Bell v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

JAMES M. BELL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.);

BOARD OF CHURCH AND SOCIETY OF

THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH;

WOMEN'S DIVISION OF THE GENERAL

BOARD OF GLOBAL MINISTRIES OF THE

UNITED METHODIST CHURCH;

AMERICAN BAPTIST CHURCHES IN THE No. 96-1297

U.S.A.,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

ELENORA GIDDINGS IVORY; JANE HULL

HARVEY; ANNA RHEE; JAY LINTNER;

ROBERT TILLER; LIONEL

DERENONCOURT; OTIS TURNER;

VERNON BROYLES,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge.

(CA-95-1507-A)

Argued: April 10, 1997

Decided: October 1, 1997

Before HALL and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and DUFFY,

United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina,

sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion,

in which Judge Hall and Judge Duffy joined.

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COUNSEL

ARGUED: James Wright Crabtree, SMATHERS & THOMPSON,

Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Alissa Aaronson Horvitz,

MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for

Appellees. ON BRIEF: Katharine B. Houlihan, MORGAN, LEWIS

& BOCKIUS, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

The Reverend James M. Bell, an ordained minister, served as exec-

utive director of Interfaith Impact, a multi-denominational outreach

program. In June 1995, his employment was terminated as part of

Interfaith Impact's "complete reduction in force." Interfaith Impact's

board of directors advised Bell that the termination was "based solely

upon the financial condition" of the program and was "absolutely no

reflection on the quality of your work." Bell sued Interfaith Impact's

four principal constituent religious organizations, as well as others,

for breach of contract and various torts arising from the termination.

The district court dismissed the complaint against the constituent reli-

gious organizations because of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

concluding that, by reason of the First Amendment, a civil court has

no jurisdiction over ecclesiastical decisions by churches "as to how

they are going to expend their funds." For the reasons that follow, we

affirm the judgment of the district court.

I

More than twenty religious groups, including as principal contribu-

tors four national religious organizations,1 created and funded Inter-

_________________________________________________________________

1 The four religious organizations, all named as defendants in this case,

are the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., the Board of Church and Society of

2

faith Impact, a nonprofit corporation in Washington, D.C., "to

advance the jointly shared religious purposes of its members, namely,

to carry out their theological imperative to increase the possibilities

for peace, economic and social justice." Interfaith Impact's charter

states as its mission:

(1) promoting a public policy that reflects prophetic Jewish-

Christian values, (2) advocating to the United States govern-

ment the enactment of public policies that are just, promote

peace and protect the environment (reflecting Jewish-

Christian values), (3) developing and nurturing people of

faith . . . to be effective advocates for public policies that are

just, promote peace and protect the environment, (4) maxi-

mizing the voice, visibility, and ability of member agencies

and denominations or faith groups to advocate for[such pol-

icies], (5) educating . . . the general public on the public pol-

icy issues of major concern to the inter-religious

community.

In the fall of 1991, Interfaith Impact "called" Bell, an ordained

minister, to serve as its executive director. In the engagement letter,

Interfaith Impact recognized that Bell's service would be an extension

of his ministry with the United Church of Christ, in which he was an

ordained minister. It stated:

We are happy that the four entities required by the United

Church of Christ to recognize your ordained ministry in this

position will do so. Those entities are you and your sense of

call; the recognition of this being a place of ministry by your

local church; the Potomac Association of the United Church

of Christ; and Interfaith Impact for Justice and Peace.

The letter confirmed a financial arrangement that designated $25,000

of Bell's salary as "housing allowance" to enable him to claim a par-

sonage exemption from income taxes and a contribution that Inter-

_________________________________________________________________

the United Methodist Church, the Women's Division of the General

Board of Global Ministries of the United Methodist Church, and the

American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A.

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faith Impact would make to the United Church of Christ's pension

program so that Bell would continue to receive pension and health

benefits from that church. The letter concluded,"We hope this will

be a rewarding ministry for you."

Because of diminished support from constituent faith groups in the

spring of 1995, the full explanation for which does not appear in the

record, Interfaith Impact began to experience serious financial diffi-

culties. In May 1995, the Presbyterian Church, one of Interfaith

Impact's main financial contributors, decided that because of the

financial crisis it would not allocate further funds for Interfaith Impact

for the year 1996. It also conditioned fulfillment of its 1995 commit-

ment on a complete reduction of force and vacation of the premises

rented by Interfaith Impact. The Presbyterian Church explained, "The

current situation is not to be seen as the fault of the current staff who

are in many ways victims of the circumstances the faith groups find

themselves in due to diminished resources."

In response to the Presbyterian Church's withdrawal of support, the

board of directors of Interfaith Impact promptly effected a complete

reduction of force, intending to continue the program's ministry with

a volunteer staff. In its letter of termination to Bell, dated June 23,

1995, the board stated:

Your termination is based solely upon the financial condi-

tion of Interfaith IMPACT which has [led] the Board of

Directors to enact a complete "reduction in force." In this

termination, there is absolutely no reflection on the quality

of your work.

The letter concluded, "I would again express to you my admiration

and appreciation of your work, my regret for the situation that makes

this reduction necessary, and my gratitude for the helpfulness which

you are continuing to give to Interfaith IMPACT."

Several months later, Bell filed this action against the board of

directors and against the four principal contributing religious organi-

zations, challenging their expressed reason for ending the program

and terminating his employment. He complained, in six counts, that

the defendants (1) interfered with his contract, (2) intentionally

4

inflicted on him emotional distress, (3) breached a covenant of good

faith and fair dealing, (4) interfered with his prospective advantage,

(5) wrongfully terminated him, and (6) that the religious organization

defendants breached their pledge to contribute to Interfaith Impact on

a yearly basis. The district court dismissed the complaint against the

individual board members for lack of personal jurisdiction and against

the religious organizations because of a lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.2 He appeals only on the ground that the district court

erred in determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

II

In keeping with the First Amendment's proscription against the

"establishment of religion" or prohibiting the"free exercise thereof,"

civil courts have long taken care not to intermeddle in internal eccle-

siastical disputes. As early as Watson v. Jones , 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679

(1871) (decided on general common law and not constitutional law),

the Supreme Court disavowed the ability to resolve a dispute between

a national religious organization and one of its local churches based

on differing interpretations of church law, reasoning that

All who unite themselves to . . . a [religious] body do so

with an implied consent to [its] government, and are bound

to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and would

lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any

one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the

secular courts and have them reversed. It is of the essence

of these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribu-

nals for the decision of questions arising among themselves,

that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesi-

astical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the

organism itself provides for.

Id. at 729. And later in Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280

U.S. 1 (1929), the Court similarly refused, on constitutional grounds,

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2 Bell thereafter sued the individuals, as well as Interfaith Impact, in the

District of Columbia, where the district court entered summary judgment

against him. See Bell v. Ivory, ___ F. Supp. ___, 1997 WL 329589 (D.

D.C. June 11, 1997).

5

to force a Roman Catholic Archbishop to appoint the plaintiff to a

chaplaincy which was denied to him based on an interpretation of

Roman Catholic canon law. Justice Brandeis there formulated the rule

that "[i]n the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the deci-

sions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical,

although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the

secular courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest made them

so by contract or otherwise." Id. at 16. These principles were applied

more recently in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94

(1952), where the Court refused, again on constitutional grounds, to

intervene into a schism between the Russian Church in America and

the Soviet-era Russian Orthodox Church over church lands, holding

that churches must have the "power to decide for themselves, free

from state interference, matters of church government as well as those

of faith and doctrine." Id. at 116.

Although Gonzalez and other cases allowed the possibility of

"`marginal civil court review' under the narrow rubrics of `fraud' or

`collusion' when church tribunals act in bad faith for secular pur-

poses," the Court in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.

Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), abandoned any"arbitrariness"

exception, moving yet further from any role for civil courts in ecclesi-

astical disputes. Id. at 713. It has thus become established that the

decisions of religious entities about the appointment and removal of

ministers and persons in other positions of similar theological signifi-

cance are beyond the ken of civil courts. Rather, such courts must

defer to the decisions of religious organizations"on matters of disci-

pline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or

law." Id. The Supreme Court explained,"[I]t is the essence of reli-

gious faith that ecclesiastical decisions are reached and are to be

accepted as matters of faith whether or not rational or measurable by

objective criteria." Id. at 714-15.

The question that we must resolve in the case before us, therefore,

is whether the dispute between Bell and the four national churches is

an ecclesiastical one about "discipline, faith, internal organization, or

ecclesiastical rule, custom or law," id. at 713, or whether it is a case

in which we should hold religious organizations liable in civil courts

for "purely secular disputes between third parties and a particular

defendant, albeit a religiously affiliated organization." General Coun-

6

cil on Finance Administration of the United Methodist Church v. Cal-

ifornia Superior Court, 439 U.S. 1369, 1373 (1978) (Rehnquist,

Circuit Justice). We conclude that the dispute in this case is ecclesias-

tical.

Bell's complaint against the four national churches centers on the

Presbyterian Church's withholding of funding and its consultation

with the other constituent churches in effecting a complete reduction

of force of Interfaith Impact. Bell argues that the motives of these

churches were not as benign as simply withdrawing financial support.

He has alleged that board members were improperly focusing on tak-

ing over the Interfaith Impact ministry, or on his personal life, or on

unjustified claims of financial misconduct. At bottom, however,

Bell's challenge focuses on how the constituent churches spend their

religious outreach funds. While it is possible that the Presbyterian

Church may have harbored hostility against Bell personally, it is also

possible that the church may have been acting in good faith to fulfill

its discernment of the divine will for its ministry. Resolution of such

an accusation would interpose the judiciary into the Presbyterian

Church's decisions, as well as the decisions of the other constituent

churches, relating to how and by whom they spread their message and

specifically their decision to select their outreach ministry through the

granting or withholding of funds.

Bell argues that he is not challenging the internal decisions of the

national churches but their external conduct in interfering with his

relationship with Interfaith Impact. He characterizes this as a secular

dispute between the churches and a third party. This argument, how-

ever, overlooks Interfaith Impact's role as the joint ministry of its

constituent churches and Bell's role as executive director of Interfaith

Impact.

Interfaith Impact is not a secular organization with which the

national constituent churches had a secular relationship. On the con-

trary, Interfaith Impact constituted a ministry of those constituent

churches, and this was understood by all persons involved. The

national churches maintain that they were engaging in ministry as

directed by scripture, relying on Deuteronomy 15:11; Proverbs 21:3;

Isaiah 49:6, 58:10; Amos 5:22-24; and Matthew 5:14-16, which they

read to describe spreading light in the world and pursuing social jus-

7

tice as core Judeo-Christian values. Their claim is borne out by the

charter of Interfaith Impact which provides that it is organized "to

advance the jointly shared religious purposes of its members, namely,

to carry out their theological imperative to increase the possibilities

for peace, economic and social justice." Interfaith Impact's religious

purpose is also borne out by Interfaith Impact's engagement of Bell

in its "ministry." Indeed, their engagement letter to Bell concluded,

"We hope this will be a rewarding ministry for you." Finally, Bell

himself treated his position as a ministry. He obtained approval from

his church to engage as executive director of Interfaith Impact as part

of his ministry, and he agreed to the designation of part of his salary

as a parsonage allowance for tax purposes. In summary, in carrying

out his duties, Bell worked to spread the shared religious beliefs of

Interfaith Impact's constituent members and to promote their Judeo-

Christian values.

As this court has previously noted, a person is a member of a reli-

gion's clergy "if the employee's primary duties consist of teaching,

spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious

order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship."

Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d

1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Corporation of Presiding Bishop

of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S.

327, 337 (1987) (recognizing the importance to the religion's mission

of activities run by closely-associated corporations); E.E.O.C. v.

Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455, 461-63 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing Rayburn

in case applying "ministerial exception" to a professor of canon law);

Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp. , 929 F.2d 360,

362-63 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding a chaplain in a religiously-affiliated

hospital to be a minister); E.E.O.C. v. Southwestern Baptist Theologi-

cal Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 283 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981) (consid-

ering even non-ordained Baptist seminary faculty to be ministers for

Title VII purposes). In light of this precedent, it follows that Bell too

was serving in a religious ministry while acting as executive director

of Interfaith Impact.

When the Presbyterian Church decided to withhold its funds from

Interfaith Impact, causing the end of Bell's work at Interfaith Impact,

the Presbyterian Church, as well as the other churches, made a deci-

sion on how it would expend funds raised by the church for religious

8

purposes, which directly related to its outreach ministry and Bell's

status as a minister. Such a decision about the nature, extent, adminis-

tration, and termination of a religious ministry falls within the ecclesi-

astical sphere that the First Amendment protects from civil court

intervention.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district

court.

AFFIRMED

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