Williams v. Meyer

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Williams v. Meyer No. 01-1951

ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0344P (6th Cir.)

File Name: 03a0344p.06 GENERAL, CORRECTIONS DIVISION, Lansing,

Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: John A. Shea, Ann

Arbor, Michigan, for Appellant. Brad H. Beaver, OFFICE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, CORRECTIONS

DIVISION, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellee.

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

_________________ OBERDORFER, D. J., delivered the opinion of the court,

in which DAUGHTREY, J., joined. BOGGS, J. (p. 18),

THEODORE G. WILLIAMS, X delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

Petitioner-Appellant, -

- _________________

- No. 01-1951

v. - OPINION

> _________________

,

WILLIAM MEYER, - OBERDORFER, District Judge. Theodore G. Williams,

Respondent-Appellee. - the petitioner, appeals the district court’s order denying his

N motion for relief from judgment. The district court entered

Appeal from the United States District Court judgment, denying Williams’ petition for habeas relief, after

for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. Williams failed to timely file objections to the magistrate’s

No. 93-75495—Paul D. Borman, District Judge. report and recommendation. Williams has demonstrated that

his failure to timely file his objections was the result of

Argued: May 8, 2003 “excusable neglect,” entitling him to relief. Accordingly, we

reverse and remand.

Decided and Filed: September 25, 2003

I. BACKGROUND

Before: BOGGS and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges;

OBERDORFER, District Judge.* A. Relevant Statutory Provisions

_________________ 1. Michigan’s Criminal Sexual Psychopath Act

COUNSEL Until its repeal, effective August 1, 1968, Michigan’s

Criminal Sexual Psychopath Act (the “Sexual Psychopath

ARGUED: John A. Shea, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Act”), Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 780.501-.509 (West

Appellant. Brad H. Beaver, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY 1968), repealed by 1968 Mich. Pub. Acts 143 (Aug. 1, 1968),

provided that a criminal defendant in Michigan who was

designated a “criminal sexual psychopathic person” would be

committed to the custody of the state hospital commission to

* be confined in an appropriate state institution. Id. § 780.505.

The Honorable Louis F. Oberdorfer, United States District Judge for

the District of Columbia, sitting by designation. A criminal sexual psychopathic person was defined as “[a]ny

1

No. 01-1951 Williams v. Meyer 3 4 Williams v. Meyer No. 01-1951

person who is suffering from a mental disorder and is not understand the need for treatment and whose continued

feeble-minded, which mental disorder is coupled with behavior can reasonably be expected, on the basis of

criminal propensities to the commission of sexual offenses.”1 competent clinical opinion, to result in significant physical

Id. § 780.501. After the Sexual Psychopath Act was repealed, harm to himself or herself or others. Id. § 330.1401. Mental

the Michigan Supreme Court ordered that the discharge of illness is defined as “a substantial disorder or thought or

persons in custody pursuant to the Act would continue to be mood that significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity

governed by the Act’s discharge provisions until further to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary

legislative clarification. Admin. Order 1969-4, 382 Mich. demands of life.” Id. § 330.1400(g).

xxix (1969). As no such clarification ever occurred, the Act’s

discharge provisions have continued to apply to such persons. B. Facts

Under those provisions (section 7 of the Act as enacted), a

person in custody “shall be discharged only after there are In October 1967, Theodore Williams, the petitioner, entered

reasonable grounds to believe that such person has recovered a plea of guilty in Michigan state court to a charge of first

from such psychopathy to a degree that he will not be a degree murder. Prior to sentencing, Williams was designated

menace to others.” Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. § 780.507 (West a “criminal sexual psychopath,” under the then-applicable

1968). Sexual Psychopath Act, and committed to the custody of a

state mental hospital. He was initially discharged in

2. Michigan’s Mental Health Code September 1973, but he was returned to custody in 1979,

following a determination by the Michigan Supreme Court

With the exception of persons committed pursuant to the that he had been improperly released.2 See People v.

Sexual Psychopath Act, Michigan’s Mental Health Code

governs the commitment and discharge of persons in the

custody of the Michigan Department of Mental Health. Mich. 2

A convoluted series of events transpired between W illiams’ release

Comp. Laws Ann. § 330.2050(5) (West 2003). Under the in 1973 and his return to custody in 1979. W hen W illiams pleaded guilty

Mental Health Code, a person must be discharged when “the in 1967, he had been charged with the rape and murder of a seven-year-

patient’s mental condition is such that he or she no longer old girl in Allegan County, Michigan. After his release, Allegan County,

meets the criteria of a person requiring treatment.” Id. for reasons not apparent from the record, filed new charges based on that

§ 330.1476(2). A “person requiring treatment” is defined as same rape and murder. W illiams again pleaded guilty, this time to second

degree murder, and he was sentenced to life in prison. Williams appealed,

an individual “who has mental illness” and (1) who as a result citing section 8 o f the Sexual Psychopath A ct. Section 8 provided that a

of that illness can reasonably be expected within the near defendant was immune from prosecution for the “the offense with which

future to intentionally or unintentionally seriously injure he originally stood charged, or convicted” prior to commitment. Mich.

himself or herself or another individual; (2) who as a result of Comp. Laws Ann. § 780.508 (West 1968). The Michigan Court of

that illness is unable to attend to his or her basic physical Appeals held that section 8 applied and reversed W illiams’ conviction.

The Michigan Supreme C ourt affirmed, but ordered Williams returned to

needs necessary to avoid serious harm in the near future; or the custody of the Department of Mental Health on the ground that he had

(3) whose judgment is so impaired that he or she is unable to been “imprope rly released” in 1973. People v. Williams, 406 Mich. 990

(1979). The case was rem anded to the state circuit court to permit

W illiams to file a new petition for discharge. People v. Williams, 407

1

Mich. 91 2 (1979 ).

Under the Sexual Psychopath Act, either the state or the defendant

could seek this designation. Shortly after his release in 1973 , W illiams was also arrested and

No. 01-1951 Williams v. Meyer 5 6 Williams v. Meyer No. 01-1951

Williams, 406 Mich. 909 (1979). From then until the present, JA 105-111 (People v. Williams, 580 N.W.2d 438, 441-44

he has remained in the custody of the Michigan Department (Mich. Ct. App. 1998)). On November 24, 1998, the

of Mental Health. He has filed a number of petitions for Michigan Supreme Court denied Williams’ application for

discharge pursuant to section 7 of the repealed Sexual leave to appeal. See People v. Williams, 589 N.W.2d 287

Psychopath Act, all of which have been denied. Today, he is (Mich. 1998).

the only person remaining in the custody of the Michigan

Department of Mental Health who was committed under, and 2. Federal Collateral Proceedings

whose discharge is governed by, the Sexual Psychopath Act.

After the state circuit court rejected his constitutional

C. Procedural History claims in 1993, Williams filed a petition in federal district

court seeking habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On

1. State Proceedings January 5, 1995, the district court dismissed the petition,

pending final resolution of the state court proceedings. The

The present action began with the petition for discharge case was reopened on January 14, 1999, after the Michigan

Williams filed on September 19, 1991. In addition to seeking Supreme Court denied Williams’ application for leave to

discharge under section 7 of the Sexual Psychopath Act, appeal. The district court appointed counsel to review, and

Williams contended that the application of section 7 violated amend as necessary, Williams’ petition. Williams filed an

his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. amended petition on October 13, 2000, claiming that

On July 29, 1993, the state circuit court rejected Williams’ requiring him to seek discharge under section 7 deprived him

constitutional challenges. JA 77-100 (People v. Williams, No. of his constitutional rights to due process and equal

67-4411 FY (Allegan County, Mich. Cir. Ct. July 29, 1993)). protection. His due process claim had two components.

On June 13, 1994, at the conclusion of a series of evidentiary First, he claimed that section 7 failed to satisfy the

hearings, it orally denied Williams’ petition. A subsequent requirements of constitutional due process because it only

written order stated that “it was established by clear and required the state to prove a predisposition toward, not a

convincing evidence that the defendant has not recovered “likelihood” of, future dangerousness, in conflict with the due

from his criminal sexual psychopathy to a degree that he will process principles established by the Supreme Court in

not be a menace to others.” JA 103. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), a decision

upholding the standard for commitment in Kansas’ Sexually

The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. It ruled that the Violent Predator Act. Next, he claimed that even if section 7

constitutional challenges were without merit and that the did not on its face violate due process, his continued detention

circuit court had not clearly erred in denying discharge. See did because even under section 7 there was insufficient

evidence to support the state circuit court’s conclusion that he

was not entitled to release. His equal protection claim rested

charged with the rap e and murd er of a thirteen-yea r-old girl in Newaygo

on a comparison between the standard for discharge under

County, Michigan, a crime he had committed in 1966 and confessed to section 7 and the standard for discharge under the Mental

when he was arrested in 1967. Williams was unsuccessful in his attempt Health Code. The latter, he claimed, was easier to satisfy,

to get those charges dismissed under se ction 8 , as they were not the basis resulting in his being treated differently than other similarly

for his conviction. Nonetheless, for reasons not apparent from the record, situated persons held under the Mental Health Code. The

those charges were dism issed after Williams entered his second plea of

guilty in Allegan County.

No. 01-1951 Williams v. Meyer 7 8 Williams v. Meyer No. 01-1951

district court referred the case to a magistrate judge on Kansas v. Crane . . . is unlikely to affect the merits of this

January 16, 2001. case.” JA 194. That same day, the district court accepted the

magistrate’s report and recommendation and denied

On March 7, 2001, the magistrate judge issued his report Williams’ petition for habeas relief. JA 195-96.

and recommendation, concluding that the habeas petition

should be denied. JA 145-173. Williams had ten days to file On May 11, 2001, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

objections to that report. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). On Procedure 60(b), Williams filed a motion for relief from

March 16, 2001, Williams filed a consent motion for an judgment, for reconsideration of the order denying his second

enlargement of time, asking the district court for an additional motion for an enlargement of time, and for leave to file

thirty days to file objections because “the issues are novel and objections, which he attached. JA 197-211. As grounds for

complex, the record voluminous, and other matters already relief, Williams argued that his failure to timely file

scheduled [for counsel] when the Report and objections was “excusable neglect” under Rule 60(b).

Recommendation was received will occupy a significant Williams’ motion described in greater detail the reasons why

amount of [counsel’s] time in the next couple of weeks.” JA counsel had failed to file objections within the time allotted:

189-90. The district court granted the motion, giving

Williams until April 25, 2001, to file objections. JA 191. undersigned counsel informs the Court that he fell ill on

two separate occasions in the time between his first and

On April 24, 2001, Williams filed a second motion for second motions for enlargement. As a result, he lost

enlargement of time, asking for an additional twenty-one several days of work. Moreover, also during this time a

days, until May 17, 2001, to file objections. JA 192-93. The close friend came into the final stage of a terminal

motion stated that counsel needed the extra time “[o]n illness, which required the undersigned’s attention in

account of recent illnesses and his trial schedule” and to both a personal and representative capacity, resulting in

review the implications of the Supreme Court’s April 2, 2001 a additional time being diverted from the office. Those

grant of certiorari in Kansas v. Crane, 532 U.S. 937 (2001), unexpected events, combined with an already heavy

a case counsel thought had the potential to alter the guiding hearings schedule (including a trial) during this time, and

constitutional principles of involuntary hospitalization.3 JA combined further with the unexpected Crane

193. Williams’ counsel was unable to speak with Williams development, made it impossible for the undersigned to

prior to making this request, but he informed the district court file [William’s] objections within the enlargement of

that he was “confident” Williams would not object. JA 193. time initially given.

On April 27, 2001, the district court denied the motion,

stating: “Petitioner’s counsel has already had one extension JA 198. With respect to the potential relevance of Crane,

of time, and the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Williams argued that if the Supreme Court were to decide in

Crane that the Constitution requires a showing of volitional

impairment to prove future dangerousness, that would support

3

The issue presented in Crane was what, if any, showing of volitional

Williams’ claim that the quantum of proof of dangerousness

impairment a state must make before civilly committing a sexual required under the Sexual Psychopath Act did not satisfy

offender. Ultimately, the Court held that a state does not need to prove constitutional due process. JA 199. Finally, Williams

the offender’s total or complete lack of control over his dangerous pointed out that if the district court denied the motion for

behavior, but does need to make some determination of a lack of contro l.

534 U.S. 407 (2002).

No. 01-1951 Williams v. Meyer 9 10 Williams v. Meyer No. 01-1951

relief from judgment, he would be barred from any appeal on seeking relief has a meritorious claim or defense. Id. at 845.

the merits. JA 204. Culpability is “framed” by the specific language of the rule;

i.e., a party demonstrates a lack of culpability by

On June 6, 2001, the district court denied Williams’ motion demonstrating “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable

for relief from judgment, for reconsideration of the order neglect.” Waifersong, Ltd. v. Classic Music Vending, 976

denying the second motion for enlargement of time, and for F.2d 290, 292 (6th Cir. 1992). And because Rule 60(b)(1)

leave to file his objections instanter. JA 174-75. The court “mandates” such a demonstration, “[i]t is only when the

ruled that Williams’ counsel’s “recent illnesses, his trial [party seeking relief] can carry this burden that he will be

schedule and the potential need to review a case before the permitted to demonstrate that he also can satisfy the other two

Supreme Court” did not amount to “excusable neglect to factors: the existence of a meritorious defense and the absence

justify granting relief under Rule 60(b).” JA 175. of substantial prejudice to the [other party].” Id.; see also

Weiss v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 283 F.3d 790, 794

Williams filed a timely Notice of Appeal on July 3, 2001. (6th Cir. 2002) (a party seeking relief “must demonstrate first

On January 11, 2002, the Sixth Circuit issued a Certificate of and foremost that the default did not result from his culpable

Appealability, limited to “the sole issue of whether the district conduct”). A district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b)(1) motion

court properly denied Williams’ motion for relief from is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United Coin, 705 F.2d at

judgment and for leave to file objections to the magistrate’s 843.

report and recommendation.”

B. Application

II. DISCUSSION

1. Culpability of Party Seeking Relief

A. Legal Principles

We start, as we must, by considering Williams’ culpability.

In relevant part, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) Williams contends that the failure to timely file objections

provides that “on motion and upon such terms as are just, the was not the result of culpable conduct but of “excusable

court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment . . . for . . . neglect.” A party’s conduct is culpable if it “display[s] either

mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.” Fed. R. an intent to thwart judicial proceedings or a reckless disregard

Civ. P. 60(b)(1). Where a party seeks relief from a default for the effect of its conduct on those proceedings.”

judgment,4 Rule 60(b)(1) should be applied “equitably and Amerinational Indus. v. Action-Tungsram, Inc., 925 F.2d 970,

liberally . . . to achieve substantial justice.” United Coin 978 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting INVST Financial Group, Inc. v.

Meter v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 705 F.2d 839, 844-45 (6th Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc., 815 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1992).

Cir. 1983) (internal quotations omitted). In deciding whether Moreover, although clients are held liable for the acts and

relief is warranted, three factors are relevant: (1) whether the omissions of their counsel, see, e.g., United States v. Reyes,

party seeking relief is culpable; (2) whether the party 307 F.3d 451 (6th Cir. 2002), “this court, like many others,

opposing relief will be prejudiced; and (3) whether the party has been extremely reluctant to uphold the dismissal of a case

or the entering of a default judgment merely to discipline an

4

errant attorney because such a sanction deprives the client of

Although these principles com e from cases involving defa ult his day in court,” see Buck v. United States Dep’t of

judgments, the parties assume, and we agree, that the same approach Agriculture, 960 F.2d 603, 608 (6th Cir. 1992).

should govern the prese nt case.

No. 01-1951 Williams v. Meyer 11 12 Williams v. Meyer No. 01-1951

The record establishes that in failing to timely file neither demonstrate with respect to a sexual offender’s lack of

Williams nor his counsel engaged in any culpable conduct. control, clearly had the potential to be relevant to Williams’

First, Williams’ failure to timely file objections does not claims.

appear to have been “willful” or the result of “carelessness”

or “negligence.” See Weiss, 283 F.3d at 795. He timely Finally, Williams did not delay seeking relief or filing his

asked for enlargements of time, and the time requested was objections. He filed his motion for relief, with objections

not extraordinary. His first motion for an enlargement of attached, almost immediately after the district court denied

time, which was granted, was timely filed and sought merely the second motion for enlargement of time and entered

an additional thirty days. The second motion was also timely judgment. And the objections Williams seeks to file are not

filed and asked for only an additional twenty-one days. mere repetitions of his original petition. Given these

Moreover, the length of time that lapsed between the circumstances, Williams’ failure to timely file objections was

appointment of Williams’ counsel and the filing of the the result of “excusable neglect,” not culpable conduct.

amended petition, while not irrelevant, does not obviate the

need for sufficient time after receiving the magistrate’s report 2. Prejudice to Prevailing Party

and recommendation to review the actual report and prepare

responsive objections. The respondent concedes that granting the requested relief

will cause it no prejudice.

Nor did Williams fail to give reasons for needing additional

time. See, e.g., Wilson v. Cassidy (In re Cassidy), 273 B.R. 3. Meritoriousness of Claim or Defense

531 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002). In both the second motion for

an enlargement of time and the motion for relief from The final factor to consider is the meritoriousness of the

judgment, Williams cited a number of reasons for needing claim of the party seeking relief – in this case, the

additional time, including illness, preexisting professional meritoriousness of Williams’ objections to the magistrate’s

obligations, the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in report and recommendation. A claim or defense is

Kansas v. Crane, the complexity of the issues, the magnitude “meritorious,” if “there is some possibility that the outcome

of the record, and the magistrate’s reliance on caselaw from of the suit after a full trial will be contrary to the result

other jurisdictions. All of these events were mostly or achieved by the default.” INVST Financial v. Chem-Nuclear

entirely beyond counsel’s control, and there is no evidence Systems, 815 F.2d 391, 398-99 (6th Cir. 1987) (internal

that the any of the claimed reasons were false or frivolous. quotations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Amerinational

The respondent asks us to penalize Williams for failing to Indus. v. Action-Tungsram, Inc., 925 F.2d 970, 977 (6th Cir.

provide the district court with the specific details of his 1991). The test of meritoriousness is not “likelihood of

counsel’s illness or trial schedule, but we do not believe that success,” but merely whether the claim or defense is “good at

fact supports a finding of culpability where, as here, he was law.” United Coin, 705 F.2d at 845. Ambiguous or disputed

never asked for such information and the veracity of the facts must be construed “in the light most favorable to the

information has not been challenged. The respondent also [defaulted party].” Amerinational, 925 F.2d at 977.

contends, as the district court ruled, that Crane had no Accordingly, we must decide whether permitting the filing of

relevance to Williams’ case. We disagree. The grant of Williams’ objections, which opens up the possibility of an

certiorari in Crane, presenting (and ultimately resolving) the appeal on the merits, creates “some possibility” of a different

issue of what the federal Constitution requires a state to

No. 01-1951 Williams v. Meyer 13 14 Williams v. Meyer No. 01-1951

outcome. Applying this standard, as explained below, we The magistrate judge agreed that Hendricks established that

believe that several of his objections are meritorious. due process requires proof of a likelihood of future

dangerousness, but rejected Williams’ claim that section 7

a. Meritorious Objection to Analysis of First Due does not require such proof. He acknowledged that the

Process Claim language of section 7 differs from the language of Kansas’s

Sexually Violent Predator Act, but found those differences

Williams’ first due process claim is that section 7 is immaterial as the Michigan courts, in his view, had applied

unconstitutional because it does not require sufficient proof section 7 in a manner that “mirrors the Kansas statute.” JA

of future dangerousness. Specifically, he claims that under 162. He justified his conclusion by pointing out that the

section 7, as interpreted and applied by Michigan courts, the Michigan Court of Appeals stated in its opinion that

State can prevent discharge by proving merely a Williams’ claim failed “because the state proved, as required

predisposition toward future dangerousness, whereas the by the [Sexual Psychopath Act], that [Williams] would pose

Supreme Court’s decision in Kansas v. Hendricks, upholding an actual threat of danger to others if he were release[d] from

Kansas’ Sexually Violent Predator Act, established that his detention.” JA 162-63 (quoting Williams, 228 Mich. App.

continued confinement requires proof of a likelihood of future at 555 (JA 109)). Relying on this language, he concluded that

dangerousness. the “menace to others” language of section 7 serves the same

purpose as the “likelihood of such conduct” language in the

In Hendricks, in the course of resolving the specific issues Kansas statute, namely, to insure that continued commitment

before it, the Supreme Court observed that civil commitment is based on a finding of a likelihood of future dangerousness.

statutes generally satisfy due process when “they have

coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some Williams objects to the magistrate’s reliance on the

additional factor, such as a mental illness or mental Michigan Court of Appeals’ opinion as the basis for his

abnormality.” It then concluded that Kansas’ Sexually conclusion that section 7 requires finding a likelihood of

Violent Predator Act satisfied this standard because it future dangerousness. JA 207. He contends that the opinion

required “evidence of past sexually violent behavior and a does not clearly impose such a requirement, as it also

present mental condition that creates a likelihood of such describes the required finding in terms of a predisposition or

conduct in the future if the person is not incapacitated.”5 521 propensity toward future dangerousness. Id. (citing Williams,

U.S. at 357-58 (emphasis added). 228 Mich. App. at 554-555 (JA 109)).

We agree. In its opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals

states that Williams poses an “actual threat of danger,” but it

5 also describes section 7 as requiring the state to prove

Kansa s’ Sexually Vio lent Predator Act is an act similar, but not “criminal propensities to commit future sex offenses,” or a

identical, to M ichgan ’s Sexual Psychopath Ac t. The Kansas Act provides

for the civil co mmitment o f a “sexually violent predator,” defined as a

“mental disorder that predisposes him to commit future sex

person (1) convicted of, or charged with, a sexually violent offense, offenses.” JA 109 (Williams, 228 Mich. App. at 554-555).

(2) who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder, and This conflicting language calls into question the magistrate’s

(3) which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual conclusion that it has been clearly established by the

violence. A person held under this statute must be discharged if, at any Michigan courts that section 7 requires proof of a likelihood

time, the state can no longer sa tisfy its burden of p roving these facts

beyo nd a reasonable doubt.

No. 01-1951 Williams v. Meyer 15 16 Williams v. Meyer No. 01-1951

of future dangerousness and persuades us that Williams’ preclude the possibility that a federal court might nonetheless

objection is meritorious. conclude that there are differences between the two schemes

and that those differences are constitutionally significant. The

b. Meritorious Objections to Equal Protection magistrate’s analysis does not address this possibility.

Analysis Moreover, Williams’ claim that the burdens are not identical,

and that it is more difficult to obtain release under section 7,

Williams’ equal protection claim is that section 7 is is supported by the testimony of at least one expert. See JA

unconstitutional because it subjects him to a different, and 41 (describing testimony of Dr. Mark Fettman). Accordingly,

more difficult to satisfy, standard for release than that applied we are persuaded that this objection is meritorious.

to other involuntary detainees, including sexual offenders

committed after being found guilty but mentally ill or not Williams also objects to the magistrate’s conclusion that

guilty by reason of insanity, who are covered by the Mental any difference between his treatment under section 7 and the

Health Code. treatment of other sexual offenders under the Mental Health

Code is constitutionally insignificant because it results from

The magistrate rejected Williams’ equal protection claim the state’s “substantial” interest in improving its criminal

on several grounds. First, again relying on the Michigan justice, sentencing and mental health schemes. He contends

Court of Appeals’ opinion, he concluded that standards for that the magistrate erred because he failed to apply strict

discharge in the Mental Health Code and in section 7 “largely scrutiny, which requires that the government’s interests be

mirror” each other and, therefore, that Williams could not compelling. We agree. Any difference in treatment of

show any constitutionally significant difference between his involuntary detainees is subject to strict scrutiny. See Foucha

treatment and the treatment of other involuntary detainees v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 85-86 (1992). As the magistrate’s

under the Mental Health Code. JA 166. Moreover, he ruled, analysis fails to apply this standard, Williams’ second

even if the standards are different, the equal protection claim objection to the magistrate’s equal protection analysis is also

fails because “[i]mprovement in the criminal justice, meritorious.

sentencing, and mental health schemes of a state are

substantial governmental interests, and a state does not violate III. CONCLUSION

equal protection by applying different schemes to persons

who committed their crimes at different times.” JA 169. As all three Coin factors weigh in Williams’ favor, the

district court should have granted Williams’ motion for relief

Williams first objects to the magistrate’s conclusion that from judgment and permitted him to file his objections.

section 7 imposes the same burden as the Mental Health Accordingly, and for the above stated reasons, the district

Code. He argues that the definition of future dangerousness court’s order denying Williams’ motion for relief from

in the Mental Health Code is “specific and narrow,” while the judgment, for reconsideration of the order denying a second

definition in section 7 is “broad and general,” making it easier enlargement of time to file objections and for leave to file

to obtain release under the Mental Health Code. JA 210. As objections is REVERSED. The district court’s April 27,

the magistrate recognized, the Michigan Court of Appeals’ 2001 order denying the second motion for enlargement of

finding that the Mental Health Code and section 7 “largely time is REVERSED; its April 27, 2001 order accepting the

mirror” each other is a construction of state law that is magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and denying

binding on a federal court. However, that finding does not Williams’ application for the writ of habeas corpus is

No. 01-1951 Williams v. Meyer 17 18 Williams v. Meyer No. 01-1951

VACATED; and its April 27, 2001 judgment in favor of the ______________

respondent and against the petitioner is VACATED. The

case is REMANDED with instructions for the district court DISSENT

to accept Williams’ objections for filing, and to issue a ______________

decision on Williams’ petition after consideration of all of his

objections.6 BOGGS, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent

from my colleagues’ holding that counsel committed

“excusable neglect” in failing to file objections to the

magistrate judge’s report in this case. Counsel had asked for

an extension of time for thirty days beyond the ten-day period

prescribed for such objections. The court actually granted an

additional thirty-nine days, to April 25.

Counsel, now having had forty-nine days since the filing of

the magistrate judge’s report, waited until the forty-eighth day

to ask for an additional twenty-one day extension.

Under these circumstances, waiting until the next to the last

day to file the extension was virtually defying the judge’s

right to rule on the motion. The circumstances at issue here,

while certainly trying, are in no way out of the ordinary for

legal practice. Other professional and personal commitments,

which did not arise at the last moment, are part and parcel of

doing business as a lawyer. The reasons relied on by my

colleagues for finding this neglect excusable would be present

in very many cases before our court. By waiting until the end

of the extended period to file a request for yet another

extension, counsel insured that the judge would have no

choice between dismissing the case, with the harsh

consequences that are noted in the opinion, and acceeding to

counsel’s request, whatever its merits. Under these

circumstances, I would hold that the test of United Coin

Meter and of Weiss has been met and that counsel’s actions

show carelessness and/or negligence in dealing with the time

given him by the court’s initial extension of time.

6

A de termination o n remand that W illiams has been dep rived of his I therefore respectfully dissent.

constitutional right to due pro cess or equa l protection d oes not entitle him

to release, but to have a state court recon sider his petition for discharge

guided by the federal court’s final ruling o n the merits.