Roberson v. TN

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 05a0072p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

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Plaintiff-Appellant, -

DAVID ROBERSON,

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No. 03-6181

v.

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STATE OF TENNESSEE; EAST TENNESSEE STATE -

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UNIVERSITY; JAMES H. QUILLEN COLLEGE OF

Defendants, -

MEDICINE,

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RONALD FRANKS, M.D.; PAUL STANTON, M.D.,

Defendants-Appellees. -

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Greeneville.

No. 03-00198—J. Ronnie Greer, District Judge.

Argued: September 14, 2004

Decided and Filed: February 15, 2005

Before: SUTTON and COOK, Circuit Judges; ALDRICH, District Judge.*

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COUNSEL

ARGUED: Samuel W. Brown, BECKER, FLEISHMAN, BROWN & KNIGHT, Knoxville,

Tennessee, for Appellant. Brandy M. Gagliano, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Samuel W. Brown, Arthur F. Knight III,

BECKER, FLEISHMAN, BROWN & KNIGHT, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Brandy M.

Gagliano, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees.

*

The Honorable Ann Aldrich, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by

designation.

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No. 03-6181 Roberson v. State of Tennessee, et al. Page 2

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OPINION

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ALDRICH, District Judge. This is a civil rights action, in which plaintiff David Roberson

(“Roberson”) appeals an order dismissing his complaint as untimely. Because the district court

properly applied the applicable statute of limitations, we AFFIRM its decision.

I. Background

Roberson enrolled in the James H. Quillen College of Medicine at East Tennessee State

University (“ETSU”), and matriculated on August 1, 1999. He was expected to graduate in May of

2003. Roberson’s first year at ETSU went better than smoothly, as he was elected student body

president and chosen by the administration to represent ETSU with the Association of American

Medical Colleges (“AAMC”).

During his first year of medical school, Roberson was diagnosed with attention deficit

disorder (“ADD”) and prescribed Ritalin and Adderall by his primary care physician. By his second

fall semester, Roberson’s symptoms were exacerbated by an increased academic workload, as well

as the added pressure of his duties as student body president and AAMC representative. Roberson’s

physician increased his dosage of Adderall in response to the intensifying symptoms.

As his second year examinations approached, Roberson began to feel that, even in increased

dosages, his ADD medication was not sufficiently addressing his symptoms. Roberson therefore

altered his method of taking the medication, cutting his pills in half and ingesting them twice as

frequently. Unbeknownst to Roberson, this method of taking Adderall can induce mania and

amphetamine psychosis.

Roberson’s dispute with ETSU stems from an allegation that he cheated on a take-home

exam for the second year course in “practicing medicine.” Roberson denies any intent to cheat, and

in fact has no recollection of completing the exam, probably due to the onset of amphetamine

psychosis. Roberson was assessed a failing grade on the exam in question, and in January 2001, he

was brought before the College’s Student Promotions Committee.

Roberson now claims that he was not informed of any cheating allegation, but rather that

he was summoned to appear before the Committee to discuss his receipt of a failing grade. He then

alleges that the Committee “found him guilty of an honor code violation” without conducting any

investigation or offering him the opportunity to defend himself. ETSU notes that Roberson was

“placed on a leave of absence” as a result of this ruling. Roberson alleges that, by finding him guilty,

the Student Promotions Committee usurped the authority of the school’s Honor Council, which is

charged with investigating and ruling on violations of ETSU’s honor code.

In fact, the Promotions Committee informed the Honor Council of its “finding” on

January 29, 2001. On February 20, 2001, the Honor Council concurred with the finding, but

expressed an opinion that Roberson’s violation occurred unintentionally, probably as a result of

amphetamine psychosis. The Council found that any disciplinary action exceeding a formal

reprimand would be excessive in Roberson’s case.

Yet Roberson’s leave of absence continued, and he spent the spring and summer of 2001

attempting to get his education back on track. Roberson checked himself into a rehabilitation

program for assessment, and began seeing a psychiatrist. He also began to seek readmission to the

ETSU medical program. Roberson claims that he repeatedly petitioned the medical school

“informally and formally”– and on August 2, 2001, he again met with the Student Promotions

No. 03-6181 Roberson v. State of Tennessee, et al. Page 3

Committee. Roberson alleges that the Committee did not inquire about the honor code violation

during this meeting, but that it denied him readmission from the leave of absence nonetheless.

ETSU did permit Roberson to attend classes during the Spring semester of 2002, pending

another ruling on readmission by the Promotions Committee. However, Roberson was deemed

“unsuitable to enroll” at a Committee meeting of February 14, 2002. Roberson alleges that this time

he was “granted appeal rights, which he utilized.”

Roberson then endeavored to obtain readmission by appealing to Dr. Ronald Franks, Dean

of the ETSU College of Medicine, and the President of ETSU, Dr. Paul Stanton. On April 18, 2002,

Dr. Franks signed a letter denying Roberson’s request, and noting his violation of the school Honor

Code. On May 22, 2002, Dr. Stanton similarly supported the adverse decision of the Promotions

committee.

Roberson filed his complaint in federal court on May 22, 2003. The district court for the

Eastern District of Tennessee dismissed the complaint, holding that it was untimely under the

applicable statute of limitations. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

Roberson’s appeal raises a single issue: whether his complaint was timely filed under the

one-year limitations period applicable to civil rights actions filed in Tennessee under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983.

The Court reviews de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss a complaint under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Kostrzewa v. City of Troy, 247 F.3d 633, 638 (6th Cir. 2001). In

reviewing the ruling below, the panel must treat all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true.

The panel must reverse the dismissal unless “it appears beyond doubt that [Roberson] can prove no

set of facts” under which his complaint was timely filed. Id.

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations, the Court must look

to state law to determine the appropriate limitations period. Sharpe v. Cureton, 319 F.3d 259, 266

(6th Cir. 2003); Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984). Tennessee provides for a one-

year limitations period for civil rights actions under § 1983. See TENN.CODE ANN. § 28-3-104(a)(3)

(2004); Hughes v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 F.3d 543, 547 (6th Cir. 2000), citing Berndt v. Tennessee,

796 F.2d 879, 883 (6th Cir. 1986).

The date on which the limitations period began is not counted in computing the length of

time elapsed; thus Roberson’s claim was timely if the period began to run on or before May 22,

2002. Roberson’s complaint was untimely if the period began on any date prior to that. In

determining when the limitations period began, the Court must refer to federal law. Sharpe, 319 F.3d

at 266; Sevier, 742 F.2d at 272.

In Sevier, the Sixth Circuit articulated a familiar standard. “The statute of limitations

commences to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis

of his action. A plaintiff has reason to know of his injury when he should have discovered it through

the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Id. at 273 (citations omitted). Courts have taken a common-

sense approach to this task, inquiring as “to what event should have alerted the typical lay person

to protect his or her rights.” Hughes, 215 F.3d at 548 (quoting Dixon v. Anderson, 928 F.2d 212, 215

(6th Cir. 1991)).

The district court was correct in concluding that the typical lay person would have been

alerted as to the need to protect his rights before May 22, 2002. While Roberson argues that the

Student Promotions Committee had no authority to issue a final decision on his case, and therefore

No. 03-6181 Roberson v. State of Tennessee, et al. Page 4

that he had not “exhausted his administrative remedies” until Dr. Stanton issued his letter, it is clear

that a typical lay person would have recognized the need to take legal action considerably earlier

in the process.

Specifically, the district court determined the “summer of 2001” to be the latest date on

which the limitations period could begin. It reasoned that the decisions of the Student Promotions

Committee amounted to a final and formal dismissal from school, and that Roberson’s efforts to

informally petition various officials about reinstatement demonstrate an awareness that any alleged

infringement of his rights had already occurred.

In response, Roberson seeks to downplay the involvement and authority of the Promotions

Committee, arguing at length that the Committee can only “recommend” dismissal, and not order

it. Roberson contends that Dr. Franks’s letter of April 18, 2002, operated as an official acceptance

of the Committee’s “recommendation,” and that Roberson was not put on notice of the need to

protect his rights until Dr. Stanton “upheld” this acceptance. In support of these claims, Roberson

cites several passages from the ETSU handbook in which the words “recommend” or

“recommendation” are used in reference to the functioning of the Promotions Committee.

Roberson’s argument is misplaced. It was not necessary, as he argues, for a decision of the

school administration to “conver[t] a mere dismissal recommendation into a concrete expulsion” for

Roberson to be aware of the need to protect his rights. Roberson acknowledges that his leave of

absence was involuntary, and alleges that he was denied his right to appeal the decision placing him

on leave. Whether this decision was made by the Promotions Committee (of right or by usurpation)

or by a school official adopting the Committee’s “recommendation” is of no import1. The fact

remains that Roberson was aware of any alleged denial of his rights by the summer of 2001.

While Roberson was undoubtedly wise to utilize the appellate process provided to him

following the denial of his plea for reinstatement in 2002, it is clear that his allegations under §1983

must include a discrete deprivation of rights finalized before this second process even began. As the

Supreme Court explained in a similar (educational) setting, “[t]he grievance procedure, by its nature,

is a remedy for a prior decision, not an opportunity to influence that decision before it is

made.”Delaware State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 261 (1980)(emphasis in original). Cf. Morse v.

Univ. of Vermont, 973 F.2d 122, 125 (2nd Cir. 1992)(“The fact that UVM allowed appellant to

continue to take courses and undertook an internal administrative review of its allegedly

discriminatory decision has no effect on when the statute of limitations period begins to run.”);

Kessler v. Bd. of Regents, 738 F.2d 751, 754 (6th Cir. 1984)(similar result in termination from

employment context).

The district court did not err in selecting “the summer of 2001” as the date for the relevant

decision. It is clear from the record2, as well as from Roberson’s own statements, that he was

1

It bears noting, however, that while the Quillen College of Medicine's Student Handbook refers to Committee

“recommendations” as being “forwarded” to the dean, it does not specify whether the dean is required to take any action

in order to implement the actions “recommended.” Handbook at 40; Joint Appendix at 74.

2

The Student Handbook, though not otherwise a model of administrative clarity, is explicit in its classification

of students “whose behavior is not in keeping with the standards of the medical profession” as subject to dismissal, a

sanction named among the subcategories of “students whose registration is discontinued.” Handbook 39-40; JA 73-74.

Students such as Roberson, who are dismissed without “a specified date of expected re-enrollment,” must receive

approval of the Student Promotions Committee to return to medical studies.” Id. at 74 (emphasis added).

Roberson’s letter writing clearly occurred after he was dismissed, and after the Committee denied his request

for re-admission. Under the language of the handbook, the letters to Drs. Frank and Stanton would be classified as “an

appeal to other authorities,” a step which “is available” following adverse Committee action and denial of

reconsideration. Id. at 75.

No. 03-6181 Roberson v. State of Tennessee, et al. Page 5

dismissed from the ETSU medical program in February of 2001, and that the Student Promotions

Committee denied him admission in August of 2001. Nor did the court err in construing Roberson’s

efforts following the execution of that decision (including “informal” petitions for reinstatement,

as well as the letters to Dr. Franks and Dr. Stanton) as efforts at achieving a post hoc remedy.

A reasonable lay person would have acted to protect his rights following the August decision,

at the very latest. Because Roberson did not file his complaint until May 22, 2003, the district court

correctly dismissed the action as untimely.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court dismissing Roberson’s complaint

is AFFIRMED.