Opinion

Southwell Investments Group, III v. Indwell Resources, Inc., Chief Operating Company, Pan American Energy, LLC and Bill Wood, Individually

Court
Texas Court of Appeals, 14th District (Houston)
Filed
Apr 8, 2010
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 39.7%

affirming trial court’s denial of motion to reinstate when evidence supported appellant’s lack of diligence in prosecuting her case

How later courts described this case

  • affirming trial court’s denial of motion to reinstate when evidence supported appellant’s lack of diligence in prosecuting her case

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion

filed April 8, 2010.

In

The

Fourteenth

Court of Appeals

NO. 14-08-00695-CV

Southwell

Investments Group, III , Appellant

v.

Indwell

Resources, Inc., Chief Operating Company, Pan American Energy, LLC and Bill

Wood, Individually, Appellees

On Appeal from

the 506th District Court

Waller County, Texas

Trial Court

Cause No. 04-11-17587

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant

Southwell Investments Group, III (“Southwell”) contends the trial court abused

its discretion by dismissing Southwell’s case for want of prosecution, failing

to hold an oral hearing on its motion to reinstate, and denying its motion to

reinstate. We affirm.

I

On

November 10, 2004, Southwell filed suit against appellees Indwell Resources,

Inc. (“Indwell”) and Bill Wood, as well as Chief Operating Company (“Chief”)

and Pan American Energy, LLC (“Pan American”), for breach of contract, fraud,

and other claims in connection with an oil, gas, and mineral lease in Waller

County. Southwell served three of the four defendants by certified mail, but

Pan American’s citation was returned. [1]

Indwell and Wood answered, but Chief did not. In 2006, Southwell’s counsel

filed a notice of change of address. Southwell did not initiate any discovery,

request a trial setting or entry of a scheduling order, seek a default judgment

against Chief, or take any other action in the case.

On

April 9, 2008, after the case had been transferred to a another court, the

trial court issued a notice of intent to dismiss the case for want of

prosecution on June 24, 2008, if a motion to retain was not timely filed. On

June 2, 2008, Southwell filed a motion to substitute counsel and to retain the

case on the docket. After initially granting both motions, the trial court

vacated the retention order and dismissed the case for want of prosecution on

June 24, 2008.

On

June 30, 2008, Southwell filed a motion to set aside the dismissal or in the

alternative for a new trial. Southwell gave notice to Indwell, Wood, and Pan

American that its motion would be submitted to the court for consideration and

ruling without an oral hearing. On July 21, 2008, the trial court denied

Southwell’s motion to set aside the dismissal. By a separate order, the trial

court also denied Southwell’s motion for a new trial.

II

A

In

its third issue, Southwell contends that the trial court abused its discretion

by denying its motion to retain the case. A trial court’s power to dismiss a

case for want of prosecution stems from two sources: (1) Texas Rule of Civil Procedure

165a, entitled “Dismissal for Want of Prosecution”; and (2) the court’s

inherent authority. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 165a; Villarreal v. San

Antonio Truck & Equip. , 994 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex. 1999). Rule 165a

provides for a dismissal in cases in which a plaintiff fails to appear for any

scheduled hearing, or when the case is not disposed of within the time periods set

by the Texas Supreme Court. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 165a(1)–(2). In addition, under the common law, the trial court has the

inherent power to dismiss independently of the rules of procedure when a

plaintiff fails to prosecute its case with due diligence. Villarreal,

994 S.W.2d at 630 . Southwell contends Rule 165a(1)

does not apply because it did not fail to attend any hearing, and Rule 165a(2)

does not apply because neither the trial court’s dismissal order nor the

appellees’ response in opposition to Southwell’s motion to retain mentions Rule

165a(2) as a basis for the dismissal. Therefore, Southwell urges, the only

applicable basis for dismissing the case is the trial court’s inherent authority

to dismiss a case that has not been prosecuted with due diligence. Because we

can affirm on the basis of inherent authority, we need not consider the other

possible bases for dismissal.

Factors generally considered by the trial court before

dismissing a case include: (1) the length of time the case has been on file;

(2) the extent of activity in the case; (3) whether a trial setting was

requested; and (4) the existence of reasonable excuses for the delay. Keough

v. Cyrus USA, Inc. , 204 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006,

pet. denied); Bilnoski v. Pizza Inn, Inc ., 858

S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ). We must

look to the record in its entirety, and we will reverse the trial court only if

that court clearly abused its discretion. Bilnoski , 858 S.W.2d at 58 .

Southwell

admits that the case was on file for more than three years and that little

activity occurred on the case during that time. Southwell also admits that

there was a delay in the prosecution of the case. Additionally, it is

undisputed that Southwell never initiated any discovery or requested a trial

setting, it did not seek a default judgment against Chief, and it made no

further attempt to serve Pan American until after the court had issued its

notice of intent to dismiss. Southwell’s explanation below for this failure to

prosecute its case is that it expected the trial court to set the case for

trial or issue a docket-control order, but “[f]or some unexplainable reason

neither was done.” Southwell does not explain how the absence of a scheduling

order shows that it exercised diligence in prosecuting its case. Nor does

Southwell explain why it did not request the trial court to enter a docket-control

order before the court issued its notice of intent to dismiss for want of

prosecution.

Southwell

also points out that (1) its counsel updated the court with its new firm name

and address in 2006, (2) its counsel was mistaken as to how the original court

handled its trial docket, (3) its representative sold his business and failed

to give his counsel new contact information, (4) Southwell did not intend to

conduct any discovery, (5) it secured new counsel who moved to substitute and

announced ready for trial, (6) Southwell filed a motion to retain, (7) the

trial court initially issued a docket-control order setting the case for trial,

(8) Southwell requested a jury trial in its original petition, (9) it did not

fail to appear for any hearings or trial, and (10) it timely filed a motion to

reinstate the case.

But

Southwell’s limited contact with the court for over three and one-half years

and the loss of contact between Southwell and its counsel during that time

likewise do not provide a reasonable explanation for Southwell’s lack of

diligence in prosecuting the case. Southwell knew that it had filed a lawsuit,

but took no steps to stay in contact with its

attorney. Southwell also did not obtain new counsel until after the trial

court sent out its notice of intent to dismiss for want of prosecution.

Similarly, many of the other actions it points to were taken only after the

trial court’s notice of its intent to dismiss in an effort to retain the case

on the trial court’s docket. As for requesting a jury in its original

petition, Southwell fails to explain why it did not pay a jury fee until after

the case was dismissed. Considering the entire history of the case, including

the length of time it was on file, the lack of activity, the lack of discovery,

and the failure to request a docket-control order or a trial setting for over

three and one-half years, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion

by dismissing Southwell’s case for want of prosecution. See Frenzel v.

Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. , 780 S.W.2d 844, 845 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 1998, no writ) (holding failure to initiate discovery during forty-one

months case was on docket clearly constituted lack of due diligence); City

of Houston v. Robinson , 837 S.W.2d 262, 265 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

1992, no writ) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion when there was

no activity on case for a year and appellants merely asserted that they wished

to pursue their case).

Southwell

also argues that it announced ready for trial and by dismissing the case

Southwell was prevented from having its day in court and that amounts to a

“drop-dead” sanction. The record does not support Southwell’s argument that the

dismissal of its case amounted to a death-penalty sanction. First, Southwell

cites no authorities and makes no argument to support this assertion;

therefore, it is waived. See Nyugen v. Kosnoski , 93 S.W.3d 186, 188

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.). Second, the trial court’s

order was clearly a dismissal for want of prosecution, and did not implicate

the considerations applied to death-penalty sanctions for discovery abuse as

stated in TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell , 811 S.W.2d 913 ,

917–18 (Tex. 1991). Third, our supreme court has declined to apply the TransAmerican

analysis when it found no abuse of discretion in dismissing the case for want

of prosecution. See MacGregor v. Rich , 941 S.W.2d 74, 75 (Tex. 1997)

(per curiam).

We

therefore overrule Southwell’s third issue.

B

In

its first issue, Southwell contends the trial court abused its discretion by

not granting an oral hearing on Southwell’s motion to reinstate. Southwell

cites Cabrera v. Cedarapids, Inc. , 834 S.W.2d 615, 618 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992), writ denied , 847 S.W.2d 247 (Tex.

1993), in which this court held that the trial court did not err in failing to

set a hearing on a motion to reinstate when the movant did not request a

hearing.

Southwell

contends it requested an oral hearing and the appellees requested a submission

date. The record, however, does not support Southwell’s contention. Although

Southwell submitted a proposed order for an oral hearing along with its motion

to set aside the dismissal, the blanks for the date and time were not filled

in. Further, Southwell itself filed a “Notice of Submission” informing the

appellees that its motion would be submitted to the trial court for

consideration and ruling without an oral hearing within ten days after the

notice was filed. The record does not show that Southwell ever objected to

submitting the motion without an oral hearing, nor does it show that the trial

court denied a request from Southwell for an oral hearing.

Even

presuming for the sake of argument that the trial court erred in failing to set

a hearing, Southwell still would not be entitled to relief. A party may not

lead a trial court into error and then complain about it on appeal. Kelly

v. Cunningham , 848 S.W.2d 370, 371 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no

writ). When a movant sets a motion to reinstate on the trial court’s

submission docket, effectively requesting the court to rule without conducting

an oral hearing, the movant is estopped from complaining on appeal that the

trial court erred in ruling on the motion to reinstate without conducting an

oral hearing. Solomon v. Parkside Med. Servs. Corp. , 882 S.W.2d 492–93

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied); see also Keough , 204

S.W.3d at 6 n.3 (“ Before trial court error can be

found in the failure to set a hearing on a motion to reinstate, the movant must

request a hearing.”).

We therefore overrule Southwell’s first issue.

C

In

its second issue, Southwell contends the trial court abused its discretion by

denying Southwell’s motion to reinstate as required by Texas Rule of Civil

Procedure 165a. We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to reinstate

for abuse of discretion. Keough , 204 S.W.3d at 3 .

Initially,

Southwell argues that we should review the court’s denial of its motion to

reinstate by applying the standard set out in Rule 165a(3), regardless of

whether the trial court dismissed the case under Rule 165a or whether it dismissed

the case under its inherent authority. See Cappetta v. Hermes , 222

S.W.3d 160 , 164–67 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.) (en banc) (surveying

split of authority in appellate courts and holding that that Rule 165a(3)

standard applies to all dismissals for want of prosecution, whether rule-based

or inherent-power-based); Brown v. Howeth Invs., Inc. , 820 S.W.2d 900 ,

902–03 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (applying Rule 165a

standard to determine whether trial court abused its discretion in refusing to

reinstate case). Under Rule 165a, the court must reinstate the case if it is

shown that “the failure of the party or his attorney was not intentional or the

result of conscious indifference but was due to an accident or mistake or that

the failure has been otherwise reasonably explained.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 165a(3).

Unlike

the Cappetta and Brown courts, this court has applied a different

standard to review the denial of a motion to reinstate when the trial court

dismisses a case under its inherent authority. We have explained that when a

trial court relies on its inherent authority to dismiss a case and denies a

motion to reinstate, we consider whether the trial court abused its discretion

in determining that the plaintiff did not prosecute its case with due

diligence. See, e.g., Keough , 204 S.W.3d at 4–5; Polk v. Sw.

Crossing Homeowners Ass’n , 165 S.W.3d 89 , 95–97 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2005, pet. denied). On these facts, however, the result would be the

same under either analysis. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

refusing to reinstate Southwell’s case.

In

its motion to reinstate, Southwell attached no evidence, but relied on the

arguments and affidavits presented in support of its motion to retain. On

appeal, Southwell argues that the facts enumerated above negate a finding that

its failure was intentional or the result of conscious indifference. To

support this conclusion, Southwell cites Brown v. Howeth Investments, Inc. ,

820 S.W.2d at 902 . But Brown is distinguishable. In that case, the

court concluded there was nothing in the record to suggest that the plaintiff

intentionally ignored his suit for sixteen months or intentionally failed to

respond to the notice of intent to dismiss, when he had become dissatisfied

with his first lawyer’s failure to prosecute the suit, took steps to retain new

counsel, and had substituted new counsel just after the notice of intent to

dismiss was sent to his first lawyer. See id. at 902 . The court stated

that “the plaintiff should not be precluded from reaching the merits of his

suit because of the unfortunate timing of the notice to substitute.” Id.

Here,

Southwell did not argue below that its lawyer failed to diligently prosecute

the case, and the record does not show that Southwell expressed any

dissatisfaction with its counsel before the trial court issued its notice of

intent to dismiss for want of prosecution. Southwell’s stated reason for

obtaining new counsel was that its first lawyer was unwilling to continue

handling the case on a contingent-fee basis. Moreover, Southwell failed to

keep in contact with its lawyer for over three years, providing some evidence

of its own lack of diligence and conscious indifference. And, unlike the

situation in Brown , Southwell’s motion to substitute counsel was not

filed until two months after the trial court issued its notice of intent to

dismiss. Therefore, Brown does not support a conclusion that the trial

court abused its discretion by refusing to reinstate Southwell’s case.

Other

explanations in Southwell’s motion to reinstate are not supported by the record

or tend to undermine its contention that its failure to prosecute the case was

not intentional or the result of conscious indifference. For example,

Southwell alleged that the case was ready for trial in January 2005, even

though it was filed on November 10, 2004, and the original petition a requested

Level 2 discovery schedule. Southwell also alleged that it intended to

non-suit defendants Chief and Pan American at trial, but it sought to have

citation served on Pan American for a second time on June 18, 2008. Southwell

also does not explain why it did not take a default judgment against Chief

after it was served in November 2004 and did not answer. Further, Southwell

requested a jury trial in its original petition, but it did not pay a jury fee

until June 30, 2008, after the case was dismissed for want of prosecution.

Southwell also attempts to blame the original trial court for not issuing a

scheduling order or setting the case for trial, while at the same time

asserting that it and its counsel “were occupied with other matters” and the

case “dropped through the cracks.”

As

discussed above, on these facts we cannot say the trial court abused its

discretion by dismissing Southwell’s case for want of prosecution. For the

same reasons, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying

Southwell’s motion to reinstate, whether we review its ruling under its

inherent authority or Rule 165a(3). See Keough , 204 S.W.3d at

4–5 (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s

motion to reinstate for failing to diligently prosecute her case); Polk ,

165 S.W.3d at 97 (affirming trial court’s denial of motion to reinstate when

evidence supported appellant’s lack of diligence in prosecuting her case); Ballantyne

v. Johnson , No. 04-08-00185-CV, 2008 WL 5181927 , at *4 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio Dec. 10, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming trial court’s denial of appellant’s

motion for reinstatement under Rule 165a when appellant failed to reset the

case after a continuance and little activity occurred in case for five years); Rad

v. Black , No. 03-07-00574-CV, 2008 WL 2777320 , at *2–8 (Tex. App.—Austin

July 17, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming trial court’s denial of motion to

reinstate under Rule 165a(3) when there had been no filings in case for three

years and eight months, and no further activity occurred after appellant filed

a motion to substitute counsel).

We

therefore overrule Southwell’s second issue.

* * *

Having

overruled Southwell’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Jeffrey

V. Brown

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Yates, Frost,

and Brown

[1]

The record shows that on January 25, 2005, Southwell’s counsel requested a new

citation for service on Pan American, with instructions to return the citation

to him. After the trial court sent its notice of intent to dismiss the case

for want of prosecution in 2008, Southwell’s new counsel attempted to serve Pan

American again, but was unsuccessful.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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