Steiner v. Henderson

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Steiner v. Henderson No. 02-3395

ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0429P (6th Cir.)

File Name: 03a0429p.06 ATTORNEY, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:

Elizabeth A. Raies, TZANGAS, PLAKAS, MANNOS &

RECUPERO, Canton, Ohio, for Appellant. William J. Kopp,

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Cleveland,

Ohio, for Appellee.

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

_________________ _________________

VICKI STEINER, X OPINION

Plaintiff-Appellant, - _________________

-

- No. 02-3395 SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant

v. - Vicki Steiner appeals from the district court’s dismissal of her

> Title VII claim for failure to exhaust her administrative

, remedies. The district court dismissed Steiner’s claim under

WILLIAM J. HENDERSON , -

Postmaster General, United Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because Steiner had failed to file her

- gender discrimination claim with an Equal Employment

States Postal Service, - Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) officer within forty-five

Defendant-Appellee. - days of the alleged discriminatory occurrence, as required by

- 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). Steiner contends that principles

N of equitable tolling apply, despite her failure to timely contact

Appeal from the United States District Court an EEO counselor, because she actively and diligently

for the Northern District of Ohio at Akron. pursued a resolution to her complaint by following an

No. 01-01064—Dan A. Polster, District Judge. established employer policy concerning discrimination

complaints in the workplace. We affirm the decision of the

Argued: September 16, 2003 district court.

Decided and Filed: December 8, 2003 I.

Before: SUHRHEINRICH, COLE, and ROGERS, Circuit Steiner is an employee of the United States Postal Service

Judges. (“USPS”). For the past twenty-four years, she has worked at

the USPS mail processing plant in Canton, Ohio. In 1997,

_________________ she received a promotion to the position of Manager of

Distribution Operations (“MDO”) for the weekday day shift.

COUNSEL As a MDO, Steiner’s new responsibilities included managing

employees who process mail in the plant.

ARGUED: Elizabeth A. Raies, TZANGAS, PLAKAS,

MANNOS & RECUPERO, Canton, Ohio, for Appellant. In April 1998, Judson Zernechel arrived at the Canton plant

William J. Kopp, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES as the new plant manager, and Steiner’s supervisor. On

1

No. 02-3395 Steiner v. Henderson 3 4 Steiner v. Henderson No. 02-3395

October 4, 2000, Zernechel distributed a letter informing filed suit in the district court on May 3, 2001. The USPS

Steiner that she was to be reassigned, effective October 7, to filed a motion to dismiss Steiner’s complaint as untimely, and

the position of MDO “in training,” and that she would no the district court granted that motion on March 28, 2002,

longer be working the day shift Monday through Friday, but because Steiner had not filed her complaint with the EEOC

the midnight shift Thursday through Monday. within the forty-five day deadline provided by 29 C.F.R. §

1614.105(a)(1). Moreover, the district court found that there

Steiner was displeased with her reassignment and was no reason to equitably toll the filing deadline under the

apparently perceived the reassignment as discrimination circumstances. Steiner filed a notice of appeal to this Court

based on her gender. Accordingly, she sought redress. On on April 10, 2002, and her appeal of the district court’s

October 18, she sent a letter to Frank Neri, the Senior Plant dismissal is timely before us.

Manager and Zernechel’s direct superior, requesting a

meeting to discuss her reassignment. The letter stated that II.

Steiner felt she was “being treated disparately.”

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a

Neri responded on October 20, and informed Steiner that complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Amini v.

she should contact Zernechel directly to discuss her concerns. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 497 (6th Cir. 2001). We will

Steiner did not contact Zernechel as Neri had instructed, but dismiss the plaintiff’s claims only if it is clear that the

instead contacted Jordan Small, the District Manager and plaintiff “can prove no set of facts in support of the claims

Neri’s direct superior, by letter on November 8, and requested that would entitle him to relief.” Id. (citation omitted).

a meeting to discuss the situation. Small responded in writing

on November 15 and informed Steiner that he had no “We review a district court’s decision to grant or deny

jurisdiction to handle her complaint and stated that he was equitable tolling de novo when the facts are undisputed or the

referring her letter back to Neri, the Senior Plant Manager. district court rules, as a matter of law, that equitable tolling is

not available; in all other circumstances we review for an

Neri responded to the forwarded letter on December 4, and abuse of discretion.” Seay v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 339 F.3d

again informed Steiner that she should attempt to meet with 454, 469 (6th Cir. 2003).

Zernechel, her direct supervisor, to discuss the matter.

Specifically, Neri stated that he wished to “encourage III.

[Steiner] again to meet with Judson Zernechel so decisions

can be made that best suit [Steiner] and [her] future success Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as

with the [USPS].” Moreover, in this December 4 letter, Neri amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,

stated that he was willing to be present at any meeting 86 Stat. 103, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., provides the

between Zernechel and Steiner. exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in

federal employment. See Brown v. General Servs. Admin.,

Steiner again failed to attempt to meet with Zernechel, and 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976). “In permitting federal employees

contacted the EEOC for pre-complaint counseling on January to sue under Title VII, Congress conditioned the

9, 2001. She subsequently filed a Title VII complaint with government’s waiver of sovereign immunity upon a

the USPS EEOC on February 7, 2001. The USPS EEOC plaintiff’s satisfaction of ‘rigorous administrative exhaustion

dismissed her complaint as untimely on March 15, 2001. She requirements and time limitations.’” McFarland v.

No. 02-3395 Steiner v. Henderson 5 6 Steiner v. Henderson No. 02-3395

Henderson, 307 F.3d 402, 406 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting actual notice of the time restraint; (2) whether she had

Brown, 425 U.S. at 833). At issue here is the requirement that constructive notice of the time restraint; (3) the degree of

a federal employee claiming discrimination must contact an diligence exerted in pursuing her rights; (4) the degree of

Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) counselor within prejudice to the defendant; and (5) the reasonableness of

forty-five days of an alleged discriminatory occurrence. 29 plaintiff’s ignorance of the time constraint. EEOC v. Ky.

C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1) (2003). Failure to do so is cause for State Police Dep’t, 80 F.3d 1086, 1094 (6th Cir. 1996);

dismissal of the complaint by the agency, see 29 C.F.R. Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146, 151 (6th Cir. 1988). These

§ 1614.107(a)(2) (2003), as well as by the district court. See factors are not exclusive bases for equitable tolling, however,

Brown, 425 U.S. at 832 (noting that § 717(c) allows an and the decision to allow equitable tolling is made on a case-

aggrieved employee to file a civil action in federal district by-case basis. Seay, 339 F.3d at 469 (citations omitted).

court, but that the complainant must first seek relief in the

agency that had discriminated against him). Steiner attached a copy of the USPS’s “Publication 552,”

entitled “Manager’s Guide to Understanding Sexual

Steiner does not dispute that she failed to contact an EEO Harassment,” to her memorandum in opposition to the

counselor within forty-five days of the October 7, 2000, USPS’s motion to dismiss below.1 On page ten of that

reassignment. However, Steiner argues that the forty-five day publication, the forty-five day filing requirement is clearly

period is subject to principles of equitable tolling. Indeed, delineated. Steiner has admitted that, as a manager herself,

the forty-five day filing period is not a jurisdictional she was intimately familiar with these guidelines, and further

prerequisite, and can be tolled where principles of equity states that she relied on this publication to determine how to

demand it. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. proceed with her complaint. By her own admission, Steiner

385, 393 (1982); see also Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, had actual knowledge of the time limits. Cf. Amini, 259 F.3d

498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990) (extending Zipes to administrative at 501 (noting that the plaintiff, a lawyer, admitted in his brief

requirements for federal employees); Mitchell v. Chapman, that he was aware of both the EEOC filing requirements and

343 F.3d 811, 819-20 (6th Cir. 2003); Seay, 339 F.3d at 469. the applicable limitations period; agreeing with the district

This Court has held that a federal employee’s obligation to court that equitable tolling was not warranted). Moreover,

consult with an EEO counselor within a set time period as a Steiner’s correspondence with her superiors indicates that

precondition to suit is subject to equitable tolling, waiver, and Steiner had hired an attorney as early as October 18, 2000.

estoppel. Mitchell, 343 F.3d at 819-20. “Constructive knowledge of a time limit will usually be

imputed when the plaintiff retains an attorney within the

At the same time, the Supreme Court has made clear that limitations period.” Weigel v. Baptist Hosp., 302 F.3d 367,

tolling in a Title VII context should be allowed “only 376 (6th Cir. 2002); Jackson v. Richards Med. Co., 961 F.2d

sparingly.” Irwin, 498 U.S. at 457. This Court has similarly 575, 579 (6th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, we find little doubt

noted that equitable tolling is “available only in compelling that Steiner had actual, let alone constructive, notice of the

cases which justify a departure from established procedures.”

Puckett v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 889 F.2d 1481, 1488 (6th

Cir. 1989). 1

This publication deals only with sexual harassment claims, and not

In considering whether equitable tolling should apply, we discrimination claims. Steiner, ho wever, uses this publication to

generally look at five factors: (1) whether the plaintiff had dem onstrate that she was aware of the internal operating procedures of the

USPS.

No. 02-3395 Steiner v. Henderson 7 8 Steiner v. Henderson No. 02-3395

forty-five day filing deadline. She was aware of the filing complaints, and the University agreed that it would not

deadline and failed to follow the Senior Plant Manager’s use the time it spent in its investigation to prejudice

instructions on how to pursue her claim internally. Therefore, plaintiff with respect to any statute of limitations. It

the first, second, and fifth factors cut against Steiner’s appears to us that the University’s express statements,

argument for equitable tolling. and plaintiff’s reliance thereon, could reasonably have

led plaintiff to delay in the filing of her charges with the

Nevertheless, Steiner claims that the forty-five day filing EEOC.

period should be tolled because she diligently pursued her

claim during that time period. Steiner presents her 605 F.2d at 259. Here, Neri, through his letters, merely

correspondence with both Neri and Small to illustrate that she encouraged Steiner to first seek redress from Zernechel.

was in pursuit of her claim at all times. However, although Nowhere in either of Neri’s letters to Steiner did Neri mention

Steiner claims the pursuit of her claim was diligent, she has the filing deadline. Nor did Neri ever discourage Steiner from

admitted that at no time did she follow Neri’s instructions as immediately filing her claim with the EEOC. Therefore, we

to how to proceed with her claim. Neri twice instructed cannot find that Neri, or any other USPS supervisor, tricked

Steiner to contact Zernechel for another meeting, and even Steiner or did anything untoward in order to prevent her from

offered to appear at such a meeting. Steiner never contacted seeking EEOC counseling. Steiner was free to seek EEOC

Zernechel. Thus, the third factor also cuts against Steiner. counseling at any time. Cf. Seay, 338 F.3d at 468-70 (holding

that equitable tolling was warranted where the employer

Steiner further claims that Neri’s and Small’s refusal to informed the plaintiff that no one had received the job, but

agree to meet with her or to personally address her claim omitted additional information that another employee had

contributed to her missing the deadline, and constituted been “rotated” into the position for “developmental

misleading tactics that should likewise toll the deadline purposes”; stating that “[t]his was the critical information

period. This Court has held that affirmative representations Plaintiff needed to raise his suspicions about the employer’s

by the employer that misled a Title VII complainant into possible racially discriminatory motive in rejecting him”).

missing a filing deadline are sufficient to toll the applicable

Title VII period. See, e.g., Leake v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 605 Furthermore, Steiner has not presented any evidence that

F.2d 255, 259 (6th Cir. 1979); see also Irwin, 498 U.S. at 458 either Neri or Small blatantly disregarded USPS policy in an

(noting that the Court has allowed equitable tolling in effort to improperly delay satisfaction of Steiner’s claim.

situations where the claimant “has been induced or tricked by Steiner impliedly argues that either Neri, Small, or both, were

his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the filing deadline required to address her claim. In her affidavit, Steiner relies

to pass”). In Leake, we found it necessary to equitably toll on the aforementioned Publication 552 as the basis for this

the filing deadline because the defendant employer had assertion. However, Publication 552 does not make any

specifically requested that the plaintiff not seek EEOC specific individual responsible for such discrimination

counseling until it had time to investigate the plaintiff’s complaints, but matter of factly states that each manager,

allegations. There we found: postmaster, and supervisor has the “role [and responsibility]

to listen, inquire, and try to resolve a sexual harassment

It was during the period of voluntary negotiations that complaint,” and that if the supervisor does not “have the

plaintiff and the University agreed that she would give authority to conduct an inquiry, [he] must take it to a

the University sufficient time to investigate her manager, postmaster, or supervisor who does.” First, this is

No. 02-3395 Steiner v. Henderson 9 10 Steiner v. Henderson No. 02-3395

exactly what Small and Neri did in referring her to Zernechel. a “right-to-sue” letter, that she may pursue a claim in federal

This vague language does not necessarily render every USPS court. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 181.

manager or supervisor responsible for addressing any

employee’s claim. Second, even if Publication 552 does “Voluntary compliance is Title VII’s preferred method for

make every supervisor responsible, it applies only to promoting the goal of nondiscrimination; it also is the reason

harassment claims, not discrimination claims. The fact that for the EEOC’s existence.” St. John v. Employment Dev.

both harassment and discrimination claims potentially fall Dep’t., 642 F.2d 273, 275 (9th Cir. 1981). See generally

under Title VII and are both subject to the forty-five day Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974)

filing deadline does not necessarily mean that each claim is (stating that “[c]ooperation and voluntary compliance were

likewise governed by the same internal grievance procedures. selected” by Congress as the preferred means of assuring

In any event, we find no evidence that either Neri or Small equality of employment opportunities by eliminating

did anything at all to mislead Steiner or to prevent her from discrimination, and “[t]o this end, Congress created the

timely filing her claim with the EEOC. [EEOC]” and established a procedure by which the EEOC

and cooperating local agencies would have an opportunity to

Finally, assuming lack of prejudice to the defendant settle disputes through conference and conciliation before the

employer had been shown, Steiner would still not be entitled aggrieved party was allowed to file a lawsuit). Steiner’s

to equitable relief. The Supreme Court has held that the efforts contravene the congressional decision that the role of

absence of prejudice to the defendant employer “is not an conciliator belongs to a third party with expertise, the EEOC.

independent basis for invoking the doctrine and sanctioning As such, her efforts do not provide a suitable basis upon

deviations from established procedures.” Baldwin County which to grant equitable relief. Cf. Puckett, 889 F.2d at 1488

Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984) (per (holding that equitable tolling was not warranted where the

curiam); Amini, 259 F.3d at 501. plaintiff merely requested withdrawal of her EEOC charges

but did not request a right-to-sue letter; stating that “[s]uch a

In essence, Steiner seeks equitable tolling because she was decision flouts the statutory requirement of a receipt of a

proactive in seeking conciliation, and did not passively let the right-to-sue letter, and amounts to a position of arrogance

time slip away. Her efforts are at odds with the will of regarding the statutory requirement as mere surplusage”).

Congress, however. “In Title VII, Congress set up an

elaborate administrative procedure, implemented through the As we remarked in Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks

EEOC, that is designed to assist in the investigation of claims Museum of Art, 209 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 2000), “[t]ypically,

of racial discrimination in the workplace and to work towards equitable tolling applies only when a litigant’s failure to meet

the resolution of these claims through conciliation rather than a legally-mandated deadline unavoidably arose from

litigation.” Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, circumstances beyond that litigant’s control.” Id. at 560-61

180-81 (1989) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)); see also (and cases therein); see also Brown v. Crowe, 963 F.2d 895,

Morgan v. Washington Mfg. Co., 660 F.2d 710, 711 (6th Cir. 899-900 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that equitable tolling applied

1981) (stating that the purpose of Title VII’s administrative where the legal mistake which caused the plaintiff not to meet

scheme is “to encourage reconciliation and arbitration of the statutory time requirements was made by a state agency

employee grievances prior to litigation”). It is only after these and through no fault of plaintiff). The circumstances of this

procedures have been exhausted and the plaintiff has received case certainly do not fit within that model. As the Supreme

Court observed in Baldwin,

No. 02-3395 Steiner v. Henderson 11

[p]rocedural requirements established by Congress for

gaining access to the federal courts are not to be

disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for

particular litigants. As we stated in Mohasco Corp. v.

Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 . . . (1980), “[i]n the long run,

experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural

requirements specified by the legislature is the best

guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law.”

Brown, 466 U.S. at 152. Accordingly, we hold that the

district court did not err in dismissing this action for failure to

meet the forty-five day filing period. In other words, the

district court did not err in holding as a matter of law that

equitable tolling was not warranted on the facts of this case.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of

the district court.