Argaw v. Ashcroft

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

WONDEMU GEBREEGZIABH ARGAW, 

Petitioner,

v.  No. 03-2436

JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney General,

Respondent.



On Petition for Review of an Order of

the Board of Immigration Appeals.

(A46-087-001)

Argued: September 30, 2004

Decided: January 31, 2005

Before MICHAEL and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges,

and Roger W. TITUS, United States District Judge

for the District of Maryland,

sitting by designation.

Petition for review granted; order of removal reversed by published

opinion. Judge Michael wrote the opinion, in which Judge Duncan

and Judge Titus joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Sidney Leighton Moore, III, Atlanta, Georgia, for Peti-

tioner. Jonathan F. Cohn, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, Washing-

ton, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Peter D. Keisler, Assistant

2 ARGAW v. ASHCROFT

Attorney General, Civil Division, David V. Bernal, Assistant Direc-

tor, Jennifer Paisner, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUS-

TICE, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, Washington,

D.C., for Respondent.

OPINION

MICHAEL, Circuit Judge:

Wondemu G. Argaw, an alien with a green card, is subject to an

order of removal, and he petitions for review of the decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or the Board). The case arose

when Argaw returned from a visit to Ethiopia in possession of khat,

a plant whose leaves are chewed as a stimulant. The order of removal

against Argaw stands on the BIA’s legal determination that khat is a

controlled substance. We lack jurisdiction to review an order of

removal against an alien who is removable for committing certain

criminal offenses, such as the importation of a controlled substance.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2). We have jurisdiction, however, to deter-

mine whether the facts that would deprive us of jurisdiction are pres-

ent. In this case, one of the jurisdiction-stripping facts — a controlled

substance offense — is missing. Because khat is not listed as a con-

trolled substance and it has not been established when khat might

contain a controlled substance, Argaw’s conduct did not amount to a

criminal offense. Accordingly, we are not deprived of jurisdiction,

and we reverse the order of removal.

I.

Argaw, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, returned

to Washington Dulles Airport on November 7, 1998, after a two-

month visit to Ethiopia, his native country. On his Customs Declara-

tion form, Argaw checked a box indicating that he was bringing agri-

cultural products into the United States. When the U.S. Customs

Service inspected his luggage, agents found a quantity of khat, a tradi-

tional herbal stimulant widely used in East Africa and the lower Ara-

bian peninsula. The Customs agents seized the khat, believing it was

a controlled substance under U.S. law. Argaw, who speaks Amharic

ARGAW v. ASHCROFT 3

and reads only a "little" English, J.A. 58, signed a second Customs

form, entitled "Agreement to Pay Monetary Penalty," in which he

agreed to pay a penalty of $500 for failing to declare a controlled sub-

stance, listed as 6.65 pounds of khat. He did not have the assistance

of an interpreter when he signed the penalty form.

Later that same day, an Immigration and Naturalization Service

(INS) agent took a sworn statement from Argaw with the assistance

of an interpreter. According to Argaw, he was carrying five or six

bunches of khat, or about a handful, that he had bought in Ethiopia

for the equivalent of approximately sixteen U.S. dollars. The khat was

to be a gift for family and friends in the United States. Argaw insisted

he did not know that khat was illegal in this country. Finally, Argaw

said he had other "twig and leaf" material, J.A. 96, used for making

a fermented drink, that the Customs agents mistook for khat.

The INS initiated removal proceedings against Argaw. He was

charged as (1) an arriving alien who admits committing acts that con-

stitute the essential elements of a violation of a controlled substances

law, in this case the unlawful importation of such a substance, and as

(2) an arriving alien who the INS has reason to believe is an illicit

trafficker in a controlled substance. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II);

21 U.S.C. § 952; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C) (1999) (amended 2000).

Argaw’s attempted importation of the khat was the basis for the

charges. Khat, however, is not listed as a controlled substance under

the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). See 21 U.S.C. § 812; 21 C.F.R.

§ 1308.11-15. Two chemicals associated with khat, cathinone, a

Schedule I controlled substance, and cathine, a Schedule IV con-

trolled substance, are listed as controlled substances under the CSA.

See 21 U.S.C. § 812; 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11(f)(3); 21 C.F.R.

§ 1308.14(e)(1). Argaw’s khat was never analyzed to determine

whether it contained either cathinone or cathine.

The central issue in the proceedings before the immigration judge

and the BIA was whether khat is a controlled substance or the equiva-

lent. The immigration judge, after noting that federal regulations list

cathinone as a controlled substance, see 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11(f)(3),

concluded "that cathinone is khat." J.A. 38. This led the judge to

determine that Argaw was removable on both grounds asserted by the

INS. On appeal the BIA "t[ook] administrative notice of the fact that

4 ARGAW v. ASHCROFT

khat is an East African plant containing Cathinone," J.A. 5, and con-

cluded that khat is the legal equivalent of the controlled substance,

cathinone. The Board dismissed Argaw’s appeal, noting that he was

removable as charged. Thereafter, Argaw filed a petition for review

in this court.

II.

Our power to review a final order of removal is limited by 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2). This section provides that "no court shall have jurisdic-

tion to review any final order of removal against an alien who is

removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered

in" § 1182(a)(2), among others. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). Section

1182(a)(2) includes the grounds for removal alleged in this case: the

alien admitted acts that constitute the essential elements of a con-

trolled substance offense, id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), and the INS had

reason to believe the alien was a trafficker in a controlled substance,

id. § 1182(a)(2)(C). We are therefore without jurisdiction if two facts

exist: the petitioner is an alien, and he committed one of the covered

offenses. The provision that limits our jurisdiction, § 1252(a)(2)(C),

"does not declare that the agency’s determinations of alienage and

deportability are final and unreviewable. It merely says there will be

no [review]" when the two jurisdiction-stripping facts are present.

Hall v. INS, 167 F.3d 852, 855 (4th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). We

retain jurisdiction to determine whether these facts are present. Lewis

v. INS, 194 F.3d 539, 541-42 (4th Cir. 1999).

It is undisputed that Argaw is an alien. The second fact that deter-

mines jurisdiction is contested. It is whether Argaw is removable

because he admitted to acts that constitute the essential elements of

a controlled substance offense or because the INS has reason to

believe he is a trafficker in a controlled substance. Argaw and the

Attorney General agree that resolution of this jurisdictional fact

requires us to determine whether Argaw’s khat is a controlled sub-

stance under U.S. law. Because the INS does not administer the crimi-

nal laws relating to controlled substances, we do not defer to the

BIA’s interpretation of those laws. Sutherland v. Reno, 228 F.3d 171,

174 (2d Cir. 2000). We therefore consider de novo whether khat is a

controlled substance. See id.

ARGAW v. ASHCROFT 5

III.

A.

According to the Attorney General, the second jurisdiction-

stripping fact is established by Argaw’s admission that he (1) know-

ingly and willfully (2) imported (3) a controlled substance, the essen-

tial elements of a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952. See 21 U.S.C. § 952

(outlawing the importation of controlled substances); United States v.

Samad, 754 F.2d 1091, 1096 (4th Cir. 1984) (noting that scienter is

an essential element of a § 952 crime). Again, the main issue is

whether khat is a controlled substance or the equivalent. Khat is not

a controlled substance, and it was not established that Argaw’s khat

contained either cathinone or cathine, controlled substances that

would have rendered the khat illegal. In their decisions both the immi-

gration judge and the BIA held that khat is the legal equivalent of

cathinone, a Schedule I controlled substance. Neither decision dis-

cussed cathine, the Schedule IV substance. Argaw does not dispute

that khat contains cathinone when it is first harvested, but he argues

that within seventy-two hours it may not contain any cathinone at all.

In determining that khat is the legal equivalent of cathinone, the

immigration judge relied on the INS’s submission of a printout from

the website of an organization called "The Life Education Center."

The printout stated, apparently without elaboration, that khat contains

cathinone. Based entirely on this unauthenticated document, the

immigration judge concluded that "cathinone is khat." J.A. 38. On

appeal the BIA did not rely on the internet printout. Instead, the BIA

took "administrative notice of the fact that khat is an East African

plant containing Cathinone." J.A. 5. The BIA based this determination

on three sources, two court opinions and one supplementary informa-

tion statement issued by the Drug Enforcement Administration

(DEA). These sources are not sufficient to establish that khat always

contains cathinone.

The first opinion cited by the BIA, United States v. Hofstatter, 8

F.3d 316 (6th Cir. 1993), dealt with a prosecution for the manufacture

of several stimulants, none of which was related to khat. In recounting

the facts, the court noted in passing that a search of one defendant’s

car turned up, among other things, documents that "described ‘khat’

(an East African plant containing cathinone)." Id. at 320. This was the

6 ARGAW v. ASHCROFT

opinion’s only reference to khat. In the second opinion cited by the

BIA, United States v. Hussein, 230 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D. Me. 2002),

aff’d, 351 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003), the district court assessed the evi-

dence in a prosecution for possession with intent to distribute a sub-

stance containing cathinone, a controlled substance. According to the

court, the record "indicate[d] that cathinone is present in fresh khat,

but is highly unstable and degrades rapidly . . . within 72 hours after

the khat leaf is picked." Id. at 114. The court noted specifically that

"[t]here was no evidence whether cathinone or cathine ever com-

pletely disappears from khat." Id. at 115. Last, the BIA relied on the

DEA’s supplementary information statement issued when the agency

published the rule that added cathinone to the federal schedules of

controlled substances. According to the statement, "[w]hen khat con-

tains cathinone, khat is a Schedule I substance." 58 Fed. Reg. 4317

(1993)(emphasis added). This tends to contradict, rather than support,

the BIA’s apparent conclusion that khat always contains cathinone.

Indeed, none of the sources cited by the BIA supports the proposition

that khat and cathinone are legal equivalents or that khat always con-

tains cathinone. If anything, these sources suggest that cathinone

quickly disappears from khat, perhaps as soon as seventy-two hours

after the leaf is harvested.

The Attorney General attempts to brush aside "the fact that [the

BIA] may have erred in finding khat a controlled substance because

it always contains cathinone." Respondent’s Brief at 23. According to

the Attorney General, two new arguments, neither of which was pre-

sented in the administrative proceedings, support his claim that khat

is a controlled substance or the legal equivalent. We will consider

these arguments because they speak to the legal question of khat’s

status under the laws dealing with controlled substances. First, the

Attorney General argues that khat is a controlled substance because

the DEA has demonstrated an intent to regulate it as a Schedule IV

substance. Second, he argues that khat is the equivalent of a con-

trolled substance because it always contains cathine. To support these

arguments, the Attorney General relies mainly on two supplementary

information statements that accompanied the DEA’s final rules sched-

uling cathinone and cathine. The supplementary information state-

ment attached to the May 17, 1988, rule that placed cathine in

Schedule IV said: "khat will be subject to the same Schedule IV con-

trols as cathine." 53 Fed. Reg. 17,460 (1988). The statement accom-

ARGAW v. ASHCROFT 7

panying the rule placing cathinone in Schedule I on January 14, 1993,

referred to the earlier statement: "In a previously published final rule,

the [DEA] Administrator stated that khat will be subject to the same

Schedule IV controls as cathine." 58 Fed. Reg. 4,317 (1993).

According to the Attorney General, these supplementary informa-

tion statements indicate that the DEA "placed khat itself . . . in the

Schedule IV category of controlled substances." Respondent’s Brief

at 20. The statements may indicate that the DEA planned to list khat

in Schedule IV; however, the statements were not incorporated into

the schedules appearing in the Code of Federal Regulations. More-

over, the DEA has never proposed to add khat to the list of controlled

substances in accordance with the formal rulemaking procedures out-

lined in the Controlled Substances Act. See 21 U.S.C. § 811. Khat, in

short, is not a controlled substance because the schedules themselves

contain no reference to the plant. See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11-15.

Nothing in the DEA’s two statements of supplementary informa-

tion substantiates the Attorney General’s argument that khat always

contains cathine. The statement attached to the 1988 rule refers to

cathine as "one of the psychoactive substances found in khat," 53 Fed.

Reg. 17,460 (1988), but neither statement indicates that cathine is

always present in khat. Indeed, the Attorney General fails to cite any

authority to establish that cathine never disappears from khat. The

few published cases discussing khat indicate that without scientific

testing on a case-by-case basis, it cannot be determined when cathine

or cathinone appears in khat. The First Circuit, in reviewing an appeal

from a cathinone conviction, observed that "[t]he evidence presented

at trial does not disclose whether either cathinone or cathine ever

completely disappears from khat." United States v. Hussein, 351 F.3d

9, 11 (1st Cir. 2003). An Ohio appellate court likewise noted that it

was not clear "whether cathinone or cathine ever completely disapp-

ear[s] from khat." Ohio v. Samatar, 787 N.E.2d 691, 703 (Ohio App.

2003). At this juncture, there is no reasonable basis for the conclusion

that khat always contains cathine.

Although Argaw admitted to importing (and possessing) khat, khat

is not listed as a controlled substance. Moreover, there is no evidence

that the khat Argaw imported contained either controlled substance,

cathinone or cathine. For these reasons, the Attorney General has

8 ARGAW v. ASHCROFT

failed to establish the jurisdiction-stripping fact that Argaw admitted

to the knowing importation of a controlled substance, a violation of

21 U.S.C. § 952. Because the controlled substance element of the

§ 952 crime has not been established, we need not consider the

scienter element.*

B.

The alternative jurisdiction-stripping fact would be that the INS

had reason to believe Argaw was an illicit trafficker in a controlled

substance. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C). As our discussion in part

III.A, supra, reveals, khat is not a controlled substance, and khat’s

chemical properties are not sufficiently known to establish, without

testing, whether a particular batch of khat contains either controlled

substance, cathinone or cathine. Argaw’s khat was never tested.

Under these circumstances the INS could not have reason to believe

that Argaw, who admittedly imported khat, was an illicit trafficker in

a controlled substance.

C.

One of the two facts necessary to deprive us of jurisdiction is miss-

ing, so we have jurisdiction to review the final order of removal

issued against Argaw. Because it was not established either that

Argaw imported a controlled substance or that the INS had reason to

believe he was an illicit trafficker in a controlled substance, we grant

Argaw’s petition for review and reverse the order of removal.

*In his brief the Attorney General asserts that Argaw also "admitted

to the essential elements of an offense relating to khat" when he agreed

to pay a civil penalty for bringing khat into the United States without

declaring it, in violation of the Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1497. Respon-

dent’s Brief at 24. This could not take away our jurisdiction because a

§ 1497 violation was not the basis for the removal order against Argaw.

Even if a removal order based on a § 1497 violation could be shielded

by the jurisdiction-stripping provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), we are

not deprived of jurisdiction unless the § 1497 violation was "actually the

basis, or one of the bases," of the order. Yousefi v. INS, 260 F.3d 318,

325 (4th Cir. 2001).

ARGAW v. ASHCROFT 9

PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED;

ORDER OF REMOVAL REVERSED