The opinion
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0127P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 00a0127p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
;
ROGER ANTHONY BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 99-5457
v.
>
JAMES MORGAN, Warden;
JAMES B. MITCHELL; DOUG
Defendants-Appellees.
SAPP,
1
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington.
No. 98-00492—Karl S. Forester, District Judge.
Submitted: February 3, 2000
Decided and Filed: April 7, 2000
Before: MERRITT and MOORE, Circuit Judges;
HEYBURN, District Judge.*
*
The Honorable John G. Heyburn II, United States District Judge for
the Western District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.
1
2 Brown v. Morgan, et al. No. 99-5457 No. 99-5457 Brown v. Morgan, et al. 3
_________________ unambiguously requires exhaustion as a mandatory threshold
requirement in prison litigation. Prisoners are therefore
COUNSEL prevented from bringing suit in federal court for the period of
time required to exhaust “such administrative remedies as are
ON BRIEF: Roger Anthony Brown, West Liberty, available.” For this reason, the statute of limitations which
Kentucky, pro se. applied to Brown’s civil rights action was tolled for the period
during which his available state remedies were being
_________________ exhausted. See Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 157-59
(5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); Cooper v. Nielson, 194 F.3d
OPINION 1316, 1999 WL 719514 (9th Cir. (Cal.)).
_________________
In the case before us, it is not clear when the period of
MERRITT, Circuit Judge. This appeal arises from pro se exhaustion expired. In order to properly determine the last
Kentucky prisoner Roger Anthony Brown’s civil rights suit possible date on which Brown could file his complaint, it is
against prison officials for allegedly denying him access to the necessary to determine the period of time during which the
courts. The District Court dismissed his civil rights suit as limitations period was tolled in order for Brown to pursue his
frivolous for failure to comply with the statute of limitations administrative remedies. Therefore, we REVERSE the
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The case has been referred to District Court’s dismissal and REMAND in order that the
this panel pursuant to Rule 34(j)(1), Rules of the Sixth District Court may consider and decide the period during
Circuit. We unanimously agree that oral argument is not which the statute of limitations was tolled and for such other
needed. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a). proceedings as may be necessary.
Brown, proceeding in forma pauperis, claimed in a
complaint dated November 30, 1998, that several Kentucky
corrections officials denied him access to the courts by
denying him access to legal books and legal aides. The
District Court dismissed Brown’s suit, concluding that it was
barred by Kentucky’s one-year statute of limitations. In his
timely appeal, Brown argues that the district court erred by
dismissing his suit as barred by the statute of limitations. The
defendants have not been served. We review de novo a
judgment dismissing a suit as frivolous under § 1915A. See
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act amended 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e to provide: “No action shall be brought with respect
to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any
other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison,
or other correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a) (1999) (emphasis added). This language