context). Instead, courts should

apply a “common-sense” factual inquiry—essentially, are

there enough common features between the individuals to

allow a meaningful comparison? Id. (citing Freeman v.

Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 374, 382-83 (7th Cir.

2000) and Radue, 219 F.3d at 619). Put a different way,

the purpose of the similarly situated requirement is to

eliminate confounding variables, such as differing roles,

performance histories, or decision-making personnel,

which helps isolate the critical independent variable:

complaints about discrimination. See Hull, 445 F.3d at

951-52.

It is important not to lose sight of the common-sense

aspect of this inquiry. It is not an unyielding, inflexible

requirement that requires near one-to-one mapping

between employees—distinctions can always be found

in particular job duties or performance histories or the

nature of the alleged transgressions. See, e.g., Ezell, 400

F.3d at 1050. Now, it may be that the degree of similarity

necessary may vary in accordance with the size of the

potential comparator pool, as well as to the extent to which

the plaintiff cherry-picks would-be comparators, see

Crawford v. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co., 461 F.3d 844, 845-

46 (7th Cir. 2006), but the fundamental issue remains

whether such distinctions are so significant that they

render the comparison effectively useless. In other words,

the inquiry simply asks whether there are sufficient

commonalities on the key variables between the plaintiff

and the would-be comparator to allow the type of compari-

son that, taken together with the other prima facie

evidence, would allow a jury to reach an inference of

discrimination or retaliation—recall that the plaintiff

need not prove anything at this stage.

No. 05-4047 33

Establishing a prima facie case should not be such an

onerous requirement: “the plaintiff ’s evidence on the

prima facie case need not be overwhelming or even des-

tined to prevail; rather, the plaintiff need present only

‘some evidence from which one can infer that the employer

took adverse action against the plaintiff on the basis of a

statutorily proscribed criterion.’ ” Bellaver v. Quanex Corp.,

200 F.3d 485, 493 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Leffel v. Valley

Fin. Servs., 113 F.3d 787, 793 (7th Cir. 1997) (also noting

that the prima facie burdens “should not be applied rig-

idly”)); see also Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450

U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (“The burden of establishing a prima

facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous.”). “The

prima facie case, and specifically its fourth prong, are

meant to identify situations where the ‘actions taken by

the employer, . . . if unexplained, are more likely than not

based on consideration of impermissible factors.’ ” Collier

v. Budd Co., 66 F.3d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting

Allen v. Diebold, Inc., 33 F.3d 674, 678 (6th Cir. 1994)).

But the method of inquiry established by McDonnell

Douglas was “never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or

ritualistic.” Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,

577 (1978). After all, our intention in establishing the

similarly situated requirement was to provide plaintiffs

the “boost” that the McDonnell Douglas framework

intended. See Stone, 281 F.3d at 643.

With this legal and policy backdrop in mind, we now

turn to the would-be comparators in this case. It is clear

that Stinnett was a sufficient comparator. He held the

same associate manager position as Humphries, with the

same duties, including responsibility for ensuring the safe

was locked at all times. He shared the same supervisor

(Dowd) and same ultimate decisionmaker (Christensen).

Like Humphries, Stinnett had received past negative

performance evaluations, including low ratings on “asset

protection” categories. In addition, Humphries presented

34 No. 05-4047

competent testimony (both his own and that of a co-

worker) that Stinnett—like Humphries—had used a so-

called Gold Card to pay for a meal that a customer had

complained about, apparently in contravention of Cracker

Barrel policy. In addition, Humphries presented evidence

that Stinnett’s termination of Green (the immediate

precursor event connected to Humphries’s termination)

was impermissible (under Cracker Barrel policy, only

general managers, not associate managers, can fire

employees). If anything, the record tends to suggest that

Humphries generally performed slightly better than

Stinnett. In addition, Humphries presented evidence that

Stinnett also left the safe unlocked. Specifically,

Humphries testified that Stinnett (and Dowd) routinely

left the safe unlocked—the very basis for which Humphries

was fired, and one which Humphries hotly disputes.

Cracker Barrel seeks to distinguish Stinnett on the

grounds that he left the safe unlocked during the daytime

(i.e., business hours) whereas Humphries left it unlocked

during the nighttime (i.e., overnight). This is a distinction

without much difference. Although arguments can be

made as to relative greater potential harm of leaving the

safe unlocked at night, the issue remains that it was

contrary to Cracker Barrel policy to leave the safe un-

locked and unattended at any point during the 24-hour

day. More importantly, Cracker Barrel’s argument here

reflects precisely the type of formalistic argument that

should not carry the day at summary judgment.

Humphries was not required to show an identity of

wrongful conduct: “the law is not this narrow.” Ezell, 400

F.3d at 1050. It was enough to show “similar—not identi-

cal—conduct” and this surely qualifies under that stan-

dard. Id. To find otherwise is to lose sight of the big-

picture, common-sense perspective. Thus, in terms of job

titles, work duties, supervisor, and work performance

histories, Stinnett and Humphries have more than suffi-

No. 05-4047 35

cient similarity. A single comparator will do; numerosity

is not required.14 See, e.g., Goodwin, 442 F.3d at 619; Ezell,

400 F.3d at 1050.

Cracker Barrel also contends that it established that

it had a legitimate reason for firing Humphries, and

that Humphries failed to show that the reason that

Cracker Barrel provided for his discharge was pretext (i.e.,

a lie). See Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 453 F.3d 416,

417-19 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing general requirements to

establish pretext). On these issues, we agree with the

district court’s determination that the record is replete

with contested material facts pertaining to Humphries’s

work performance and the nature of Christensen’s beliefs

when he terminated Humphries. As an initial matter,

Humphries contends that he did not leave the safe unat-

tended, and the evidence implicating him is comprised

solely of the testimony from Stinnett—the very individual

Humphries targeted in his final complaint of discrimina-

tion. And there is testimony in the record that a co-worker

observed Stinnett and Dowd acting differently (less

deferentially) toward Humphries just prior to his firing,

and that this co-worker specifically warned Humphries

about Stinnett and Dowd because she believed that their

behavior indicated that they were “up to something to

harm Humphries.” In addition, prior to firing Humphries,

it appears that Christensen conducted no investigation

into the veracity of Stinnett’s claim. He did not interview

Humphries; he simply credited Stinnett’s story. Finally,

the timing of Humphries’s firing is suspicious: he was

fired one week after he complained to Christensen about

discriminatory practices and one day prior to a scheduled

meeting with Dowd, which, presumably would have

14

Because we conclude the Stinnett was an adequate comparator,

we need not address whether Dowd fits the requisite criteria.

36 No. 05-4047

created a more elaborate (and less favorable to Cracker

Barrel) documentary record of Humphries’s complaints.

Finally, there was evidence in the record tending to show

that similar transgressions were not sufficient to fire

other similarly situated employees who did not complain

of discrimination. See generally Curry v. Menard, Inc., 270

F.3d 473, 479 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that a showing that

similarly situated employees were treated differently

may be enough to establish pretext).

This is not to say that merely pointing to an employer’s

shoddy investigatory efforts is sufficient to establish

pretext. Erroneous (but believed) reasons for terminating

an employee are not tantamount to pretextual reasons. See

Forrester, 453 F.3d at 419; Little v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue,

369 F.3d 1007, 1012-13 (7th Cir. 2004). But, under the

circumstances here, there was sufficient other circum-

stantial evidence in the record to support a reasonable

inference that Humphries was “set-up” by Stinnett (in

tandem with Dowd and Christensen), see Sylvester, 453

F.3d at 905, and that his purported bad act of leaving the

safe unlocked was a fabrication to justify his firing. In this

sense, the quality of Christensen’s investigation may

have some bearing on the truthfulness of Cracker

Barrel’s proferred reasons for terminating Humphries. In

short, these are the sort of disputed factual issues that a

jury should sort out.

As a final note, on remand, Humphries will have only his

claim of retaliation. We agree with the district court’s

determination that he waived (forfeited would be the

better term) his discrimination claim by devoting only a

skeletal argument in response to Cracker Barrel’s motion

for summary judgment. Although Humphries did attempt

to incorporate his well-developed arguments pertaining

to the retaliation claim, and there is substantial over-

lap with regard to the prima facie requirements be-

tween the two claims, he did nothing more. On appeal,

No. 05-4047 37

however, Humphries addresses for the first time the

issue of his replacement, and Cracker Barrel outlines a

series of arguments as to why Humphries’s reprimands

and warnings do not constitute materially adverse em-

ployment actions. None of these arguments were reached

by the district court nor flushed out in the briefing—this

is precisely why we insist on parties raising all pertinent

arguments below. Given that Humphries’s core claim is

one for retaliation, there is little inequity in applying our

typical forfeiture rule to this particular claim.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defen-

dant on Humphries’s retaliation claim, we AFFIRM the

grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant on

Humphries’s discrimination claim, and we REMAND for

further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, dissenting in part. The

Supreme Court held in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of

Education, 544 U.S. 167 (2005), that Title IX of the

Education Amendments of 1972—which forbids educa-

tional programs that receive federal funds from discrimi-

nating on account of sex, 29 U.S.C. §1681(a)—allows the

judiciary to define the word “discriminate.” The Court used

that authority to curtail steps that make reports of

discrimination costly to students and employees. Today

38 No. 05-4047

this court attributes to Jackson the conclusion that all

federal statutes dealing with the employment relation

prohibit retaliation.

The Justices gave three principal reasons for their

decision in Jackson. (1) The word “discrimination” has

sufficient ambiguity to permit a reading that includes

an anti-retaliation norm. 544 U.S. at 173-74. (2) Title IX

was enacted in 1972, after anti-retaliation norms became

common, making it sensible to resolve the ambiguity in

favor of this reading. 544 U.S. at 176. (3) Lack of an anti-

retaliation norm would make it too easy for educational

programs to undermine the principal substantive rules

in Title IX by getting rid of anyone who tried to enforce

them. 544 U.S. at 180-81.

None of these reasons applies to 42 U.S.C. §1981, the

subject of today’s decision. (1) The word “discriminate”

does not appear in §1981. What that statute provides is

that all citizens have the same right to make and enforce

contracts. How can a decision that resolves ambiguity

in the word “discriminate” apply to other statutes with

different language? (2) Section 1981 was enacted in 1866,

long before anti-retaliation norms were created. The first

mention of “retaliatory discharge” in any federal appel-

late opinion came in NLRB v. Arthur Winer, Inc., 194 F.2d

370 (7th Cir. 1952), and the first use by the Supreme Court

was NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117 (1972). (3) Lack of an

anti-retaliation norm in §1981 would not hinder enforce-

ment of civil rights laws, because there is a real anti-

retaliation rule in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a). That’s one reason why Jackson

distinguished Title IX of the 1972 Act from Title VII of the

1964 Act. 544 U.S. at 175. Cf. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.

Ct. 1951 (2006) (holding that there is no general anti-

retaliation doctrine under 42 U.S.C. §1983).

The question at issue today is not whether an employer

may fire a worker who protested discrimination, but

No. 05-4047 39

whether an employee may present a claim of retaliation

even though he failed to file a timely charge under Title

VII and engage in conciliation before turning to court. By

adding an anti-retaliation rule to §1981, the majority

does not craft an ancillary doctrine necessary to make

the principal norm work (as the Court did in Jackson);

instead it demolishes components of Title VII that Con-

gress thought necessary to expedite the resolution of

disputes and resolve many of them out of court.

This is not the first time that a disgruntled employee

has turned to §1981 after missing the deadline for litiga-

tion under Title VII. The Court held in Patterson v.

McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), that §1981

should be construed when possible to avoid conflict with

Title VII. Today, however, the majority does exactly what

Patterson forbids. It reads §1981 to have the same sub-

stantive content as Title VII, but without features such

as short periods of limitations that employees find incon-

venient. That’s not a sound way to treat this statute,

already extended far beyond its original meaning. See

Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Charles Fairman,

VI History of the Supreme Court of the United States:

Reconstruction and Reunion 1864-88 (Part One) 1207-60

(1971); Gerhard Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Bemused

and Confused Muse, 1968 Sup. Ct. Rev. 89. Patterson holds

that the process of judicial extension must stop.

Congress can add to a law’s reach, and in 1991 it did

so—but the 1991 revision does not mention “retaliation” or

change the text of §1981(a), on which Humphries’s claim

rests. When §1981 and Title VII have different but overlap-

ping provisions (as they do, for example, with respect

to damages), then the judiciary must enforce both. See,

e.g., Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003); J.E.M. Ag

Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 534

U.S. 124, 141-44 (2001); Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d

40 No. 05-4047

726 (7th Cir. 2004). But the fact that overlapping systems

may coexist does not justify creating incompatibility, as the

majority does today. Section 1981 does not contain an anti-

retaliation rule. When deciding whether to add such a rule

to §1981, we must consider the effect that this step would

have on Title VII. That’s the holding of Patterson.

To the extent that my colleagues treat the 1991 legisla-

tion as discarding all of Patterson, they follow an approach

that was rejected in Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511

U.S. 298 (1994), and Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511

U.S. 244 (1994). Legislation does not “overrule” decisions

of the Supreme Court; new statutes adopt new rules but

leave in place existing norms that the legislation does

not touch. Nothing in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 justifies

reading §1981 more broadly than its (amended) text or

undermining parts of Title VII that remain in force. The

Court demonstrated this in Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDon-

ald, 126 S. Ct. 1246 (2006), which unanimously reversed a

decision that had invoked the judges’ views of wise public

policy to extend §1981. Domino’s Pizza shows that

Patterson cannot be treated as defunct. The Supreme

Court has cited Patterson favorably in 24 decisions since

Landgraf and Rivers. Of these, Domino’s Pizza is the

most salient because it uses Patterson’s interpretive

methodology to construe §1981 as amended by the Civil

Rights Act of 1991.

My colleagues end up declaring that the text of §1981, its

context, its history (the absence of anything like an anti-

retaliation norm in 1866), its function, and the effect of an

inventive reading on the operation of Title VII all are

irrelevant. The rule they impute to Jackson has no moor-

ings in any statute’s text or provenance. Yet that’s not at

all what Jackson says; it dealt with the actual language

and operation of Title IX and does not justify a language-

and-history-free interpretation of all federal statutes. I do

No. 05-4047 41

not think it likely that the Supreme Court, which insists

that statutory language be followed even if inconvenient

or jarring—see, e.g., Arlington Central School District v.

Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2006); Exxon Mobil Corp.

v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2625-27

(2005); Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353 (2005); Tyler

v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663 n.5 (2001)—would accept

such an atextual approach. I appreciate the temptation to

make every law “the best it can be,” but that is not the

Supreme Court’s current mode of statutory interpretation,

as Domino’s Pizza shows for §1981 in particular.

Perhaps it was the approach that prevailed in 1969,

when the Court decided Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,

Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). The majority in Sullivan held

that a plaintiff in litigation under 42 U.S.C. §1982 has

standing to complain about retaliation, and Jackson

concluded that it must have had a substantive component

too. So read, Sullivan is of a piece with other decisions

holding that judges may supplement statutes to make

them “more effective.” See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377

U.S. 426 (1964). But Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975),

abandoned that approach, and since the 1970s the Court

has lashed interpretation more closely to statutory text.

“[N]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs. Deciding

what competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the

achievement of a particular objective is the very essence

of legislative choice—and it frustrates rather than ef-

fectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that

whatever furthers the statute’s primary objective must

be the law.” Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-

26 (1987) (emphasis in original).

It is anachronistic to say that, because Sullivan engaged

in a freewheeling “interpretation” of §1982, we may today

take liberties with §1981. One might as well cite Borak

for the proposition that “every right implies a remedy” so

42 No. 05-4047

that courts should today create a private right of action

for every statute other than those that the Supreme Court

addressed in Cort and its successors.

Yet that is the majority’s tack. The argument goes that,

because Sullivan ignored the language of §1982 and

drafted an “improved” version of the statute, we are free

to do the same today for §1981, its neighbor. The Supreme

Court requires us to proceed otherwise. Borak dealt

with §14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15

U.S.C. §78n(a). It was as freewheeling in “interpreting”

that law as Sullivan was with §1982. Yet the Court has

held that the change of interpretive method announced

in Cort applies to all other sections of the Securities

Exchange Act. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430

U.S. 1 (1977) (§14(e)); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442

U.S. 560 (1979) (§17(a)). Borak and similar decisions from

the 1960s have not been overruled, but we have been told

in no uncertain terms that they must not be extended.

Indeed, in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S.

1083 (1991), the Court declined to apply Borak to a portion

of §14(a) that had not been involved in Borak. So that case

has been limited to a single sentence of one subsection.

Why, then, may the method of Sullivan be applied to other

sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 despite intervening

precedent?

There has been a sea change in interpretive method

between Sullivan and today—and Patterson not only

exemplifies the change but also applies it to §1981. In 1989

the Justices were invited to rely on Sullivan as a model

for the interpretation of §1981. They declined. Less than

a year ago, in Domino’s Pizza, the Court reiterated

Patterson’s interpretive stance. Sullivan, by contrast, did

not receive a mention. Yet my colleagues do not mention

Domino’s Pizza. Why bypass the Supreme Court’s 2005

understanding of §1981 in favor of a 1969 understand-

No. 05-4047 43

ing of §1982? We must respect our superiors’ decision to

call a halt to judicial extrapolation; Domino’s Pizza rather

than Sullivan exemplifies the appropriate judicial role. By

relying on Sullivan, my colleagues indulge an assump-

tion—that if some remedies are good, then more must

be better—that has no support on today’s Supreme Court.

Now if §1981 had been enacted while the freewheeling

approach of Sullivan was in force, it might well be ap-

propriate to adopt a goal-driven reading. To use the

interpretive tools of the last 30 years to unravel a statute

passed in earlier days would be to cross up the legislature.

That was a point the Court made in Jackson: Title IX

was enacted in 1972, and Congress may well have antici-

pated that Sullivan-like construction would follow. 544

U.S. at 176. The legislators who voted for §1981 in 1866

would not have anticipated any such judicial liberties,

however; and when §1981 was amended in 1991, decisions

such as Cort and Rodriguez and Patterson had announced

a textual approach. So when a question arises in 2006

about the meaning of this 1866/1991 legislation, our job

is to apply the interpretive norms that prevailed in 1866,

1991, and today, not to take an ambiguous decision from

1969 and see how far we can run with it.

Section 1981 does offer one opening for a claim in the

nature of retaliatory discharge. Suppose Cracker Barrel

regularly fired black employees who protest discrimina-

tion in the workplace, but not protesting white employees.

Then it might be appropriate to conclude that black

persons do not enjoy the same right as white persons to

contract with Cracker Barrel. But Humphries does not

make such an argument. For all this record shows, Cracker

Barrel fires every complainer, without regard to the

subject of the complaint. An employer that treats everyone

the same in this respect complies with §1981, so the

judgment should be affirmed.

44 No. 05-4047

A true Copy:

Teste:

________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

USCA-02-C-0072—1-10-07