Cone v. Bell

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Cone v. Bell No. 99-5279

ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0064P (6th Cir.)

File Name: 04a0064p.06 Appellant. Jennifer L. Smith, Tonya G. Miner, OFFICE OF

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Nashville, Tennessee, for

Appellee.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

RYAN, J., delivered the opinion of the court. MERRITT,

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT J. (pp. 25-36), delivered a separate concurring opinion.

_________________ NORRIS, J. (pp. 37-38), delivered a separate dissenting

opinion.

GARY BRADFORD CONE, X

Petitioner-Appellant, - _________________

-

- No. 99-5279 OPINION

v. - _________________

>

, RYAN, Circuit Judge. Gary Bradford Cone was sentenced

RICKY BELL, Warden, - to death in a Tennessee state court for a double murder of an

Respondent-Appellee. - elderly couple and his conviction and death sentence were

N affirmed by the Tennessee Supreme Court.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Tennessee at Memphis. On this appeal from the district court’s denial of Cone’s

No. 97-02312—Jon Phipps McCalla, District Judge. petition for habeas corpus relief, we are asked to decide

Argued: September 10, 2003 • Whether Cone was sentenced to death in violation of

the prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment of

Decided and Filed: March 1, 2004 the Eighth Amendment of the United States

Constitution.

Before: MERRITT, RYAN, and NORRIS, Circuit Judges. Before we may reach that question, however, we must

_________________ resolve two rather complex and interrelated questions of state

procedural law.

COUNSEL

• The first, is whether, under Tennessee law, the state

ARGUED: Paul R. Bottei, FEDERAL PUBLIC supreme court implicitly reviews death penalty

DEFENDER’S OFFICE, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. sentences for arbitrariness, even in cases in which the

Jennifer L. Smith, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY issue is not raised explicitly.

GENERAL, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee.

ON BRIEF: Paul R. Bottei, FEDERAL PUBLIC • The second, is whether the petitioner procedurally

DEFENDER’S OFFICE, Nashville, Tennessee, Robert L. defaulted, in the state court, the Eighth Amendment

Hutton, GLANKLER BROWN, Memphis, Tennessee, for issue he asks us to decide.

1

No. 99-5279 Cone v. Bell 3 4 Cone v. Bell No. 99-5279

Our answer to the first state law question is yes, and to the § 39-13-204(i) (2003)). In Cone’s case the jury found four

second, it is no. Given our resolution of these issues, we are aggravating factors, which were defined in the statute as

authorized to reach the Eighth Amendment issue, for which follows:

the petitioner has brought this appeal. As to that issue, we

hold that petitioner Cone’s death sentence must be vacated (2) The defendant was previously convicted of one or

because one of the statutory aggravating circumstances the more felonies, other than the present charge, which

jury relied upon in imposing the death sentence—that the involve the use or threat of violence to the person.

murders were “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel”—is

unconstitutionally vague, and therefore, violates the Eighth (3) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of

Amendment. death to two or more persons, other than the victim

murdered, during his act of murder.

I.

....

Cone was sentenced to death in a Tennessee court in 1982

following his conviction for the brutal murders of an elderly (5) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or

couple, Shipley and Cleopatra Todd. The facts of the case are cruel in that it involved torture or depravity of mind.

fully detailed in our previous decision in Cone v. Bell, 243

F.3d 961 (6th Cir. 2001), rev’d, 535 U.S. 685 (2002), and (6) The murder was committed for the purpose of

need not be recounted here. It is necessary, however, to detail avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest

the procedural history of the case in order to explain why we or prosecution of the defendant or another.

have the case on appeal for a second time and to explain the

basis for the State’s argument that Cone has procedurally Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2404(i) (1981). In its review of the

defaulted the Eighth Amendment issue he now asks us to jury’s findings, the Tennessee Supreme Court first noted that

decide. the jury had failed to find one aggravating factor, that the

crime was committed in the course of committing another

Cone challenged his conviction and sentence on direct felony (felony-murder), even though the evidence clearly

review in the Tennessee Supreme Court, which conducted a would have supported it. State v. Cone, 665 S.W.2d at 94.

mandatory death penalty review pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 39-2-205 (1982) (current version at Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- The court then reviewed the four aggravators the jury did

13-206 (2003)). State v. Cone, 665 S.W.2d 87 (Tenn. 1984). find, and concluded (1) that the evidence supported the

The Tennessee court affirmed Cone’s murder convictions, finding that Cone had been convicted previously of one or

and then, as it was required to do, considered the validity of more felonies involving violence, id.; (2) that the evidence

the aggravating circumstances relied on by the jury in supported the finding that the murders were “especially

imposing the death penalty. Id. at 94-96. Under Tennessee heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that they involved torture or

law as it existed at the time of Cone’s conviction, a jury could depravity of mind,” id. at 94-95; (3) that the evidence

impose the death penalty only if it found that the prosecution supported the finding that the murders were committed for the

had proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of at purpose of preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution, id. at 95;

least one of twelve aggravating factors. Tenn. Code Ann. and (4) that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s

§ 39-2404(i) (1981) (current version at Tenn. Code Ann. affirmative finding that the petitioner “‘knowingly created a

No. 99-5279 Cone v. Bell 5 6 Cone v. Bell No. 99-5279

great risk of death to two (2) or more persons, other than the States Supreme Court denied Cone’s petition for a writ of

victim murdered, during [the] act of murder,’” id. (citation certiorari.

omitted). But the court found this error to be “harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt” in light of the three other Cone then filed a motion in federal district court to stay his

aggravating circumstances found by the jury and the court’s execution. The district court granted the stay and Cone filed

conclusion that the jurors should have found, although they a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

did not, the additional aggravator, that the petitioner was The district court denied the § 2254 petition and lifted the

guilty of felony-murder. Id. Accordingly, the court affirmed stay of execution. We then granted Cone's motion for a

Cone’s death sentence. The constitutionality of the jury’s certificate of appealability.

finding that the murders were “especially heinous, atrocious,

or cruel,” which we hereafter refer to as the “HAC” After briefing and oral argument, we granted Cone’s

aggravator, is a fundamental issue in this case. habeas petition with respect to his death sentence because we

thought he had been unconstitutionally denied the effective

Cone filed his first state post-conviction petition in the state assistance of counsel at sentencing. We found it unnecessary

trial court on June 22, 1984, attacking his conviction and to decide several of Cone’s other sentencing claims, including

death sentence. He alleged numerous violations of his rights his “Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment

under the United States Constitution including prosecutorial argument and his argument concerning the application of

misconduct and the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. aggravating circumstances.” Cone, 243 F.3d at 975. In Bell

The trial court held a hearing and denied Cone’s petition. The v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002), the U.S. Supreme Court

Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial and reversed our decision on the ineffective assistance of counsel

the Tennessee Supreme Court declined Cone’s request to issue and remanded to this court for further proceedings,

appeal. which we understand to mean consideration of the sentencing

issues that Cone raised and we did not reach in our previous

Approximately five years later, in June 1989, Cone filed a decision.

second state post-conviction petition, followed by several

amendments. In this second petition, Cone alleged numerous II.

constitutional violations including, for the first time, an

Eighth Amendment claim that the language of the HAC “An appellate court reviews a district court’s decision to

aggravator considered by the jury in the sentencing phase was deny or grant a writ of habeas corpus de novo, but it reviews

unconstitutionally vague. The trial court dismissed the the district court’s factual findings only for clear error.”

second petition as barred by the successive petition Barker v. Yukins, 199 F.3d 867, 870 (6th Cir. 1999).

restrictions of Tennessee’s post-conviction statute, Tenn.

Code Ann. § 40-30-111 (1990) (since repealed), holding that III.

all the grounds raised in the second petition were barred

because they either had been previously determined or were Initially, we must take up the State’s argument that Cone’s

waived. This judgment was affirmed by the Tennessee Court Eighth Amendment claim that the HAC aggravating factor

of Criminal Appeals, and the Tennessee Supreme Court was unconstitutionally vague, first raised in his second

denied an application for permission to appeal. The United petition for post-conviction relief, had been procedurally

defaulted. We address this issue first because, as a general

No. 99-5279 Cone v. Bell 7 8 Cone v. Bell No. 99-5279

rule, on habeas review, federal courts may not consider In death penalty cases the Tennessee Supreme Court is

procedurally defaulted claims. Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d required to conduct a mandatory death penalty review to

542, 549-50 (6th Cir. 2000). A claim is procedurally determine whether:

defaulted if: (1) the petitioner failed to comply with an

applicable state procedural rule; (2) the state courts actually (1) The sentence of death was imposed in any

enforced the procedural rule; and (3) the state courts’ finding arbitrary fashion;

of noncompliance is an adequate and independent state

ground for denying relief on the federal constitutional claim. (2) The evidence supports the jury’s findings of a

Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986). statutory aggravating circumstance or statutory

aggravating circumstances;

Under Tennessee law at the time of Cone’s conviction,

grounds for relief that had been previously determined or (3) The evidence supports the jury’s finding of the

waived were not cognizable in a state post-conviction action. absence of any mitigating circumstances sufficiently

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-111 (since repealed). In its substantial to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or

consideration on appeal of the denial of Cone’s second post- circumstances so found; and

conviction petition, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals

refused to address Cone’s constitutional challenge to the HAC (4) The sentence of death is excessive or

aggravator because, according to the court, it had been either disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,

previously determined or waived. Cone v. State, 927 S.W.2d considering both the nature of the crime and the

579, 582 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Of these two possibilities, defendant.

“previously determined” or “waived,” we must determine

which one actually describes the status of Cone’s Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-205(c) (1982) (emphasis added)

constitutional claim in the state courts. If Cone waived his (current version at Tenn. Code. Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1)

claim, then such waiver will constitute a procedural default (2003)).

and will serve as an adequate and independent state ground Tennessee responds that Cone’s “necessarily reviewed”

barring habeas review in this court. If Cone’s claim was claim, also known as “implicit review,” proves too much,

previously determined, then we must decide whether the state since it would eviscerate the procedural default doctrine with

courts’ determination “resulted in a decision that was contrary respect to all constitutional claims.

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court The U.S. Courts of Appeals are divided on whether these

of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (West Supp. state mandatory review statutes create an implicit review of

2003). constitutional challenges not explicitly raised. The Fourth,

Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits all have rejected the implicit

Cone argues that he did not procedurally default on his review argument. See Mu’min v. Pruett, 125 F.3d 192, 197

Eighth Amendment vagueness challenge to the HAC (4th Cir. 1997); Nave v. Delo, 62 F.3d 1024, 1039 (8th Cir.

aggravating factor, because the Tennessee Supreme Court 1995); Julius v. Johnson, 840 F.2d 1533, 1546 (11th Cir.

“necessarily reviewed” the claim as part of its mandatory 1988). The Ninth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in

death penalty review. an Idaho death penalty case, albeit in dicta. See Beam v.

No. 99-5279 Cone v. Bell 9 10 Cone v. Bell No. 99-5279

Paskett, 3 F.3d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1993), overruled on considered the constitutionality of the HAC aggravator in this

other grounds by Lambright v. Stewart, 191 F.3d 1181 (9th case, and Cone did not procedurally default on the claim.

Cir. 1999).

It is important to frame this preliminary question of state

This court, in Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320 (6th Cir. 1998), in law carefully. We understand the question to be whether it is

dicta, expressed discomfort with the implicit review argument the law in Tennessee that in all capital punishment cases, the

in the context of a challenge to jury instructions on unanimity Tennessee Supreme Court reviews the sentencing proceedings

in sentencing in a death penalty case in a Tennessee court. Id. to ensure that the jurors have not imposed the death penalty

at 336. We stated that the argument that “the [Tennessee] “in any arbitrary fashion,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-205(c)

supreme court has to review significant errors, whether or not (1982), even in cases in which the issue is not raised on direct

they were raised by the defendant,” is “too broad, as it would review.

eliminate the entire doctrine of procedural bar in Tennessee

in capital cases.” Id. Despite these reservations, we Just three years ago, in State v. West, 19 S.W.3d 753 (Tenn.

recognized in Coe that Tennessee courts had been moderately 2000), the Tennessee Supreme Court considered whether a

receptive to the implicit review theory. Id. For example, in defendant could raise an issue in his state post-conviction

State v. Martin, 702 S.W.2d 560 (Tenn. 1985), overruled on petition that he had not raised on direct review. Id. at 754.

other grounds by State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530 (1992), the The court prefaced its discussion as follows:

Tennessee Supreme Court stated that it was “required by

statute to review the sentence and to consider significant In this appeal of a post-conviction proceeding, . . . the

errors whether or not called to the attention of the trial court.” appellant[] raises for the first time the issue whether

Id. at 564 (emphasis added). We explained in Coe that, based evidence adduced at the sentencing phase of his trial was

on Martin, a procedural default could not arise under sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that he

Tennessee law when a capital defendant raised an issue on committed two murders for the purpose of avoiding

appeal which he had failed to preserve properly during trial. arrest or prosecution. Although [the appellant] casts the

Coe, 161 F.3d at 336. Thus, in Coe, we partially adopted the issue as concerning the evidentiary sufficiency of the

implicit review theory, but only to the extent of issues that (i)(6) aggravating circumstance, we think his grievance

were explicitly raised on appeal, even though not properly involves instead the constitutional issue of whether the

preserved in the trial court. Of course, unlike Coe, Cone’s aggravating circumstance narrows the class of death

unconstitutional HAC aggravator issue was not explicitly eligible offenders. He says that it does not, and because

raised either in the trial court or on direct review in the it does not, he contends that it violates the Eighth

Tennessee Supreme Court. Amendment.

The cases that divide the circuits on the implicit review Id. (emphasis added). The court’s reference to “narrow[ing]

theory agree on one point: “The scope of the state court’s the class of death eligible offenders” is responsive to the rule

mandatory review is, ultimately, a question of state law.” announced in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983), that in

Nave, 62 F.3d at 1039. Accordingly, if Tennessee construes capital punishment cases, the “aggravating circumstance must

its mandatory review statute to encompass constitutional genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death

issues not explicitly raised on direct review, then the penalty” in order to ensure that the jury’s discretion in

Tennessee Supreme Court must be deemed to have imposing the death sentence is “adequately . . . channel[ed].”

No. 99-5279 Cone v. Bell 11 12 Cone v. Bell No. 99-5279

Id. at 877. Later Supreme Court cases have characterized Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).

death sentences imposed without appropriately narrowing

instructions as having been imposed arbitrarily and upon Although West appears to stand alone as direct support for

criteria, i.e., statutory aggravating factors, whose language is the implicit review argument, other Tennessee Supreme Court

unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., Tuilaepa v. California, cases lend moderate support. In Martin, discussed above, the

512 U.S. 967, 974-75 (1994); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. court held that it was “required by statute to review the

333, 367 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring). sentence and to consider significant errors whether or not

called to the attention of the trial court.” 702 S.W.2d at 564

The emphasized language in West is significant because the (emphasis added). Likewise, in State v. Duncan, 698 S.W.2d

court characterized the issue as an Eighth Amendment 63 (Tenn. 1985), the court stated: “in cases where the

vagueness challenge to a statutory aggravating factor, the defendant is under sentence of death, this court is under the

precise issue raised by Cone. In West, the State argued that duty to ‘automatically’ review the sentence, which imposes

the defendant could not raise the vagueness issue in his post- the burden on this court to consider any alleged error, whether

conviction petition for two reasons: (1) he had failed to raise called to the trial court’s attention or not.” Id. at 67-68

it on direct appeal and thus “waived” it; and, alternatively, (emphasis added). Finally, in State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872

(2) it had been “previously determined” due to the Tennessee (Tenn. 1998), the court held that the mandatory review statute

Supreme Court’s mandatory review. West, 19 S.W.3d at 756. gave it jurisdiction to review issues raised by the defendant’s

The court agreed with the State, but, in a seeming appeal despite the defendant’s failure to timely file his appeal.

contradiction, held that the vagueness issue had been both Id. at 880-81. These three cases make clear that the

“previously determined” and “waived” as a result of West’s Tennessee Supreme Court considers its task when conducting

direct appeal. Id. Specifically, the court stated: the required review to be important enough to warrant

departures from procedural rules that would normally bar

Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-112(b), when [the supreme court review. In each of these three cases, however,

appellant] failed to raise the (i)(6) issue on direct appeal, unlike this case, the issue was raised by the defendant on

he effectively blocked any consideration of this issue by direct review.

this Court on post-conviction review. Additionally,

under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-205(c)(3) (1982) The conceptual leap from claims explicitly raised on direct

(repealed 1989), this Court was required in all cases in appeal, although not properly preserved, to claims not raised

which the death penalty was imposed to automatically at all is significant and, without West, there would be no

consider whether the “evidence supports the jury’s Tennessee authority for attempting it. Nevertheless, West

finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance or cannot be ignored; neither can the Tennessee statute, which

statutory aggravating circumstances. . . .” Pursuant to mandates supreme court review to assure that no death

these mandatory provisions, this Court found that the sentence is “imposed in any arbitrary fashion.” Tenn. Code

requirements of the statute had, in fact, been met in [the Ann. § 39-2-205(c)(1) (1982). It is also significant that the

appellant’s] case. Thus, we conclude that the issue under statute does not condition the mandatory review upon the

discussion has, indeed, been both “previously issues named in the statute being properly raised. The

determined” and “waived,” under the definitions following factors in West strongly favor the conclusion that it

provided in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-112(a) and (b). is the law in Tennessee that the supreme court “implicitly”

reviews death sentences for arbitrariness, even if the issue is

No. 99-5279 Cone v. Bell 13 14 Cone v. Bell No. 99-5279

not explicitly raised on direct appeal: (1) the language that in because the claim was “waived” but because it was

“all” death penalty cases, the court “automatically” complies “previously determined.”

with the mandatory review statute; (2) the court’s re-

characterization of the appellant’s “evidentiary sufficiency” This conclusion would seem to be confirmed by the written

challenge as a vagueness (i.e., arbitrariness) challenge; and findings of the state trial court dismissing Cone’s second

(3) its holding that the same was “previously determined” amended petition for post-conviction review. Referring to the

(although never raised by the appellant). We can find no specific paragraph of the petition in which Cone raised his

other logical construction to put upon the court’s language in vagueness challenge for the first time, the trial court stated:

West. “grounds . . . [appearing in paragraph] 18 . . . involve[] a

potpourri of various errors by the court at the trial all of which

We note, in passing, that the implicit review doctrine, as we grounds have been considered and denied in direct appeal or

apply it today in this case, does not foreclose the possibility the First Post Conviction Petition.” Cone v. State, No. P-

that other death penalty defendants may procedurally default 06874, slip op. at 4 (Crim. Ct. Tenn., 13th Judicial Dist., Dec.

on other constitutional issues not raised on direct appeal. The 16, 1993) (emphasis added). The Tennessee Court of

language of Tennessee’s mandatory review statute provides Criminal Appeals, the last state court to render an opinion on

a basis to distinguish between vagueness challenges and other Cone’s petition, affirmed the holding of the trial court and, in

constitutional claims, since it requires the Tennessee Supreme fact, commended the trial court judge for his “exemplary and

Court to look specifically for sentences “imposed in any meticulous treatment of the appellant’s petition.” Cone v.

arbitrary fashion.” The “evil” of vague sentencing State, 927 S.W.2d at 581. These statements by the lower state

instructions is, precisely, that they invite arbitrary decision- courts are in accordance with our holding today: that, under

making. As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated: “our cases Tennessee law, Cone’s vagueness challenge was not

have insisted that the channeling and limiting of the “waived,” but “previously determined.”

sentencer’s discretion in imposing the death penalty is a

fundamental constitutional requirement for sufficiently Therefore, although Cone failed to explicitly raise the

minimizing the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious vagueness challenge to the HAC aggravator, that claim was

action.” Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988). nonetheless implicitly decided on the merits by the Tennessee

Because there are other constitutional violations that do not Supreme Court and it is a proper subject for federal habeas

pose this same risk, the implicit review principle we have review.

applied today would not necessarily save those claims from

procedural default. IV.

We think that given the holding in West, and the court’s Finally, we turn to the merits of Cone’s habeas claim that

language explaining it, we must conclude that the Tennessee the HAC aggravator the jury considered in sentencing him to

Supreme Court implicitly considered and rejected Cone’s death is unconstitutionally vague, thus invalidating his

unmentioned vagueness “challenge” to the HAC aggravator, sentence.

in the course of its mandatory review. As such, Cone’s claim

must be deemed to have been decided on the merits during the

direct appeal and, therefore, when the Tennessee lower courts

disposed of the claim on procedural grounds they did so not

No. 99-5279 Cone v. Bell 15 16 Cone v. Bell No. 99-5279

A. B.

Our standard of review is governed by the Antiterrorism At sentencing, the jurors were instructed that they could not

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). When a impose the death penalty unless they unanimously found,

petitioner’s claim has been adjudicated on the merits in a state beyond a reasonable doubt, at least one of eleven statutory

court, a federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus aggravating factors, including whether “[t]he murder was

with respect to such claim, unless the state court’s especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved

determination: torture or depravity of mind.” In a limiting instruction, the

court then defined some of the terms of this aggravating

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or factor:

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme “Heinous” means extremely wicked or shockingly evil.

Court of the United States; or “Atrocious” means outrageously wicked and vile.

“Cruel” means designed to inflict a high degree of pain,

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an utter indifference to, or enjoyment of, the suffering of

unreasonable determination of the f..acts in light of the others, pitiless.

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

The jurors found that Cone’s crime was “especially heinous,

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (West Supp. 2003). A state court’s atrocious, or cruel.” They did not add, on their verdict form,

decision must be evaluated against the clearly established the words, “in that it involved torture or depravity of mind.”

Supreme Court precedent at the time the petitioner’s However, we do not think that omitting that verbiage when

conviction became final. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, announcing the verdict is of any constitutional significance.

380 (2000). Moreover, as we explained recently:

Cone argues that the HAC aggravator is “clearly

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court unconstitutional” based upon the holding of Godfrey v.

precedent “if the state court arrives at a conclusion Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Godfrey held that the Georgia

opposite to that reached by [the Court] on a question of statutory aggravator, “that the offense ‘was outrageously or

law,” or “if the state court confronts facts that are wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture,

materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim,’” id.

Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to” the at 422 (citation omitted), was unconstitutionally vague,

Court’s decision. A state court decision involves an because there was “nothing in these few words, standing

“unreasonable application” of clearly established alone, that implies any inherent restraint on the arbitrary and

Supreme Court precedent when it correctly identifies the capricious infliction of the death sentence,” id. at 428.

governing legal standard but applies it to the facts of the

case before it in an objectively unreasonable manner. The State responds first, that the language of the Tennessee

HAC aggravator, as further defined and limited by the trial

Alley v. Bell, 307 F.3d 380, 385 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal court, is not the language found to be vague in Godfrey, and

citation omitted) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, 409-10), second, that the HAC aggravator in Cone’s case was not

cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 99 (2003) “contrary to . . . clearly established” U.S. Supreme Court

No. 99-5279 Cone v. Bell 17 18 Cone v. Bell No. 99-5279

precedent as it stood at the time of Cone’s direct appeal. That horrible or inhuman” aggravator) to hold that Oklahoma’s

precedent, the State argues, was established in Proffitt v. HAC aggravator was unconstitutionally vague, id. at 363-64,

Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), decided eight years before but implied that had Oklahoma’s HAC aggravator been

Cone’s conviction became final, in which the Court held that further limited by a “torture or serious physical abuse”

Florida’s HAC aggravator was not unconstitutionally vague instruction, it might have been constitutional, id. at 365.

in light of the Florida courts’ narrowing construction that the Nonetheless, two years later, in Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S.

term “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” means a “‘conscienceless 1 (1990) (per curiam), the Supreme Court announced that the

or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” language, along with the same

victim.’” Id. at 255-56 (citations omitted). This narrowing “limiting” definitions as were provided to the jury in Cone’s

language is the identical language the Tennessee Supreme case, was unconstitutional. Id. at 1. The HAC aggravator in

Court used in narrowing Tennessee’s HAC aggravator in Shell, however, did not have the “torture or depravity”

State v. Dicks, 615 S.W.2d 126, 132 (Tenn. 1981), a case qualifier that is attached to the HAC aggravator in Cone’s

decided three years before the court’s “implicit review” of case. In Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), overruled

Cone’s case. Moreover, the State argues, it must be presumed on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),

that the Tennessee Supreme Court evaluated the Cone jury’s the Court stated, “there is no serious argument that Arizona’s

reliance upon the HAC aggravator using the same narrowing ‘especially heinous, cruel or depraved’ aggravating factor is

construction adopted in Dicks. The State also reminds us that not facially vague.” Id. at 654.

the U.S. Supreme Court held in Williams, 529 U.S. 362, that

the state court’s decision must be evaluated against the Despite the confusion resulting from these cases (or

“clearly established” Supreme Court precedent at the time the perhaps because of it), the Supreme Court, in Stringer v.

petitioner’s conviction became final. Id. at 380. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992), came at the subject from a

different angle. It addressed the “new rule” non-retroactivity

One thing is clear: No Supreme Court case has addressed doctrine as respects Godfrey, the pre-Cone decision, and

the precise language at issue in this case. As we will show, Maynard, the post-Cone decision.

the cases decided after Cone’s conviction became final

indicate clearly that the language of the HAC aggravator the [T]he language [in Maynard (“especially heinous,

jurors used to sentence Cone to death–“especially heinous, atrocious or cruel”)] gave no more guidance than did the

atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or depravity of statute in Godfrey [(“outrageously or wantonly vile,

mind”–is unconstitutionally vague. Normally, post-Cone horrible or inhuman”)]. . . .

decisions would be immaterial, but, as will be seen, the

Supreme Court’s fairly recent application of its doctrine of the . . . Godfrey and Maynard did indeed involve

“non-retroactivity” of new constitutional rules, in the context somewhat different language. But it would be a mistake

of an Eighth Amendment vagueness challenge to a death to conclude that the vagueness ruling of Godfrey was

penalty instruction, makes several post-Cone Supreme Court limited to the precise language before us in that case. In

decisions not only material, but controlling. applying Godfrey to the language before us in Maynard,

we did not “brea[k] new ground.”

In 1988, in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, a death

penalty case from Oklahoma, the Supreme Court explicitly Id. at 228-29 (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 412

relied upon Godfrey (the “outrageously or wantonly vile, (1990)). The “break new ground” terminology refers to the

No. 99-5279 Cone v. Bell 19 20 Cone v. Bell No. 99-5279

rule announced in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), that very minor variations on the instruction in Maynard and Cone

if a decision announces a “new” constitutional rule, it is not would not also be dictated by Godfrey.

to be applied retroactively to convictions that have already

become final when the new decision is announced, subject to There remains, of course, the question whether the

two narrow exceptions not applicable here. A “new Tennessee Supreme Court’s narrowing construction of

[constitutional] rule” is one that “breaks new ground” or Tennessee’s HAC aggravator, announced in 1981 in Dicks,

imposes new obligations on the states or federal government. 615 S.W.2d at 132, that Tennessee’s HAC aggravator should

Id. at 301. “[A] case announces a new rule if the result was be read as meaning “conscienceless or pitiless crime which is

not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s unnecessarily torturous to the victim,” the identical language

conviction became final.” Id. (emphasis omitted). that was approved in Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 255, “saves” the

HAC aggravator in Cone’s case.

Given this old rule/new rule definition, the language of

Stringer, that Maynard did not “break new ground,” strongly The State argues that if we are to indulge the fiction,

suggests that the Supreme Court considers Godfrey to have discussed earlier, that the Tennessee Supreme Court

clearly established the unconstitutionality of the HAC “implicitly reviewed” Cone’s Eighth Amendment vagueness

aggravator as early as 1980. Although Stringer dealt with a “challenge” to the HAC aggravator, a challenge Cone did not

pre-AEDPA retroactivity issue, the Supreme Court in explicitly raise, we should also indulge the fiction that the

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, explained that the “clearly court applied the “pitiless crime” narrowing construction it

established law” requirement codified the old rule/new rule adopted for Tennessee’s HAC aggravator three years earlier

doctrine of non-retroactivity that prevailed before AEDPA. in Dicks, 615 S.W.2d at 132. Although this “implicit

Id. at 379-80, 412; see also Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940, narrowing construction” argument would provide a nice

944 (6th Cir. 2000). Indeed, the Court cited Stringer as an symmetry to the earlier “implicit review” argument, we think

example of the old rule/new rule doctrine codified by the two, on close consideration, are actually asymmetrical.

AEDPA’s “clearly established law” requirement. Williams, Here’s why: The Tennessee court explicitly reviewed whether

529 U.S. at 412. the HAC aggravator the jury found was supported by

sufficient evidence, but in doing so, it did not apply, or even

Although none of these Supreme Court decisions is “on all mention, any narrowing interpretation or cite to Dicks.

fours” with the instruction in Cone’s case, in the final Instead, the court simply, but explicitly, satisfied itself that

analysis, Stringer’s statement that Maynard’s invalidation of the labels “heinous, atrocious, or cruel,” without more,

Oklahoma’s HAC aggravator was an “old rule” dictated by applied to Cone’s crime. State v. Cone, 665 S.W.2d at 94-95.

Godfrey, points ineluctably to the conclusion that Godfrey

represents a “clearly established” Supreme Court precedent Therefore, we conclude that the Tennessee Supreme

dictating that Tennessee’s HAC aggravator is Court’s “implicit decision,” upon mandatory review of

unconstitutionally vague. Although it is true that the HAC Cone’s death sentence, was that the HAC aggravator relied

aggravator in Cone’s case contained the additional words “in upon by Cone’s jury in imposing the death sentence was not

that it involved torture or depravity of mind,” all of those arbitrary and, consequently, not unconstitutionally vague. We

words except “torture” have been held to be too vague, on the hold that this decision by the Tennessee Supreme Court was

basis of Godfrey. Since Maynard was dictated by Godfrey, it contrary to clearly established U.S. Supreme Court precedent

is difficult to imagine how any of the other cases addressing

No. 99-5279 Cone v. Bell 21 22 Cone v. Bell No. 99-5279

as announced in Maynard and Shell, and made applicable to The applicable harmless error standard is “whether the error

Cone’s case via the rule of retroactivity explained in Stringer. ‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict.’” Id. (quoting Brecht v.

We are not in the least comfortable with this “implicit Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993)). The Supreme Court

review” doctrine, but it is a matter of Tennessee, not federal, elaborated on this standard to some extent in O’Neal v.

law, and we know of no other way to read and understand McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995), by explaining: “When a

what the Tennessee Supreme Court said in West. federal judge in a habeas proceeding is in grave doubt about

whether a trial error of federal law had substantial and

V. injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict,

that error is not harmless.” Id. at 436 (internal quotation

We must now consider whether the jury’s erroneous marks omitted); see also DePew v. Anderson, 311 F.3d 742,

application of two invalid aggravating factors was harmless 751 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 270 (2003), and

error. The AEDPA standard of review does not apply to this cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 83 (2003).

question because no Tennessee court has considered this

question. Thus, this is an independent harmless error inquiry, In Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d at 335, we considered whether the

not a review of a state court’s harmless error inquiry. jury’s reliance on an unconstitutionally vague HAC

aggravating factor had a “substantial and injurious effect” on

Cone contends that this court is not empowered to perform the sentence. We concluded that it did not because the jury’s

an independent harmless error inquiry; rather, he argues, this sentencing verdict form indicated that “the jury [had] ignored

court must grant habeas relief so that state courts can perform the problematic ‘depravity’ factor and limited its finding to

a new sentencing calculus. He insists that prior Sixth Circuit the appropriately narrowing ‘torture’ factor.” Id. at 336.

cases, Houston v. Dutton, 50 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 1995), and Thus, the error was harmless because the jury, effectively, had

Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, are in conflict on this issue. “channeled” its own discretion despite the failure of the

instructions to do so. Id.

In Coe v. Bell, we held that this court was “permitted to

perform a harmless-error analysis” to determine whether a In Abdur’Rahman v. Bell, 226 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2000),

Tennessee jury’s reliance on the unconstitutional HAC cert. denied, 534 U.S. 970 (2001), we again considered the

aggravator required habeas relief. 161 F.3d at 334. We harmfulness of the jury’s reliance on the unconstitutionally

distinguished our previous decision in Houston v. Dutton, 50 vague HAC aggravator. We remarked that “removing one

F.3d at 387, on the ground that Houston had prohibited a aggravating circumstance from the sentencing calculus in a

federal habeas court from “re-weighing” but had not weighing state normally would require a re-weighing of the

considered whether a federal habeas court could evaluate, in aggravating and mitigating factors.” Id. at 711. We

the first instance, the harmlessness of the jury’s reliance on an determined, however, that the jury’s reliance on the HAC

invalid aggravator. Coe, 161 F.3d at 335. Thus, Coe drew a aggravator was harmless because, “even if the heinous,

distinction between re-weighing and harmless error analysis atrocious, or cruel aggravator is removed from the calculus,

and held that a federal habeas court is permitted to undertake there is no mitigating evidence to weigh against the remaining

the latter. . . . aggravators.” Id.

No. 99-5279 Cone v. Bell 23 24 Cone v. Bell No. 99-5279

In this case, when the jury made its sentencing VI.

determination it found four aggravating circumstances

((1) HAC; (2) great risk of death to others; (3) prior violent For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s decision is

felonies; and (4) murder for purpose of avoiding REVERSED as to the petitioner’s sentence. We REMAND

arrest/prosecution), and weighed those against the mitigating to the district court with instructions to issue a writ of habeas

evidence offered by the defense. This balancing process was corpus vacating the petitioner’s death sentence due to the

infected by the weight of two invalid aggravating factors: jury’s weighing of an unconstitutionally vague aggravating

(1) HAC, which was unconstitutionally vague, and (2) great factor at sentencing, unless the State conducts a new penalty

risk of death to others, which was not supported by sufficient phase proceeding within 180 days of remand.

evidence.

The prosecutor specifically emphasized the HAC

aggravator during his closing arguments at the sentencing

phase of the trial. In contrast to Coe, 161 F.3d at 336, the jury

here did not “channel[]” its discretion by ignoring the

vagueness inherent in the HAC aggravator. Moreover,

although the defense here offered no mitigating evidence at

sentencing, the Supreme Court stated in Bell v. Cone, 535

U.S. at 699, that the defense put before the jury “the most

compelling mitigating evidence in the case” during the guilt

phase. The Court’s observation thus distinguishes this case

from Abdur’Rahman, in which we concluded that the HAC

aggravator, if unconstitutionally vague, did not substantially

affect the sentence due to the total absence of mitigating

evidence.

The second invalid aggravator, “great risk of death to

others,” was found by the jury despite insufficient evidence,

State v. Cone, 665 S.W.2d at 95, even though the prosecutor

did not request the jury to find this aggravator. One could

argue that this aggravator must have influenced the

sentencing decision, since the jury found it without sufficient

evidence and without being asked to do so by the prosecution.

In any event, we conclude that these two invalid aggravators,

together, if not individually, “‘had substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining’” the jury’s sentence.

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 631 (citation omitted). The error,

therefore, is not harmless.

No. 99-5279 Cone v. Bell 25 26 Cone v. Bell No. 99-5279

___________________ The Defendant has not challenged the sufficiency of the

evidence to support the aggravating circumstances found

CONCURRENCE by the jury to warrant imposition of the death penalty in

___________________ this case. Nonetheless, as in all capital cases, under the

directive of T.C.A. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(B) [formerly

MERRITT, Circuit Judge, concurring. I agree with the T.C.A. § 39-2-205(c)(2)], this Court has reviewed the

Court that this death case cannot be disposed of on grounds of evidence pertaining to the aggravating circumstances and

procedural default, and I agree on the merits of the concludes that it is sufficient to support the aggravating

constitutional issue. I believe there are additional reasons that circumstances found by the jury in this case.

the Court is right and that the State’s position is untenable.

Id. at 76. Two dissenting justices would have held that

I. Procedural Default sentence invalid based on the “heinous, atrocious, or cruel”

aggravator as applied to the evidence in the case because the

In this case, the jury found that the crimes were “especially instruction did not sufficiently guide the jury’s discretion as

heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that [they] involved torture or a matter of constitutional law. Noting that the jury’s

depravity of mind.” (J.A. at 235, 237 (verdict forms)). application of the aggravator could only have been based on

Pursuant to its statutory mandate, the state supreme court a finding of depravity, the dissenting justices concluded that

automatically reviews, inter alia, whether the sentence of “the instructions provided no help in guiding the jury to its

death was imposed in any arbitrary fashion and whether the decision” because the jury “received no guidance in

evidence supported the jury’s finding of a statutory determining whether the defendant’s mind was materially

aggravating circumstance. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2- ‘depraved’ beyond that of any first degree murderer, and was

205(c)(1), (2) (1982). On direct review in this case, the state bestowed unconstitutionally unfettered and unguided

supreme court expressly examined the evidence presented at discretion in applying this aspect of [the] aggravating

trial and determined that the evidence was sufficient for the circumstance.” Id. at 83-84 (Reid, C.J. dissenting) (citing

jury to find that the murders were “especially heinous, cruel, Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1 (1990)). The majority

or atrocious in that they involved torture or depravity of responded to the “dissent[’s] challenge[] [to] the validity in

mind.” State v. Cone, 665 S.W.2d 87, 94-95 (Tenn. 1984). the present case of the aggravating circumstance” by setting

forth evidence in support of the aggravator and holding that

In State v. Harris, the jury found three aggravating the jury was “fully and correctly instructed” on the aggravator

circumstances to support the death penalty, including that the in accord with State v. Williams, 690 S.W.2d 517, 529 (Tenn.

crimes were “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that 1985).1

[they] involved torture or depravity of mind.” 839 S.W.2d

54, 59-60 & n.1 (Tenn. 1992). On direct appeal, the

defendant did not raise any specific vagueness challenge to 1

Approximately one year after the state supreme court upheld Co ne’s

the aggravator or challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in death sentence, the Tennessee Supreme Court decided State v. Williams,

support of it. Nevertheless, the state court clearly examined in which it construed “depravity of mind” in cases where there was no

both aspects of the aggravator as part of its statutory review evidence of torture. 690 S.W .2d at 529-30. The co nstruction was

of the sufficiency of the evidence: intended to comport with constitutional requirements by sufficiently

narrowing the class o f perso ns eligible for the death penalty as required

by Go dfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980).

No. 99-5279 Cone v. Bell 27 28 Cone v. Bell No. 99-5279

Harris demonstrates that, in a death penalty case, the state To the extent that the decision of the state court of appeals

supreme court’s mandatory review of the sufficiency of the can be read as an “unexplained ruling” due to its failure to

evidence to support the jury’s finding of an aggravator specify that a procedural default has been expressly invoked

necessarily includes an affirmative examination of whether to dispose of this particular claim, we must refer to the only

the aggravator, either as instructed or as viewed by the reasoned state court judgment addressing the aggravator,

reviewing court through a narrowing construction, sufficiently which in Cone’s case is the state supreme court’s express

narrowed the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. consideration of the aggravator on direct appeal. See Ylst v.

As a result, there can be no doubt in this case that the state Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991) (“If an earlier opinion

court reviewed the “heinous, atrocious, and cruel” aggravator ‘fairly appears[] to rest primarily on federal law,’ . . . we will

on the merits and determined that it was not presume that no procedural default has been invoked by a

unconstitutionally vague. subsequent unexplained order that leaves the judgment or its

consequences in place”); O’Guinn, 88 F.3d at 1423. As

Moreover, there is nothing in the record that would explained above, we can presume that, in ruling that the

constitute a clear and express statement that the state court evidence supported the jury’s finding that the crimes were

disposed of this issue on state procedural grounds, a “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel,” the state supreme

prerequisite to the deference to state decisionmaking that our court, as in Harris, fulfilled its statutory duty to test the

federal doctrine of procedural default aims to protect. Cone constitutionality of the aggravator. Further, contrary to the

first presented his challenge to the constitutionality of the State’s assertion, no state court has clearly and expressly

aggravator in paragraph 18 of his second amended post- stated that its disposition on the issue was based on the

conviction petition. In dismissing the ground, the trial court independent and adequate state ground of waiver, as required

did not state that the claim had been waived, as the State by Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989), and Coleman v.

asserts in its brief before this Court, but that “grounds 17, 18 Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 (1991).

[which included his challenge to the constitutionality of the

aggravator], 19, 21, 22, 23, 34, 35, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, Our view is reinforced by State v. West, 19 S.W.3d 753

33, 34, 35, and 36 involve[] a potpourri of various errors by (Tenn. 2000), in which the constitutionality of an aggravator

the court at the trial all of which grounds have been was raised. The state supreme court ruled that it had

considered and denied in direct appeal or the First Post previously determined the constitutionality of the aggravator

Conviction Petition.” Cone v. State, No. P-06874, slip op. at on direct appeal pursuant to its statutory mandate “to

4 (Crim. Ct. Tenn., 13th Judicial Dist., Dec. 16, 1993). In automatically consider whether the ‘evidence supports the

affirming the trial court’s ruling, the Tennessee Court of jury’s finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance or

Appeals did not expressly address Cone’s claim for relief statutory aggravating circumstances.’” Id. at 756. West

based on the “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravator, but demonstrates that the Tennessee Supreme Court understands

agreed with the trial court that all of Cone’s claims had been its statutory obligation to review death sentences as carrying

“previously determined or waived.” This language, in light with it the affirmative responsibility to keep the application

of the state supreme court’s mandatory review on direct of the statutory aggravators within constitutional bounds. See

appeal, “gives a federal court good reason to question whether Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 429 (1980) (noting the

there is an adequate and independent state ground for the Georgia Supreme Court’s previous exercise of its

decision.” O’Guinn v. Dutton, 88 F.3d 1409, 1423 (6th Cir. responsibility to keep the application of the “outrageously or

1996) (Merritt, J., concurring).

No. 99-5279 Cone v. Bell 29 30 Cone v. Bell No. 99-5279

wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman” aggravator within establish cause for the third default, because there is no

constitutional bounds). constitutional right to counsel at post-conviction hearings,

according to Coleman, and without such a right ineffective

II. Cause and Prejudice assistance of counsel cannot constitute cause for a procedural

default. 501 U.S. at 752.

Even if Cone had procedurally defaulted his objection to

the “heinous, atrocious, and cruel” aggravator, this Court can It is clear from the record that Cone did not waive his

still hear the claim if Cone can establish “cause and ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Cone raised a general

prejudice” for the default. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. Cone claim of ineffective counsel in his first post-conviction

argues that his failure to raise the objection on direct appeal petition. Although he did not claim specifically in that first

was due to the ineffectiveness of his counsel. Ineffective petition that his counsel was ineffective because of the failure

assistance of counsel, if established, can be sufficient to to object to the vague “heinous, atrocious, and cruel”

establish cause and therefore allow a federal court to reach the aggravator, he added those grounds in his second post-

merits of a claim defaulted in a state court so long as the conviction petition. Both the state trial court and the

ineffectiveness rises to the level of a Sixth Amendment appellate court ruled that under Tennessee law, ineffective

violation resulting in prejudice to the defendant. Murray v. assistance of counsel is a “single ground for relief” that had

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). been “previously determined” in the first post-conviction

petition. J.A. at 2001. Therefore, even though Cone did not

In this case, counsel was allegedly ineffective at two stages claim that his counsel was ineffective specifically because of

of the proceeding in failing to raise the constitutional the failure to object to the aggravator until his second post-

objection to the instruction – at trial and on appeal. Before conviction petition, he has not defaulted that claim because

we can decide if Cone has established ineffective assistance under Tennessee law it constitutes the same ground that the

of counsel as cause of the failure to object at trial and on Tennessee courts had previously determined to be without

appeal, we must first decide whether Cone has properly merit.

exhausted the ineffectiveness claim in the state courts. When

a petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel as cause Still, even though Cone has not procedurally defaulted his

for a procedural default in state court of a substantive ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the message from

constitutional claim, the allegation of ineffectiveness is a Edwards is that in order to rely on the ineffectiveness claim

separate claim which must itself be exhausted in state court as cause for his failure to raise the “heinous, atrocious, and

according to the normal procedures. Edwards v. Carpenter, cruel” aggravator, the issue must not only have been

529 U.S. 446, 452 (2000); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, presented to, or at least determined by, the state courts, the

489 (1986) (“[T]he exhaustion doctrine...generally requires restrictions on federal review from the Anti-Terrorism and

that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel be presented Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) must be satisfied as

to state courts before it may be used to establish cause for a well. Specifically, §2254(d) prevents federal courts from

procedural default.”). According to Edwards, the failure to granting habeas “with respect to any claim that was

exhaust the ineffectiveness claim will itself constitute a adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless

procedural default of the procedural default defense and, the adjudication of the claim” was either “contrary to” or an

absent cause and prejudice, will prevent federal courts from “unreasonable application of” clearly established federal law.

hearing it. 529 U.S. at 452. A petitioner cannot easily 28 U.S.C. §2254(d) (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

No. 99-5279 Cone v. Bell 31 32 Cone v. Bell No. 99-5279

402-13 (2000). Thus, we must determine whether the Godfrey mean that the “heinous, atrocious, and cruel”

rejection of Cone’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim by aggravator was unconstitutional (as explained later in

the Tennessee state courts in his post-conviction petitions was Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988)), to rule

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly otherwise as the Tennessee Supreme Court did in its

established federal law. mandatory review was contrary to clearly established

Supreme Court precedent even according to the high

The starting point for ineffective assistance of counsel standards of AEDPA as interpreted in Williams v. Taylor.

claims is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Cone’s defense counsel missed, both at trial and on direct

According to Strickland, in order to establish a claim for the appeal, a claim of clearly established constitutional

ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must be able to dimension, the preservation of which would result in having

show both that his counsel was constitutionally deficient and one of the aggravators on which Cone was sentenced to death

that the deficiency prejudiced his defense. Id. at 687; Wiggins thrown out. Failing to raise a winning defense is not a

v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, strategic decision, and incompetence is the only explanation

529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Although the Strickland test is for the failure to raise it. It appears that Cone’s counsel was

“highly deferential” to the judgment of defense counsel, 466 litigating a capital case while simply unaware of controlling

U.S. at 689, and the mere fact that counsel has failed to Supreme Court precedent in death penalty cases. It is hard to

recognize or raise a particular claim does not always imagine a better case for “ineffectiveness in failing properly

constitute cause for a procedural default, Smith v. Murray, to preserve [a] claim for review in state court.” Edwards, 529

477 U.S. 527, 535 (1986); Carrier, 477 U.S. at 486-87, the U.S. at 451.

Supreme Court has also made it clear that “the right to

effective assistance of counsel . . . may in a particular case be This conclusion is further supported by the American Bar

violated by even an isolated error...if that error is sufficiently Association’s Guidelines for the Appointment and

egregious and prejudicial.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 535 (quoting Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases. As

Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496); see also Edwards, 529 U.S. at 451 pointed out in Strickland, “[t]he proper measure of attorney

(“Although we have not identified with precision what performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing

constitutes ‘cause’ to excuse a procedural default, we have professional norms.” 466 U.S. at 688. American Bar

acknowledged that in certain circumstances counsel’s Association standards are only “guides” and not “rules” for

ineffectiveness in failing properly to preserve the claim for what constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, id., but in

review in state court will suffice.”). this case the guidelines speak clearly:

In this case, there can be no doubt that the defense One of the most fundamental duties of an attorney

counsel’s error was “sufficiently egregious and prejudicial” defending a capital case at trial is the preservation of any

to constitute cause for his procedural default. The defense and all conceivable errors for each stage of appellate and

counsel failed both at trial and on direct appeal to object to post-conviction review. Failure to preserve an issue may

the “heinous, atrocious, and cruel” aggravator despite the result in the client being executed even though reversible

then-recent Supreme Court decision in Godfrey v. Georgia, error occurred at trial. For this reason, trial counsel in a

446 U.S. 420 (1980), in which the Court held similar death penalty case must be especially aware not only of

language to be unconstitutionally vague. Indeed, as the Court strategies for winning at trial, but also of the heightened

here points out, not only did the principle established in need to fully preserve all potential issues for later review.

No. 99-5279 Cone v. Bell 33 34 Cone v. Bell No. 99-5279

ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of established right to effective counsel. See id. (“[I]t can hardly

Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 91-92 (rev. ed. be said that recognizing the right to effective counsel breaks

2003) (internal quotations omitted).2 In this case, not only new ground or imposes a new obligation on the states.”

did Cone’s counsel fail to preserve “any and all” errors, he (internal quotations omitted)).

failed to preserve a claim based on binding Supreme Court

precedent that was a sure winner as a matter of federal law The Strickland test requires not only ineffectiveness of

and that, given the role of the “heinous, atrocious, and cruel” counsel, but also prejudice to the defendant as a result of that

aggravator in the jury’s deliberation of the death sentence, ineffectiveness. 466 U.S. at 687. For the purposes of this

may well have saved his client’s life. There can be no doubt test, prejudice amounts to a “reasonable probability that, but

that this error was “sufficiently egregious and prejudicial” to for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

constitute cause for the procedural default of that claim. proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.

Demonstrating such a reasonable probability is not difficult

III. Contrary to Established Supreme Court Cases here. As the Court explains in its harmless error analysis,

supra, the prosecutor specifically emphasized the “heinous,

Finally, I have no trouble finding that the denial of Cone’s atrocious, and cruel” aggravator during closing arguments and

claim that his counsel was ineffective due to the failure to at the sentencing phase of the trial. Moreover, this is the

object to the “heinous, atrocious, and cruel” aggravator was second invalid aggravator found by the jury. Thus, there is at

not only wrong, but contrary to clearly established federal law the very least a reasonable probability that had Cone’s

as required by AEDPA and Williams. Although the error at counsel preserved the objection to this “heinous, atrocious,

issue here involves the failure to raise a claim rather than the and cruel” aggravator, his sentence ultimately may well have

failure to investigate at issue in Strickland and Wiggins, the been different.

differences do not mean that the Tennessee courts’ rejections

of his valid ineffectiveness claim are not contrary to the IV. The Merits

clearly established test from Strickland. As the Supreme

Court explained in Williams, “ [t]hat the Strickland test ‘of As is now typical in death penalty cases, we have spent

necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the more time discussing the maze of “door closing” devices such

evidence’ . . . obviates neither the clarity of the rule nor the as procedural default than the merits. In this case, the merits

extent to which the rule must be seen as ‘established’ by this are relatively easy to decide.

Court.” 529 U.S. at 391 (citation omitted). The Strickland

test is well-established, and is itself based on a long The Court concludes that applying the “heinous, atrocious,

and cruel” aggravator to Cone’s case was not only wrong but

contrary to clearly established federal law as required by

2 AEDPA and Williams because similar language was ruled

Although the above quotation is a recent statement not published at unconstitutional in Godfrey. The Court cites Maynard for

the time of Cone’s trial, I use it because it is an articulation of long- support of this proposition, which specifically held that an

established “fundamental” duties of trial counsel. See Ham blin v.

Mitchell, 354 F.3d 4 82, 487 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying 1989 ABA identical Oklahoma “heinous, atrocious, and cruel”

guide lines to counsel’s 19 82 rep resentation on the gro unds that “the aggravator was unconstitutional. Although Maynard was not

standards merely represent a codification of longstanding, co mmo n-sense decided until 1988 – after the Tennessee Supreme Court

principles of representation understo od b y diligent, comp etent co unsel in upheld Cone’s conviction – because the Court in Maynard

death penalty cases”).

No. 99-5279 Cone v. Bell 35 36 Cone v. Bell No. 99-5279

said that it was only applying the clear principle of Godfrey For these reasons, as well as those articulated by the Court,

and not establishing new law, this Court today cites it for the I agree with the Court’s ruling.

proposition that Tennessee’s upholding the “heinous,

atrocious, and cruel” aggravator was contrary to clearly

established federal law.

I agree with the Court despite the state counsel’s objection

to reliance on a later case to determine what law had been

then clearly established. I would only add that the Supreme

Court recently did precisely the same thing in Wiggins v.

Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2535-36 (2003), despite an identical

objection by the dissenting justices in that case. Id. at 2546-

47. In that case, the Court applied the rule of Strickland v.

Washington, which was decided before Wiggins’ state court

ruling, but also cited Williams v. Taylor, which was decided

after Wiggins’ state court decision. Id. Since the Court in

Williams had “made no new law in resolving Williams’

ineffectiveness claim,” id. at 2535, the Wiggins Court was

free to cite Williams in determining whether or not the state

court ruling against Wiggins was contrary to clearly

established federal law, even though Williams was decided

after the state court ruled against Wiggins. Similarly, as the

Supreme Court later said when discussing non-retroactivity,

“[i]n applying Godfrey to the language before us in Maynard,

we did not “break[] new ground.” Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S.

222, 228-29 (1992) (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S.

407, 412 (1990)). Therefore, Wiggins reinforces our reliance

on Maynard’s application of Godfrey when determining what

was “clearly established federal law” at the time of Cone’s

state court decision even though Maynard was not yet

decided. In Houston v. Dutton, 50 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 1995),

our Court did the same thing in invalidating the same

Tennessee instruction. We cited Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S.

40, 46 (1992), a case decided after Houston’s last state court

decision, to find the same “heinous, atrocious, or cruel”

aggravator unconstitutional because Richmond simply applied

the principle enunciated in Godfrey and Maynard.

No. 99-5279 Cone v. Bell 37 38 Cone v. Bell No. 99-5279

_____________ broad, as it would eliminate the entire doctrine of procedural

bar in Tennessee capital cases.” Id. As the majority points

DISSENT out, virtually every other circuit that has reviewed analogous

_____________ state-law provisions has expressed similar concerns. Majority

Op. at 7-8 (citing cases). Aware of the potential sweep of its

ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge, dissenting. As my conclusion, the majority seeks to reign it in by drawing the

concurrence in this court’s initial panel decision makes clear, following distinction:

Cone v. Bell, 243 F.3d 961 (6th Cir. 2001), I harbor grave

reservations about the appropriateness of the death penalty in [T]he implicit review doctrine, as we apply it today in

this case. However, our analysis was soundly rejected by the this case, does not foreclose the possibility that other

Supreme Court. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002). On death penalty defendants may procedurally default on

remand, the majority concludes that the writ should issue on other constitutional issues not raised on direct appeal.

a ground not reached in our prior opinion. While I am The language of Tennessee’s mandatory review statute

reluctant to part company with my colleagues in this case, I provides a basis to distinguish between vagueness

feel obliged to do so because the majority’s construction of challenges and other constitutional claims, since it

Tennessee law with respect to “implicit review” as it applies requires the Tennessee Supreme Court to look

to waiver lacks any clear support from the Tennessee courts. specifically for sentences “imposed in any arbitrary

I therefore respectfully dissent. fashion.”

To its credit, the majority candidly acknowledges the Maj. Op. at 13. Given that the scope of procedural default is

tenuousness of its position with respect to whether petitioner a matter of state law, I would be much more comfortable if

has procedurally defaulted his Eighth Amendment claim. For the majority had cited a single Tennessee opinion that

lack of more compelling authority, the majority hitches its explicitly draws this distinction. Frankly, I do not find it in

wagon to State v. West, 19 S.W.3d 753 (Tenn. 2000), a case West, and the majority concedes that “[t]he conceptual leap

that it concedes contains a “seeming contradiction” because from [reviewing] claims explicitly raised on direct appeal,

it holds that defendant’s vagueness claim was both although not properly preserved, to claims not raised at all is

“previously determined” and “waived.” Maj. Op. at 11 significant and, without West, there would be no Tennessee

(citing West, 19 S.W.3d at 756). However, West primarily authority for attempting it.” Maj. op. at 12. Given the

focuses upon waiver: “[W]hen West failed to raise the inherent contradictions in West, it is a leap that I am unwilling

[vagueness] issue on direct appeal, he effectively blocked any to make without further guidance from the courts of

consideration of this issue by this Court on post-conviction Tennessee.

review.” West, 19 S.W.3d at 756.

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

In Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320 (6th Cir. 1998), an opinion in

which I also concurred, we reviewed a district court reading

of Tennessee Code Ann. § 39-2-205 (1982) for “the notion

that, in capital cases, the state supreme court has to review

significant errors, whether or not they were raised by the

defendant.” Id. at 336. Coe rejected this reading as “too