Kennedy, Terry J. v. Commonwealth Edison

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________

No. 03-2971

TERRY J. KENNEDY, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 00-C-4053—Joe Billy McDade, Judge.

____________

ARGUED APRIL 16, 2004—DECIDED JUNE 2, 2005

____________

Before EASTERBROOK, RIPPLE, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.

WOOD, Circuit Judge. Although the Fair Labor Standards

Act (FLSA) guarantees overtime compensation for many

workers, its protections do not extend to everyone. In this

case, 55 employees of Commonwealth Edison (“ComEd”)

claim that ComEd classified them on the wrong side of the

line—namely, as administrative employees who fall within

an exemption to the FLSA’s overtime promise. See 29 U.S.C.

§ 213(a)(1). In a series of rulings, the district court ultimately

concluded that ComEd had met its burden of demonstrating

for purposes of summary judgment that the employees were

correctly classified, both for purposes of the FLSA and for

2 No. 03-2971

a closely related claim under the Illinois Minimum Wage

Law (IMWL), 820 ILCS 105/4a. The employees appealed,

and we affirm.

I

We begin with an introduction to the parties. The 55

plaintiffs are employed at five nuclear power plants now

operated by Exelon Generation Company, LLC (“Exelon

Generation”). Plaintiffs fall into five different groups: 42 are

Work Planners; three are Lead Work Planners; four are First

Line Supervisors; three are Supply Analysts; and three are

Staff Specialists (two in the Engineering Department and

one in the Chemistry Department). We save for later a more

detailed discussion of what these jobs entailed.

The identity of the defendant, or defendants, caused us

some trouble at oral argument. The caption of the case

names only Commonwealth Edison Company, but the lawyer

who appeared on ComEd’s behalf listed himself as counsel

with Exelon Business Services Company. This prompted us

to ask what the relationship was between Exelon Business

Services (obviously not an outside law firm) and ComEd,

and whether ComEd was still a proper party in the case.

The parties responded with post-argument briefs, in which

they explained that ComEd is still a separate corporate en-

tity, though now a subsidiary of Exelon Corporation

(“Exelon”). ComEd is the only defendant ever served in this

case and it has admitted that it employed the plaintiffs at

the time the case began in May 2000. On October 20, 2000,

ComEd’s parent, Unicom Corporation, merged with Exelon,

which is when ComEd became Exelon’s subsidiary. Shortly

after the merger, Exelon took a number of steps to restruc-

ture its businesses. As part of that process, ComEd trans-

ferred its five nuclear plants to Exelon Generation, a

different wholly- owned subsidiary of Exelon. That transfer

was effective January 1, 2001, at which time the plaintiffs’

No. 03-2971 3

employer changed from ComEd to Exelon Generation.

ComEd itself, no longer in the power generation business,

became a subsidiary of Exelon Energy Delivery Company,

LLC, which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Exelon. Yet

another subsidiary of Exelon, Exelon Business Services

Company (“Business Services”) provides legal services

(among other things) to the various members of the Exelon

family. The parties dispute the significance of the fact that

the plaintiffs never took steps formally to add Exelon Genera-

tion as a party defendant to the case. Plaintiffs argue that,

given the way the litigation has proceeded, Exelon Genera-

tion is a de facto defendant, and that it would be a mere

formality to add it as a party on remand; ComEd concedes

that the case is alive against it for any salary claims before

January 1, 2001, but it implies that plaintiffs have no claim

against Exelon Generation. While it seems fairly clear that

Business Services has been representing whichever member

of the corporate family was the employer, we need not

explore the intricacies of this situation in detail. Given our

disposition of the merits, it can wait for another day.

Exelon proclaims on its website that it “operates the

largest nuclear fleet in the United States, the third largest

commercial nuclear fleet in the world, and is generating

nuclear energy more efficiently than ever.” See http://

www.exeloncorp.com/corporate/about/a_overview.shtml. The

five nuclear power plants at which the plaintiffs worked are

part of that “fleet.” Because their appeal turns on an ap-

preciation of what exactly it was that they did for ComEd (and

now for Exelon Generation), we must identify the duties and

responsibilities of each position.

Work Planners. Forty-two of the plaintiffs held the job

title of “Work Planner.” Work Planners are essentially prob-

lem solvers. Whether in the electrical area, the mechanical

area, or the instrument area, a Work Planner’s primary

duty is to prepare and create a “work package.” If some-

thing at the plant needs to be repaired, if something needs

4 No. 03-2971

to be inspected, or if equipment needs to be modified, the

Work Planner is responsible for devising the solution to the

problem. He or she first studies the problem and decides

what kind of labor, materials, and equipment will be needed

for the project. The Planner may study a computer database

to find out what has been done before on similar problems,

to see what parts are available, and to review repair

procedures. The Planner may also make a visual inspection

of the problem area to verify the exact nature of the prob-

lem and to assess the situation personally. Once the

Planner has written up the proposed work package, she

submits it to another Work Planner for technical review.

Further review after that step is also possible.

Lead Work Planners. Three of the plaintiffs held the title

of “Lead Work Planner.” These employees are essentially

middlemen between the Planners and the higher-ups. They

review the Planners’ work packages, conduct spot-checks to

make sure the Planners’ work is adequate, and often write

work packages themselves. Lead Planners must keep those

working under them on task, conforming to a strict schedule

dictated by ComEd’s Work Control Department. To keep

her group on schedule, the Lead Planner must assess the

efficiency of various possible approaches and determine

which Planner has the time and experience necessary to

handle a particular assignment. The Lead Planner coordi-

nates with other departments, anticipating and removing

any roadblocks that could slow her team down. The Lead

Planner also provides information to her supervisor,

discussing the Planners’ progress and assessing the feasibil-

ity of staying on schedule.

First Line Supervisors. Four plaintiffs held the title of

“First Line Supervisor.” These Supervisors instruct and

oversee the crew of workers that carries out the work pack-

ages the Work Planners design. This requires the Supervisor

to understand the work package, explain what needs to be

accomplished to the workers, and choose the workers who

No. 03-2971 5

are best suited for each task. The Supervisor advises her

team throughout the project. If an unanticipated problem

arises, the Supervisor discusses the problem with a Work

Planner. In these discussions, the Supervisors will often

offer their opinion as to how best to remedy the concern.

After completing a work package, the Supervisor is respon-

sible for debriefing her work crew on their performance.

Supply Analysts. Three of the plaintiffs held the title of

“Supply Analyst.” Essentially buyers for the corporation,

Supply Analysts locate replacement parts for needed re-

pairs. Given the complexity of a nuclear power plant, this

can be a difficult task. Frequently the proper part is no

longer manufactured, requiring the Supply Analyst to

search a computer database, vendor catalogs, and her own

past experience to find a safe substitute that will meet

ComEd’s exacting standards. Supply Analysts often check

each other’s work in an attempt to ensure that they have

found the optimum replacement.

Staff Specialists. The remaining three plaintiffs were clas-

sified as “Staff Specialists.” Two worked in the Engineering

Department, and one in the Chemistry Department. These

Specialists focus on keeping the ComEd plants compliant

with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s guidelines. The

Chemistry Specialist coordinates training for employees,

tests machinery to check for possible equipment failures,

and makes suggestions for improvements in the department’s

procedures and protocols. The Engineering Specialists do

not coordinate training, but, apart from that task, their

duties are substantively the same as those of the Chemistry

Specialist. If the Specialists believe that they have discov-

ered a problem, they consult a guidebook that explains the

corrective procedures to follow. After consulting the guide-

book, the Specialists draft a report detailing their concerns

and recommending a solution.

6 No. 03-2971

II

Under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., employers must

pay overtime to employees working on an hourly basis. If

such an employee works more than 40 hours in a week, she

must receive at least one and a half times her regular wage

for every extra hour worked. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).

Critically for our purposes, however, there is a significant

exception to this rule: it does not apply to individuals “em-

ployed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or profes-

sional capacity.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). The FLSA does not

define “executive, administrative, or professional capacity”;

instead, it expressly delegates that task to the Secretary of

Labor who may “from time to time” alter the definitions.

See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).

From “time to time” has proved to be fairly infrequent. A

few days after oral argument in this case, the Secretary

issued a comprehensive set of new regulations, see 69 Fed.

Reg. 22,260 (April 23, 2004), but it had been some time

since the last changes. The FLSA’s duties test, which deter-

mines which jobs qualify for exempt status, had not been

changed significantly since 1949. The Act’s definitions for

what it means to work on a “salary basis” had not changed

since 1954, and the Department of Labor (“DOL”) had last

adjusted the minimum qualifying salary levels in 1975.

Although the Secretary’s interpretive hiatus ended while

this appeal was pending, the new definitions do not apply

retroactively, saving us from having to send the case back

to the district court for new findings. See Bowen v.

Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“a stat-

utory grant of legislative rulemaking authority will not, as

a general matter, be understood to encompass the power to

promulgate retroactive rules unless that power is conveyed

by Congress in express terms.”). We therefore stick with the

old regulations, which (like their new counterparts) have

“the force and effect of law,” as the statute expressly

authorizes their promulgation. See Batterton v. Francis, 432

U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977).

No. 03-2971 7

ComEd contends that each of the plaintiffs was exempt

from receiving overtime because, properly characterized, they

were all “administrative” employees. Under the old reg-

ulations, there was both a long test, see 29 C.F.R. § 541.2

(a)-(e) (2001), and a short test, see 29 C.F.R. § 541.214

(2001), to determine whether an employee fell within the

administrative exception. Under the new regulations, there

is just one test, see 29 C.F.R. § 541.200 (2004), but, as we

noted, we must apply the old rules to this case. (Unless we

note otherwise, citations to the regulations are to the 2001

version we are using here.) Both parties agree that we

should use the short test, which applies to “high salaried

administrative employees.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.214. In part

because the DOL had not amended this section since 1975,

plaintiffs qualified as “high salaried” and therefore eligible

for the short test, which required only that they be “com-

pensated on a salary or fee basis at a rate of not less than

$250 per week exclusive of board, lodging, or other facili-

ties.” Id.

It is the employer’s burden to establish that an employee

is exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements. See

Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196-97

(1974). To satisfy this burden under the old short test, the

employer has to demonstrate that the employee meets three

conditions. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.214; Piscione v. Ernst &

Young, 171 F.3d 527, 533 (7th Cir. 1999). First, the employer

has to pay the employee on a salary basis, as defined in the

regulations. Piscione, 171 F.3d at 533. Second, the primary

duty of the employee must involve office or nonmanual work

“directly related to management policies or general business

operations.” Id. Finally, the employee’s job has to “include[ ]

work requiring the exercise of discretion and independent

judgment.” Id. As the district court properly concluded, it is

ComEd’s burden on summary judgment to show that there

is no genuine issue of material fact on each one of these

points.

8 No. 03-2971

Salary Basis. Whether ComEd can show that it paid the

plaintiffs on a salary basis depends on whether, under the

plaintiffs’ employment agreements, they “regularly receive[ ]

each pay period . . . a predetermined amount constituting

all or part of [their] compensation, which amount is not

subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or

quantity of the work performed.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a)

(now codified under 29 C.F.R. § 541.602(a) (2004)). “If an

employer docks an employee’s pay for partial day absences,

violations of rules other than those of safety, or based on

the quantity or quality of the employee’s work, the em-

ployee is not considered to be on a salary basis.” Piscione,

171 F.3d at 534.

The plaintiffs, amalgamating the various job categories,

make three arguments for why they are not employed on a

“salary basis” even though they are identified as “salaried”

on ComEd’s payroll and receive salaried employee benefits.

First, the plaintiffs contend that because ComEd tracked

employee time and sometimes paid the plaintiffs more than

their listed salaries, the resulting upward fluctuations must

mean that they were hourly workers. Yet the old regulation

stated plainly that “additional compensation besides the

salary is not inconsistent with the salary basis of payment.”

See 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(b). As we have said before, “when

the regulation’s interpretations state that a salaried em-

ployee’s pay ‘is not subject to reduction because of varia-

tions in the quality or quantity of the work performed,’ 29

C.F.R. § 541.118(a), a reduction of salary must have

actually occurred for an employee to lose the exemption.”

Klein v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Med. Ctr. 990 F.2d

279, 286 (7th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added). For obvious

reasons, the DOL is concerned more with reductions in a

salaried employee’s wages that are correlated with the

number of hours worked than it is with increases. See

Wage-Hour Op. Ltr. No. 1738 (April 6, 1995) (“[E]xtra

compensation may be paid for overtime to an exempt

No. 03-2971 9

employee on any basis. The overtime payment need not be

at time and one-half, but may be at straight time, or at one-

half time, or flat sum, or any other basis.”). The situation

would be different if the plaintiffs’ salaries were so far be-

low their actual compensation (calculated on an hourly basis)

that the “salary” was “nothing more than an illusion,” see

Mich. Ass’n of Gov’t Employees v. Mich. Dept. of Corrs., 992

F.2d 82, 84 n.3 (6th Cir. 1993), but that is not the case here.

Second, the plaintiffs argue that they are not salaried em-

ployees because ComEd’s “Snow Day Policy” subjects them

to an impermissible reduction in pay. The plaintiffs’ wages

have never been decreased under this policy, but both the

old and new regulations state that being “subject to” a

reduction in pay is sufficient to prevent an employee from

being considered “salaried.” See 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a)

(2001); 29 C.F.R. § 541.602(a) (2004). The phrase “subject

to” does not require proof that an employer has reduced an

employee’s wages; “an employment policy that creates a

‘significant likelihood’ of [a] deduction” will suffice. Auer v.

Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); see also Klein, 990 F.2d

at 286 (“ ‘Subject to reduction’ does not mean that a reduc-

tion was actually made. The plain meaning of the language

suggests that it is enough that a deduction could have been

made for an impermissible reason.”).

ComEd’s Snow Day Policy, as recounted in an informal

email to ComEd managers and supervisors, states:

[E]mployees who cannot get to work at all as a result of

extremely hazardous conditions and roads made im-

passable by a heavy snowstorm will be given the option

of either taking a vacation day or the day off without

pay. Employees who do report to their regular work lo-

cation for work during their basic day, but are late de-

spite taking every precaution and making every effort

to be on time, will be paid for the entire day.

While this email contemplates the possibility of an em-

ployee’s choosing to take a day off without pay, it does not

10 No. 03-2971

state that ComEd will reduce a salaried employee’s wages

for failing to make it to work during a snowstorm. Being

given the choice to make up the time lost is not the same as

having a policy that imposes deductions for failing to show

up. See Haywood v. North Amer. Van Lines, 121 F.3d 1066,

1070 (7th Cir. 1997). The record indicates that even if an

employee had chosen to take the day off without pay,

ComEd would not have reduced her salary. Instead, ComEd

would have issued a check in the same amount as always,

but would have reduced the employee’s number of personal

leave days by one. The FLSA does not prohibit this type of

non-monetary deduction. See id. (“Nothing in the regula-

tions suggests that an employee loses his exempt status

simply because his employer disciplines him in a non-

monetary fashion for failing to work during his scheduled

time.”). While the plaintiffs contend that the policy would

require ComEd to reduce an employee’s salary if she had

already exhausted her personal leave days, the email does

not dictate such a result. Given that ComEd has never

reduced an employee’s salary on this basis, we find this lone

email, which does not spell out the feared result, insuf-

ficient to create a genuine issue of material fact that the

policy subjected the plaintiffs to a reduction in salary.

Finally, the plaintiffs attempt to prove that they are not

salaried by identifying a few instances where ComEd im-

permissibly docked small portions of three of the plaintiffs’

wages. ComEd admits these improprieties, but argues that

the deductions were inadvertent and that the affected work-

ers have since been repaid. Through a “window of correc-

tion,” the old regulations protected employers who intended

to pay their employees on a salary basis, but who, inadver-

tently and infrequently, docked an otherwise salaried

employee. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a)(6) (“where a deduction

not permitted by these interpretations is inadvertent, or is

made for reasons other than lack of work, the exemption

will not be considered to have been lost if the employer

No. 03-2971 11

reimburses the employee for such deductions and promises

to comply in the future.”); see also 29 C.F.R. § 541.603(c)

(2004).

While “the plain language of the regulation sets out ‘inad-

verten[ce]’ and ‘made for reasons other than lack of work’ as

alternative grounds permitting corrective action,” see Auer,

519 U.S. at 463, the employer may take advantage of the

regulation only if it objectively intended to pay its employ-

ees on a salary basis. See Whetsel v. Network Prop. Servs.,

L.L.C., 246 F.3d 897, 901 (7th Cir. 2001). If the employees

can show that the deductions were not merely happen-

stance, but a routine practice or company policy, the

employer may not rely on the margin of error tolerated by

the regulation. Here, the plaintiffs can identify only three

affected individuals among them, none of whom lost more

than the equivalent of a few hours of pay. There was no

pattern to the deductions and they occurred over the

equivalent of 470,000 work weeks. We note also that the

instances cited in the plaintiffs’ brief all occurred during the

calendar year 2000, and most were around the time that

Exelon was reorganizing its corporate operations. Iden-

tifying a few random, isolated, and negligible deductions is

not enough to show an actual practice or policy of treating

as hourly the theoretically salaried. Since ComEd has

reimbursed the plaintiffs for these improper, but inad-

vertent, deductions, it may invoke the regulation’s “window

of correction.” This means that these isolated instances of

deductions do not create a genuine issue of fact about the

proper characterization of the plaintiffs’ positions.

Primary Duty. Next, ComEd has to show that the plaintiffs’

duties “consist primarily of office or nonmanual work di-

rectly related to management policies or general business

operations.” Haywood, 121 F.3d at 1071; see also 29 C.F.R.

§ 541.205. Since both parties agree that the plaintiffs do

office or nonmanual work, our only inquiry is whether there

is any meaningful dispute about whether their primary

12 No. 03-2971

duties directly relate to ComEd’s management policies or

general business operations. See id. The old regulations

provided that work “directly related to management policies

or general business operations” includes activities “relating

to the administrative operations of a business.” 29 C.F.R.

§ 541.205(a). “The administrative operations of the business

include the work performed by so-called white-collar

employees engaged in ‘servicing’ a business as, for example,

advising the management, planning, negotiating, represent-

ing the company, purchasing, promoting sales, and business

research and control.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.205(b). “These

interpretive regulations suggest a dichotomy between ‘produc-

tion’ and ‘administrative’ jobs.” Shaw v. Prentice Hall

Computer Pub., Inc., 151 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 1998). While

every job context is different, “the typical example of the

production/administrative dichotomy is a factory setting

where the ‘production’ employees work on the line running

machines, while the administrative employees work in an

office communicating with the customers and doing paper-

work.” Id. Administrative tasks constitute an employee’s

primary duty if the tasks represent “the major part, or over

50 percent of the employee’s time.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.103. In

order to evaluate this part of the plaintiffs’ argument, we

must consider each group of employees separately.

We look first at the 42 Work Planners. As we detailed

before, these employees spend the majority of their day in

an office, creating instructions for the maintenance and

repair of ComEd’s machines. The plaintiffs admit that the

Planners do not turn the wrenches themselves, but they

insist that Planners should nonetheless fall on the prod-

uction side of the production/administrative line, both be-

cause of what they are doing and because of the number of

people employed as Planners. We disagree. With respect to

numbers, the regulations foreclose the plaintiffs’ position:

“[t]he fact that there are a number of other employees of the

same employer carrying out assignments of the same rela-

No. 03-2971 13

tive importance or performing identical work does not affect

the determination of whether they meet this test so long as

the work of each employee is of substantial importance to

the management or operation of the business.” 29 C.F.R.

§ 541.205(a)(6). With respect to their duties, recall that the

Planners are responsible for “planning” and “advising the

management” about the best way to operate the plant when

difficulties arise. In that sense, their task is a strategic one;

as we noted earlier, they evaluate possible repairs, they

inspect equipment, and they decide whether equipment may

need to be modified.

The inspection work most obviously relates to planning,

insofar as it is designed to spot trouble in advance and

decide what steps to take. The role the Planners take in

repairs and modifications is both to map out solutions to a

particular problem and to advise on future actions. The

mere fact that their advice and planning relates directly to

plant operations is not enough to make them, personally,

the actual production employees. As the regulations explain,

the exemption “is not limited to persons who participate in

the formulation of management policies or in the operation

of the business as a whole.” It includes those “whose work

affects business operations to a substantial degree, even

though their assignments are tasks related to the operation

of a particular segment of the business.” 29 C.F.R.

§ 541.205(c). Given the reality of the Planners’ daily routine,

we see no genuine issue of fact with respect to the “duties”

portion of ComEd’s burden with respect to this group.

The Lead Planners and the First Line Supervisors are

part of the administrative operations of the business be-

cause their primary task is managing the work of others.

They do no physical work, but rather guide other employees

to make sure that work packages are implemented effi-

ciently and tasks are completed on time. Lead Planners and

Supervisors fall on the administrative side of the adminis-

tration/ production line because managing others is, by

14 No. 03-2971

definition, “of substantial importance to the

management . . . of a business.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.205(c)(1).

The conclusion that the three Supply Analysts, whose

primary job is to locate replacement equipment for ComEd,

are part of the company’s administration is straightforward.

The regulations expressly classify such workers as adminis-

trative, stating, “[a]nother example of an employee whose

work may be important to the welfare of the business is a

buyer of a particular article or equipment in an industrial

plant.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.205(c)(4). While the Supply Analysts

do not sign the checks, they determine what part is needed

and inform others in the administration what ComEd needs

to purchase. The regulation classifies such jobs within the

administrative side of a company.

The record also establishes that ComEd’s Staff Specialists

can only be classified as administrative. These employees

ensure that ComEd complies with the requisite federal guide-

lines by collecting data, conducting tests, and organizing

employee training. The regulations characterize duties like

these as administrative:

In the data processing field some firms employ persons

described as systems analysts and computer program-

mers. If such employees are concerned with the plan-

ning, scheduling, and coordination of activities which

are required to develop systems for processing data to

obtain solution to complex business, scientific, or engin-

eering problems of his employer or his employer’s

customers, he is clearly doing work directly related to

management policies or general business operations.

29 C.F.R. § 541.205(c)(7). Although the regulation refers to

the “data processing field”, “the interpretive regulations are

to be used to the extent they are helpful analogies to the

case at hand.” Prentice Hall, 151 F.3d at 644. Here, the

Specialists “are concerned with the planning, scheduling,

No. 03-2971 15

and coordination of activities” necessary to discover and

rectify any compliance problems ComEd may have. These

tasks are sufficiently analogous to the regulation’s charac-

terization of “Systems Analysts” to find the Specialists’

tasks “directly related to management policies or general

business operations.”

We agree with the district court, in summary, that the

undisputed facts about the jobs each group of plaintiffs

performed show that their duties meet this part of the ad-

ministrative exemption test.

Discretion and Independent Judgment. Last, ComEd must

show that the undisputed facts demonstrate that the

plaintiffs’ duties involve the exercise of discretion and in-

dependent judgment. This determination requires “the com-

parison and the evaluation of possible courses of conduct

and acting or making a decision after the various possibili-

ties have been considered. . . . [It] implies that the person

has the authority or power to make an independent choice,

free from immediate direction or supervision and with re-

spect to matters of significance.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.207. “While

the regulations require the employee to exercise independ-

ent judgment, the term does not require this judgment to be

made in isolation.” Piscione, 171 F.3d at 535 (emphasis

removed). The fact that others may review or even reverse

an employee’s judgment does not mean necessarily that the

employee will fall outside the FLSA’s administrative

exemption. Id.

The plaintiffs make the general argument that because a

nuclear power plant is an exceedingly regulated work-

place—as they put it, “procedure driven, routine, and strictly

controlled”—there was no room for any of the plaintiffs to

exercise independent judgment. We disagree. Taken to

its logical limit, such a blanket rule would prevent any

employee at ComEd from falling under the exemption.

Moreover, “[j]ust because an employee may spend a signi-

16 No. 03-2971

ficant portion of his time engaged in ministerial or routine

tasks does not necessarily prevent the application of the

administrative exemption.” Id. at 539. While the plaintiffs’

discretion may be channeled by the regulations that apply

to this industry, that does not mean ComEd employees do

not exercise independent judgment. Certainly no one would

contend that a tax lawyer does not exercise discretion or

independent judgment just because the Internal Revenue

Code contains a highly regimented set of rules.

The plaintiffs’ job-specific arguments fare no better.

As problem solvers, the Work Planners and Lead Work

Planners exercise discretion and independent judgment with

respect to matters of significance. Their job is to come up

with a set of instructions that will remedy reported prob-

lems around the plant. The fact that they look to past work

packages for guidance and use a computer to aid their rec-

ommendations does not transform them into automatons.

Judges, to name just one profession, routinely look to past

decisions to determine how to resolve cases. Faced with

novel or not-so-novel problems, judges and Work Planners

must use their independent judgment to determine how

best to respond. The fact that a chosen action might be

overruled by a supervisor says nothing about the discretion

and judgment that went into its selection in the first place.

See also 29 C.F.R. § 541.207(e) (“The term ‘discretion and

independent judgment’ as used in the regulations . . . does

not necessarily imply that the decisions made by the em-

ployee must have a finality that goes with unlimited authority

and a complete absence of review.”).

Lead Work Planners and First Line Supervisors are in

routine contact with upper management, making recommen-

dations about projects, schedules, and personnel. This input

requires the use of independent judgment and discretion, as

is typical for supervisory roles like these. See Piscione, 171

F.3d at 537 (finding the plaintiff exercised discretion

because he had a number of supervisory responsibilities such

No. 03-2971 17

as “set[ting] the priorities for the other members of his team

[and ] . . . judg[ing] the abilities of his junior employees”).

One of the primary tasks of the Lead Work Planners and

the First Line Supervisors is to assess the members of their

team and decide which worker can complete a task most

efficiently. These are matters of consequence that require

the exercise of discretion and independent judgment.

If finding the right replacement part for a broken-down

piece of equipment involved nothing more than calling the

hardware store and having some standardized screws deliv-

ered, this case would be different. But the record reveals

that the job of a Supply Analyst for ComEd is far more

demanding. The parts that the Supply Analysts must pur-

chase are often no longer manufactured. The Analysts must

use their judgment to find a safe, compatible alternative

that will meet the exacting specifications imposed by ComEd

and the governing regulations. This is not an easy task and

we conclude that it satisfies the final component of the

administrative exemption.

We reach the same conclusion with respect to the Chemis-

try and Engineering Staff Specialists, who (as noted earlier)

are responsible for keeping ComEd compliant with the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s guidelines. They conduct

various tests and help train the employees in their respec-

tive departments. When they find a problem, they propose

an appropriate remedy—a responsibility that makes their

jobs somewhat similar to that of the Work Planners. Like

the Planners, the Staff Specialists exercise independent

judgment and discretion by comparing and evaluating

several possible courses of action. The Specialists’ recom-

mendations keep ComEd in line with the applicable regu-

lations, a role of unquestionable importance to ComEd and

public safety.

18 No. 03-2971

III

Having reviewed the plaintiffs’ jobs under the FLSA’s short

test, in light of the summary judgment record, we conclude

that ComEd has shown that the plaintiffs were properly

classified as exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirement.

Since the plaintiffs’ FLSA claims fail, their related state law

claims under the IMWL must fail as well. See 820 ILCS

105/4a(2)(E) (making a violation of the IMWL contingent on

establishing a violation under the FLSA). Accordingly, we

AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

A true Copy:

Teste:

________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

USCA-02-C-0072—6-2-05