Opinion

Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Centers, Inc.

  • 334 F.3d 390
  • 2003 WL 21508938
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Filed
Jul 2, 2003
Status
Published
Author
King
On the bench
Wilkins, Motz, King
Cited by
611 cases
Authority
More cited than 98.8%

explaining that “to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, two conditions must be satisfied: (1) the exercise of jurisdiction must be authorized under the state’s long-arm statute; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment” (citing Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of the First Church of Christ v. Nolan, 2 Ms. Johnson also brings a claim of tortious interference with contractual relations, but this count (Count II) is only alleged against John Doe. (First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 35–43.) 259 F.3d 209 , 215 (4th Cir.2001))

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that “to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, two conditions must be satisfied: (1) the exercise of jurisdiction must be authorized under the state’s long-arm statute; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment” (citing Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of the First Church of Christ v. Nolan, 2 Ms. Johnson also brings a claim of tortious interference with contractual relations, but this count (Count II) is only alleged against John Doe. (First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 35–43.) 259 F.3d 209 , 215 (4th Cir.2001))
  • finding no personal jurisdiction in Maryland where “generally accessible, semi- interactive Internet website [did not] direct electronic activity into Maryland with the manifest intent of engaging in business or other interactions within that state in particular”
  • finding that “when [defendant] set up its generally accessible, semi-interactive Internet website, it did not thereby direct electronic activity into Maryland with the manifest intent of engaging in business or other interactions within that state in particular.”
  • holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying jurisdictional discovery when, against the defendants’ affidavits, plaintiff offered nothing beyond bare allegations that the defendants had had significant contacts with the forum state

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

CAREFIRST OF MARYLAND, 

INCORPORATED, d/b/a Carefirst Blue

Cross/Blue Shield,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CAREFIRST PREGNANCY CENTERS,  No. 02-1137

INCORPORATED, d/b/a Carefirst,

Defendant-Appellee,

and

NETIMPACT, INCORPORATED,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.

(CA-01-1578-CCB)

Argued: April 3, 2003

Decided: July 2, 2003

Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and

KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge King wrote the opinion, in

which Chief Judge Wilkins and Judge Motz joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Ruth Mae Finch, STEVENS, DAVIS, MILLER &

MOSHER, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Frederick Chris-

2 CAREFIRST OF MARYLAND v. CAREFIRST PREGNANCY CENTERS

topher Laney, NIRO, SCAVONE, HALLER & NIRO, Chicago, Illi-

nois, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Barth X. deRosa, STEVENS,

DAVIS, MILLER & MOSHER, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appel-

lant. Raymond P. Niro, Jr., Matthew G. McAndrews, NIRO, SCA-

VONE, HALLER & NIRO, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellee.

OPINION

KING, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, we address whether an Illinois organization sub-

jected itself to personal jurisdiction in Maryland by operating an

Internet website that allegedly infringed the trademark rights of a

Maryland insurance company. Carefirst of Maryland ("Carefirst")

accuses Chicago-based Carefirst Pregnancy Centers, Inc. ("CPC") of

selecting the name CAREFIRST, despite having notice both of Care-

first’s federal registrations for CAREFIRST and of Carefirst’s com-

mon law use of the CAREFIRST mark. Carefirst brought suit against

CPC in the District of Maryland, alleging infringement and dilution

of its trademark. The court dismissed the case without prejudice for

lack of personal jurisdiction over CPC. Carefirst asks that we vacate

the dismissal on the ground that Carefirst has made the requisite

prima facie showing that CPC is subject to personal jurisdiction in

Maryland. In the alternative, Carefirst seeks remand to the district

court for jurisdictional discovery. Because the district court properly

resolved the jurisdictional issue, we affirm its dismissal of this trade-

mark action.

I.

A.

Carefirst, a Maryland corporation with its principal place of busi-

ness in Maryland, is one of the nation’s largest healthcare insurance

companies. It is a non-profit BlueCross BlueShield licensee, primarily

in the business of selling prepaid healthcare plans. BlueCross Blue-

Shield is an association of independent health plans, which, since the

1930s, have been chartered to operate in geographically distinct terri-

CAREFIRST OF MARYLAND v. CAREFIRST PREGNANCY CENTERS 3

tories. Carefirst operates exclusively within the mid-atlantic region of

the United States; the majority of its 3.1 million members resides in

Maryland and in the nearby states of Pennsylvania and West Virginia.

Among the services covered by Carefirst’s trademark and service

mark in the CAREFIRST name are "educational services, namely,

conducting seminars, classes, workshops and lectures on nutrition,

infant care, prenatal care, fitness, weight reduction, stress manage-

ment and substance abuse." Carefirst advertises and promotes its

products and services extensively via the Internet at

www.carefirst.com. Its website includes information on health educa-

tion classes in pregnancy, child birth, and infant care, and it provides

pregnancy-related educational materials.

B.

CPC, an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business in

Illinois, is a non-profit, evangelical, pro-life advocacy organization.

CPC’s professed mission is to "care[ ] for Chicago-area women in

pregnancy-related crisis by meeting their emotional, physical and

spiritual needs, enabling them to choose life." The organization origi-

nally incorporated in 1985 under the name "Loop Crisis Pregnancy

Center," but it changed its name in 1993 to "ChicagoCare Pregnancy

Centers," and then in 1999 to "Carefirst Pregnancy Centers, Inc. d/b/a

Carefirst."

CPC is headquartered in Chicago, Illinois, and it has no physical

presence in Maryland: it has no offices, no telephone listing, no

employees, and no agents there. Nor does CPC directly solicit funds

from individuals in Maryland. And, according to the declaration of

CPC’s president, Nancy W. Good, CPC has never even provided

counseling services to anyone in Maryland. CPC’s sole contact with

Maryland springs from its operation of an Internet website, accessible

from anywhere in the world through any one of several web

addresses.

In 1998, CPC entered into a contract with NetImpact, Inc.,

4 CAREFIRST OF MARYLAND v. CAREFIRST PREGNANCY CENTERS

a web hosting1 and web development2 company incorporated

in Delaware and headquartered in Ocean Pines, Maryland.

On CPC’s behalf, NetImpact purchased several domain names,3

including "www.carefirstpc.com," "www.carefirstpc.org,"

"www.carefirstpc.net," "chicagocare.org," "love4real.org," and

"care1pregnancy.com." Between November 5, 1998, and November

20, 2001, NetImpact submitted twenty-three invoices to CPC’s Illi-

nois address for the web hosting services that NetImpact provided

during the period.4

CPC uses its various domain names to direct Internet traffic to

CPC’s website, throughout which the CAREFIRST name appears. On

that website, CPC solicits donations; educates pregnant women about

nutrition, infant care, and prenatal care; provides references to

Chicago-area medical doctors and hospitals; promotes its counseling

services and parenting classes; and advertises the pregnancy tests and

ultrasound services that it offers free of charge. The website asserts

at several points that the geographic focus of CPC’s activities is the

Chicago metropolitan area.

In soliciting donations, CPC’s website offers prospective donors

two methods of contribution: (1) they can call an advertised toll-free

number and make a credit card transaction over the phone; or (2) they

can make a credit card donation directly through the website. In either

case, the donor’s name and address are recorded in CPC’s database,

and the donor thereafter receives advertising materials through the

1

"Web hosting" is a service provided by companies that have a direct

connection to the Internet. When an individual wants to create a website,

he can contract with one of these host companies to rent space on the

host’s Internet-connected "server" computer. For a fee, the individual is

permitted to save his website files on the host’s server; the host, in turn,

maintains the server and the Internet connection.

2

"Web development" refers to the design and programming of a web-

site.

3

A "domain name" is a unique Internet address that serves as the pri-

mary identifier of an Internet user. See Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen,

938 F. Supp. 616, 618 (C.D. Cal. 1996).

4

The CPC website itself was created, and now is administered and

maintained, by Highgate Cross, Inc., a Chicago-area company.

CAREFIRST OF MARYLAND v. CAREFIRST PREGNANCY CENTERS 5

mails. If the donation is made online, the donor also receives a thank-

you e-mail.

CPC has acknowledged that it received $1,542 in donations (about

0.0174% of its total donation receipts) from Maryland residents

between 1991 and September of 2001. Of this amount, only $120 was

donated (by nine different Marylanders) after CPC adopted the name

"Carefirst Pregnancy Centers, Inc.," in 1999. Apart from a single

online donation made by the lawyer for Carefirst in this proceeding,

there is no evidence that the Maryland donations were made through

the website.

II.

On October 26, 2000, shortly after learning of CPC’s use of the

CAREFIRST name and mark, Carefirst transmitted a cease-and-desist

letter to CPC. After attempting to resolve the dispute, Carefirst, on

May 31, 2001, filed suit against CPC and NetImpact in the District

of Maryland.

CPC responded by filing a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack

of personal jurisdiction, supported by the declaration of its president,

Nancy W. Good. After obtaining several extensions of time, Carefirst

filed a motion requesting both limited jurisdictional discovery and

another extension of time in which to respond to the motion to dis-

miss. CPC opposed Carefirst’s motion, maintaining that discovery

was unwarranted since Carefirst had failed to make a prima facie case

for personal jurisdiction.

On January 2, 2002, the court dismissed the action, without preju-

dice, for lack of personal jurisdiction, and it denied Carefirst’s discov-

ery request.5 Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc.,

5

On March 28, 2002, the district court entered a Consent Judgment for

trademark infringement, dilution, and unfair competition against CPC’s

co-defendant, NetImpact, enjoining that company from creating or main-

taining an Internet website or link under the CAREFIRST mark and

name, and releasing NetImpact from damages based upon NetImpact’s

compliance with the Consent Judgment and terms of the settlement

agreement. As part of Carefirst’s and NetImpact’s settlement, NetIm-

pact’s president and owner agreed to give testimony regarding CPC’s

contacts with NetImpact.

6 CAREFIRST OF MARYLAND v. CAREFIRST PREGNANCY CENTERS

Mem. Op., Civ. No. CCB-01-1578 (D. Md. Jan. 2, 2002) (the "Opin-

ion"). In granting CPC’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal juris-

diction, the court found that CPC operated primarily in Chicago; had

no office, telephone listing, employees, agents, or sales representa-

tives in Maryland; had never directly solicited funds from Maryland

residents or otherwise targeted the forum; had received a de minimus

portion of its charitable contributions from Maryland residents; and

had recived nearly all of those contributions by mail, rather than

online. Opinion at 1. The court went on to find that CPC’s only con-

nections to Maryland arose from the facts that (1) its website could

be accessed from anywhere in the world, including Maryland; and (2)

the website’s "host" was a Maryland corporation. Id. On this basis,

the court concluded that CPC did not have sufficient contacts with

Maryland to support personal jurisdiction in the Maryland courts. Id.6

On January 11, 2002, Carefirst sought reconsideration of the dis-

missal. Then, on March 12, 2002, it filed a motion to vacate the dis-

missal on the basis of newly discovered evidence of CPC’s contacts

with Maryland, which Carefirst had obtained from NetImpact’s presi-

dent. The court denied the motion for reconsideration on March 29,

2002, Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., Order,

Civ. No. CCB-01-1578 (D. Md. Mar. 29, 2002), and it denied the

motion to vacate on July 17, 2002, Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst

Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., Order, Civ. No. CCB-01-1578 (D. Md. July 17,

2002) (the "July Order"). Carefirst timely appealed the dismissal of

its complaint, the denial of its motion for reconsideration, and the

denial of its motion to vacate. We possess jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1291.

III.

We review de novo a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction,

Kohler v. Dodwell, 152 F.3d 304, 307 (4th Cir. 1998), though we

review any underlying factual findings for clear error, see In re

6

Two days later, on January 4, 2002, the court informed counsel for

Carefirst that, although the court had not had an opportunity to review

Carefirst’s reply brief before denying Carefirst’s motion for discovery

and an extension of time, it subsequently had done so and remained con-

vinced that its January 2 ruling was correct.

CAREFIRST OF MARYLAND v. CAREFIRST PREGNANCY CENTERS 7

Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 619, 627 (4th Cir. 1997). When personal

jurisdiction is properly challenged under Rule 12(b)(2), the jurisdic-

tional question is to be resolved by the judge, with the burden on the

plaintiff ultimately to prove grounds for jurisdiction by a preponder-

ance of the evidence. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. AKZO, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 59-

60 (4th Cir. 1993). When, however, as here, a district court decides

a pretrial personal jurisdiction motion without conducting an evidenti-

ary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of

personal jurisdiction. Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 676 (4th Cir.

1989). In deciding whether the plaintiff has made the requisite show-

ing, the court must take all disputed facts and reasonable inferences

in favor of the plaintiff. See Mylan Labs., 2 F.3d at 60.

We review a district court’s discovery orders for abuse of discre-

tion. See id. at 64. We also review for abuse of discretion the denial

of a Rule 6(b)(1) motion for extension of time. See Lujan v. Nat’l

Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).

IV.

A.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A), a federal court

may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant in the manner

provided by state law. See ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126

F.3d 617, 622 (4th Cir. 1997). Thus, for a district court to assert per-

sonal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, two conditions must

be satisfied: (1) the exercise of jurisdiction must be authorized under

the state’s long-arm statute; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction must

comport with the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment. Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of the First Church of Christ v.

Nolan, 259 F.3d 209, 215 (4th Cir. 2001). With regard to the first

requirement, we must accept as binding the interpretation of Mary-

land’s long-arm statute rendered by the Maryland Court of Appeals.

See Mylan Labs., 2 F.3d at 61. The Maryland courts have consistently

held that the state’s long-arm statute is coextensive with the limits of

personal jurisdiction set by the due process clause of the Constitution.

See Mohamed v. Michael, 370 A.2d 551, 553 (Md. 1977). Thus, our

statutory inquiry merges with our constitutional inquiry. See Stover v.

O’Connell Assocs., Inc., 84 F.3d 132, 135 (4th Cir. 1996).

8 CAREFIRST OF MARYLAND v. CAREFIRST PREGNANCY CENTERS

A court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant

comports with due process if the defendant has "minimum contacts"

with the forum, such that to require the defendant to defend its inter-

ests in that state "does not offend traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice." Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316

(1945) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The standard for determining the existence of personal jurisdiction

over a nonresident defendant varies, depending on whether the defen-

dant’s contacts with the forum state also provide the basis for the suit.

If those contacts form the basis for the suit, they may establish "spe-

cific jurisdiction." In determining whether specific jurisdiction exists,

we consider (1) the extent to which the defendant has purposefully

availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the state; (2)

whether the plaintiffs’ claims arise out of those activities directed at

the state; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would

be constitutionally "reasonable." ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Con-

sultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 711-12 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123

S. Ct. 868 (2003); see Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.

Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 & n.8 (1984). If, however, the defendant’s

contacts with the state are not also the basis for the suit, then jurisdic-

tion over the defendant must arise from the defendant’s general, more

persistent, but unrelated contacts with the state. To establish general

jurisdiction, the defendant’s activities in the state must have been

"continuous and systematic." ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 712; see Helicop-

teros, 466 U.S. at 414 & n.9.

Because there is, in this case, no suggestion that CPC engaged in

continuous and systematic activities within Maryland, our inquiry

must focus on the conduct giving rise to the suit, i.e., CPC’s alleged

infringement of Carefirst’s trademark. And accordingly, it is only if

(1) CPC purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting

activities in Maryland, (2) Carefirst’s claims arise out of those activi-

ties, and (3) the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be constitu-

tionally "reasonable," that CPC can be held subject to specific

jurisdiction in Maryland. In conducting this inquiry, we direct our

focus to "the quality and nature of [CPC’s Maryland] contacts." Nich-

ols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 783 F. Supp. 233, 238 (D. Md. 1992), aff’d,

991 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir. 1993). We should not "merely . . . count the

contacts and quantitatively compare this case to other preceding

CAREFIRST OF MARYLAND v. CAREFIRST PREGNANCY CENTERS 9

cases." Id. Even a single contact may be sufficient to create jurisdic-

tion when the cause of action arises out of that single contact, pro-

vided that the principle of "fair play and substantial justice" is not

thereby offended. Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471

U.S. 462, 477-78 (1985)); see McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S.

220, 223-24 (1957).

B.

To decide whether the requisites of specific jurisdiction are satis-

fied in this case, it is necessary to consider how they apply to the par-

ticular circumstance in which, as here, an out-of-state defendant has

acted outside of the forum in a manner that injures someone residing

in the forum. In Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), the Supreme

Court held that a court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction

over a nonresident defendant acting outside of the forum when the

defendant has intentionally directed his tortious conduct toward the

forum state, knowing that that conduct would cause harm to a forum

resident.7 Id. at 789-90. Applying that test to the libel suit before it,

the Calder Court held that California possessed jurisdiction over Flor-

ida reporters who had written an allegedly libelous article for the

National Enquirer about a California actress, because "California

[was] the focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered." Id.

at 789. The writers’ "actions were expressly aimed at California," the

Court said, "[a]nd they knew that the brunt of [the potentially devas-

tating] injury would be felt by [the actress] in the State in which she

lives and works and in which the National Enquirer has its largest cir-

culation." Id. at 789-90; see also ESAB Group, 126 F.3d at 625-26

(emphasizing importance, in light of Calder, of evidence that defen-

dant expressly aimed or directed its conduct toward forum state and

noting that business activities focusing "generally on customers

7

This "effects test" of specific jurisdiction is typically construed to

require that the plaintiff establish that: (1) the defendant committed an

intentional tort; (2) the plaintiff felt the brunt of the harm in the forum,

such that the forum can be said to be the focal point of the harm; and (3)

the defendant expressly aimed his tortious conduct at the forum, such

that the forum can be said to be the focal point of the tortious activity.

See, e.g., IMO Indus., Inc. v. Keikert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265-66 (3d Cir.

1988).

10 CAREFIRST OF MARYLAND v. CAREFIRST PREGNANCY CENTERS

located throughout the United States and Canada without focusing on

and targeting" forum state cannot yield personal jurisdiction).

C.

Carefirst contends that, in two distinct ways, CPC expressly aimed

its trademark-infringing conduct at the forum state of Maryland: first,

CPC set up a semi-interactive website that was accessible from Mary-

land; and second, CPC maintained a relationship with the Maryland

web hosting company, NetImpact. We address in turn each of these

two potential sources of specific jurisdiction.

1.

Carefirst first contends that it made a prima facie showing of spe-

cific personal jurisdiction when it alleged that CPC used an interac-

tive website to direct electronic activity into the state with the

manifest intent of conducting commercial activities with Maryland

residents. That CPC possessed the requisite intent is, according to

Carefirst, demonstrated by CPC’s acceptance of donations from

Maryland residents; its submission of e-mails to Maryland residents

who make contributions; its mailing of promotional materials to

Maryland residents who make contributions; and its establishment of

a 24-hour toll-free telephone number and hotline over which Mary-

land residents could make donations, obtain counseling, or receive

pregnancy test kits.

The issue before us is whether the evidence that Carefirst has prof-

fered is sufficient to make out a prima facie case that CPC "expressly

aimed" its allegedly unlawful online conduct at Maryland, so as to

confer personal jurisdiction over CPC in the Maryland courts. To

resolve this question, we begin with our recent decision in ALS Scan,

Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 713 (4th Cir.

2002), in which we addressed "whether a person electronically trans-

mitting or enabling the transmission of information via the Internet to

Maryland, causing injury there, subjects the person to the jurisdiction

of a court in Maryland." Id. at 712. Or, to put the ALS Scan issue

more broadly, when has "an out-of-state citizen, through electronic

contacts, . . . ‘entered’ the State via the Internet for jurisdictional pur-

poses"? Id. at 713.

CAREFIRST OF MARYLAND v. CAREFIRST PREGNANCY CENTERS 11

In tackling these questions, our ALS Scan decision expressly

"[a]dopt[ed] and adapt[ed]" the model for Internet-based specific

jurisdiction developed in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com,

Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). Id. at 714. In its Zippo deci-

sion, Judge McLaughlin of the Western District of Pennsylvania first

enunciated that court’s influential "sliding scale" model for applying

Calder principles to cases arising from electronic commerce. In

Zippo, the defendant operated an online news service, which collected

information and payments from, and contracted with, subscribers in

the plaintiff’s jurisdiction, all via the Internet. In holding that personal

jurisdiction over the defendant was proper in the plaintiff’s home

state, the Zippo court distinguished among interactive, semi-

interactive, and passive websites. When a defendant runs an interac-

tive site, through which he "enters into contracts with residents of a

foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmis-

sion of computer files over the Internet," he can properly be haled into

the courts of that foreign jurisdiction. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. If,

by contrast, the defendant’s site is passive, in that it merely makes

information available, the site cannot render him subject to specific

personal jurisdiction in a foreign court. Id.; see Mink v. AAAA Dev.

LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999); see also ESAB Group, Inc.

v. Centricut, LLC, 34 F. Supp. 2d 323, 330 (D.S.C. 1999). Occupying

a middle ground are semi-interactive websites, through which there

have not occurred a high volume of transactions between the defen-

dant and residents of the foreign jurisdiction, yet which do enable

users to exchange information with the host computer. "In these

cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the

level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of infor-

mation that occurs." Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.

Applying Zippo, we held in ALS Scan that, as a general matter, "[a]

State may, consistent with due process, exercise judicial power over

a person outside of the State when that person (1) directs electronic

activity into the State, (2) with the manifested intent of engaging in

business or other interactions within the State, and (3) that activity

creates, in a person within the State, a potential cause of action cogni-

zable in the State’s courts." Id. at 714. Thus, "a person’s action of

placing information on the Internet" is not sufficient by itself to "sub-

ject[ ] that person to personal jurisdiction in each State in which the

information is accessed." Id. at 712; see also Panavision Int’l, L.P. v.

12 CAREFIRST OF MARYLAND v. CAREFIRST PREGNANCY CENTERS

Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that some-

thing more than posting and accessibility is needed to "indicate that

the [defendants] purposefully (albeit electronically) directed [their]

activity in a substantial way to the forum state"). Applying this frame-

work, we decided in ALS Scan that Maryland could not exercise per-

sonal jurisdiction over an Internet service provider whose activities in

the state were merely "passive." And accordingly, we affirmed the

dismissal of an underlying copyright action brought by the owner of

copyrighted photographs against a nonresident Internet service pro-

vider for the website where the photographs were being displayed.

Since deciding ALS Scan last year, we have had only one occasion

on which to discuss in detail and apply the principles of Internet-

based personal jurisdiction that our ALS Scan opinion set forth. In

Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002), we

addressed whether a Virginia district court had personal jurisdiction

over foreign defendants in a libel suit brought by the warden of a Vir-

ginia prison against two Connecticut newspapers. The warden’s alle-

gations stemmed from the newspapers’ coverage of conditions in the

prison, which housed numerous Connecticut prisoners. In their

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the newspapers

pointed out that both publications were printed and distributed in

Connecticut. One of the newspapers had no mail subscribers in Vir-

ginia, and the other had just eight. Neither solicited subscriptions

from Virginia residents, and neither had officers or employees there.

No one from either newspaper — not even the reporters — had trav-

eled to Virginia to work on the articles. Two reporters made a few

telephone calls into Virginia to gather information, but the newspa-

pers otherwise had no direct contact with the Commonwealth.

In response, the warden noted that the newspapers posted the alleg-

edly defamatory articles on Internet websites that were accessible to

Virginia residents. He also observed that the newspapers’ websites

contained real estate, employment, and other advertising content, and

he argued that such content was designed to target and attract out-of-

staters, such as Virginians. Thus, the warden contended, the Virginia

court possessed personal jurisdiction over the Connecticut defendants

because (1) the newspapers, knowing that the warden was a Virginia

resident, intentionally defamed him in their articles; (2) the newspa-

pers posted the articles on Virginia-accessible websites that were

CAREFIRST OF MARYLAND v. CAREFIRST PREGNANCY CENTERS 13

designed to attract an out-of-state audience; and (3) the primary

effects of the defamatory statements on the warden’s reputation were

felt in Virginia. Id. at 261-62.

Despite the warden’s showing of these Virginia connections, we

held in Young that the Connecticut newspapers did not post materials

on their Internet sites with the "manifest intent" of targeting readers

in Virginia, and hence that a Virginia court lacked personal jurisdic-

tion over the newspapers. Id. at 264. In rejecting the warden’s argu-

ment and finding in favor of the defendant newspapers, Judge

Michael reasoned that "[t]he [newspapers’] websites are not designed

to attract or serve a Virginia audience." Id. at 263. Furthermore, "Con-

necticut, not Virginia, was the focal point of the [allegedly libelous]

articles." Id. at 264. Because "[t]he newspapers did not post materials

on the Internet with the manifest intent of targeting Virginia readers,"

they "could not have ‘reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into [a Vir-

ginia] court.’" Id. (quoting Calder, 465 U.S. at 790).

Applying these precedents to this case, it is clear that, in order for

CPC’s website to bring CPC within the jurisdiction of the Maryland

courts, the company must have done something more than merely

place information on the Internet. See ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 712.

Rather, CPC must have acted with the "manifest intent" of targeting

Marylanders. See Young, 315 F.3d at 264. Whether CPC intended to

target Marylanders can be determined only from the character of the

website at issue.

First, it is relevant that CPC’s sites are "semi-interactive," in that

they contain features that make it possible for a user to exchange

information with the host computer. When a website is neither merely

passive nor highly interactive, the exercise of jurisdiction is deter-

mined "by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature

of the exchange of information that occurs." See Zippo, 952 F. Supp.

at 1126. While the Zippo defendant was "doing business over the

Internet" with residents of the forum state, entering into contracts

through its website with 3,000 individuals and seven Internet access

providers in the forum state, id. at 1125-26, the only concrete evi-

dence of online exchanges between CPC and Maryland residents was

the single donation initiated by Carefirst’s counsel (and ostensibly

made to bolster the position of her client in this litigation).

14 CAREFIRST OF MARYLAND v. CAREFIRST PREGNANCY CENTERS

Second, we find it pertinent that the overall content of CPC’s web-

site has a strongly local character, emphasizing that CPC’s mission is

to assist Chicago-area women in pregnancy crises. See Young, 315

F.3d at 263 ("The overall content of both [of the Connecticut newspa-

pers’] websites is decidedly local."). Rather than target a Maryland

audience, the website states that CPC is a non-profit organization that

offers assistance "to more than 46,000 hurting women and families in

the Chicago area"; that CPC "now operate[s] out of seven different

locations in the city [of Chicago] and [Chicago] suburbs"; and that

CPC "teaches abstinence until marriage in public high schools

throughout [Chicago’s] Cook County." In fact, the only respect in

which CPC even arguably reaches out to Marylanders via its Internet

website is in its generalized request that anyone, anywhere make a

donation to support CPC’s Chicago-based mission. Such a general-

ized request is, under the circumstances, an insufficient Maryland

contact to sustain jurisdiction in that forum.

In advocating in favor of Maryland jurisdiction, Carefirst empha-

sizes that Maryland is the focal point of the injuries that it has suf-

fered by virtue of CPC’s infringement of its trademark. And indeed,

it is true that, much as in Young, a substantial portion of the injuries

that Carefirst has alleged were suffered in the forum state: just as the

allegedly libeled warden in Young lived in Virginia, where that suit

was filed, Carefirst’s members reside in the mid-atlantic region, many

of them in Maryland. However, as we said in Young, "[a]lthough the

place that the plaintiff feels the alleged injury is plainly relevant to the

[jurisdictional] inquiry, it must ultimately be accompanied by the

defendant’s own [sufficient minimum] contacts with the state if juris-

diction . . . is to be upheld." 315 F.3d at 262 (quoting ESAB Group,

126 F.3d at 626) (alterations in original); see also ALS Scan, 293 F.3d

at 714. And, for the reasons discussed above, those minimum contacts

are here lacking.

In sum, when CPC set up its generally accessible, semi-interactive

Internet website, it did not thereby direct electronic activity into

Maryland with the manifest intent of engaging in business or other

interactions within that state in particular. See ESAB Group, 126 F.3d

at 625-36 (holding that company’s sales activities "focusing generally

on customers located throughout the United States and Canada with-

out focusing on and targeting" forum state do not yield personal juris-

CAREFIRST OF MARYLAND v. CAREFIRST PREGNANCY CENTERS 15

diction); see also Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. Thus, while Maryland does

have a strong interest in adjudicating disputes involving the alleged

infringement of trademarks owned by resident corporations, and

while we give due regard to Carefirst’s choice to seek relief in that

state, see Kulko v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978), it nonethe-

less remains the case that CPC "could not [on the basis of its Internet

activities] have ‘reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into [a Mary-

land] court.’" Young, 315 F.3d at 264 (quoting Calder, 465 U.S. at

790). Consequently, the website fails to furnish a Maryland contact

adequate to support personal jurisdiction over CPC in the Maryland

courts.

2.

Carefirst next maintains that CPC’s relationship with the in-forum

web hosting company, NetImpact, is sufficient to ground specific

jurisdiction. However, we have described as "de minimis" the level

of contact created by the connection between an out-of-state defen-

dant and a web server located within a forum. Christian Sci., 259 F.3d

at 217 n.9. And whereas in our Christian Science decision, we found

jurisdiction proper on the basis that the in-state individual was

involved in the "administration, maintenance, and upkeep" of the site,

id., NetImpact had no comparably active role with respect to CPC’s

site: NetImpact merely facilitated the purchase of CPC’s domain

names and rented CPC space on its servers — which in fact were

located not in Maryland, but in Massachusetts. It is unreasonable to

expect that, merely by utilizing servers owned by a Maryland-based

company, CPC should have foreseen that it could be haled into a

Maryland court and held to account for the contents of its website.

Consequently, CPC’s employment of NetImpact as a web host does

not ground specific jurisdiction over CPC in Maryland.

3.

In sum, given the limited contacts between CPC and Maryland, to

require CPC to defend its interests in that state would "offend tradi-

tional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S.

at 316 (internal quotation marks omitted). The evidence that CPC

expressly aimed or directed its conduct toward Maryland consists of

(1) CPC’s semi-interactive, Maryland-accessible Internet website,

16 CAREFIRST OF MARYLAND v. CAREFIRST PREGNANCY CENTERS

which contained CPC’s allegedly infringing use of the CAREFIRST

name; and (2) CPC’s contract with the Maryland web hosting com-

pany, NetImpact, which enabled CPC to launch the allegedly infring-

ing website. For the reasons spelled out above, this evidence is

insufficient to make out a prima facie case of specific jurisdiction.

V.

Carefirst next contends that, even if it did not make a prima facie

showing of personal jurisdiction, the district court abused its discre-

tion in refusing to permit jursidictional discovery. In denying Care-

first’s motion for discovery, the court explained that, "in light of

CPC’s specific affidavits and the lack of any concrete proffer by [Care-

first],"8 Carefirst had not demonstrated that it was entitled to discov-

ery. Opinion at 2. And in response to Carefirst’s subsequent renewal

of its discovery request on a motion to vacate the dismissal, the court

found that Carefirst had "failed to establish any fraud or intentional

misconduct on the part of [CPC]," and that the "additional informa-

tion [that Carefirst sought] concerning [NetImpact] would not alter

[the] analysis of personal jurisdiction." July Order at 1.

Discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is broad in

scope and freely permitted. Mylan Labs., 2 F.3d at 64. At the same

time, however, district courts "have broad discretion in [their] resolu-

tion of discovery problems that arise in cases pending before [them]."

Id. (quoting In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liab. Litig., 653 F.2d 671,

679 (D.C. Cir. 1981)) (alterations in original). When a plaintiff offers

only speculation or conclusory assertions about contacts with a forum

state, a court is within its discretion in denying jurisdictional discov-

ery. See McLaughlin v. McPhail, 707 F.2d 800, 806 (4th Cir. 1983)

(holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

jurisdictional discovery when, "[a]gainst the defendants’ affidavits,"

plaintiff "offered nothing beyond his bare allegations that the defen-

dants had had significant contacts with the [forum] state of Maryland"

8

The Opinion refers to "the lack of any concrete proffer by the defen-

dant." Opinion at 2. Of course, Carefirst is the plaintiff, not the defen-

dant. However, the accompanying Order makes it clear that the

Opinion’s reference to the "defendant" is merely a typographical error,

and that the court intended "plaintiff" rather than "defendant."

CAREFIRST OF MARYLAND v. CAREFIRST PREGNANCY CENTERS 17

(internal quotation marks omitted)); ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 716 n.3

(upholding district court’s refusal to allow plaintiff to engage in juris-

dictional discovery where plaintiff’s request was based on "conclu-

sory assertions"); see also Rich v. KIS Cal., Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254, 259

(M.D.N.C. 1988) ("[W]here a plaintiff’s claim of personal jurisdiction

appears to be both attenuated and based on bare allegations in the face

of specific denials made by defendants, the Court need not permit

even limited discovery confined to issues of personal jurisdiction

should it conclude that such discovery will be a fishing expedition.").

Having found a "lack of any concrete proffer by [Carefirst]," no indi-

cation of "fraud or intentional misconduct on the part of [CPC]" in its

jurisdiction affidavits, and no reason to believe that the "additional

information [that Carefirst sought] concerning [NetImpact] would . . .

alter [the] analysis of personal jurisdiction," the court was within its

discretion in deciding that Carefirst had failed to establish that juris-

dictional discovery was warranted.9

VI.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is

affirmed.

AFFIRMED

9

Carefirst also asserts that the district court abused its discretion in

denying its request for additional time in which to file a response to

CPC’s motion to dismiss, maintaining that the request was made in good

faith and would not have caused significant delay or prejudice to CPC.

The district court, however, found that such an extension would be fruit-

less. Order at 2. That finding is not clearly erroneous, and the court was

within its discretion in denying the motion on that basis. We thus affirm

the denial.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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