Lincoln v. Reksten Management

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM LINCOLN, JR., 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

REKSTEN MANAGEMENT,

Defendant-Appellee,

and  No. 99-1681

NEW ORLEANS COLD STORAGE; GREEN

TUNDRA, her engines, appurtenances,

cargo, apparel, electronics, etc., in

rem,

Defendants.



Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston.

Patrick Michael Duffy, District Judge.

(CA-98-490-2-23)

Argued: March 3, 2000

Decided: December 29, 2003

Before WIDENER and KING, Circuit Judges, and

James H. MICHAEL, Jr., Senior United States District Judge

for the Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions by

published opinion. Judge Widener wrote the opinion, in which Judge

King and Senior Judge Michael joined.

2 LINCOLN v. REKSTEN MANAGEMENT

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Edward Paul Gibson, RIESEN LAW FIRM, L.L.P.,

North Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. Gordon D. Schreck,

BUIST, MOORE, SMYTHE & MCGEE, P.A., Charleston, South

Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Allison A. Stover, RIESEN

LAW FIRM, L.L.P., North Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant.

Julius H. Hines, BUIST, MOORE, SMYTHE & MCGEE, P.A.,

Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.

OPINION

WIDENER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff, William Lincoln, appeals the district court’s opinion and

order granting summary judgment to the defendant, Reksten Manage-

ment A.S. (Reksten). Lincoln v. Reksten Management, A.S., No. 2:98-

0490-23 (D.S.C. Apr. 14, 1999). Lincoln was injured while loading

Reksten’s ship, the M/V GREEN TUNDRA (the GREEN TUNDRA),

with frozen chicken, and he filed this negligence action against Reks-

ten under § 905(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensa-

tion Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950. Lincoln claims the district court erred

because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Reksten

breached its turnover duty to Lincoln and because Reksten owed Lin-

coln, as a third-party beneficiary to the charter party contract, a

heightened duty to supervise, inspect, and/or intervene in the steve-

dore’s activities. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

I.

At the time of his accident, Lincoln was employed by Stevens

Shipping and Terminal Company (Stevens) as a longshoreman. Ste-

vens is a stevedore and was hired to load the GREEN TUNDRA, a

refrigerator vessel owned by Reksten, with a load of frozen chicken

destined for Russia pursuant to a charter party agreement between

Reksten and Hudson Foods. The charter party agreement included

provisions that Reksten would provide a ship that had decks capable

of holding up to five tons and that was fit in every way for the loading

of frozen food packed in cartons.

LINCOLN v. REKSTEN MANAGEMENT 3

The GREEN TUNDRA has three cargo holds or decks, designated

A, B, and C from top to bottom. Longshoremen access these decks

through four cargo hatches, numbered one through four moving from

fore to aft on the ship. The stevedore is required to lower pallets full

of boxes of frozen chicken with a crane through the cargo hatches into

the cargo holds. Once the crane deposits the pallets in the cargo holds,

the stevedore uses forklifts to move the pallets of chicken boxes to

designated areas in the cargo hold. The longshoremen remove the

chicken boxes from the pallets and hand stack them on the ship’s

decks in their appropriate locations within the hold.

At the time of his accident, Lincoln was working on deck B.1 The

floor of deck B consists of wooden deck boards bolted to supporting

steel I-beams. The deck boards in deck B are approximately ten

inches wide and two to three inches thick, and there is an approxi-

mately one and a half inch space between each of the boards that

allows refrigerated air to circulate between decks B and C. There is

no other barrier between decks B and C, so if a board broke on deck

B, an object, with no interruption, would fall straight to the floor of

deck C.

The GREEN TUNDRA arrived in Charleston, South Carolina on

July 16, 1996 to receive the load of frozen chicken. Prior to the ship’s

arrival, the ship’s crew had pre-cooled the ship’s cargo holds to 20

degrees Fahrenheit, cleaned the holds, and inspected the holds to

ensure they were safe and ready for loading. Prior to the loading oper-

ations, Stevens’ stevedore superintendent conducted a pre-loading

inspection of the pre-cooled ship’s holds to ensure that they were safe

for the longshoremen to work in. Stevens commenced loading the fro-

zen chicken that same day. The evidence is in conflict as to whether

Lincoln’s accident or the condition of the ship which caused it was

reported to the vessel before Lincoln’s suit was filed.

At approximately 4:30 p.m. on July 22, 1996, Lincoln was on deck

B when his right foot went through the deck boards. Lincoln’s right

foot and leg went through the boards, causing him to fall down so that

he was "resting on [his] tailbone," leaving his foot and leg dangling

1

The evidence is in conflict as to whether Lincoln was in hatch 2 or

4 at the time.

4 LINCOLN v. REKSTEN MANAGEMENT

inside hold C. Lincoln’s fellow longshoremen working on deck B

helped Lincoln out of the hole after it appeared that he could not

extricate himself. Lincoln then climbed out of the cargo hold using

the ladder. On the dock, he spoke to Lawrence Mixson, the stevedore

in the dock office, who states that he reported the accident to the ves-

sel and told Lincoln to go to the hospital. As a result of this fall, Lin-

coln sustained injuries to his wrist, back, neck, and knee. Another

stevedore acting as the safety director for the operation, David

LeBlanc, filled out two accident reports documenting Lincoln’s fall,

one dated July 29, 1996 and another that is not dated.

On March 11, 1998, Lincoln filed this action against Reksten under

33 U.S.C. § 905(b), which provides in relevant part:

In the event of injury to a person covered under this chap-

ter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person,

or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason

thereof, may bring an action against such vessel as a third

party in accordance with the provisions of section 933 of

this title, and the employer shall not be liable to the vessel

for such damages directly or indirectly and any agreements

or warranties to the contrary shall be void. . . . The liability

of the vessel under this subsection shall not be based upon

the warranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time

the injury occurred. . . .

33 U.S.C. § 905(b). After completing some of the discovery in the

case, Reksten moved for summary judgment arguing that it had not

breached any duties owed Lincoln. The district court granted the

motion after finding that Lincoln did not provide sufficient evidence

that Reksten breached its turnover duty to Lincoln and that Reksten

did not owe Lincoln a heightened duty to supervise and to inspect the

hold under either OSHA regulations or its charter party contract with

Hudson Foods. Lincoln appeals, claiming the district court improperly

granted summary judgment when material issues of fact exist as to

whether Reksten breached its turnover duty to Lincoln and claiming

the district court erred as a matter of law in concluding that Lincoln

was not a third-party beneficiary of a heightened duty of care con-

tained in the charter party contract.

LINCOLN v. REKSTEN MANAGEMENT 5

We review a district court’s decision granting summary judgment

de novo. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994). A party

is entitled to summary judgment only if, after viewing the facts in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party, it is entitled to a judg-

ment as a matter of law. Shaw, 13 F.3d at 798.

II.

While Congress created a cause of action against the shipowner in

negligence in § 905(b), it left to the courts the task of defining the

duties the shipowner owed to the longshoreman. Scindia Steam Navi-

gation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 165-66 (1981). In Scindia

Steam, the Court defined three general duties shipowners owe long-

shoremen under § 905(b): (1) the turnover duty, which relates to the

condition of the ship upon the commencement of stevedoring opera-

tions; (2) once stevedoring operations have begun, the duty to exer-

cise reasonable care in order to prevent injuries to longshoremen in

areas where the shipowner remains in "active control of the vessel";

and (3) the duty to intervene concerns the vessel’s obligations with

respect to cargo operations in areas under the principal control of the

independent stevedore. Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., 512 U.S.

92, 98 (1994) (construing Scindia Steam, 451 U.S. at 167-68). In this

appeal, we first consider Lincoln’s argument that Reksten breached

the first of these duties, the duty to exercise reasonable care when

turning the ship over for stevedoring activities.2

The turnover duty has two components. The first involves the ship-

owner’s duty with respect to the ship’s gear, equipment, tools, and

work space that the stevedore will utilize during its operations. The

shipowner must "at least [exercise] ordinary care under the circum-

stances to have the ship and its equipment in such condition that an

expert and experienced stevedore will be able by the exercise of rea-

sonable care to carry on its cargo operations with reasonable safety

to persons and property." Scindia Steam, 451 U.S. at 166-67.

2

Lincoln argues that Reksten also breached a duty based on provisions

in the charter party contract between Reksten and the charterer, Hudson

Foods. We address this argument in section III, infra.

6 LINCOLN v. REKSTEN MANAGEMENT

As a corollary to this initial turnover duty, the shipowner must

warn the stevedore of any hazards on the ship or with

respect to its equipment that are known to the vessel or

should be known to it in the exercise of reasonable care, that

would likely be encountered by the stevedore in the course

of his cargo operations and that are not known by the steve-

dore and would not be obvious to or anticipated by him if

reasonably competent in the performance of his work.

Scindia Steam, 451 U.S. at 167. The duty to warn attaches only to

latent hazards, including those in cargo areas, and "[a]bsent actual

knowledge of a hazard, . . . the duty to warn may attach only if the

exercise of reasonable care would place upon the shipowner an obli-

gation to inspect for, or discover, the hazard’s existence." Howlett,

512 U.S. at 99-100. If a defect is open and obvious and the stevedore

should be able to conduct its operations around it safely, the ship-

owner does not violate the duty to warn. See Bonds v. Mortensen &

Lange, 717 F.2d 123, 127-28 (4th Cir. 1983) (finding malfunctioning

bell was an obvious defect).

There is no evidence that the rotten wood or hole in the deck that

Lincoln fell through was known to either Lincoln or the stevedore or

the vessel, so we assume that the defect in the floorboards on the

GREEN TUNDRA was latent and that Reksten breached the second

part of the turnover duty, the duty to warn, by failing to inspect the

ship adequately and to warn the stevedore of a hole or rotten flooring

in the hold. Under Scindia Steam, in order to avoid summary judg-

ment, Lincoln must show that there was a latent defect in the deck,

that the shipowner knew or should have known of the defect in the

exercise of reasonable care, and that the shipowner breached its duty

by failing to discover or warn the stevedore of the defect. Howlett,

512 U.S. at 105 (citing Scindia Steam, 451 U.S. at 167).

There is no evidence that the hole in the deck through which Lin-

coln fell, or the rotten wood at that place, was known to the vessel.

So the question is whether the vessel should have known of the defect

in the exercise of reasonable care so that it might have warned the ste-

vedore of the defect. In this connection, the hole is described in the

LINCOLN v. REKSTEN MANAGEMENT 7

record as 6 inches wide and 18 inches long at a place where the space

between the planks in the deck should have been 1-1/2 inches.

The affidavit of Captain Helgesen, widely experienced in such

marine affairs, describes the state of repair and upkeep of the deck as

that which resulted from "evidence that the ship’s personnel failed to

act reasonably concerning maintenance and upkeep of the vessel." He

noted that the coatings on the deck boards had not been maintained,

leading to water access to the wood in the deck boards, making them

conducive to rot, that holes remained in the wooden decks, "areas that

could be repaired were not repaired." He attached photographs to his

affidavit illustrating wooden patches in certain decks, unreasonable

damage to certain decks, cracks in hatch boards in certain decks, worn

and splintered boards in certain decks, steel plates installed over

wooden hatch boards in certain decks, and extreme wear of edges of

deck boards and surface coatings of certain decks. Captain Helgesen

stated that the refrigerated compartments in the ship, of which this

was one, were pre-frozen3 and, on that account, the deck boards might

appear quite sound when they, in fact, were not, and should have been

inspected before freezing sets in. He stated that decayed wood can be

spotted by sounding with a hammer for "[d]eteriorated wood will be

spongy when probed."

In this connection, such a state of upkeep of the holds was gener-

ally corroborated by Lawrence Mixson, an employee of the stevedore,

who was in charge of the loading of the ship. He stated that with the

number in the crew down to "a fourth the size that they used to have,

I think with the size of the crew they had, they found it very difficult

to keep up with what was going on. Regular maintenance was diffi-

cult, much less damage that was happening." It was a part of Mix-

son’s job to see that the decks were in working condition, and he

probably, in fact, actually inspected the decks prior to the time that

loading commenced.4 Mixson states he reported Lincoln’s accident to

3

By pre-frozen it is meant that the temperature in the refrigerated hold

was reduced to well below freezing prior to the commencement of the

loading of the ship. This enabled the shipper to load frozen chicken

directly into the cold holds without delay.

4

This is not to infer that any negligence on the part of Mixson would

be a defense to the suit against the vessel.

8 LINCOLN v. REKSTEN MANAGEMENT

the ship’s crew but received no report back with respect to the acci-

dent. One of the longshoremen testified that the hole Lincoln fell into

was later covered up with boxes of chicken.

While we emphasize that the facts we have just related may be

stated favorably to Lincoln, Lincoln has no burden in opposing sum-

mary judgment to reconcile inconsistent statements in the record. The

burden is on the moving party, as we have stated, to show that it is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In that respect, it is remark-

able that an affidavit of Captain Tipnis,5 a marine surveyor, offered

by the vessel, with respect to the inspections of deck boards which

would have been required by Helgesen, stated: "In my opinion, to

expect the officers and compliment of the GREEN TUNDRA to per-

form detailed inspections of deck boards and deck gratings as sug-

gested by Mr. Helgesen would be both impractical and unreasonable."

Despite this excuse for not making inspections as recommended by

Helgesen, an affidavit of the ship’s bosun states that while he could

not "remember any specific repairs which may have been made at that

time" he stated "with certainty that all necessary repairs would have

been carried out," prior to loading.

An analysis of the foregoing evidence convinces us that the record

shows that, taking the present evidence most favorably for Lincoln,

the vessel might have been negligent in the maintenance, upkeep, and

especially the inspection of the deck in question, so that, in the exer-

cise of reasonable care, it might have discovered the defect or hole in

the decking into which Lincoln fell, enabling it to warn the stevedore

of the defect.

The summary judgment of the district court in favor of the vessel

on this account must be vacated.

5

For our present purposes, we consider Captain Helgesen and Captain

Tipnis were each a qualified expert in the fields in which they testified

by way of affidavit. Notably, Helgesen concluded "it is my opinion that

the vessel was negligent in all respect and that its negligence caused Lin-

coln’s accident." Tipnis’s affidavit concluded that the decks "are very

well maintained and exhibit only the usual signs of normal wear and

tear." This illustrates the conflict in the statements of fact relied on by

the parties. We do not at this time accept either conclusion, even if

admissible as such.

LINCOLN v. REKSTEN MANAGEMENT 9

III.

Lincoln also claims that the district court erred in its finding that

the charter party provisions did not inure to his benefit thus creating

an additional obligation to those outlined in Scindia Steam. The rele-

vant language in Scindia Steam is "absent contract provisions to the

contrary the ship owner has no general duty by way of supervision or

inspection to exercise reasonable care to discover dangerous condi-

tions that develop within the confines of the cargo operations that are

assigned to the stevedore." 451 U.S. 172 (italics added). The contract

provisions which Lincoln relies on from the charter party are parts of

clauses 19 and 36 of the charter party. Clause 19: "[t]he vessel’s holds

to be clean, dry and free from smell and in every way fit for holding

a cargo of frozen food products in cartons;" Clause 36: "Fully

gratingsfitted, suitable for forklifts with rubber tyres upto 5 tons

weight incl cargo."

The argument goes that construing these provisions, at least liter-

ally and probably over-literally, the fact that the gratings, which were

fully fitted, and at one place had a hole or rotten place in them which

a man’s foot could fall through, were bound to be not "in every way

fit for loading" under clause 19 and not "fully gratingsfitted" under

clause 36.

In this circuit we have held in Bernard v. U. S. Lines, Inc., 475

F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973), that a longshoreman who was injured in

the use of a land-based forklift owned by the charterer was not a

third-party beneficiary of the charter party agreement because it "cre-

ated no contractual duty to the longshoreman on the part of the United

States, a time charterer." 475 U. S. at 1135, 1136. Similarly, in Spence

v. Mariehamns R/S, 766 F.2d 1504 (11th Cir. 1985), a longshoreman

who was injured by the stevedore’s negligence in the unloading of the

vessel was held not entitled to recover from the vessel under a charter

party provision which provided that the "Charterers to load, stow and

discharge the cargo at their expense under the supervision of the Cap-

tain." The Court held that the quoted language was not construed so

that the vessel’s "crew would take direct responsibility for supervising

the discharge of cargo." 766 F.2d at 1507. It reasoned, as did Bernard,

that the language made no mention of the longshoremen’s safety, and

the plaintiff had not presented extensive proof of such a duty. In Car-

10 LINCOLN v. REKSTEN MANAGEMENT

penter v. Universal Star Shipping, S.A., 924 F.2d 1539, 1545 (9th Cir.

1991), the court held that charter party provisions that "stevedores . . .

shall be employed and paid for by charterers" and "charterer to load,

stow, lash, secure, trim and discharge the cargo free of risks and

expenses to owners" determined indemnity issues between the owner

of the vessel and the charterer and did not inure to the benefit of a

longshoreman who had been injured when he fell through a hole

improperly left in the loading of a cargo of logs. The court held, as

had Spence, that the charter party was a contract between the charterer

and the ship owner and did not affect the duty owed to the longshore-

man. It held that no language in the charter party created a duty on

the ship owner to intervene to insure longshoremen’s safety during

cargo loading. We especially note that the real basis for such claims

is footnote 23 on page 176 of Scindia Steam, which provides that "[i]t

may also be that the contract between the stevedore and the ship-

owner will have provisions specifically bearing on the dispute. The

contract between Scindia [the owner] and Seattle [the stevedore] is

not part of the record in this case [referring to Scindia Steam]." There

is no provision in the charter party in the case at hand specifically

bearing on the dispute at hand. Longshoremen’s safety or concomitant

care is not mentioned in the charter party. Therefore, we are of opin-

ion, and so hold, that the charter party provision does not offer Lin-

coln an additional opportunity to sue the owner on account of his

injury. At this point, we should note that a construction of the charter

party provision involved here so as to give relief to Lincoln would

amount to a recovery on the ground that the ship was not seaworthy.

Even if the fact of unseaworthiness be true in the abstract, the ability

of a longshoreman to sue the ship because not seaworthy instead of

for negligence was abolished by the Longshoremen’s and Harbor

Worker’s Compensation Act of 1972. Scindia Steam, Part II, 451

U.S. at 164, et seq.

We thus hold that the charter party provisions involved do not sup-

port a cause of action on behalf of Lincoln. The decision of the dis-

trict court is affirmed in that respect.

The decision of the district court is accordingly affirmed in part

and vacated in part, and the case is remanded for action not inconsis-

tent with this opinion.

LINCOLN v. REKSTEN MANAGEMENT 11

JUDGMENT VACATED IN PART AND

REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS