Herron, Gary v. DaimlerChrysler Corp

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________

No. 03-2802

GARY HERRON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 00 C 1838—Sara Evans Barker, Judge.

____________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 28, 2004—DECIDED NOVEMBER 3, 2004

____________

Before BAUER, EASTERBROOK, and MANION, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge. Gary Herron sued his former

employer, DaimlerChrysler Corporation (“Daimler-

Chrysler”) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging race

discrimination, retaliation, racial harassment, and construc-

tive discharge. The district court granted Daimler Chrysler’s

motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

2 No. 03-2802

Background

Gary Herron, who is black, began working at Daimler-

Chrysler’s Kokomo, Indiana transmission plant (“KTP”) in

1994. After a few months, he announced his intention to

accept a supervisory position with a different employer. In

order to keep Herron, DaimlerChrysler countered with an

offer of a supervisory position at KTP, which Herron ac-

cepted. In his new position, Herron was responsible for the

manufacture of transmission parts used on KTP’s assembly

line.

While Herron performed well in terms of producing parts,

he had considerable difficulty interacting with subordinates,

peers, and superiors. In 1996, Herron had two major

incidents resulting in disciplinary action by DaimlerChrysler.

First, Herron ignored instructions from his area manager

(the position overseeing supervisors such as Herron) and

yelled at him in March 1996. At a meeting to address this in-

cident, Herron was informed that the union had also com-

plained about him. According to a memorandum by KTP’s

labor relations supervisor, Herron was arrogant, disrespect-

ful, and defensive when discussing these issues.

In May 1996, Herron was again disciplined. Ron Abney,

Herron’s area manager, informed Herron of complaints by

subordinates of rude and unprofessional behavior. Herron

then had a meeting with Abney, the labor relations supervi-

sor, and Bill Schaefer, one of KTP’s manufacturing managers

(a supervisory position above area manager). The labor

relations supervisor noted that during this meeting Herron

was again disrespectful, refusing to listen and interrupting

his superiors. Subsequently, Herron was placed on a paid

leave of absence, and Schaefer recommended Herron’s re-

moval from any supervisory position. Schaefer informed the

Complex Personnel Manager that Herron “does not recog-

nize his responsibility for respect of authority for his

No. 03-2802 3

supervisor. He also displays no consideration for positive

working relationships with co-workers.” Herron avoided

demotion, however, and only received a written reprimand

in early June 1996 and placement in a 30/60/90-day perform-

ance improvement program. As part of this program, Herron

had to improve his performance, which Abney monitored in

30-day periods. Herron successfully completed this program.

Despite his brushes with the disciplinary process, Herron’s

behavioral problems resurfaced in 1997 and 1998. He was

placed on a five-day disciplinary layoff after a January 1997

confrontation during which he was disrespectful to an area

manager named Ed Wallace. In July 1998, a supervisor in

another department told Herron not to ship certain parts, as

the parts were being inspected. Herron ignored this request

and shipped the parts before the inspection could be

completed. The inspection showed that the parts were sub-

par and should not have been shipped. When Wallace at-

tempted to talk to Herron about his disregard of the other

supervisor’s request, Herron refused to listen, argued, and

walked off angrily.

These persistent, significant problems with his treatment

of co-workers, superiors, and subordinates obscured Herron’s

continued good production. Herron never failed to meet his

daily production goal in 1998. One of Herron’s area man-

agers, Richard Huffman, noted that Herron carried the de-

partment for him the first six months of the year with his

excellent production of parts. Huffman later elaborated on

his feelings toward Herron.

Now Gary is headstrong and has a short temper.

Gary is the type that when you have a discussion

with him it escalates quickly . . . He doesn’t get along

with people. He is argumentative, not a team player,

a lone wolf, not a [sic] but kisser, but would do

what he was told.

4 No. 03-2802

Herron’s 1998 appraisal reflected this mixed performance.

The DaimlerChrysler appraisal report is made up of several

sections. First is an overall Assessment of Results, which

notes generally how the employee performed. In this sec-

tion, an employee is graded (from highest to lowest) either

Role Model, Significant Contributor, Contributor, or

Development Needed. The appraisal itself does not specify

what considerations go into this Assessment. The appraisal

also contains a section specifically devoted to a variety of be-

havior ratings (from the employee’s supervisor), a section

for supervisor comments, and a section for employee com-

ments. Huffman originally recommended Herron for

Significant Contributor in the overall Assessment and gave

him behavior ratings averaging a 2.9 out of 4. Schaefer, placing

emphasis on Herron’s interpersonal problems, asked that

Huffman reduce the overall Assessment to the lower

Contributor level, and Huffman agreed. Huffman reviewed

four other supervisors. The two white supervisors received

Significant Contributor rankings, with one supervisor re-

ceiving a behavior rating of 2.9 and the other receiving a 2.7.

The two remaining supervisors, who were minorities, were

ranked Contributors, with behavior ratings of 2.9. Huffman

submitted Herron’s revised evaluation with the Contributor

rating on or before December 7, 1998, when a computer

processing center recorded it.

In December 1998, Larry Hall succeeded Schaefer as man-

ufacturing manager. Hall, who is also black, attempted to

mentor Herron. Feeling that Herron was having trouble

with his area manager, Hall inquired of the other area man-

agers at the plant whether anyone would take Herron. Every

manager, whether black or white, refused.

Herron’s attitude problems continued in 1999. In January,

area manager Mark Carie attempted to talk to him about at-

tendance issues. Herron interrupted and became belligerent.

No. 03-2802 5

The next day Herron met with Carie and Hall, who issued

a discipline known as a Statement A for Herron’s belligerence.

Herron refused to sign the discipline and left the plant,

though Hall indicated that Herron did not have permission

to leave. Herron subsequently claimed that he went on sick

leave and saw a doctor during his two-day absence. Herron

was not paid for his time away from the plant, as the

Personnel Administrator determined his actions were arbi-

trary and defiant. Shortly thereafter, Herron was transferred.

Between February 1999 and April 2000, Herron was trans-

ferred between departments three times, and Herron’s shift

assignments changed four times.

At the end of the January 1999 meeting, Herron requested

to talk to Workforce Diversity, an independent Daimler-

Chrysler group established to investigate discrimination

complaints. He spoke with Marvin Moore, who informed

Herron that he would come to KTP on February 8 to con-

duct an on-site investigation of Herron’s complaints. Moore

interviewed several employees during this investigation,

including Schaefer and Herron, while Hall was interviewed

by another member of Workforce Diversity. Both Schaefer

and Hall explained that a good supervisor did not just make

parts and that Herron had problems with another crucial

aspect of his position—his ability to interact with his fellow

supervisors and subordinates. Hall further noted that Herron

had developed a reputation as someone who was difficult

to work with and that no area managers wanted to work

with him. Moore determined there was no discrimination.

Herron continued his pattern of solid production work

and poor behavior as 1999 progressed. In August 1999,

Herron had problems with another supervisor, and an area

manager, Harry Morrow, disciplined him. In October and

November 1999, Herron’s then area manager, Bentley Craig,

complained about Herron’s attitude and behavior towards

6 No. 03-2802

him. Craig and Morrow gave Herron a Development Needed

rating, the lowest rating possible, in the overall Assessment

section of his 1999 appraisal. Hall approved this rating at a

next level review meeting on November 6, 1999. In Decem-

ber 1999, Herron received another Statement A discipline for

failing to provide information for his self-appraisal. On

December 14, 1999, Herron contacted Michele Cook at

Workforce Diversity with renewed complaints of discrimi-

nation and harassment. After an investigation, she concluded

there had been no discrimination.

Herron filed two EEOC complaints charging discrimina-

tion and retaliation in February and April 2000. On April 11,

2000, he received his 1999 appraisal with the Development

Needed rating. He was again placed on a 30/60/90 review

to improve his behavior and performance. On June 6, 2000,

after securing employment with Rolls Royce at a similar

wage and position, Herron resigned his position at Daimler-

Chrysler.

Herron then brought suit against DaimlerChrysler in the

Southern District of Indiana. He alleged race discrimination

and retaliation against him by DaimlerChrysler. Herron

further asserted that DaimlerChrysler’s actions constituted

a campaign of racial harassment that created a hostile work

environment and led to his constructive discharge. Daimler-

Chrysler moved for summary judgment, which the district

court granted. Herron appeals.

I.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo, construing all facts in favor of Herron, the nonmov-

ing party. See Williams v. Waste Mgmt. of Ill., Inc., 361 F.3d

1021, 1028 (7th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is appropriate

when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogato-

No. 03-2802 7

ries, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In short, summary

judgment is warranted where “a rational trier of fact could

not find for the non-moving party.” Rogers v. City of Chicago,

320 F.3d 748, 752 (7th Cir. 2003).

Herron makes claims of race discrimination, retaliation,

and racial harassment under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Because we evaluate § 1981 claims under the same rubric as

Title VII claims, we need not address them separately. See

Williams, 361 F.3d at 1028. As DaimlerChrysler presents

challenges to Herron’s constructive discharge claim specific

to each of the statutes, we will address these claims sepa-

rately.

A. Race Discrimination

Herron first claims that DaimlerChrysler committed race

discrimination in four different instances: (1) a two-month

delay by DaimlerChrysler in the payment of certain over-

time; (2) Herron’s status as one of KTP’s lower-paid super-

visors; (3) Herron’s physical illness caused by the stress of

the alleged discrimination; and (4) the automatic denial of

a pay raise based on Herron’s negative 1999 appraisal. As

Herron never argued the first three of these as part of his

racial discrimination claim before the district court, however,

he is barred from raising them now. Gonzalez v. Ingersoll

Milling Mach. Co., 133 F.3d 1025, 1033 (7th Cir. 1998). Herron’s

final claim, which relates to the 1999 appraisal and denial of

the pay raise, remains.

While Herron may prove intentional discrimination in

violation of Title VII under either the direct or indirect

8 No. 03-2802

method, see Little v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 369 F.3d 1007, 1011

(7th Cir. 2004), he chooses to proceed using only the indirect

method of proof.

The indirect method relies on the familiar burden-shifting

analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). To establish a prima facie case, Herron must show

that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was

meeting his employer’s legitimate expectations; (3)

DaimlerChrysler took an adverse employment action against

him; and (4) his employer treated similarly situated indi-

viduals outside of the protected class more favorably. See,

e.g., Peters v. Renaissance Hotel Operating Co., 307 F.3d 535, 545

(7th Cir. 2002). If Herron meets this burden, Daimler-

Chrysler must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for its actions. Little, 369 F.3d at 1011. If Daimler-

Chrysler were able to point to such a reason, the burden

remains with Herron to show that the reason put forth was

not a true reason, but a pretext—“a dishonest explanation,

a lie rather than an oddity or an error.” Peters, 307 F.3d at

545 (quoting Kulumani v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass’n, 224

F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 2000)). In this case, however, Herron

does not advance to the later stages of the analysis, as he

cannot show a prima facie case of discrimination.

Before turning to Herron’s prima facie case, a brief com-

ment on the structure of Herron’s argument. Once again, a

plaintiff has put “the pretext cart before the prima facie

horse.” Brummett v. Lee Enters., Inc., 284 F.3d 742, 744 (7th

Cir. 2002). Herron analyzes only one prong of the indirect

method, the employer’s allegedly adverse employment

actions, before jumping to pretext. This is not correct. “We

have frequently warned litigants that the prima facie case

must be established and not merely incanted.” Grayson v.

O’Neill, 308 F.3d 808, 818 (7th Cir. 2002). The plaintiff must

meet each prong of the prima facie test before reaching pre-

No. 03-2802 9

text. Brummett, 284 F.3d at 744. While merger of the legiti-

mate expectations requirement with the pretext analysis is

acceptable in limited circumstances, the obligation to establish

a prima facie case should not be disregarded as a matter of

course.

We turn then to the question of whether Herron has es-

tablished a prima facie case of race discrimination. Herron

is clearly a member of a protected class. DaimlerChrysler

also acknowledges that for the “purposes of summary

judgment” the negative 1999 evaluation, which resulted in

the automatic denial of a pay raise, constitutes a materially

1

adverse employment action.

Herron’s prima facie case quickly unravels, however,

because he failed to show that he was meeting Daimler-

Chrysler’s legitimate expectations at the time of the 1999

evaluation. DaimlerChrysler argued, without opposition

from Herron, that it measured a successful supervisor not

simply by success in producing parts, but also by his ability

to interact with his subordinates, peers, and supervisors.

Herron had a long history of volatile relations with each of

these groups. Beginning in 1996, he was frequently being

disciplined at varying levels of severity for his persistent

behavior and attitude problems. In 1999 alone, he received

two Statement A disciplines, he had to attend a meeting with

Manufacturing Manager Larry Hall because of behavior

problems, and he engaged in multiple altercations with area

1

An adverse employment action is “a significant change in em-

ployment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reas-

signment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision

causing a significant change in benefits.” Burlington Indus. Inc. v.

Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). However, a negative performance

evaluation is usually not labeled an adverse employment action.

See, e.g., Grube v. Lau Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d 723, 730 (7th Cir. 2001).

10 No. 03-2802

managers, including Carie, Morrow, and Craig. Herron’s

ability to point to a few co-workers who tolerated his attitude

is not sufficient to show that he met DaimlerChrysler’s

legitimate expectations. DeJarnette v. Corning Inc., 133 F.3d

293, 299 (4th Cir. 1998) (“that plaintiff’s coworkers ‘may have

thought that [she] did a good job . . . is close to irrelevant.’ ”).

Herron’s disrespectful and argumentative nature was

continually on display at KTP. DaimlerChrysler clearly

enunciated a desire to have supervisors who could success-

fully deal with subordinates, peers, and supervisors, and

Herron did not meet this expectation.

Herron also failed to establish that a similarly situated em-

ployee was treated more favorably. To succeed, Herron first

must show an employee who is similarly situated, demon-

strating “that there is someone who is directly comparable to

him in all material aspects.” Grayson, 308 F.3d at 819. Herron

does not make this initial showing. He points to the higher

marks of white supervisors in the 1998 appraisal, but this is

completely irrelevant. First, only the 1999 appraisal (with the

denial of the pay raise), not the 1998 appraisal, is at issue.

Evidence of how other supervisors were graded in 1998 has

no real bearing on an analysis of whether one was treated

more favorably in 1999.

Second, even if the 1998 appraisal did have some relevance

for 1999, Herron does not show that the other supervisors

were similar in all material aspects to him. When making this

determination, we must look at all relevant factors, which

depend on the context of the particular case. Patterson v.

Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2002).

Herron did not present any evidence of other supervisors

who engaged in similar interpersonal conduct but who were

not subjected to the same disciplinary measures. Without

such evidence, the other supervisors cannot be considered

similarly situated.

No. 03-2802 11

Because Herron fails to demonstrate either that he met his

employer’s legitimate expectations or that a similarly situated

employee was treated more favorably, he has failed to estab-

lish a prima facie case of race discrimination. However, even

if he had established a prima facie case, he would still lose.

DaimlerChrysler presented a non-discriminatory reason for

Herron’s negative evaluation, namely his volatile behavior

and poor attitude, and Herron failed to show pretext.

Accordingly, the district court correctly granted summary

judgment on Herron’s race discrimination claims.

B. Retaliation

We next consider Herron’s retaliation claim. Herron claims

that DaimlerChrysler retaliated in various ways after he com-

plained in 1999 to Workforce Diversity and in 2000 to the

EEOC.

Herron chose to proceed before this court using the direct

method of proving retaliation under Title VII and Section 1981.

Under this method, Herron must show: (1) a statutorily pro-

tected activity; (2) an adverse employment action taken by

the employer; and (3) a causal connection between the two.

Davis v. Con-Way Transportation Central Express, Inc., 368 F.3d

776, 786 (7th Cir. 2004).

Turning first to the claimed 1999 retaliation, Daimler-

Chrysler does not challenge that Herron’s complaint to

Workforce Diversity was a protected activity, but claims that

Herron failed to present evidence of an adverse action. Herron

points to several alleged adverse employment actions: (1) a

two-month delay by DaimlerChrysler in the payment of

certain overtime; (2) his transfers between various depart-

ments and shifts; (3) DaimlerChrysler’s refusal to pay him

for his absence on January 13-14, 1999; and (4) Schaefer’s

reduction of Herron’s rating in the 1998 evaluation to the

Contributor level.

12 No. 03-2802

To demonstrate an adverse employment action, “an em-

ployee must be able to show a quantitative or qualitative

change in the terms or conditions of employment.” Haywood

v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 323 F.3d 524, 532 (7th Cir. 2003). The

first three allegations are minor annoyances, not matters

which typically involve adverse employment actions. A short

delay in overtime payment is an inconvenience, as are trans-

fers without any reduction in pay or status. See id. (“mere

unhappiness and inconvenience are not actionable under

Title VII”); Sitar v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 344 F.3d 720, 727 (7th

Cir. 2004) (“job transfers . . . that lead to significantly diminished

responsibilities and substantially changed working conditions can

be retaliatory actions”) (emphasis added). Further, Daimler-

Chrysler’s refusal to pay Herron for his brief absence in

January 1999 when he left after a verbal confrontation with

his supervisors did not constitute an adverse employment

action. This non-payment during his disputed absence did

not work a quantitative or qualitative change in the condi-

tions of his employment. See Fyfe v. City of Fort Wayne, 241

F.3d 597, 602 (7th Cir. 2001) (refusal to reimburse expenses

for unapproved, but work-related, seminar was not a ma-

terially adverse action); Rhodes v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 359

F.3d 498, 505 (7th Cir. 2004) (in Title VII race discrimination

context, the loss of one day of wages was not substantial

enough to qualify as an adverse employment action).

Herron’s remaining claim, relating to Schaefer’s reduction

of his 1998 appraisal rating, fails under the causal connection

prong of the analysis. Herron asserts that his 1998 appraisal

was lowered in response to January 1999 complaints to

Workforce Diversity. This is a non-starter, as unchallenged

company records indicated that his appraisal was lowered

to the Contributor level as of December 7, 1998, more than

a month before any complaints. “It is axiomatic that a plaintiff

engage in statutorily protected activity before an employer

No. 03-2802 13

can retaliate against her for engaging in statutorily protected

activity.” Durkin v. City of Chicago, 341 F.3d 606, 614-15 (7th

Cir. 2003).

Herron’s claim of retaliation relating to the 2000 EEOC

complaints also runs aground on causal connection. Herron

claims that he received a Development Needed rating in his

1999 appraisal in response to his February and April of 2000

EEOC complaints. Undisputed KTP records, however, show

that Morrow and Craig completed the appraisal and Hall

approved it by November 6, 1999. As the appraisal came

well before the complaints, the EEOC complaints could not

have resulted in the supposed retaliation. Herron cannot

establish retaliation under Title VII, and the district court

properly granted DaimlerChrysler summary judgment on

this claim.

C. Racial Harassment

Herron next contends that he suffered racial harassment

due to the hostile work environment at KTP. To succeed on

his racial harassment claim, Herron has to show that: “(1) he

was subject to unwelcome harassment; (2) the harassment

was based on his race; (3) the harassment unreasonably in-

terfered with his work performance by creating an intimidat-

ing, hostile, or offensive working environment that seriously

affected his psychological well-being; and (4) there is a basis

for employer liability.” Hrobowski v. Worthington Steel Co., 358

F.3d 473, 476 (7th Cir. 2004). Further, Herron must establish

that the objectionable environment was both subjectively

and objectively offensive. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,

524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998). “Another method of framing this

issue, as we have done in some of our opinions, is to ask

whether the harassing words or conduct were ‘severe or per-

vasive,’ although the substance of the inquiry is the same

either way.” Hrobowski, 358 F.3d at 476.

14 No. 03-2802

Herron builds his hostile work environment claim largely

on the same allegations that powered his racial discrimina-

tion and retaliation claims. However, Herron offers no evi-

dence that the alleged harassment was based on his race. In

his brief before this court, Herron merely states that, while

he suffered from a campaign of racial harassment, “this is

not the classic racial harassment case . . . .” That is true, but

not in the way that Herron meant it; this case involves no

racial component at all. Herron points to a number of prob-

lems he experienced at KTP and suggests they were racially

based because white supervisors did not have the same prob-

lems. Herron does not show any connection between these

occurrences and his race. His problems were not related to

his race—they were related to him. The fact that he is a

member of a protected class does not transform them. This

alone dooms his racial harassment claim.

Moreover, the allegations simply do not rise to actionable

harassment. When deciding whether a hostile environment

exists for racial harassment purposes, this court must eval-

uate the totality of the circumstances, including the frequency

of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is

physically threatening or humiliating or a mere offensive

utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an

employee’s work performance. See National R.R. Passenger

Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116 (2002). Herron’s allegations

do not place him in any of the multiple levels of workplace

trauma that would establish actionable harassment. See

Rogers, 320 F.3d at 752 (quoting Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l

Co., 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 1994)) (“the workplace that is ac-

tionable is the one that is hellish”). Here he complains about

transfers, a late overtime payment, his salary, and difficulties

with managers. This is normal workplace friction. Objec-

tively, the treatment Herron “suffered” at KTP was neither

severe nor pervasive enough to constitute harassment in-

terfering with his work performance.

No. 03-2802 15

D. Constructive Discharge

Herron’s final claim is that he suffered a constructive dis-

2

charge. In order to show that a hostile work environment

resulted in a constructive discharge, Herron “must not only

demonstrate that a hostile work environment existed but

also that the abusive working environment was so intolera-

ble that [his] resignation was an appropriate response.”

McPherson v. City of Waukegan, 379 F.3d 430, 440 (7th Cir.

2004). The “working conditions for constructive discharge

must be even more egregious than the high standard for

hostile work environment because . . . an employee is ex-

pected to remain employed while seeking redress.” Id.; Tutman

v. WBBM-TV, Inc./CBS, Inc., 209 F.3d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir.

2000) (quoting Drake v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d

878, 886 (7th Cir. 1998)). Herron was obviously not pleased

with his situation at DaimlerChrysler, but he left voluntarily

several months after filing his last EEOC complaint and

after having secured a comparable job elsewhere. Because

Herron failed to establish a hostile work environment, his

claim for constructive discharge also must fail. Therefore,

2

Before turning to the substance of this claim, we note that

Herron may only proceed on his claim under § 1981. Under Title

VII, a plaintiff must file an EEOC complaint before proceeding

with a federal case and can only pursue those claims “like or

reasonably related to” the allegations contained in the charge. See

Peters, 307 F.3d at 550. Herron’s EEOC charges in February and

April 2000 described racial discrimination, retaliation, and

harassment, not constructive discharge. As the district court found,

the four-month delay between his February EEOC complaint and

his decision to leave was inconsistent with notice of constructive

discharge. Since the charges contained in the EEOC complaint

were not “like or reasonably related to” his EEOC allegations,

Herron cannot proceed under Title VII on a constructive dis-

charge claim.

16 No. 03-2802

the district court properly granted DaimlerChrysler sum-

mary judgment on this claim as well.

CONCLUSION

Gary Herron was an employee who was able to do some

aspects of his job quite well. Unfortunately, he also was an

employee whose interaction with his subordinates, peers,

and supervisors was unacceptable. It was Herron’s confron-

tational and disrespectful attitude, and not his race, that

created his problems at DaimlerChrysler. Because Herron

failed to present sufficient evidence of race discrimination,

retaliation, race harassment, or constructive discharge, the

district court properly granted DaimlerChrysler summary

judgment. For these and the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.

A true Copy:

Teste:

_____________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

USCA-02-C-0072—11-3-04