Anheuser-Busch Inc v. NLRB

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INCORPORATED, 

Petitioner,

v.  No. 02-1740

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

Respondent.



NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 

Petitioner,

v.  No. 02-1897

ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INCORPORATED,

Respondent.



On Petition for Review and Cross-application

for Enforcement of an Order

of the National Labor Relations Board.

(3-CA-21796, 3-CA-21906, 3-CA-22112)

Argued: February 26, 2003

Decided: August 1, 2003

Before WIDENER, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Petition for review denied and cross-application for enforcement

granted by published opinion. Judge King wrote the opinion, in which

Judge Widener joined. Judge Shedd wrote an opinion concurring in

part and dissenting in part.

2 ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. v. NLRB

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Arthur G. Telegen, FOLEY HOAG, L.L.P., Boston, Mas-

sachusetts, for Anheuser-Busch. Christopher Warren Young,

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Washington, D.C., for

Board. ON BRIEF: Robert A. Fisher, FOLEY HOAG, L.L.P., Bos-

ton, Massachusetts, for Anheuser-Busch. Arthur F. Rosenfeld, Gen-

eral Counsel, John E. Higgins, Jr., Deputy General Counsel, John H.

Ferguson, Associate General Counsel, Aileen A. Armstrong, Deputy

Associate General Counsel, Frederick C. Havard, Supervisory Attor-

ney, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Washington,

D.C., for Board.

OPINION

KING, Circuit Judge:

Anheuser-Busch Incorporated ("Busch") petitions this Court for

review of a Decision and Order entered against it by the National

Labor Relations Board (the "Board"). Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 337

N.L.R.B. No. 2 (Dec. 19, 2001) (the "Order").1 By its Order, the

Board affirmed an earlier decision of an Administrative Law Judge

(the "ALJ"), who concluded that Busch, on four occasions, had vio-

lated § 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the "Act").2 The

Board has cross-applied for enforcement of its Order. As explained

below, we deny the petition for review and grant the Board’s cross-

application for enforcement.

I.

Busch operates twelve breweries in the United States, including a

1

The Board subsequently made technical corrections and modified, in

minor part, its rulings against Busch. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 337

N.L.R.B. No. 121 (July 5, 2002). In referring to the Order, we are refer-

ring to it as modified.

2

The Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169, and § 8(a)(1) is codified

at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).

ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. v. NLRB 3

brewery in Baldwinsville, New York (the "Baldwinsville brewery").

At the Baldwinsville brewery, certain of Busch’s employees are rep-

resented by the Brewery Conference of the International Brotherhood

of Teamsters and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local

No. 1149 (collectively, the "Teamsters"). In 1998 and 1999, the

Teamsters and brewery management engaged in contract negotiations

on a new collective bargaining agreement, leading to several contro-

versial incidents at the Baldwinsville brewery. As a result of these

incidents, the Teamsters filed a series of charges with the Board,

asserting that Busch had committed a host of unfair labor practices.

Ultimately, on December 2, 1999, the charges were consolidated into

a complaint against Busch (the "Complaint"), issued by the Board’s

Regional Director for the New York area.3

In order to assess the Teamsters’s allegations, the ALJ conducted

a hearing in Syracuse, New York, from March 8 through 10, 2000.

On July 7, 2000, the ALJ issued his decision, making findings of fact

and conclusions of law, and preparing a recommended order (the

"ALJ Decision").4 The ALJ concluded that Busch had committed four

unfair labor practices involving three employees who worked at the

Baldwinsville brewery, specifically, Patrick Lamirande, Joseph Rimu-

aldo, and Brian Meany. After the ALJ Decision was filed with the

Board, Busch filed exceptions to it. On review, the Board affirmed the

ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, and it adopted his rec-

ommended order.5 Order at 1. As noted above, Busch has petitioned

3

The Teamsters initiated these proceedings by filing charges with the

appropriate Regional Director, who decided to issue and prosecute the

Complaint. See 29 C.F.R. § 101.8 (stating that if charges appear to have

merit, Regional Director institutes formal action by issuing complaint

and notice of hearing). The Teamsters then participated in the proceed-

ings before the ALJ. Id. § 101.10; 102.38. It is appropriate for Busch to

have petitioned for review in this Court because the company transacts

business in Virginia. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (stating that petition may be

filed in any circuit where party "transacts business").

4

The ALJ Decision is published with the Board’s Order at 337

N.L.R.B. No. 2 (Dec. 19, 2001).

5

In resolving a complaint, an ALJ is obliged to set forth his findings

of fact and conclusions of law, in addition to preparing a recommended

order. 29 C.F.R. § 101.11. An ALJ’s decision, including his recom-

4 ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. v. NLRB

for our review of the Order, and the Board has cross-applied for its

enforcement. We possess jurisdiction pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160(f).

II.

A. Incidents Involving Patrick Lamirande

On December 15, 1998, Teamsters member Patrick Lamirande, a

production operator at the Baldwinsville brewery, allegedly

obstructed an independent contractor doing work for Busch (the

"Contractor Incident"). At approximately 11:15 the following morn-

ing, Mark Burlingame and Art Lux, members of the brewery’s man-

agement, approached Lamirande and began questioning him about the

incident. Lamirande promptly requested the presence and assistance

of Dan Finn, a shop steward in Lamirande’s department, who was

already aware of the facts underlying the Contractor Incident.6

Assuming Finn was at lunch, Burlingame declined this request, call-

ing instead for Fred Vogel, another shop steward in Lamirande’s

department. Vogel arrived at the site of Lamirande’s questioning

within fifteen minutes, and after speaking privately with Lamirande,

Vogel renewed the request for Finn’s presence. Burlingame denied

this request, stating that Lamirande should respond to the allegations

immediately. Lamirande declined to discuss the matter without Finn,

and Burlingame sent him home for the day.

The next morning, December 17, 1998, Lamirande was directed to

Burlingame’s office for a meeting with management. Upon reporting

to the office, he met with Vogel, Burlingame, Lux, Howard Ormsby

(a Teamsters business agent), and Ken Silva (a brewery assistant

manager). Ormsby, speaking on Lamirande’s behalf, requested that

mended order, is then filed with the Board. Id. If a party files exceptions,

the Board reviews the exceptions and issues a decision and order. Id.

§ 101.12(a). If no exceptions are filed, the ALJ’s decision and recom-

mended order become the decision and order of the Board. Id.

§ 101.12(b).

6

A shop steward is a union member who, among other duties, is autho-

rized to act as an employee’s representative in an investigatory interview.

See generally 29 U.S.C. § 402(q).

ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. v. NLRB 5

Finn be allowed to attend the meeting and represent Lamirande, but

Silva insisted that Finn’s presence was unnecessary. Lamirande was

questioned without Finn, and Burlingame thereafter informed Lami-

rande that he would be disciplined for the Contractor Incident. As a

result of these events, the Teamsters filed a charge with the Board,

alleging that Busch had committed two unfair labor practices in refus-

ing Lamirande’s requests (on December 16 and 17) to be represented

by Finn.

In assessing the Teamsters’s allegations, the ALJ ruled that, under

the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc.,

420 U.S. 251 (1975), and pursuant to the Board’s related precedents,

"an employee has the right to specify the representative he or she

wants, and the employer is obligated to supply that representative

absent some extenuating circumstances." ALJ Decision at 6. Pursuant

to this principle, the ALJ concluded that, although Finn may have

been eating lunch when Burlingame initially wanted to question

Lamirande, Finn was nevertheless "available" as a representative. Id.

Finn had previously circumscribed his lunch breaks in order to repre-

sent employees. In any event, Finn would have completed his lunch

break within fifteen minutes of Lamirande’s initial request. By its

Order, the Board agreed with the ALJ’s ruling that Busch had com-

mitted two unfair labor practices in denying Lamirande’s requests to

be represented by a particular shop steward. Order at 1.

B. Incidents Involving Joseph Rimualdo

In 1987, Joseph Rimualdo, a member of the Teamsters, began

working in the packaging, bottling, and shipping department of the

Baldwinsville brewery. In 1998, he became a shop steward, and he

soon learned of certain safety issues in two other departments of the

brewery. In January of 1999, he filed six grievances related to those

safety issues. Upon being informed of these grievances, Fred Singler,

the manager of Rimualdo’s department, met with Rimualdo and the

managers of the two departments involved in the safety grievances,

Lux and Nick Alivero. In this meeting, Singler asserted that Rimualdo

had failed to follow the proper procedures for addressing the safety

issues. Rimualdo admitted that this assertion was accurate, and the

meeting adjourned. Four days later, upon seeing Rimualdo drinking

a Labatt’s Blue beer in a tavern near the brewery, Lux said, "This is

6 ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. v. NLRB

two strikes. You got one for filing safety grievances and you got one

for drinking Labatt’s Blue." ALJ Decision at 11. As a result of this

incident, the Teamsters charged Busch with an unfair labor practice,

asserting that Lux had threatened Rimualdo for filing safety griev-

ances, an activity protected by the Act.

Before a hearing was conducted on this charge, Rimualdo was

involved in another incident at the brewery. On August 25, 1999,

Rimualdo, with a group of fellow employees, was hand stamping

dates on packages of beer. On that occasion, Rimualdo accidentally

got ink on his hands. Lux approached the group and, according to

Rimualdo, said, "You got to be careful what you say and what you

do around this guy, he’s bad news." Lux then stated to Rimualdo:

"You got to be pretty good with having ink on your fingers." Id. at

12. The latter comment, according to Rimualdo, referred to Rimual-

do’s recent arrest and fingerprinting in a domestic incident involving

his ex-wife. Lux told him, "You made it very tough for me, filing

those charges with the [Board]. We’ll see in September." Id. Rimu-

aldo claimed that, after these statements, Lux threatened to get even

with him in some way.7 Based on this incident (the "Stamping Inci-

dent"), the Teamsters, on September 8, 1999, charged Busch with

another unfair labor practice charge, alleging that Busch had "inter-

fered with, restrained and coerced Rimualdo in the right to engage in

protected, concerted activity by threatening and disciplining him for

filing a charge with the [Board]."8

7

Other employees, including Dwight Hart and Supervisor Dan

Tamulevich, were present during Lux’s interactions with Rimualdo. Hart

corroborated Rimualdo’s version of events, indicating that Lux made

remarks about the ink on Rimualdo’s hands and that Lux commented on

the pending charges before the Board. By contrast, Lux and Supervisor

Tamulevich insisted that it was Rimualdo, in making a joke at his own

expense, who referred to the ink on his hands. Tamulevich denied that

Lux had referred to the grievances Rimualdo had filed or to the upcom-

ing hearing on the two strikes incident.

8

The Complaint issued by the Board’s Regional Counsel revised this

allegation slightly, asserting that Busch had threatened Rimualdo

because "he had given testimony to the Board" during a prior investiga-

tion.

ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. v. NLRB 7

As to Lux’s comments at the tavern, the ALJ found that they were

based on Rimualdo’s apparent disloyalty in drinking a competitor’s

beer, rejecting the Teamsters’s assertion that Busch had threatened

Rimualdo because he had filed safety grievances. ALJ Decision at 11.

The ALJ thus concluded that Lux’s comments to Rimualdo at the tav-

ern did not constitute an unfair labor practice. Id. On the Stamping

Incident, however, the ALJ found that Lux had threatened Rimualdo

because of the Teamsters’s pending charge before the Board, and he

thus concluded that Busch had committed an unfair labor practice. Id.

at 12. By its Order, the Board agreed with the ALJ’s determinations.

Order at 1.

C. Incidents Involving Brian Meany

On February 11, 1999, Teamsters member Brian Meany, an

employee in the brewing department of the Baldwinsville brewery,

attended a mandatory company communications meeting conducted

by Michael Harding, a senior executive from Busch’s headquarters in

St. Louis. At the outset of Harding’s presentation, the brewery’s

employees were advised that the meeting was for the purpose of dis-

cussing Busch’s financial performance and that there would be no dis-

cussion of collective bargaining or "contract issues." Following his

presentation, Harding entertained questions from employees. At that

time, Meany criticized Busch for its treatment of workers at the Bald-

winsville brewery. At one point, Meany read a list of symptoms of an

abused spouse, drawing an analogy to Busch’s treatment of its

employees. During Meany’s commentary, Harding urged Meany to

keep his comments brief, but Meany ignored this request.

When Meany reported to work the next day, February 12, 1999, he

was advised to find a shop steward and report to Brewmaster Sam-

martino’s office for a meeting with Sammartino and Human

Resources Manager Larry Harmon. At the meeting, Sammartino criti-

cized Meany for disrupting the communications meeting, suggesting

that, if Meany behaved that way again, he would be removed from the

Baldwinsville brewery and disciplined. Sammartino then said, "I want

you to know that the work you do on the floor here does not outweigh

the things you do in communications meetings. If you speak again at

a communications meeting, you will be fired." ALJ Decision at 8.

After Meany requested that this restriction be placed in writing, Har-

8 ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. v. NLRB

mon said, "You know what, you will be fired. Then the [Teamsters]

will go through the grievance procedure and what will happen will

happen." Id.

As a result of this incident, the Teamsters charged that Busch had

interfered with Meany’s right to engage in a protected activity by

threatening him for voicing his opinions on collective bargaining

issues. As to this charge, the ALJ agreed with the Complaint, con-

cluding that Busch management threatened Meany in reaction to a

protected activity and that Busch had thus engaged in an unfair labor

practice. Id. at 8-9. The Board also affirmed this conclusion, agreeing

that Busch had committed an unfair labor practice in its treatment of

Meany. Order at 1.

III.

In considering a petition for review, we are obliged to uphold the

Board’s legal interpretations if they are "rational and consistent" with

the Act. Sam’s Club, a Div. of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 173

F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Indeed, if the Board’s resolution is a "defensible construction of the

statute," it is entitled to deference, because the "function of [effectuat-

ing] national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibil-

ity, which the Congress committed primarily to the [Board], subject

to limited judicial review." Arrow Auto. Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 853

F.2d 223, 237 (4th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). In

deciding legal issues, however, the Board should apply its principles

consistently. Sara Lee Bakery Group, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 292,

295 (4th Cir. 2002). And when the Supreme Court has already inter-

preted a statutory provision, the Board’s interpretation and application

of the statute will be judged in relation to the Court’s rulings. Lech-

mere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536-37 (1992). Findings of fact

made by an ALJ and affirmed by the Board are conclusive, so long

as they are "supported by substantial evidence on the record consid-

ered as a whole." 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). And we have characterized sub-

stantial evidence as being "such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." NLRB v.

Peninsula Gen. Hosp. Med. Ctr., 36 F.3d 1262, 1269 (4th Cir. 1994)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. v. NLRB 9

IV.

We now turn to Busch’s contentions that the Board erred in decid-

ing that Busch had committed unfair labor practices in its treatment

of Lamirande, Rimualdo, and Meany.9 First, we assess Busch’s posi-

tion regarding Lamirande’s right to a particular union representative.

Second, we consider Busch’s contentions with regard to the charge

involving Rimualdo. Finally, we examine its challenges regarding

Meany’s activities at the communications meeting.

A.

Busch first challenges the rule articulated by the Board that, absent

extenuating circumstances, an employee subjected to an employer’s

investigation has the right to specify the union representative of his

choice (the "Representation Rule").10 Busch challenges the Represen-

tation Rule on three primary bases. First, it contends that the Rule is

inconsistent with the Act. Second, it maintains that, even if it is con-

sistent with the Act, the Rule is contrary to the Board’s own prece-

dents. Finally, and relatedly, Busch insists that the Rule cannot be

applied to this case because of the principle barring retroactive appli-

cation of the Board’s rules.

9

Each of the four unfair labor practices found by the ALJ and the

Board involve § 8(a)(1) of the Act, which provides that it is an unfair

labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce

employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [§ 7]." Pursuant to

§ 7 of the Act, employees have the right to engage in concerted activities

"for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-

tion."

10

Our dissenting colleague suggests that our shorthand use of the

phrase "Representation Rule" refers to a rule we invented in this proceed-

ing. See ante at 30. To the contrary, this is the Board’s rule. In focusing

on our rhetoric, our colleague has obscured the real issue in this case:

whether the Board’s Representation Rule is "rational and consistent"

with the Act. Put differently, we are not assessing whether the Act enti-

tles an employee to choose among available union representatives, but

rather whether the Board’s interpretation is a "defensible construction of

the statute." Arrow Auto. Indus., Inc., 853 F.2d at 237.

10 ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. v. NLRB

1.

To begin with, Busch insists that the Representation Rule is incon-

sistent with the fundamental purposes of the Act, as interpreted by the

Supreme Court in Weingarten. According to Busch, the Representa-

tion Rule interferes with an employer’s legitimate interests in disci-

plining its workers. Finally, it contends that the statutory basis of

Weingarten (i.e., that union representation safeguards the collective

interests of the bargaining unit) is inapplicable here.

In Weingarten, the Supreme Court held that an employee has a

right to union representation at any investigatory interview threaten-

ing disciplinary action. 420 U.S. at 253. An employer thus commits

an unfair labor practice in denying an employee’s request for such

representation. Id. Here, the Board decided that, in light of the

Supreme Court’s decision in Weingarten and the Board’s experiences

in resolving Weingarten-type disputes, an employee is entitled, absent

extenuating circumstances, to the union representative of his choice.

As explained below, we see the Representation Rule as a reasonable

interpretation and application of the Act.

First, the Act — as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Weingar-

ten — generally contemplates that an employee will have his choice

as to union representation. Indeed, § 1 of the Act provides that the

Act’s purpose is to protect "the exercise by workers of full freedom

of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of

their own choosing." 29 U.S.C. § 151 (emphasis added). In Weingar-

ten, the Court emphasized that the right to union representation

"plainly effectuates the most fundamental purposes of the Act," which

is to enable workers to seek mutual aid and protection without undue

interference by their employers. 420 U.S. at 262. The choice of a rep-

resentative plainly furthers the ability of workers to seek such aid and

protection.11

11

Absent extenuating circumstances, an employer has no interest in

selecting between available representatives. By contrast, employees do

have an interest in selecting between representatives. For example, an

employee may know that a representative is already familiar with the

investigation, or may generally feel more comfortable with a particular

ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. v. NLRB 11

Second, the Act attempts to rectify the inherent power imbalance

of the workplace, and an employee’s ability to choose his own union

representative serves this goal. When an employee requests union rep-

resentation in an investigatory interview, the employee is seeking

assistance to deal with a "confrontation with his employer." Id. at 260.

In such a confrontation, the employee is generally at some disadvan-

tage, and the recognition of his right to choose his representative

serves, to some extent, to mitigate this inequality. As the Court stated

in Weingarten, "[r]equiring a lone employee to attend an investigatory

interview which he reasonably believes may result in the imposition

of discipline perpetuates the inequality the Act was designed to elimi-

nate." Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 262 (internal quotation marks omit-

ted). It is thus reasonable that, absent extenuating circumstances, an

employee should be entitled to designate the union representative who

will assist him during his employer’s investigatory interview.12

In this situation, the union had designated two shop stewards in

Lamirande’s department to serve as employee representatives. When

Lamirande initially requested representation by Finn,13 "no represen-

shop steward. In fact, in this instance, one of the reasons Lamirande

requested Finn was that Finn was aware of the facts involved in the Con-

tractor Incident. ALJ Decision at 3 (stating that when Vogel first spoke

with Lamirande, Lamirande stated: "I would like to see Dan Finn

because he is aware of my situation").

12

In reaching this conclusion, we are not placing an undue burden on

employers. An employer need not always summon a requested represen-

tative. The employer may deny an employee’s request for a particular

representative, forego the interview process, and render a decision based

on the information it has already obtained. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 258.

Or, if extenuating circumstances exist (i.e., if the requested representa-

tive is unavailable), the employer may reject the employee’s request and

proceed accordingly.

13

Busch asserts that the record fails to support the conclusion that

Lamirande requested representation by Finn before Burlingame called

for Vogel. Indeed, Busch maintains that the ALJ simply assumed this

fact in order to create the current controversy. The ALJ, however, faced

with conflicting evidence on this point, was entitled to find, as he did,

that Lamirande had requested Finn’s presence before Burlingame called

for Vogel. ALJ Decision at 4.

12 ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. v. NLRB

tative was present" at the site of the proposed interview. ALJ Deci-

sion at 6. Indeed, Vogel was then in another part of the brewery and

had to be summoned via radio. Id. at 3. Finn was at lunch, but on pre-

vious occasions he had circumscribed his lunch breaks in order to rep-

resent employees. Additionally, he would have completed his lunch

break within fifteen minutes of the outset of the interview. Id. at 6.

The ALJ concluded that the fact Finn was on his lunch break at the

time of the initial request did not render him "less ‘available’ than

Vogel" to represent Lamirande.14 Id. In these circumstances, and in

keeping with applicable legal principles, the ALJ did not err in decid-

ing that Busch should have given Lamirande access to the representa-

tive of his choice.15

14

The ALJ acknowledged that a "short delay" would have resulted if

Busch, before seeking Finn’s presence at the interview, had waited until

he completed lunch. ALJ Decision at 6 (emphasis added). However,

because Finn had previously circumscribed his lunch breaks to represent

employees; because Finn would have finished his break in fifteen min-

utes; and because the allegations against Lamirande did not demand "in-

stant attention," the ALJ concluded that Busch did not have "sufficient

reason to deny Lamirande the representation he wanted." Id. Thus, the

ALJ found that "the fact that Finn was [at lunch] for a short period of

time [did not make] him any less ‘available’ than Vogel." Id. Busch does

not maintain that substantial evidence fails to support this finding, and

we have no basis for rejecting it. It is difficult to understand our col-

league’s assertion that "[t]he ALJ clearly erred in deciding that Steward

Finn was not less ‘available’ than Steward Vogel." Ante at 27. Our

review of findings of fact is limited to whether such findings are "sup-

ported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole." 29

U.S.C. § 160(e). And, as is often noted, although substantial evidence

requires more than a mere scintilla, it is less than a preponderance. Weis

Markets, Inc. v. NLRB, 265 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 2001). The ALJ was

in a better position to assess the representatives’ respective availability,

and there is sufficient support in the record to justify the ALJ’s finding

in this regard.

15

The Representation Rule may well be consistent with the prevailing

industrial practice. Cf. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 267 (reasoning Board’s

construction was in "full harmony with actual industrial practice"). At a

minimum, the Rule is consistent with an agreement between Busch and

the Teamsters for future Weingarten situations. ALJ Decision at 3; see

also Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 227 N.L.R.B. 1276 (1977)

ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. v. NLRB 13

2.

Busch next contends that the Representation Rule is inconsistent

with Board precedent. See Sara Lee Bakery Group, Inc. v. NLRB, 296

F.3d 292, 295 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that Board must apply its prin-

ciples consistently). In assessing this challenge to the Board’s ruling,

we note that the Court in Weingarten rejected a similar contention

regarding the Board’s consistency in adhering to precedent. There, the

employer pointed to several Board decisions, which had held that a

union representative was not required to be present at an investigatory

interview. The Court decided that, because an administrative rule nor-

mally "involves an evolutionary process," the Board was entitled to

modify its rule over time. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 265. The Court

observed that it would "misconceive the nature of administrative deci-

sionmaking" to hold "that the Board’s earlier decisions froze the

development of this important aspect of the national labor law." Id.

at 265-66.

We agree with Busch that certain of the Board’s earlier decisions

arguably support the contention that an employee is not entitled to the

union representative of his choice. Specifically, in Coca-Cola Bottling

Co. of Los Angeles, 227 N.L.R.B. 1276 (1977), the Board decided that

an employer had not committed an unfair labor practice by refusing

an employee’s request to be represented by a particular shop steward.

In that case, the employee requested representation by a vacationing

union representative. The Board decided that, because of the

unavailability of the requested representative, the employer had not

committed an unfair labor practice in declining to wait for the

(stating that, if requested representative had not been on vacation,

employer would have adhered to its past practice and granted employee’s

request for particular representative). The separate opinion suggests that

the Board’s Representation Rule will discourage employers from con-

ducting investigatory interviews. Ante at 28. Congress, however, has

decided that such policy concerns are best addressed by the Board.

Indeed, our standard of review, i.e., whether the Board’s rule is "rational

and consistent" with the Act, ensures that the Board, rather than the

courts, has the authority to resolve such concerns. See Arrow Auto.

Indus., Inc., 853 F.2d at 237.

14 ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. v. NLRB

requested representative to return from vacation. In so concluding, the

Board stressed the admonition in Weingarten that the right to choose

representation should not interfere with an employer’s legitimate

business interests, such as conducting investigatory interviews with-

out undue delay.

Similarly, in Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 1143

(1981), the Board concluded that an employee did not have the right

to choose a particular union representative. In that situation, the

employer operated two facilities, separated by twenty minutes of driv-

ing time. During an interview at one facility, an employee requested

a union representative from the other facility, even though the

requested representative did not usually represent employees at the

interview location. The employer refused this request, instead calling

for the representative the union had designated for the facility where

the interview was to occur. Given those circumstances, the Board

concluded that the employer did not violate the Act by refusing the

employee’s request. Id. at 1144.

Although the Board’s Coca-Cola and Pacific Gas decisions indi-

cate that employees are not entitled to choose a representative, the

Board, in more recent decisions, has refined its rule regarding union

representation. For example, in GHR Energy Corp., 294 N.L.R.B.

1011 (1989), the Board was faced with a situation where the

requested union representative was available. In those circumstances,

the Board ruled that the employer had violated the Act in denying an

employee his chosen representative. Id. at 1042 (finding that the

employer’s "refusal to permit [an employee] to exercise his right to

select a union representative in accordance with the Weingarten doc-

trine . . . violated § 8(a)(1) of the Act"). Thus, by 1989, the Board had

firmly indicated that, so long as the requested union representative is

reasonably available, an employer should accommodate an employ-

ee’s request for a particular representative. See also Consolidation

Coal Co., Robinson Run Mine No. 95, 307 N.L.R.B. 976 (1992) (rul-

ing that employer committed unfair labor practice in denying employ-

ee’s request when union representative was available and ready to

proceed).

Then, in New Jersey Bell, 308 N.L.R.B. 277 (1992), the Board

again addressed this issue. There, a union attempted to provide an

ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. v. NLRB 15

employee with a particular representative, but the employer ignored

the union’s choice and picked another representative. The employer

contended that, pursuant to Weingarten, Pacific Gas, and Coca-Cola,

it was not obligated to provide the employee with the representative

selected by the union. The ALJ in New Jersey Bell rejected this con-

tention, observing that the Board’s decisions in Pacific Gas and

Coca-Cola stood only for the proposition that an employer need not

postpone its investigatory interview in order to accommodate an

employee’s request.16 The ALJ concluded that the employer was

obliged to demonstrate a significant reason for denying the union’s

request for a particular representative. Because the union’s chosen

representative was, in the words of the ALJ, "just as available" as the

representative selected by the employer, the employer had violated

the Act. The ALJ believed that, unless special circumstances exist, an

employer has no interest in selecting the representative. On review,

the Board adopted a forerunner of the Representation Rule, conclud-

ing that: "when two union officials are equally available to serve as

a Weingarten representative . . . the decision as to who will serve is

properly decided by the union officials, unless the employer can

establish special circumstances."17 Id.

Thus, by 1992, the Board had taken a firm position that, absent

special circumstances (i.e., the requested union representative is

unavailable), the choice as to who will represent an employee during

an investigatory interview resides with the union and the employee,

not the employer.18 Beginning in 1977 with its Coca-Cola decision,

16

The ALJ in New Jersey Bell also distinguished Pacific Gas because

the Pacific Gas employee had requested a representative who did not

normally represent employees at the interview location, and the union

already had a system in place whereby an on-site representative was

available.

17

In New Jersey Bell, the Board disagreed with the ALJ’s determina-

tion that the employer had violated the Act. It concluded that, because

the requested representative had exceeded the scope of representation in

a prior interview, the employer had established special circumstances for

its denial.

18

In support of its position here, Busch also relies on the Board’s deci-

sions in Williams Pipeline Co., 315 N.L.R.B. 1 (1994) and LIR-USA

Manufacturing, Co., 306 N.L.R.B. 298 (1992). In Williams Pipeline Co.,

16 ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. v. NLRB

the Board has simply "modified and reformed its standards on the

basis of accumulating experience," as authorized and approved by the

Court in Weingarten. In such circumstances, we are constrained to

conclude that the Representation Rule is consistent with Board prece-

dent.

3.

Busch also asserts that the Representation Rule cannot be applied

to this case because it would be a retroactive application of the Rule.

See ARA Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 71 F.3d 129, 135 (4th Cir. 1995) (stat-

ing that Board cannot retroactively apply new rules). At the time of

its Coca-Cola and Pacific Gas decisions, the Board had not decided

that an employee is entitled to the union representative of his choice.

Since then, however, the Board has refined its approach to union rep-

resentation, developing its present position over the course of many

years and several decisions. In light of these developments, the Repre-

sentation Rule does not signify a substitution of new law for old law.

See ARA Serv., Inc., 71 F.3d at 135 ("[Only w]hen a Board decision

creates a new rule . . . by overruling past precedents relied upon by

the parties [is] the propriety of its retroactive application called into

question."). In sum, we conclude that the Board appropriately found

Busch to have committed unfair labor practices by failing to accom-

modate Lamirande’s requests for a particular representative.19

however, the Board merely recognized that an employer does not have

to postpone an investigatory interview when another union representative

is available. 315 N.L.R.B. at 5. And in LIR-USA, the ALJ simply noted

that an employer is not obligated to accommodate an employee’s request

when a requested representative is unavailable. 306 N.L.R.B. at 302.

Neither of these decisions is contrary to the Representation Rule.

19

Busch also asserts that the record does not support the ALJ’s finding

that Lamirande personally requested Finn’s presence on December 17,

1998. That Lamirande’s request was voiced by Lamirande’s representa-

tives on December 17, 1998, does not alter the fact that Lamirande had

personally requested Finn’s presence on the prior day. In these circum-

stances, the ALJ was entitled to find that Lamirande had requested Finn’s

presence on December 17th, even though his request was technically

made through a union official.

ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. v. NLRB 17

B.

On the Board’s disposition of the charges relating to Rimualdo,

Busch challenges the Order in two respects. First, it contends that the

Board violated its due process rights by finding an unfair labor prac-

tice that was not alleged in the Complaint. Second, it maintains that

the ALJ’s finding regarding Lux’s threat to Rimualdo is not supported

by substantial evidence. We assess these contentions in turn.

1.

In their initial charge, the Teamsters alleged that Busch "interfered

with, restrained and coerced Rimualdo in the right to engage in pro-

tected, concerted activity by threatening and disciplining him for fil-

ing a charge with the [Board]." The Complaint, by contrast, alleged

that, on August 25, 1999, Busch (through its agent Lux) "threatened

an employee with unspecified reprisals because the employee had

given testimony to the Board during a prior investigation." After the

hearing, the ALJ found that Busch had threatened Rimualdo for caus-

ing the Teamsters to file an unfair labor practice charge in connection

with the two strikes incident. The ALJ’s conclusion tracks the lan-

guage of the initial charge that the Teamsters filed with the Board

(and served on Busch) rather than the allegation of the Complaint.

Busch asserts that, in these circumstances, it was denied due process

because the ALJ’s finding had no foundation in the Complaint.

In similar circumstances, we rejected an employer’s challenge —

based on a due process contention — that the Board had found an

unfair labor practice not alleged in the complaint. In Standard-Coosa-

Thatcher Carpet Yarn Division v. NLRB, 691 F.2d 1133, 1136 n.3

(4th Cir. 1982), the Board’s General Counsel charged that an

employer had threatened its employee with a loss of benefits if she

voted in favor of a union. After hearing and considering evidence, the

ALJ and the Board concluded that the employer had actually enticed

the employee with a promise of benefits if she voted against the

union. The employer objected to this finding, asserting that it was at

variance with the complaint. We disagreed, concluding that the

employer had ample notice that an unfair labor practice was alleged

with respect to the specific conversation between the employer and

the employee. Thus, the employer had received due process in the

18 ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. v. NLRB

Board proceeding even though the ALJ’s finding was phrased differ-

ently from the allegation of the complaint. Id. (citing NLRB v. Tam-

per, Inc., 522 F.2d 781, 790 (4th Cir. 1975)).

The principle established in Standard-Coosa-Thatcher is control-

ling here. Busch was on notice that Lux’s comments to Rimualdo dur-

ing the Stamping Incident formed the gravamen of the unfair labor

practice charge set forth in the Complaint. Indeed, four separate wit-

nesses testified about the Stamping Incident, and the content and con-

text of Lux’s comments to Rimualdo were fully litigated. As in

Standard-Coosa-Thatcher, the ALJ and the Board were entitled to

articulate their findings in a manner that comported with the evidence.

Standard-Coosa-Thatcher, 691 F.2d at 1133 n.3. In these circum-

stances, Busch received ample notice that it was being charged with

an unfair labor practice because of Lux’s statements on August 25,

1999, in connection with the Stamping Incident. Thus, Busch received

all the process it was due.

2.

Busch next contends that the record fails to support the ALJ’s find-

ing that Lux threatened Rimualdo for engaging in protected activity.

Under § 8(a)(1), the filing of "grievances and Board charges are pro-

tected activities under the Act." Equitable Gas Co., Div. of Equitable

Res., Inc. v. NLRB, 966 F.2d 861, 866 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 29

U.S.C. § 157 and NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 836,

(1984)). An employer thus "violates § 8(a)(1) by threatening reprisals

for engaging in such protected activity." Id. (citing NLRB v. U.S.

Postal Serv., 906 F.2d 482, 486 (10th Cir. 1990)). Here, the ALJ

decided that Lux was threatening Rimualdo because of the pending

charges before the Board. In so concluding, the ALJ simply credited

Rimualdo’s and Hart’s versions of the Stamping Incident, rejecting

the conflicting evidence offered by Busch. When an administrative

record is fraught with conflicting testimony, we are obliged to defer

to the Board’s resolution of such conflicts. See NLRB v. Air Prods.

& Chems., Inc., 717 F.2d 141, 145 (4th Cir. 1983). We are thus con-

strained to conclude that the ALJ’s finding — i.e., that Lux threatened

Rimualdo for engaging in protected activity — is supported by sub-

stantial evidence.

ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. v. NLRB 19

C.

Finally, Busch raises two challenges to the Board’s conclusion that

it committed an unfair labor practice with respect to Brian Meany.

First, it contests the ALJ’s finding that Meany engaged in protected

activity during the communications meeting. Second, it maintains that

the Order and remedial notice are overly broad. We assess each of

these contentions in turn.

1.

On the evidentiary issue, the record amply supports the ALJ’s find-

ing that Meany was engaged in protected conduct during the commu-

nications meeting. ALJ Decision at 8-9. When an employee makes

comments or asks questions of his employer concerning working con-

ditions, he is unquestionably engaging in protected activity. See Con-

sumer Prod. Co., 282 N.L.R.B. 130, 132 (1986). An employee,

however, can lose the Act’s protections if his "conduct is so egregious

as to take it outside the protection of the Act, or of such a character

as to render the employee unfit for further service." Id. In support of

its contention on this issue, Busch relies primarily on the Board’s

decision in Eagle Picher Industries, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 169 (2000).

There, the employer instructed his employees to hold questions until

the end of a company presentation, but an employee disobeyed the

instruction and continuously interrupted the presentation. In its deci-

sion, the Board concluded that the employee’s conduct was not pro-

tected by the Act.

This case presents a factual setting that differs materially from

Eagle Picher. The communications meetings sponsored by Busch

were mandatory for all employees. At the end of each meeting, Busch

allowed its employees to ask questions. As the ALJ concluded, an

employer should reasonably expect unfavorable questions or state-

ments in such situations. ALJ Decision at 8-9. In the communications

meeting, Meany did not interrupt Harding’s presentation. Indeed, he

waited until Harding recognized him for a question before discussing

issues concerning employee morale. The record thus supports the

Board’s conclusions that Meany’s comments were not inappropriate,

much less egregious, and that he was engaged in protected activity.

Order at 1.

20 ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. v. NLRB

2.

Busch also asserts that the remedy crafted by the Board is over-

broad, in that it is not properly tailored to fit the unfair labor practice

it was intended to redress. See Ultrasystems W. Constructors, Inc. v.

NLRB, 18 F.3d 251, 258 (4th Cir. 1994). By its Order, the Board

required the posting of a notice advising Baldwinsville brewery work-

ers that Busch was prohibited from threatening to "discharge an

employee if he or she engages in a concerted protected activity,

including engaging in such activity when speaking at corporate com-

munications meetings." Order at 1. It is elementary that the Board

possesses broad discretion in crafting its orders, Ultrasystems, 18 F.3d

at 258, and there is no requirement that such an order be tailored so

as to preclude only the unlawful conduct arising from a particular

incident or employee. NLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills, 339 U.S. 563, 568

(1950). In these circumstances, and in light of these principles, the

terms of the Order are not overbroad.

V.

Pursuant to the foregoing, we deny Busch’s petition for review and

grant the Board’s cross-application for enforcement.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED AND CROSS-

APPLICATION FOR ENFORCEMENT GRANTED

SHEDD, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I concur in the part of the majority opinion denying Busch’s peti-

tion for review and granting the Board’s cross-application for

enforcement as to the Rimauldo and Meany incidents. I dissent, how-

ever, from the majority’s denial of Busch’s petition for review and its

grant of the Board’s cross-application for enforcement relating to the

two Lamirande incidents.

I dissent for several reasons. Most important, the majority’s "Rep-

resentation Rule" exceeds the scope of § 7 of the National Labor

Relations Act (the "NLRA" or the "Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 157. Also,

under the particular facts of this case, Busch afforded Lamirande all

ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. v. NLRB 21

the important protections that § 7 and the Weingarten rule were

intended to provide. Moreover, the majority’s "Representation Rule"

actually tends to undermine the protections afforded by the Weingar-

ten rule.

I.

The majority’s "Representation Rule" impermissibly expands the

right first announced by the Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingar-

ten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).1 The employer in Weingarten accused

one of its employees of stealing. The employer’s security agent inter-

viewed the employee about the allegations. Although the employee

repeatedly requested a union steward to assist her during the inter-

view, the security agent refused. After verifying the employee’s

defense, the security agent apologized to the employee and assured

her that the matter was closed.

Relieved, the employee burst into tears and made a seemingly

incriminating statement about a separate matter. The security agent

immediately launched yet another investigatory interview. The

employee again asked for a union steward, but the agent again denied

the request.

The Supreme Court held that a union employee is entitled to have

union representation during an investigatory interview that the

employee reasonably believes might result in disciplinary action. Id.

at 262. This proposition has generally become known as the "Wein-

garten right" or the "Weingarten rule." See, e.g., B. Glenn George,

Visions of a Labor Lawyer: The Legacy of Justice Brennan, Wm. &

Mary L. Rev. 1123, 1171 (1992). The Court in Weingarten based its

1

The majority insists that the "Representation Rule" is the Board’s

invention rather than its own. Ante at 9, n.10. The majority’s insistence

on this somewhat semantical point is curious. First, the majority, not the

Board, coined the phrase "Representation Rule." Second, even though

the majority may not have "invented" the "Representation Rule," the

majority has placed its imprimatur on the new rule by finding it to be

rational and consistent with the Act. Third, future litigants seeking pro-

tection or further extension of the "Representation Rule" will surely cite

the majority’s opinion rather than the Board’s order.

22 ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. v. NLRB

conclusion on the provisions of § 7 of the Act, the same provision at

issue in this case. Section 7 states in pertinent part:

Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,

join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively

through representatives of their own choosing, and to

engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of col-

lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. . . .

(Emphasis added).

The Court reasoned that an employee’s right to union representation

during an investigatory meeting is based on the guarantee that

employees have under § 7 to act in concert "for mutual aid or protec-

tion." Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 260.

In wrestling with the seeming inconsistency between the statutory

language, on one hand, which is aimed at "concerted" activity and

"mutual" aid and protection, and the individual employee’s claim, on

the other hand, that she had been deprived of union representation

during an investigatory meeting, the Court explained:

The union representative whose participation [the employee]

seeks is, however, safeguarding not only the particular

employee’s interest, but also the interests of the entire bar-

gaining unit by exercising vigilance to make certain that the

employer does not initiate or continue a practice of impos-

ing punishment unjustly. The representative’s presence is an

assurance to other employees in the bargaining unit that

they, too, can obtain his aid and protection if called upon to

attend a like interview. Concerted activity for mutual aid or

protection is therefore . . . present here.

Id. at 260-61.

The Court found that providing a union representative during an

investigative interview effectuates some of the primary purposes of

§ 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151, of the Act.2 Id., at 262. Such protection, the

2

The majority’s suggestion that § 1 grants an individual employee his

personal choice of union representation, see ante at 10, is misplaced.

ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. v. NLRB 23

Court reasoned, is consistent with the Act’s goal of eliminating the

"inequality of bargaining power between employees . . . and employ-

ers." As Justice Brennan explained for a majority of the Court:

A single employee confronted by an employer investigating

whether certain conduct deserves discipline may be too fear-

ful or inarticulate to relate accurately the incident being

investigated, or too ignorant to raise extenuating factors. A

knowledgeable union representative could assist the

employer by eliciting favorable facts, and save the employer

production time by getting to the bottom of the incident

occasioning the interview.

Id. at 262-63. Thus, the Court found that affording a "lone employee"

a union representative during an investigatory interview in which the

risk of discipline reasonably inheres falls within the protection of § 7

"read in the light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be

attained." Id. at 262.

By enforcing the Board’s decision in this case, the majority estab-

lishes a new right for individual employees that is untethered from § 7

of the Act and is not envisioned by Weingarten. Whereas the Wein-

garten rule and § 7 are designed to allow employees "to engage in . . .

concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection,"

the majority’s "Representation Rule" fails to effectuate any collective

right of employees. Instead, the majority’s holding guarantees each

individual employee the right to choose a particular union representa-

Section 1 declares it the policy of the United States to eliminate hin-

drances to the "free flow of commerce" generally by encouraging collec-

tive bargaining and "the exercise by workers of full freedom of

association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their

own choosing." 29 U.S.C. § 151 (emphasis added). This right to desig-

nate representatives arises in the context of the collective activities of

workers in a group. As Justice Marshall explained in a case decided the

day before Weingarten, the NLRA, to secure the collective strength of

the bargaining unit, establishes a regime of majority rule wherein the

rights of some individuals might be subordinated to the interests of the

majority. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Orga-

nization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975).

24 ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. v. NLRB

tive he or she desires, even when, as is in the instant case, that partic-

ular representative is not as available as another competent and duly

elected union representative and when the employee has no material

basis for insisting on one particular representative over another.3 This

new right that the majority creates does not advance the collective

interests of the bargaining unit.

The majority asserts that granting an individual employee the right

to demand one qualified, duly elected steward over another will help

mitigate the inequality between employer and employee and will

make the employee "generally feel more comfortable." See ante at 10,

n.11. As for the first purported justification, if both stewards are com-

petent and duly elected by the bargaining unit, allowing the individual

employee to choose one over the other does not benefit the collective

interests of the bargaining unit in the slightest. One competent, duly

elected steward mitigates the inequality between employer and

employee just as much as any other steward. As for the second pur-

ported justification, making an individual employee "generally feel

more comfortable" is not the important type of right that § 7 and the

Weingarten rule are intended to protect.4

3

There are, no doubt, instances when an employee would have a mate-

rial reason for preferring one representative over a proffered representa-

tive. If, for instance, the employee and the proffered representative have

a long history of animosity toward each other, the employer, after being

informed of this circumstance, should replace the proffered representa-

tive with another representative. This replacement would be required not

only because the proffered representative would be biased against the

individual employee but also because the proffered representative’s bias

could affect his ability to represent the interests of the unit as a collective

whole during the investigatory interview. No such circumstance exists in

this case. If it had, it would be consistent with the Weingarten rule and

§ 7 to require the replacement "in the light of the mischief to be corrected

and the end to be attained."

4

The majority also asserts that the "Representation Rule" is justified

because it would allow an employee to choose a steward who is already

familiar with his case. That simply is not the type of important right pro-

tected by Weingarten. In fact, the ALJ in this case found it unimportant

that a particular steward might already be "up to speed." J.A. 13. The

type of prompt, nonadversarial interview envisioned by Weingarten does

not require that a steward have in-depth knowledge about the incident

under review.

ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. v. NLRB 25

The Weingarten rule stands for the weighty proposition that an

employee should not be forced to undergo an investigatory interview

without the assistance of a union steward, who ensures that both the

employee and the bargaining unit are treated justly. The majority’s

new rule does not advance the interests of the bargaining unit as a

whole. Therefore, the "Representation Rule" exceeds the scope of § 7

of the Act and is an impermissible extension of the Weingarten rule.5

See Maislin Industries v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 131

(1990) ("Once we have determined a statute’s clear meaning, we

adhere to that determination under the doctrine of stare decisis, and

we judge an agency’s later interpretation of the statute against our

prior determination of the statute’s meaning.").6

5

We are obliged to uphold the Board’s interpretation of a statute only

if it is rational and consistent with the Act. See Sam’s Club v. N.L.R.B.,

173 F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir. 1999). Reviewing courts are not to stand

aside and rubber stamp Board determinations that are contrary to the lan-

guage or tenor of the Act. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 266.

6

Moreover, I dissent because the majority’s "Representation Rule,"

even if it could be construed as a permissible interpretation of § 7, cannot

be enforced retroactively against Busch. An important consideration in

determining whether to give retroactive application to a new rule is

deciding whether the rule proposed is an "abrupt break with well-settled

policy" or is merely an "attempt to fill a void in an unsettled area of law."

ARA Services, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 71 F.3d 129, 134 (4th Cir. 1995).

The Board’s most recent pronouncement in a Weingarten rule case

was Williams Pipeline Co., 315 N.L.R.B. 1 (1994). In Williams, the

employee being investigated asked for a union steward who was not

immediately available. In deciding the case, the Board reaffirmed its

prior decision in Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1276 (1977). In

Coca-Cola, the Board held that an employer is not required to postpone

an investigatory hearing when the employee asks for a particular union

representative who is unavailable, if there is another qualified union rep-

resentative available.

Because Williams was the most recent decision by the Board prior to

the Lamirande incident, Busch was entitled to rely on it and the prior

Board decisions, like Coca-Cola, consistent with it. Therefore, even if

the majority’s "Representation Rule" were a permissible interpretation of

§ 7, it constitutes an abrupt reversal of prior policy that may not be

applied retroactively.

26 ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. v. NLRB

II.

I also dissent because the facts of this case reveal that Busch

afforded Lamirande all the important protections that § 7 of the Act

and the Weingarten rule provide. Lamirande, who soon before this

incident was elected as a union steward,7 was accused of endangering

the safety of other workers at the Busch plant. Busch chose to inter-

view Lamirande about the incident, even though it was not required

to under the law. Instead, it could have immediately commenced a

disciplinary proceeding. See Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 259.

Lamirande asked that Steward Finn be called to represent him dur-

ing the interview. Instead, Steward Vogel was summoned to the meet-

ing to represent Lamirande. Busch did not summon Steward Finn

because he was scheduled to be at lunch. The ALJ found that Busch

had a logical reason for not calling Steward Finn. He also found that

both Steward Vogel and Steward Finn were competent stewards, and

that Busch had no ulterior motive in wanting Steward Vogel to repre-

sent Lamirande rather than Steward Finn. Steward Vogel was duly

elected by the workers in Lamirande’s department and had regularly

represented workers during investigatory interviews.

Once Steward Vogel arrived, he was given an opportunity to speak

privately with Lamirande. Lamirande told him that he preferred Stew-

ard Finn because he was already "aware of my situation." J.A. 10.

There is no evidence in the record, however, that Steward Finn was

aware of Lamirande’s situation until after the first interview. The ALJ

also found that Lamirande never told Busch any reason why he

wanted Steward Finn rather than Steward Vogel to represent him. As

the ALJ found: "Lamirande asked for union representation and got it

promptly." J.A. 11.

The ALJ assumed that the interview began at 11:15 a.m. and that,

had the interviewer granted Lamirande’s request for Steward Finn, the

interviewer would have had to wait only 15 minutes until Steward

Finn returned from lunch. The ALJ found that this "short delay" was

not a sufficient reason to deny Lamirande’s request.8 The ALJ found

7

His term as steward commenced the month after this incident.

8

The ALJ also decided that Busch should have delayed the interview

and that nothing about the circumstances required instant attention.

Busch asserts correctly that these are legitimate prerogatives reserved to

the employer under Weingarten.

ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. v. NLRB 27

that, even though Steward Finn was on lunch break, he was not any

less "available" than Steward Vogel. J.A. 13.

The ALJ clearly erred in deciding that Steward Finn was not less

"available" than Steward Vogel. The interview began before Steward

Finn was scheduled to return from lunch. The interviewer was pre-

pared to proceed when Steward Vogel was present but Steward Finn

was not.9 Steward Finn was not "equally available" as Steward Vogel.10

At no time during the course of these interviews did anyone sug-

gest that it was a Weingarten violation for Busch to provide Steward

9

The majority contends that three prior Board decisions on which it

relies require only that the requested representative be "reasonably"

available. Ante at 14. This characterization is incorrect. In GHR Energy

Corp., 294 N.L.R.B. 1011 (1989), the requested representative arrived at

the interview before the representative proffered by the employer. In

New Jersey Bell Telephone Co., 308 N.L.R.B. 277, 282 (1992), and Con-

solidation Coal Co., 307 N.L.R.B. 976, 978 (1992), the requested repre-

sentatives were "equally available" and "present and ready to go

forward."

The majority’s mischaracterization is further evidenced by the Board’s

decision in LIR-USA Manufacturing Co., 306 N.L.R.B. 298 (1992). In

that case, the Board did not give any weight to the employee’s preference

for one steward over another steward when the requested steward was

not available within five minutes.

10

The majority asserts that the ALJ was in a better position to assess

the respective availability of the two stewards and therefore substantial

evidence exists in the record justifying the ALJ’s finding that Steward

Finn was not less "available" than Steward Vogel. Ante at 12, n.14.

"Availability" has had a distinct meaning under the Weingarten rule

cases. For example, a particular steward is "available" when he or she is

"present and ready to proceed." See cases cited ante at 27, n.9.

The ALJ ignored this accepted definition. Instead, the ALJ found that

Steward Finn was no less "available" because he could have been present

after a "short delay."

The only evidence in the record, however, is that Steward Finn was not

present and ready to proceed when Steward Vogel was present and ready

to proceed. Thus, there is no evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that

Steward Finn was no less "available."

28 ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. v. NLRB

Vogel rather than Steward Finn. In fact, it was not until after the

Region refused the union’s request to issue complaint over Lami-

rande’s suspension that the Weingarten issue was raised.

To suggest that Busch somehow tried to intimidate or overpower

Lamirande or tried to disadvantage him during the two interviews by

not allowing him to have Steward Finn as his representative lacks any

support in the record. There was clearly no "mischief to be corrected"

by having Steward Finn rather than Steward Vogel represent Lami-

rande. All the underlying policy reasons for the Weingarten rule were

attained, i.e., Steward Vogel safeguarded not only the particular inter-

ests of Lamirande but also the interests of the entire bargaining unit

by ensuring "that [Busch did] not initiate or continue a practice of

imposing punishment unjustly." Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 260-61.

Because Lamirande was competently represented in both interviews

by a duly elected steward, he was not the "lone employee" whom

Weingarten and § 7 protect.

III.

Finally, the majority’s "Representation Rule" is inconsistent with

the important protections the Weingarten rule was intended to foster.

As the majority rightly notes, an employer is not obligated to summon

a particular steward requested by an employee under any circum-

stance. Ante at 10-11, n.11. Instead, the employer has the prerogative

to forgo the interview process altogether and proceed to discipline the

employee immediately. The Court in Weingarten understood the dis-

advantages of this scenario. By establishing the Weingarten rule, the

Court attempted to create a policy that was "useful to both employee

and employer." Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 262. The Court explained the

benefit of the rule:

A knowledgeable union representative could assist the

employer by eliciting favorable facts, and save the employer

production time by getting to the bottom of the incident

occasioning the interview. Certainly his presence need not

transform the interview into an adversary contest. Respon-

dent suggests nonetheless that union representation at this

stage is unnecessary because a decision as to employee cul-

pability or disciplinary action can be corrected after the

ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. v. NLRB 29

decision to impose discipline has become final. In other

words, respondent would defer representation until the filing

of a formal grievance challenging the employer’s determina-

tion of guilt after the employee has been discharged or oth-

erwise disciplined. At that point, however, it becomes

increasingly difficult for the employee to vindicate himself,

and the value of representation is correspondingly dimin-

ished. The employer may then be more concerned with justi-

fying his actions than re-examining them.

Id. at 263.

The "Representation Rule" adds an unnecessary complication to

what the Court envisioned as a streamlined system of dispute resolu-

tion. Instead of "getting to the bottom of the incident occasioning the

interview," the new rule announced today will inevitably give rise to

new disputes like what constitutes an "extenuating circumstance" and

how long must the interviewer wait before proceeding with the inter-

view. These disputes will arise even in cases like this one, where the

employee demanding a particular representative will receive no addi-

tional benefit from and has no material reason for making such a

demand. Employers may well find it much more desirable to bypass

the interview process and proceed to discipline. This result is incon-

sistent with the goals of the Weingarten rule and § 7 of the Act.11

11

The majority suggests that it lacks authority to stop such an undesir-

able result, because Congress has delegated such policy considerations to

the Board. Ante at 12-13, n.15. As previously explained, ante at 25, the

court is not allowed to merely rubber stamp the Board’s interpretation of

a statute. Instead, a court must judge an agency’s interpretation against

the Supreme Court’s prior determination of the statute’s meaning. Mais-

lin Industries, 497 U.S. at 131. In Weingarten, the Supreme Court clearly

promoted the investigatory interview as a prompt, efficient, desirable

means of handling disputes for both the employer and the employee.

Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 262-63. The "Representation Rule" might cause

employers to bypass the interview process and thereby disadvantage

employees. This potential further suggests that the "Representation Rule"

is not a permissible interpretation of the Act.

30 ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. v. NLRB

IV.

Today, the majority coins the phrase "Representation Rule" to des-

ignate the new rule that it announces. This redesignation is warranted

because the "Representation Rule" is an impermissible extension of

the Weingarten rule.

For all of the above reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majori-

ty’s denial of Busch’s petition for review and its grant of the Board’s

cross-application for enforcement as to both of the Lamirande inci-

dents. The majority’s new "Representation Rule" exceeds the reach of

§ 7 of the Act.