Leonard Young, Jr. v. Deputy Superintendent Greene S

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 13-4057

_____________

LEONARD G. YOUNG, JR.,

Appellant

v.

JEFFREY MARTIN, DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT

GREENE SCI, in his official and individual capacity; LOUIS

S. FOLINO, SUPERINTENDENT GREENE SCI, in his

official and individual capacity; MAJOR LORINDA

WINFIELD; CAPTAIN ANTHONY GUMBAREVIC, in his

official and individual capacity; CO #1 MOODY, in his

official and individual capacity

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(District Court No. 2-10-cv-00284)

Magistrate Judge: Honorable Cynthia R. Eddy

_______________

Argued: October 29, 2014

Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, GREENAWAY, JR., and

KRAUSE, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: September 8, 2015)

_______________

Elizabeth F. Collura

Robert J. Ridge (Argued)

Clark Hill

301 Grant Street

One Oxford Centre, 14th Floor

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Counsel for Appellant

Sandra A. Kozlowski

Kemal A. Mericli (Argued)

Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania

564 Forbes Avenue

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Counsel for Appellees

_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_______________

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

Leonard G. Young, Jr., a Pennsylvania prisoner with a

long history of mental illness, filed suit alleging that

Appellees-Defendants1 violated his Eighth Amendment rights

1

Appellees-Defendants include Jeffrey Martin, Deputy

Superintendent Greene SCI, in his official and individual

2

by securing him in a four-point restraint chair, naked, for

fourteen hours, although he did not pose a threat to himself or

others. Because we agree with Young that the District Court

erred as a matter of law in granting summary judgment

against him, we will vacate the judgment and remand for

further proceedings.

I. Factual Background

For over six years, Young has been held in solitary

confinement, housed in either the Restrictive Housing Unit

(“RHU”) or the mental health unit of different Pennsylvania

prisons because of his extensive disciplinary history and

history of mental illness. Since childhood, Young has been

diagnosed with various forms of mental illness, including

bipolar disorder and schizoaffective disorder. However, since

his detention over these past several years in solitary

confinement, consisting of isolation for 23 hours per day and

one hour of recreation time in a solitary pen on weekdays,

Young’s symptoms of mental illness have intensified,

including visual and auditory hallucinations, paranoid

thoughts, throwing and smearing his own feces, episodes of

self-harm, and suicidal impulses. Indeed, since living in these

conditions of prolonged isolation, his numerous suicide

attempts have included efforts to hang himself and to break

his own neck by banging his head against the wall.

capacity; Louis S. Folino, Superintendent Greene SCI, in his

official and individual capacity; Major Lorinda Winfield;

Captain Anthony Gumbarevic, in his official and individual

capacity; CO #1 Moody, in his official and individual

capacity, and referenced as “Defendants” throughout this

opinion.

3

On the evening of September 20, 2009, while Young

was confined in the RHU at State Correctional Institution

(“SCI”)-Greene, his cell door was mistakenly unlocked and

left open by a Corrections Officer (“CO”) in the control room.

He exited his cell, walked up the stairs to the second tier of

the RHU, and seated himself on an internal ledge above the

law library. What next transpired was captured in the

ordinary course by prison surveillance cameras and handheld

video cameras operated by COs.2

When other inmates saw Young on the roof they began

calling to him from their cells. In the meantime, Lieutenant

Kirby and a group of COs gathered on the floor below

Young. From his perch, Young shouted that he was

protesting for prisoners’ rights and for the return of some of

his property. Two COs watching Young from the balcony

chatted with each other and laughed as he talked. Young

remained crouched on the roof voicing his complaints for

approximately seven minutes before following the COs’

orders to step back onto the second tier and to close himself

inside the shower. Once there, he again complied with

orders, placed his hands behind his back, and pushed his

forearms through the shower tray slot so the COs could

handcuff and then remove him, secured, from the shower. As

the COs escorted him to the stairs, Young passively refused to

walk by laying down on the ground. His ankles then were

2

The facts set forth here are drawn from the video and

documentary evidence of record. In reviewing a grant of

summary judgment, we must draw all reasonable inferences

in favor of the nonmoving party; we therefore set forth the

facts in the light most favorable to Young. See Tri-M Grp.,

LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 415 (3d Cir. 2011).

4

shackled and the COs carried him down the stairs. Young

again passively refused to walk when they reached the bottom

of the staircase. At no time throughout this incident did

Young verbally threaten or attempt to physically engage any

of the COs.

After the COs carried Young to a nearby corridor and

placed him face down on the ground with his hands and

ankles cuffed, four COs stood over him and further restrained

his limbs. Young remained motionless on the ground and did

not struggle during this process. However, rather than asking

Young to submit to a routine strip search and although he had

not spit on anyone, the COs placed a spit mask on him and

cut off Young’s clothes to perform a prone strip search.3

Young complained but did not physically resist the search; no

contraband was found.

After the search was complete, Young, naked, cuffed,

and compliant, was hoisted to his knees and photographed for

several minutes to record any injuries he may have sustained

during the incident. While the pictures were taken,

Lieutenant Kirby left the scene to obtain the requisite

authorization for placing Young in a four-point restraint chair.

Young repeatedly asked why he was going to be placed in a

restraint chair, but received no answer.4 When the restraint

3

As a matter of prison policy, a strip search is

performed after an inmate escapes from his cell to ensure that

he did not acquire any contraband.

4

In a videotaped debriefing immediately following

Young’s placement in the observation cell, Lieutenant Kirby

acknowledged that Young was secured by the COs after

Young stepped into the shower but went on to say that he was

5

chair arrived, he was strapped into it, naked, and a smock was

placed over his lap. Again, Young did not physically resist

the COs but he did object to his treatment. He complained

several times that the restraints were too tight and he cried out

in pain while being strapped into the chair and again when he

was wheeled to a psychiatric observation cell. Young also

repeatedly asked that the smock on his lap be adjusted to fully

cover his genitals, but the COs refused to comply with his

request.

At approximately 8:46 p.m., Young was wheeled into

the air-conditioned cell and left naked, except for the smock

on his lap. Upon his arrival, a nurse determined that his

straps were too tight and loosened them accordingly. As

reflected in the reports generated over the time he spent in the

psychiatric observation cell, medical personnel continued to

placed in the restraint chair due to the seriousness of his

actions. Written reports prepared after the incident also state

that Young was placed in the restraint chair “due to his

actions,” J.A. 314, and that “due to [the] seriousness of [his]

actions and blatant disregard for potential injury to himself or

staff that inmate Young would be [p]laced in the restraint

chair to prevent him from harming himself or staff. This was

authorized by the [s]hift commander prior to placement,” J.A.

312. A different report states that “[d]ue to the serious[]

nature of the inmate[’]s actions, and his continued refusal of

orders, Capt. Gumbarevic determined that the inmate should

be placed into the restraint chair for his protection. After

conferring with Dep. Martin, and Act. Supt. Capozza,

restraint chair placement was authorized.” J.A. 308.

6

monitor Young’s condition. Around 11:00 p.m., Young told

a nurse that he wanted to move his hands “a bit” and was

“talkative and joking [with] staff in no distress” or pain. J.A.

193. Young fell asleep in the chair sometime after 1:20 a.m.

and woke up at 5:20 a.m., requesting “a shot in the ass” of

pain medication. J.A. 193, 196. He was “cooperative,”

agreed to see a psychiatrist and take medication, and

lamented the “next time” he would be in the restraint chair

because “that’s just how it is [with him].” J.A. 196.

Later in the morning, Young was still naked in the

chair and became agitated because of his continued restraint.

Upset, he told the COs that he would “act out” when released.

J.A. 604. Because he was “loud” and “making demands,”

prison officials declined to remove him from the restraint

chair. J.A. 196. He was finally released a couple hours later

once officials were satisfied that he had calmed down.

All told, Young was confined in the restraint chair

from approximately 8:46 p.m. to approximately 10:30 a.m.

the next morning—a nearly fourteen-hour period that

significantly exceeded the two-hour maximum recommended

by the chair’s manufacturer and the eight-hour maximum,

absent special authorization, permitted by the prison’s

regulations. See J.A. 180. Upon release, Young was shaking

uncontrollably and repeatedly complained that he was “cold

down to his bones” because of the air conditioning blowing

on his naked body for fourteen hours. J.A. 287. His legs

were so numb that he could not walk, and he had to be

wheeled back to the RHU in the chair.5 As Defendants’

5

Young’s cell door was inadvertently opened again on

September 22, 2009. From the surveillance video, it is

unclear whether he fell out of his cell or ran out. Regardless,

7

counsel conceded at oral argument, there is no evidence in the

record that anyone provided the requisite authorization to

exceed the prison’s eight-hour maximum. Oral Argument at

44:01-49:49, available at http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oral

argument/audio/13-4057Youngv.Martin,%20et.al.mp3.

II. Procedural Background

Young initiated suit in March 2010 and, in August

2010, filed an amended complaint, claiming, among other

things, that his placement in the restraint chair was purely

punitive and constituted excessive force in violation of the

Eighth Amendment. The Defendants moved for summary

judgment, arguing that their actions were justified by Young’s

extensive disciplinary history. In addition, Young filed a

motion to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of an

investigative report by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)

regarding the treatment of mentally ill prisoners in the

Pennsylvania prison system and also requested that the

District Court provide him with funding for a mental health

expert.

most of the reports of the incident state that he “lunged” at

Officer Biagini, who was just outside the cell, J.A. 404, and

that Officer Biagini was not harmed by Young. Following

the incident, Young was strip searched and returned to his

cell. Young’s Eighth Amendment claim is not based on this

incident. He references it to demonstrate that the COs’

response on September 20th involved the use of excessive

force because, following the arguably more serious event on

September 22nd, he was not placed in the restraint chair and

instead was returned to his cell in the RHU.

8

The District Court granted the Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, denied Young’s motion to stay, and

declined to allocate funds for an expert. Focusing on

Young’s “paramount claim” that “Defendants violated his

Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting him to a prolonged

period of strict mechanical restraint in the restraint chair,” the

District Court concluded that the “Defendants acted

professionally and within constitutional parameters in

subduing and placing Plaintiff in a restraint chair for about

fourteen hours . . . .” Young v. Beard, Civ. No. 10-0284,

2013 WL 5230796, at *8, *11 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2013).

Specifically, the District Court found that Young was

“agitated” and the Defendants brought him “under control

using minimal force” especially since he indicated he would

“act out” when released and he was “violence-prone,”

mentally ill, and suicidal. Id. at *11. The District Court also

found the record lacked evidence that Young suffered “actual

harm,” let alone “any risk of ‘serious’ harm, considering not

only the seriousness of the potential harm and the likelihood

that the harm will actually occur, but any evidence that

unwilling exposure to that risk violate[d] contemporary

standards of decency.” Id. at *12. The District Court

therefore concluded that the Defendants did not use excessive

force and granted the Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment. Young timely appealed.

9

III. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1331.6 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We exercise plenary review over a district court’s

order granting summary judgment, applying the same

standard as the district court. See Tri-M Grp., 638 F.3d at

415. We will affirm only if “drawing all reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and [ ] the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ruehl v. Viacom,

Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 380 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted);

see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If, on the other hand,

“reasonable minds could differ . . . [then] an issue of material

fact remains . . . for the trier of fact, and the grant of summary

judgment . . . must be reversed.” J.E. Mamiye & Sons, Inc. v.

Fid. Bank, 813 F.2d 610, 617 (3d Cir. 1987) (citations

omitted).

IV. Analysis

The main issue presented on appeal is whether the

District Court erred by granting summary judgment in favor

of the Defendants by concluding that they did not violate

Young’s Eighth Amendment rights when they strapped him

in a restraint chair, naked, for fourteen hours, in the absence

of any imminent threat of bodily harm to himself or others.

Young argues that his placement in the restraint chair

constituted use of “excessive force,” relying on the Supreme

6

The parties consented to the Magistrate Judge’s

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). For ease of

reference, we refer to the District Court throughout.

10

Court’s decision in Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).7

Appellant’s Br. 31. The Defendants argue that we should

analyze this as a “conditions of confinement” case under

Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335 (3d Cir. 2000). For the

reasons set forth below, we conclude that the District Court

erred in granting summary judgment because it did not

analyze the case under Hope and failed to draw all reasonable

inferences from the facts in Young’s favor.

A. The Applicable Eighth Amendment Framework

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of

“cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII;

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1986). The

Supreme Court has interpreted this prohibition both to bar

prison officials from using excessive force against inmates,

see Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992), and to

impose affirmative duties on prison officials to “provide

humane conditions of confinement,” see Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Depending on which of these

Eighth Amendment claims a plaintiff seeks to pursue,

different elements must be proven and different lines of cases

applied. While claims of use of excessive force require

consideration of “the need for the application of force, the

relationship between the need and the amount of force that

7

He also relies on Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318,

326-27 (3d Cir. 2009), where we reversed a grant of summary

judgment on a prisoner’s claim of excessive force. While

Giles also analyzes the use of force on a prisoner who was

already subdued, it is of limited applicability as it does not

address Hope or the use of restraint chairs or other

mechanical restraints.

11

was used, and the extent of injury inflicted,” Whitley, 475

U.S. at 321 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted),

claims concerning conditions of confinement require a

plaintiff to show that the prison conditions “pos[ed] a

substantial risk of serious harm” and that the prison officials

were deliberately indifferent to that risk, Farmer, 511 U.S. at

834.

The parties dispute whether Young’s claims regarding

the use of the four-point restraint chair, i.e., a mechanical

restraint, fall into the category of excessive force or

conditions of confinement, and, as one district court has

observed, our “[c]ase law does not provide a clear answer for

which analysis applies.” Zimmerman v. Schaeffer, 654 F.

Supp. 2d 226, 248 (M.D. Pa. 2009). We last addressed the

issue of whether the use of a restraint chair constituted an

Eighth Amendment violation in Fuentes. However, that case,

decided before Hope, is distinguishable on its facts and left

open the issue of whether the use of mechanical restraints

should be analyzed under the Supreme Court’s excessive

force or conditions of confinement jurisprudence.

In Fuentes, the inmate began kicking his cell door and

yelling for a CO, while complaining that another inmate

urinated in his cell. 206 F.3d at 339. The COs cuffed

Fuentes through his food slot and entered his cell to conduct a

search. Id. A struggle ensued, and the COs eventually

wrestled Fuentes to the floor. Id. Fuentes continued to yell

while one CO held him on the ground as another cuffed his

legs. Id. At the same time, the Assistant Warden authorized

use of the restraint chair for eight hours, in accord with the

prison’s regulations. Id. at 339, 340. Fuentes argued that use

of the restraint chair was purely punitive and violated his

Eighth Amendment rights because he was no longer a threat

12

once he was restrained. Id. at 340, 343-44. Because it was

“undisputed that the prison policy for the use of the restraint

chair was followed,” we concluded that the prison officials

were not deliberately indifferent to Fuentes’s health or well-

being, consistent with a conditions of confinement analysis.

Id. at 345. We also concluded that the prison officials did not

place Fuentes in the chair “maliciously and sadistically to

cause harm,” consistent with an excessive force analysis. Id.

at 345-46.

Despite some facial similarities to Young’s case, the

facts of Fuentes are sufficiently different that its holding is of

limited applicability here for three reasons. First, Fuentes’

placement in the restraint chair occurred contemporaneously

with the physical altercation with the COs. That is, the chair

was an instrument used by prison officials to subdue an

actively combative prisoner. In contrast, Young never

engaged in a physical altercation and was placed in the

restraint chair while entirely docile.

Second, Fuentes’ placement in the restraint chair was

in accord with prison regulations, as he posed an immediate

threat to the COs, and he was released after eight hours.

Young, on the other hand, was not an immediate threat to

himself or others, as he was shackled and face down on the

ground, and there is no evidence that any prison official

authorized Young’s confinement in the restraint chair in

excess of the eight-hour maximum otherwise permitted under

the prison regulations. See Oral Argument at 44:01-49:49,

available at http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/

audio/13-4057Youngv.Martin,%20et.al.mp3.

Finally, Fuentes does not answer the question of what

legal framework applies in the face of a claim that the use of

13

mechanical restraints violated a prisoner’s Eighth

Amendment rights. See Zimmerman, 654 F. Supp. 2d at 249

(“The Third Circuit has not since considered the

constitutionality of mechanical constraints, but to the extent

that Fuentes . . . conflict[s] with Hope, the Supreme Court

case is binding authority.”). The Supreme Court’s more

recent decision in Hope, however, does.

In Hope, the Supreme Court specifically addressed the

issue of whether the use of mechanical restraints constituted

cruel and unusual punishment. Larry Hope, an Alabama

prisoner, fell asleep during a “morning bus ride to [his] chain

gang’s worksite.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 734. He “was less than

prompt in responding to an order to get off the bus” and

eventually got into a “wrestling match with a guard.” Id.

Hope was handcuffed, placed in leg irons, and transported

back to the prison where he was cuffed on a “hitching post.”

Id. “The guards made him take off his shirt, and he remained

shirtless all day while the sun burned his skin.” Id. at 734-35.

He was chained to the post for seven hours and was given

water only once, denied bathroom breaks, and taunted by the

guards. Id. at 735.

After noting that “unnecessary and wanton inflictions

of pain are those that are totally without penological

justification,” the Supreme Court concluded that, on the facts

alleged by Hope, “the Eighth Amendment violation is

obvious.” Id. at 737-38 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). The Court explained:

Any safety concerns had long since

abated by the time petitioner was handcuffed to

the hitching post because Hope had already

been subdued, handcuffed, placed in leg irons,

14

and transported back to the prison. He was

separated from his work squad and not given

the opportunity to return to work. Despite the

clear lack of an emergency situation, the

respondents knowingly subjected him to a

substantial risk of physical harm, to

unnecessary pain caused by the handcuffs and

the restricted position of confinement for a 7-

hour period, to unnecessary exposure to the heat

of the sun, to prolonged thirst and taunting, and

to a deprivation of bathroom breaks that created

a risk of particular discomfort and humiliation.

The use of the hitching post under these

circumstances violated the “basic concept

underlying the Eighth Amendment[, which] is

nothing less than the dignity of man.” Trop v.

Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). This punitive

treatment amounts to gratuitous infliction of

“wanton and unnecessary” pain that our

precedent clearly prohibits.

Id. at 738 (footnote omitted).

The Defendants do not dispute that Hope controls as to

which Eighth Amendment test applies to analyze the use of

mechanical restraints. See Zimmerman, 654 F. Supp. 2d at

249 (Hope is the controlling case on the “constitutionality of

mechanical restraints”). They contend, however, that the

Supreme Court in Hope “applied the conditions of

confinement/deliberate indifference test of Farmer v.

Brennan.” Appellees’ Br. 34-35. We disagree because the

language and reasoning of the opinion reflect that the Court,

in fact, was applying the excessive force test.

15

After reciting the facts, the Supreme Court reaffirmed

that “unnecessary and wanton infliction[s] of pain . . .

constitute[ ] cruel and unusual punishment,” including those

that are “totally without penological justification.” Hope, 536

U.S. at 737 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319 and Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981)) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The Court referred to Farmer briefly but its

analysis of whether the use of mechanical restraints violated

the Eighth Amendment indisputably began and ended in

terms drawn from its excessive force jurisprudence, i.e.,

Whitley, because it held that Hope’s “punitive treatment”

amounted to the “gratuitous infliction of ‘wanton and

unnecessary’ pain” that was “clearly prohibit[ed].” Id. at 738.

Thus, in Hope, the Supreme Court applied its excessive force

jurisprudence for the first time to a prisoner’s allegation that

his placement in mechanical restraints was unconstitutional.

We conclude, under Hope, that Young’s claims should

be analyzed under the excessive force test and that such

analysis demonstrates that the District Court’s grant of

summary judgment was in error. We now turn to the task of

applying this test to the record before us.8

8

While we conclude that the particular claims here

concerning the use of mechanical restraints are properly

analyzed under the excessive force test, we note that the

record in this case, reflecting Young’s detention in solitary

confinement for over six years, and the DOJ investigative

report, detailing prolonged solitary confinement at SCI-

Greene and five other Pennsylvania prisons, raise serious

concerns under the Eighth Amendment’s conditions of

confinement test. As Justice Kennedy recently observed,

“[y]ears on end of near-total isolation exact a terrible price.”

16

B. Application of the Excessive Force Test In

Light Of Hope

The District Court concluded that there was no Eighth

Amendment violation because Young was “known-to-be

violent,” was exposed to “minimal force,” promised to “act

out if released,” and was not punched, kicked or “otherwise

manhandl[ed]” by the COs. Young, 2013 WL 5230796, at

*13. We conclude from our independent review of the

videotape and record evidence that the District Court failed to

draw all reasonable inferences in Young’s favor and that,

when those inferences are properly drawn, there are genuine

disputes of material fact as to whether the Defendants’ use of

the restraint chair in this case violated the Eighth

Amendment.

Force that is used “maliciously and sadistically for the

very purpose of causing harm” violates the Eighth

Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015) (Kennedy, J.,

concurring) (citing Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of

Solitary Confinement, 22 Wash. U.J.L. & Pol’y 325 (2006)

(noting the common side-effects of solitary confinement, such

as panic, hallucinations, self-mutilation, and suicidal

behaviors)); see also Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2765

(2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that “it is well

documented that . . . prolonged solitary confinement produces

numerous deleterious harms”). The record in this case,

including details of Young’s visual and auditory

hallucinations and his numerous suicide attempts, makes

palpable “[t]he human toll wrought by extended terms of

isolation.” Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2209 (Kennedy, J.,

concurring).

17

Amendment. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). While not every

“malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal

cause of action,” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9, the “[a]pplication of

force by . . . prison guards exceeding that which is reasonable

and necessary under the circumstances” may be actionable,

Davidson v. O’Lone, 752 F.2d 817, 827 (3d Cir. 1984). See

also Giles, 571 F.3d at 326 (an officer “may not . . . use

gratuitous force against an inmate who has been subdued”).

As applied to mechanical restraints, the Supreme Court

in Hope identified particular criteria relevant to the use of

excessive force test, holding that (1) where the inmate had

“already been subdued, handcuffed, [and] placed in leg

irons,” and (2) there was a “clear lack of an emergency

situation” such that “[a]ny safety concerns had long since

abated,” then (3) subjecting the inmate to “substantial risk of

physical harm” and “unnecessary pain” serves no penological

justification. Hope, 536 U.S. at 738; see also Rhodes, 452

U.S. at 346 (“Among ‘unnecessary and wanton’ inflictions of

pain are those that are ‘totally without penological

justification.’”) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183

(1976)). Measured by this yardstick, Young has raised

genuine disputes of material fact for a jury to ascertain

whether he suffered an Eighth Amendment violation.

First, like the inmate in Hope, it appears that Young

was already subdued when subjected to mechanical restraint.

He was not violent, combative, or self-destructive at any point

during the incident leading up to his prolonged confinement

in the restraint chair. On the contrary, he was safely secured

and shackled after voluntarily complying with the COs’

instructions to step into the shower. And immediately prior to

being placed in the restraint chair, he was naked and subdued,

18

face down on the ground and held by four COs, with his

hands and legs cuffed. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 738; see also

Giles, 571 F.3d at 327 (“striking and kicking a subdued,

nonresisting inmate in the side” was not “reasonable or

necessary under established law”). Given these facts,

“reasonable minds could differ” as to whether Young posed a

risk to himself or others when he was placed in the restraint

chair. See J.E. Mamiye, 813 F.2d at 617 (citations omitted).

While the District Court found that Young’s threats of

future harm were sufficient to justify his extended placement

in the restraint chair, the record, when drawing all inferences

in Young’s favor, supports a contrary interpretation. Video

recording reflects that after being strapped in the chair for

nearly eight hours, Young did comment that he would likely

be placed back in the restraint chair because “that’s just how

it is,” J.A. 196, and that, following the stress of nearly

fourteen hours of confinement, he was agitated and told two

COs he would “act out” when released, J.A. 604. When

considered on the whole, however, any number of reasonable

inferences could be drawn in Young’s favor from these

statements, not the least of which being (1) that the

Defendants had consistently used the chair to punish Young,

and (2) that Young was upset and angry about an unjustified,

punitive confinement.

Second, there is ample evidence that the events of

September 20th did not rise to the level of an “emergency

situation,” Hope, 536 U.S. at 738, despite the District Court’s

characterization of “a highly energized situation,” Young,

2013 WL 5230796, at *5 (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). Young only left his cell because a CO

inadvertently opened his cell door—far from a prison break;

the incident lasted a mere seven minutes, during which two

19

COs chatted and laughed while they watched the scene

unfold; and Young voluntarily complied with the COs’

instructions within that short time frame. The COs then

removed Young, shackled and subdued, from the common

area and subjected him in a more controlled space to a prone

strip search without resistance. By this point, a reasonable

jury could find that “[a]ny safety concerns had long since

abated.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 738.

Finally, there is a dispute of fact as to whether, despite

the lack of an emergency situation and the evidence that

Young was already subdued, the prison officials exposed

Young to a “substantial risk of physical harm” and

“unnecessary pain” by placing him in the restraint chair. See

id. The prison’s own regulations authorize use of the restraint

chair only for “protection of self or others,” J.A. 626, to

“prevent an inmate from injuring [himself] or other persons,”

J.A. 629, and to “safely restrain a combative or self-

destructive person,” id. Yet the COs and prison officials not

only placed Young in the restraint chair but did so for nearly

fourteen hours, far exceeding the eight-hour maximum

permitted without special authorization. See Hope, 536 U.S.

at 738.

At the outset, Young’s restraints were so tight that he

cried out in pain, and during the extended period he remained

in the restraint chair, Young was naked, with his genitals

partially exposed and an air conditioner blowing cold air on

him. When he was finally released from this extreme

confinement, Young was shaking uncontrollably and

complained that he was “cold down to his bones.” J.A. 287.

His legs, numb from the restricted position his body was

forced to endure over fourteen hours, could no longer hold his

weight and he had to be wheeled back to the RHU. On this

20

record, Young is entitled to have a jury determine whether he

was subjected to “a substantial risk of physical harm” without

penological justification and whether the Defendants thus

“violated the basic concept underlying the Eighth

Amendment.” See Hope, 536 U.S. at 738 (quoting Trop, 356

U.S. at 100) (quotation marks omitted).

In sum, applying the use of excessive force test,

analyzing the record under the criteria identified in Hope, and

drawing all inferences in favor of Young as the nonmoving

party, we cannot say that “there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

C. The Issue of Qualified Immunity

The Defendants also ask us—in a single sentence—to

affirm on the ground of qualified immunity. The District

Court did not reach the issue and the availability of the

defense was not briefed on appeal. In Hope, the Supreme

Court held that the officers were not entitled to qualified

immunity because their actions violated “clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” 536 U.S. at 739 (quoting Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)) (quotation marks

omitted). We will leave this issue for the District Court to

address in the first instance on remand, considering (1)

whether “the state of the law” in 2009, including Hope, gave

the Defendants “fair warning that their alleged treatment of

[Young] was unconstitutional,” 536 U.S. at 741, and (2)

whether Young’s confinement in the restraint chair violated

prison regulations of which the Defendants were aware, see,

e.g., id. at 743-44 (prison officials’ violation of Department of

Corrections’ regulations for restraining inmates at a hitching

21

post was relevant to the question of fair warning); Treats v.

Morgan, 308 F.3d 868, 875 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Prison

regulations governing the conduct of correctional officers are

. . . relevant in determining whether an inmate’s right was

clearly established.”). Cf. City & Cnty. of San Francisco v.

Sheehan, 135 S.Ct. 1765, 1777 (2015) (observing that “an

officer act[ing] contrary to her training . . . does not itself

negate qualified immunity where it would otherwise be

warranted”).

D. Young’s Remaining Arguments

Young also argues that the District Court abused its

discretion by refusing to stay the summary judgment

proceedings pending the issuance of the DOJ’s final

investigative report and erred in refusing to allocate funds for

him to retain a mental health expert. We review for abuse of

discretion the District Court’s denial of Young’s motion to

stay and its refusal to allocate funds for an expert. See

Bechtel Corp. v. Local 215, Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am.,

544 F.2d 1207, 1215 (3d Cir. 1976) (a district court may stay

proceedings “[i]n the exercise of its sound discretion”); see

also Fed. R. Evid. 706 (giving trial judge broad discretion to

appoint expert).

The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it

denied Young’s motion to stay the proceedings.9 At that

9

Young argues that the factors set forth in Golden

Quality Ice Cream Co., Inc. v. Deerfield Specialty Papers,

Inc., 87 F.R.D. 53 (E.D. Pa. 1980), weighed in favor of

granting a stay:

22

time, the only issue remaining in the case, by Young’s

(1) the interest of the plaintiffs in

proceeding expeditiously with this litigation or

any particular aspect of it, and the potential

prejudice to plaintiffs of a delay; (2) the burden

which any particular aspect of the proceedings

may impose on defendants; (3) the convenience

of the court in the management of its cases, and

the efficient use of judicial resources; (4) the

interests of persons not parties to the civil

litigation; and (5) the interest of the public in

the pending civil and criminal litigation.

Id. at 56.

While these factors provide a useful analytical

framework when deciding whether to stay a civil case

pending the outcome of criminal proceedings, Young does

not cite, and we have not found, any authority applying them

in the context of a motion for stay pending an agency’s

investigative report. See, e.g., id. at 55 (denying stay because

there was “no basis in law for the notion that defendants in a

criminal prosecution, antitrust or otherwise, have a due

process right to stay proceedings in related civil actions lest

they be forced to defend themselves on two legal fronts

simultaneously”). Indeed, all of the authority cited by Young

is in the context of parallel criminal proceedings. See, e.g.,

SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1376 (D.C. Cir.

1980); Walsh Secs., Inc. v. Cristo Prop. Mgmt., Ltd., 7 F.

Supp. 2d 523, 527, 529 (D.N.J. 1998). Given the very

different issues and interests implicated by such parallel

proceedings, we decline to import that framework here.

23

admission, was “his Eighth Amendment, excessive force

challenge to [his] fourteen hour restraint in a restrictive

movement chair” at SCI-Greene. J.A. 829 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). The District Court

properly concluded that the DOJ’s preliminary investigative

report regarding SCI-Cresson was “irrelevant and immaterial

to that sole claim” and that Young effectively requested an

“indefinite” stay because there was no indication when the

DOJ’s final report would be issued. Id. at 829, 839. While

this appeal was pending, however, the DOJ issued its final

investigative report, detailing the “dehumanizing and cruel”

conditions that attend the Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections’ (“DOC”) use of solitary confinement at six

prison facilities, including SCI-Greene, where prisoners are

reportedly confined to a cell, less than 100 square feet, for

twenty-three hours a day, exposed to unsanitary and

inhospitable conditions, and subjected to the excessive use of

restraints. Investigation of the Pa. Dep’t of Corr. Use of

Solitary Confinement on Prisoners with Serious Mental

Illness and/or Intellectual Disabilities, Appellant’s Br., Ex. C,

at 4, 9-11.10 The report observes that solitary confinement

commonly includes the “[u]nnecessary and excessive use of

10

Consistent with the Supreme Court’s observation

concerning a similar report relied upon by the Eighth Circuit

in Hope, we take judicial notice of the DOJ’s final

investigative report here. 536 U.S. at 737 n.7 (observing that

the DOJ report was not before the District Court but the

Eleventh Circuit took judicial notice and referenced it several

times in its decision); see also id. at 737 (noting that “the

court relied on . . . the results of a [DOJ] report that found

Alabama’s systematic use of the hitching post to be improper

corporal punishment.”).

24

[full-body] restraints . . . as a means to discipline prisoners by

causing discomfort or pain,” id. at 11, and concludes that the

long-term use of solitary confinement on mentally ill

prisoners “violate[s] the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition

against ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’” id. at 3.

Young argues on appeal that the final DOJ report is

both relevant and admissible. The report reflects, among

other things, that rather than providing mental health

treatment, “staff members routinely respond to [a] prisoner

exhibiting symptoms of . . . mental illness by making his

living conditions even more inhospitable,” including 24/7

confinement; denying the prisoner bedding material, clothing,

and running water; restricting prisoners to even smaller cells;

and subjecting them to the “excessive use of restraints.” Id. at

10-11. It also describes that during their solitary

confinement, the prisoners’ senses are assaulted with foul

smells from the “inadequate sanitation and ventilation”—

including the stench of human excrement that mentally ill

prisoners smear on the wall and which might remain for

days—and loud noises from the “yelling and banging of

neighboring prisoners.” Id. at 9-10. According to the report,

most cells have no windows, depriving prisoners of any

natural light, though they never enjoy a respite, even at night,

from the relentless overhead lighting within their cells. Id. at

9. Five days a week, those who are willing to submit to a

strip search are “led by tether,” “arms and legs shackled,” to

“an empty and caged outdoor pen” for a single hour. Id. at 9-

10. Solitary confinement includes a total restriction on

contact visitations, id. at 10, which means that the only

human touch these inmates experience is from the COs

shackling them, and a restriction to a single monthly non-

contact visitation, id., which means that, but for an hour a

25

month, their only human interactions are limited to the same

COs.

According to the report, the use of solitary

confinement on mentally ill prisoners “exacerbates their

mental illness and leads to serious psychological and

physiological harms,” “including psychosis, trauma, severe

depression, serious self-injury, and suicide,” id. at 3, 7, and as

a result of their prolonged isolation, the prisoners express an

inability “to conform their conduct to the prison’s rules in a

way that would allow them out of their isolation cell” and

“accumulate[] years of disciplinary time . . . fear[ing] they

[will] never be returned to general population,” id. at 8.

Having been denied mental health services, and with their

mental illness exacerbated by prolonged solitary confinement,

the prisoners are reportedly subjected to excessive restraints

as a form of punishment, with “more than 260 full-body

restraint incidents” over eighteen months, of which “almost

75% lasted longer than 7 hours, and 15% lasted longer than

12 hours.” Id. at 11.

Young notes the many parallels between the findings

in the final report and his own experience, pointing out that

not only was he subjected to excessive restraint, lasting

almost fourteen hours, but also that he suffers from many

forms of serious mental illness,11 that his mental illness has

11

The DOC defines “serious mental illness” as “a

substantial disorder of thought or mood that significantly

impairs judgment, behavior, [or] capacity to recognize reality

or cope with the ordinary demands of life.” Appellant’s Br.

Ex. C at 4-5 (quoting Pa. Dep’t Corr., Access to Mental

Health Care, Policy 13.8.1, Section 2-Delivery of Mental

26

been exacerbated by his prolonged solitary confinement, and

that his extensive disciplinary history cannot be considered in

isolation from his history of mental illness, rendering the final

report highly relevant. He also argues that the final report

should be deemed admissible, pursuant to the hearsay

exception for public records. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (a

“record or statement of a public office” is admissible “in a

civil case” if it sets out “factual findings from a legally

authorized investigation” and “the opponent does not show

that the source of information nor other circumstances

indicate a lack of trustworthiness”). Young cites our decision

in Goodman v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 293 F.3d 655, 669-70 (3d

Cir. 2002), as authority for admitting a trustworthy public

report containing legal conclusions into evidence pursuant to

Rule 803(8).

The Defendants do not dispute that the report is a

public document nor do they challenge its trustworthiness, but

they argue that it makes “general” and “inadmissible” legal

conclusions. Appellees’ Br. 29. The Defendants also argue

that admission of the DOJ’s “opinion” that “restraint chair

confinement ‘often’ is punitive for severely mentally ill RHU

inmates held elsewhere” would be “unduly prejudicial in the

most fundamental sense.” Id. at 29-30.

Because the District Court did not address any

evidentiary issues pertaining to the final report in deciding

Young’s motion to stay, it should do so on remand,

considering whether the report here, to the extent it contains

relevant findings and conclusions, constitutes a trustworthy

Health Services § A.1.a.(2) (2013)) (alteration in original)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

27

public report admissible pursuant to Rule 803(8) and whether

the admission of some or all of the report is not merely

prejudicial to the Defendants, but “unfairly prejudicial,” as

that is the touchstone for exclusion. Goodman, 293 F.3d at

670. The parties may renew their evidentiary arguments on

remand.

Finally, we agree with the Defendants that the District

Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Young’s request

to appoint a mental health expert pursuant to Federal Rule of

Evidence 706 because a court does not have the power to tilt

the scales in favor of one litigant by funding its expert

witnesses under that Rule. Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d

468, 474 (3d Cir. 1987). However, the District Court could

appoint an expert for the purpose of assisting the Court, and

the rule is clear that an expert so appointed should be paid

either from “funds provided by law”12 or “by the parties in

such proportion and at such time as the court directs, and

thereafter charged in like manner as other costs.” Young, 59

F.3d at 1169-70 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 706(b)) (internal

quotation marks omitted); see also Boring, 833 F.2d at 474.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the District Court

improvidently granted summary judgment in favor of the

Defendants by failing to apply the Supreme Court’s

12

The Western District maintains a “fund to cover

reasonable costs” incurred in pro bono civil rights

representations. See Pro Bono Counsel in Prisoner Civil

Rights Cases in the Western District of Pennsylvania,

http://www.pawd.uscourts.gov/Pages/ProBonoPC.htm (last

accessed August 24, 2015).

28

controlling precedent in Hope and failing to draw all

reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of Young. The

District Court’s order of summary judgment will be vacated

and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

29