Wadkins v. Arnold

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

DAVID WADKINS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ROBERT ARNOLD,

No. 99-1370

Defendant-Appellant,

and

THE FIRST BANK & TRUST COMPANY,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Virginia, at Abingdon.

Glen M. Williams, Senior District Judge.

(CA-97-151-A)

Argued: January 24, 2000

Decided: June 2, 2000

Before WIDENER, WILLIAMS, and KING, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge King wrote the

opinion, in which Judge Widener and Judge Williams joined.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Steven Ray Minor, ELLIOTT, LAWSON & POM-

RENKE, Bristol, Virginia, for Appellant. Mark Tucker Hurt, Abing-

don, Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

KING, Circuit Judge:

David Wadkins brought this case in the Western District of Vir-

ginia against Detective Robert Arnold of the Washington County,

Virginia, Sheriff's Office, alleging he was improperly arrested under

warrants obtained by Detective Arnold. Mr. Wadkins asserts that

Detective Arnold's actions violate his Fourth Amendment rights and

also give rise to state-law claims for malicious prosecution and defa-

mation. Detective Arnold moved for summary judgment, asserting

qualified immunity. The district court denied his motion, and Detec-

tive Arnold appeals.1 For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and

remand for entry of judgment in favor of Detective Arnold.

I.

Sometime in April 1996, Mr. Wadkins's wife, Lisa, entered the

First Bank and Trust Company (the "Bank") in Abingdon, Virginia.

She opened a joint checking account (in her and Mr. Wadkins's

name) and deposited therein a check in the sum of $1,553.80, made

out to Mr. Wadkins and Americredit, a finance company, as joint pay-

ees. The maker of the check was AIC, an insurance company, and the

check was apparently intended to cover damage to an automobile

financed through Americredit. There were two signature blocks on the

check for the endorsements of each of the two payees. Confusingly,

when the check was presented to the Bank on behalf of Mr. and Mrs.

Wadkins, Mr. Wadkins's signature appeared in both signature blocks.

However, Mrs. Wadkins convinced Carol Robinson, the teller, either

that: (1) Mr. Wadkins's second signature functioned as the endorse-

ment of Americredit; or (2) Americredit's endorsement was not

required. In any event, Ms. Robinson allowed Mrs. Wadkins to

deposit the check and to open the joint checking account.

After the account was opened, Ms. Robinson informed Mrs. Wad-

kins that a seven-day hold would be placed on the funds represented

_________________________________________________________________

1 We possess jurisdiction to hear Detective Arnold's appeal under the

collateral order doctrine. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530

(1985).

2

by the AIC check until the check cleared. Nevertheless, Mrs. Wadkins

began writing checks from the new account almost immediately.

Between April 15 and July 15, 1996, the Bank was presented with

approximately forty-nine checks on this account. Meanwhile, AIC

had notified the Bank that it would not pay the AIC check because

it was improperly endorsed. The Bank promptly informed Mr. and

Mrs. Wadkins, by letter of April 29, 1996, that the AIC check had

been returned. Additionally, on May 29, 1996, the Bank notified Mr.

and Mrs. Wadkins that Americredit had refused to endorse the AIC

check because Mr. Wadkins was delinquent in his automobile pay-

ments. Despite being notified that the initial deposit of the AIC check

into their account was not honored, and notwithstanding that no addi-

tional funds were ever deposited in the joint checking account, Mrs.

Wadkins continued writing checks on the joint account, all of which

were drawn on insufficient funds.

A second incident occurred several months later, in September

1996. Mrs. Wadkins cashed several checks at the Bank drawn on a

NationsBank account in the name of David Shiwpal. These checks

were later returned due to insufficient funds in Mr. Shiwpal's account.

When Roberta Looney, the Branch Manager of the Bank in Abing-

don, investigated the matter, she observed that some of the Shiwpal

checks had different social security numbers and addresses, and that

one Shiwpal check listed an address on the same street as the Wad-

kins's residence. Significantly, after comparing the signature "David

Shiwpal" on one of the NationsBank checks with the signature read-

ing "David Wadkins" on the AIC check, Ms. Looney concluded that

both signatures had been written by the same person. Ms. Looney

therefore suspected Mr. Wadkins of forging Shiwpal's signature on

the NationsBank checks cashed by Mrs. Wadkins. Believing that Mr.

and Mrs. Wadkins might be involved in a check fraud scheme, Ms.

Looney contacted Detective Arnold, a veteran of twenty years with

the Sheriff's Office. Detective Arnold had previously investigated

several bad check cases involving the Bank. After conferring with

Ms. Looney and examining the documentary evidence provided to

him, Detective Arnold decided to institute a formal investigation.

Following further inquiry, Detective Arnold appeared before a

Washington County Magistrate, Edward L. VanHoy, seeking a war-

rant charging Mr. Wadkins with forgery. Rather than issue the war-

3

rant, however, the Magistrate requested that Detective Arnold consult

with the Commonwealth's Attorney for Washington County, Dennis

Godfrey. Detective Arnold promptly did so, and at the culmination of

his meeting with Mr. Godfrey, the prosecutor authorized him to initi-

ate two criminal charges against Wadkins. Detective Arnold then

returned to Magistrate VanHoy seeking warrants against Wadkins for:

(1) obtaining money by false pretenses, in violation of Va. Code Ann.

§ 18.2-178; and (2) forgery, in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-172.

These warrants were issued by the Magistrate on October 1, 1996.

After learning of the outstanding warrants, Wadkins voluntarily

surrendered at the Washington County Sheriff's Office, and he was

released on bond by the Magistrate. However, the Commonwealth's

Attorney later decided not to prosecute Wadkins on either of the

charges. The prosecutor's nolle prosequi decision was based largely

on an affidavit of Mr. Shiwpal, submitted to Godfrey on behalf of

Wadkins, in which Shiwpal indicated that: (1) he had in fact written

checks payable to Lisa Wadkins; and (2) neither David nor Lisa Wad-

kins had "ever forged checks on my account and I have not requested

anyone to file charges pertaining to the same." J.A. 311.2

On September 12, 1997, Mr. Wadkins filed this action against the

Bank and Detective Arnold, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 and Vir-

ginia state law. Detective Arnold moved for summary judgment, con-

tending that he was entitled to qualified immunity. 3 The district court

denied Detective Arnold's motion, and he now appeals.

_________________________________________________________________

2 Although the Shiwpal affidavit did not address the false pretenses

charge (that Wadkins had attempted to obtain money by signing the sig-

nature of Americredit on the AIC check), that charge was also dropped.

This aspect of the nolle prosequi decision was apparently attributable to

the lack of evidence that the AIC check carried a signature purporting to

be that of Americredit.

We note that a nolle prosequi, if entered before jeopardy attaches, is

without prejudice to further prosecution. Cummings v. Commonwealth,

481 S.E.2d 493, 494 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (citation omitted).

3 The Bank also moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was

immune from liability because it was not a state actor for purposes of 42

U.S.C. § 1983. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment

to the Bank by order of February 19, 1999. This order has not been

appealed.

4

II.

We review de novo the district court's denial of Detective Arnold's

motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. See Prit-

chett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 313 (4th Cir. 1992). As in any context,

summary judgment is appropriate only if (1) there are no genuine

issues of material fact;4 and (2) based on the undisputed facts, the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c).

III.

Detective Arnold argues that the district court erred in denying his

motion for summary judgment, asserting that he is entitled to quali-

fied immunity on two grounds. First, he contends that there is no

clearly established constitutional right to be free from arrest absent

probable cause; thus, Mr. Wadkins failed to allege a deprivation of a

constitutional right. Second, even if the arrest of Wadkins violated a

clearly established constitutional right, Detective Arnold maintains

that he is nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity because he acted

reasonably; that is, a reasonable person in his position would not have

known that his actions were unlawful. Because Detective Arnold's

first argument fails on the reasoning of the district court, Wadkins v.

Arnold, No. 97-0151-A, mem. op. at 12-13 (W.D. Va. Feb. 19, 1999),

_________________________________________________________________

4 Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Jones, 515

U.S. 304 (1995), we lack jurisdiction to review the district court's order

denying qualified immunity "insofar as that order determines whether or

not the pretrial record sets forth a `genuine' issue of fact for trial." Id. at

320. However, there is no material dispute in this case regarding the

manner of Detective Arnold's investigation and the information obtained

and procedures followed prior to seeking the warrants. Accordingly,

whether Detective Arnold is entitled to qualified immunity in this case

is solely a question of law. See Gould v. Davis , 165 F.3d 265, 269 (4th

Cir. 1998) (although "different facts in evidence could be used to support

different conclusions as to whether the officers deserve qualified immu-

nity, this does not indicate a factual dispute, but rather, a question of

law.").

5

we focus our inquiry on Arnold's second argument-- that he is enti-

tled to qualified immunity based on the reasonableness of his actions.5

A.

1.

Wadkins asserts that no reasonable officer in Detective Arnold's

position could have concluded that he possessed enough information

to establish probable cause for seeking an arrest warrant. In assessing

the objective reasonableness of Detective Arnold's actions, the

absence of probable cause is not determinative. Rather, where a law

enforcement officer acts pursuant to a warrant, the critical question is

whether the officer could have reasonably thought there was probable

cause to seek the warrant. As the Supreme Court recognized in Malley

v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986), "Only where the warrant application

is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief

in its existence unreasonable will the shield of immunity be lost." Id.

at 344-45 (citation omitted). In explaining why the absence of proba-

ble cause is not determinative, the Supreme Court has observed:

[I]t is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some

cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable

_________________________________________________________________

5 Although not at issue, we note that neither the Magistrate nor the

Commonwealth's Attorney were sued, and neither of them should prop-

erly be susceptible to suit. As a judicial officer performing an act within

his judicial capacity -- directing the issuance of warrants against Wad-

kins -- the Magistrate was absolutely immune from suit. See Pressly v.

Gregory, 831 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). Likewise, the prosecutor's

decision to authorize the prosecution of Wadkins should be protected by

absolute immunity. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons , 509 U.S. 259, 273

(1993) ("[A]cts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation

of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his

role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of abso-

lute immunity."). Although the district court indicated that, in its view,

the Commonwealth's Attorney might not be entitled to absolute immu-

nity under these facts, we would be constrained to disagree. In Spring-

men v. Williams, 122 F.3d 211, 212-13 (4th Cir. 1997), we held that the

doctrine of absolute immunity "squarely covers a prosecutor's decision

to go forward with a prosecution."

6

cause is present, and we have indicated that in such cases

those officials -- like other officials who act in ways they

reasonably believe to be lawful -- should not be held per-

sonally liable.

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (citing Malley, 475

U.S. at 344-45). Therefore, Detective Arnold may be entitled to quali-

fied immunity even if the warrants at issue are later determined to

have been lacking in probable cause. Nevertheless, the legal princi-

ples relating to the probable cause standard provide a convenient

starting point for our analysis of the reasonableness of Detective

Arnold's actions.

2.

Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within an

officer's knowledge -- or of which he possesses reasonably trustwor-

thy information -- are sufficient in themselves to convince a person

of reasonable caution that an offense has been or is being committed.

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (citation

omitted). In assessing whether probable cause exists, we must exam-

ine the totality of the circumstances. Taylor v. Waters, 81 F.3d 429,

434 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Al-Talib, 55 F.3d 923, 931

(4th Cir. 1995)). Determining whether the information surrounding an

arrest suffices to establish probable cause is an individualized and

fact-specific inquiry. Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471, 479

(1963). Accordingly, we direct our attention to the circumstances sur-

rounding Detective Arnold's efforts to obtain the arrest warrants in

this case.

In Virginia, a person is guilty of obtaining money by false pre-

tenses if he "obtain[s], by any false pretense or token, from any per-

son, with intent to defraud, money or other property. . . or if he

obtain[s], by any false pretense or token, with such intent, the signa-

ture of any person to a writing, the false making whereof would be

forgery . . . ." Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-178 (Michie 1999). Prior to seek-

ing the false pretenses warrant, Detective Arnold had compiled at

least the following information: (1) AIC had issued a check to Mr.

Wadkins and Americredit as joint payees; (2) in an attempt to deposit

the AIC check and open a joint checking account on behalf of Mr.

7

Wadkins and herself, Mrs. Wadkins pointed out two signatures to the

bank teller, both of which she claimed were her husband's; (3) one

of Mr. Wadkins's signatures on the AIC check was in the signature

block reserved for the endorsement of Americredit; (4) Americredit

never endorsed the check; (5) AIC notified the Bank that it would not

pay the check because it was improperly endorsed; (6) the Bank noti-

fied Mr. and Mrs. Wadkins that the AIC check had been returned and

that Americredit did not intend to endorse it; and (7) because the ini-

tial deposit was not honored and no additional funds were ever depos-

ited in the Wadkins' newly opened checking account, over forty

insufficient checks were written by Mrs. Wadkins on the joint

account.

With respect to the forgery charge, a person is guilty of forgery in

Virginia if he "forge[s] any writing . . . to the prejudice of another's

right, or utter[s], or attempt[s] to employ as true, such forged writing,

knowing it to be forged . . . ." Va. Code Ann.§ 18.2-172 (Michie

1999). At the time he sought the forgery warrant, Detective Arnold

possessed at least the following information regarding the alleged for-

gery: (1) the branch manager of the Bank, Mrs. Looney, had com-

pared the two signatures and concluded that they were similar; (2)

Detective Arnold made the same comparison and reached the same con-

clusion;6 (3) various Shiwpal checks listed different social security

numbers and mailing addresses; and (4) the circumstances of the joint

checking account and the fact that over forty bad checks had been

written in connection with that account.

Based on the totality of these facts, Detective Arnold approached

_________________________________________________________________

6 The district court was concerned that neither Ms. Looney nor Detec-

tive Arnold were trained in handwriting comparison. J.A. 701-02. How-

ever, given Ms. Looney's experience in the banking industry and

Detective Arnold's experience investigating "bad check" cases, both

Looney and Arnold appear qualified to testify as to their conclusions. See

Wileman v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d 621, 624 (Va. Ct. App. 1997)

(bank vice president with twenty-four years of banking experience,

whose duties involved verification of customer signatures, was qualified

to give expert opinion testimony comparing signatures). Moreover, as the

district court acknowledged, even the non-expert comparison of hand-

written signatures could be a valid factor in assessing probable cause.

8

the Magistrate seeking a warrant to arrest Wadkins-- initially only

on a forgery charge. Instead of issuing the warrant, however, the

Magistrate requested Detective Arnold to consult with the Common-

wealth's Attorney "to see if there could be another charge . . . ." J.A.

246. In turn, the Commonwealth's Attorney, Mr. Godfrey, authorized

two criminal charges against Wadkins: (1) obtaining money by false

pretenses; and (2) forgery. Detective Arnold then returned to the

Magistrate, who promptly issued the two warrants against Wadkins.

B.

1.

In denying Detective Arnold's motion for summary judgment, the

district court declined to conclude that Arnold reasonably believed

that probable cause existed to arrest Wadkins on either charge. In

reaching this determination with respect to the false pretenses charge,

the district court correctly noted that "One who signs a check in the

wrong place has not committed the offense of obtaining money by

false pretenses, unless it was done with criminal intent." J.A. 708 (cit-

ing Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-178). Nevertheless, the district court found

that no reasonable officer could have inferred such intent on the part

of Wadkins, stating, "It is difficult to imagine that an individual bent

on fraud would attempt to provide the signatures of two different peo-

ple by signing his own name twice." J.A. 708.

We disagree. As the district court recognized, "[S]urrounding cir-

cumstances, even circumstances that appear innocent when consid-

ered alone, may provide a basis for finding probable cause." J.A. 703

(citing Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 570 (4th Cir. 1998)). The

district court acknowledged that the circumstances surrounding the

deposit of the AIC check, including the behavior of Mrs. Wadkins,

could properly be taken into account at the probable cause stage of

a criminal prosecution. Suspecting the existence of an illegal check

scheme, Detective Arnold therefore properly considered facts in addi-

tion to the appearance of Wadkins's signature in two places on the

AIC check. In particular, both the misrepresentation to the Bank that

the AIC check was properly endorsed, and the substantial number of

bad checks written on the Wadkins's joint account, informed Detec-

tive Arnold's probable cause assessment. In light of all these facts, we

9

conclude that Arnold could have reasonably inferred Wadkins's intent

to defraud.

With respect to the forgery charge, the district court seized upon

Detective Arnold's failure to contact Shiwpal during the course of his

investigation: "[A] reasonable officer should at least have contacted

Shiwpal and asked him if the disputed signature was his." J.A. 702.

Shiwpal ultimately averred that Wadkins had not forged his signature;

presumably, Shiwpal would have informed Detective Arnold of the

same had he been asked earlier. Finding Shiwpal's statement to be a

"key piece of evidence," the district court concluded that "a reason-

able officer should have obtained it before seeking the warrants." J.A.

702. The district court's conclusion was based largely on our decision

in Clipper v. Takoma Park, 876 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1989), where we

held that a law enforcement officer's failure to pursue an easily

obtainable piece of information that could completely exculpate a sus-

pect weighed heavily against a finding that the officer's conduct was

reasonable. Id. at 20. See also Sevigny v. Dicksey, 846 F.2d 953, 957-

58 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding officer who neglected to"avail himself of

readily available information" which would have exculpated the

plaintiff was not entitled to qualified immunity for unlawful arrest).

Here, however, Detective Arnold did not "fail to pursue" readily

available information. Indeed, Detective Arnold attempted on several

occasions, without success, to contact Shiwpal, both in person and via

telephone. Even if he had not tried to contact Shiwpal, however, the

failure to pursue a potentially exculpatory lead-- standing alone --

is not determinative. Clipper, 876 F.2d at 20. Although an officer may

not disregard readily available exculpatory evidence of which he is

aware, the failure to pursue a potentially exculpatory lead is not suffi-

cient to negate probable cause. Smith v. Reddy , 101 F.3d 351, 357

(4th Cir. 1996) (citing Torchinsky v. Siwinski , 942 F.2d 257, 264 (4th

Cir. 1991)).7 Reasonable law enforcement officers are not required to

_________________________________________________________________

7 In our Torchinsky decision, we explained the rationale behind this

approach:

It will, of course, always be possible to contend in court that an

arresting officer might have gathered more evidence, but judges

cannot pursue all the steps a police officer might have taken that

might have shaken his belief in the existence of probable cause.

942 F.2d at 264.

10

"exhaust every potentially exculpatory lead or resolve every doubt

about a suspect's guilt before probable cause is established." Torchin-

sky, 942 F.2d at 264 (citing Krause v. Bennett, 887 F.2d 362, 371 (2d

Cir. 1989) ("[P]robable cause does not require an officer to be certain

that subsequent prosecution of the arrestee will be successful.")).

Accordingly, Detective Arnold's failure to speak with Shiwpal prior

to seeking the arrest warrants does not per se render his actions unrea-

sonable.

2.

Conversely, Detective Arnold's conference with the Common-

wealth's Attorney and the subsequent issuance of the warrants by a

neutral and detached magistrate weigh heavily toward a finding that

Detective Arnold is immune. At the specific request of the Magistrate,

Detective Arnold conferred with the Commonwealth's Attorney, who

in turn explicitly authorized both of the charges in question. The dis-

trict court, concerned by the absence of evidence in the record detail-

ing precisely what information Detective Arnold provided to the

prosecutor during this conference, concluded that it could not decide,

as a matter of law, whether Mr. Godfrey's advice rendered Detective

Arnold's actions objectively reasonable: "Arnold may have offered so

little information to the prosecutor that he cannot be said to have

acted reasonably even if he acted on the prosecutor's advice. These

facts must be determined by the jury." J.A. 706.

Admittedly, beyond Detective Arnold's statement that he showed

Godfrey the checks in question, the record does not fully reveal the

extent of the evidence Arnold presented to the Commonwealth's

Attorney. However, Wadkins does not allege that Detective Arnold

acted in bad faith or that he provided misleading information to the

Commonwealth's Attorney. Accordingly, any dispute as to what was

done during this meeting is immaterial -- what is material is that, at

the meeting's conclusion, Godfrey authorized the charges against

Wadkins. Indeed, the district court admitted that"[c]ommon sense

tells us that Detective Arnold did some explaining-- he did not sim-

ply enter the prosecutor's office and mutely display various checks to

him." J.A. 706. We agree with these common sense instincts, and we

believe the district court placed too much emphasis on the absence of

the specific contents of Detective Arnold's conference with the prose-

11

cutor. The most compelling aspect of this conference is clear: at its

conclusion, the Commonwealth's Attorney, on behalf of the Com-

monwealth of Virginia, authorized warrants for the arrest of Wadkins.8

Of course, the mere fact that Detective Arnold acted upon the

Commonwealth's Attorney's authorization in applying for the war-

rants does not automatically cloak Arnold with the shield of qualified

immunity. However, this authorization -- by the elected chief law

enforcement officer of Washington County -- is compelling evidence

and should appropriately be taken into account in assessing the rea-

sonableness of Arnold's actions. See Pritchett , 973 F.2d at 316

("[T]he most obvious possibility [of exceptional circumstances sup-

porting qualified immunity despite the violation of a clearly estab-

lished constitutional right] is mistaken official advice by legal

counsel."); accord Buonocore v. Harris, 134 F.3d 245, 253 (4th Cir.

1998) (although reliance on advice of counsel alone does not consti-

tute "extraordinary circumstance," reliance on the advice of counsel

is a factor to be considered).

In our analysis of this aspect of the case, we find instructive the

Ninth Circuit's decision in Arnsberg v. United States, 757 F.2d 971

(9th Cir. 1985). In Arnsberg, two Internal Revenue Service agents

were sued after executing an arrest warrant for a material witness.

Prior to seeking the warrant, the agents consulted with an Assistant

United States Attorney. After describing the difficulties they had

encountered in attempting to serve the witness personally, the prose-

_________________________________________________________________

8 As Detective Arnold's uncontradicted deposition makes clear, it was

the Commonwealth's Attorney who authorized prosecution against

David Wadkins:

Q: Then who exactly selected the charges that were brought

against David Wadkins?

A: The Commonwealth's Attorney.

....

Q: And who was it that decided to charge David Wadkins . . .

in this case?

A: The Commonwealth's Attorney.

J.A. 285.

12

cutor concluded that the facts justified the issuance of a material wit-

ness warrant, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3149 (1982) (current version at

18 U.S.C. § 3144), which authorizes the arrest of material witnesses

whose presence cannot practicably be secured by subpoena. A Magis-

trate Judge then issued a warrant, which the two agents executed later

the same day. The district court subsequently found the warrant

invalid because, in its view, "the difficulties encountered by agents

Weiler and Maney in attempting to serve Arnsberg did not establish

probable cause for believing that it would be impracticable to secure

Arnsberg's presence by subpoena." 757 F.2d at 976.

Although the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's probable

cause assessment, it concluded that the agents were nevertheless enti-

tled to qualified immunity: "Counsel's advice would prevent a reason-

able person from knowing that Arnsberg's constitutional rights were

being violated." Id. at 982. The Ninth Circuit explained:

Reasonable attorneys could disagree with our probable

cause assessment. It would be plainly unreasonable to rule

that the arresting officers . . . must take issue with the con-

sidered judgment of an assistant United States Attorney and

the federal magistrate. Not only would such a rule cause an

undesirable delay in the execution of warrants, but it would

also mean that lay officers must at their own risk second-

guess the legal assessments of trained lawyers.

Id. at 981 (emphasis added). The rationale embodied in the Arnsberg

decision clearly applies in this case.

Furthermore, it is important that the Washington County Magis-

trate agreed with both Detective Arnold's and the prosecutor's assess-

ment of probable cause, and the magistrate determined to issue the

warrants. Admittedly, if a reasonable officer in Detective Arnold's

position should not have applied for the warrants, then Arnold would

not be shielded from liability simply because the Magistrate decided

to issue them. Malley, 475 U.S. at 345-46. However, given our con-

clusion that Detective Arnold was reasonable in seeking the warrants,

the fact that the Magistrate subsequently issued them bolsters the rea-

sonableness of Detective Arnold's actions. As Chief Judge Wilkinson

aptly observed in Torchinsky:

13

When a police officer protects a suspect's rights by obtain-

ing a warrant from a neutral magistrate, the officer should,

in turn, receive some protection from suit under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Otherwise, the threat of liability would force offi-

cers to continuously second-guess the considered decisions

of magistrates. This in turn would promote delay in the exe-

cution of warrants, and alter the proper allocation of law

enforcement functions.

942 F.2d at 262.9

3.

In this case, Detective Arnold took steps reasonably expected of

him. The question before us is not whether he exhausted every poten-

tial avenue of investigation. Rather, for purposes of qualified immu-

nity, we must simply determine whether Detective Arnold's actions

were reasonable under the circumstances. That his efforts could have

been more thorough, or even that his actions may have been mistaken,

does not mean that they were unreasonable. As we stated in Torchin-

sky, "If reasonable mistakes were actionable, difficult questions of

discretion would always be resolved in favor of inaction, and effec-

tive law enforcement would be lost." Id. at 261. In sum, there is sim-

ply no basis for a rule that would require law enforcement officers to

take issue with or second-guess the considered judgments of prosecu-

tors and magistrates. Arnsberg, 757 F.2d at 981.

_________________________________________________________________

9 In Massachusetts v. Sheppard , 468 U.S. 981 (1984), albeit in a differ-

ent context (the application of the exclusionary rule of evidence with

respect to a defective search warrant), the Supreme Court expressed sen-

timents that are informative here:

Whatever an officer may be required to do when he executes a

warrant . . . we refuse to rule that an officer is required to disbe-

lieve a judge who has just advised him, by word and by action,

that the warrant he possesses authorizes him to conduct the

search he has requested.

Id. at 989-90.

14

IV.

Pursuant to the foregoing, Detective Arnold's actions satisfy the

requirements of objective reasonableness upon which qualified immu-

nity rests. We therefore reverse and remand for entry of judgment in

favor of Detective Arnold.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

15