explaining two-part test for qualified immunity
How later courts described this case
- explaining two-part test for qualified immunity
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION SEP 04 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROYCE KEITH WILLIAMS, No. 13-55044
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 5:07-cv-01632-ABC-OP
v.
MEMORANDUM*
NICOLE STOLAR; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Audrey B. Collins, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 25, 2015**
Before: McKEOWN, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Royce Keith Williams appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of his Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights arising out of the removal of his minor son without
prior judicial authorization. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
review de novo. Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty., Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237
F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001). We may affirm on any basis supported by the
record. McSherry v. City of Long Beach, 584 F.3d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009). We
affirm.
Summary judgment was properly granted to Stolar and Fisher because they
were entitled to qualified immunity, as it would not have been clear to every
reasonable social worker and police officer that the removal of Williams’s minor
son was unlawful under the circumstances presented. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131
S. Ct. 2074, 2080, 2083 (2011) (explaining two-part test for qualified immunity);
see also Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (government
officials cannot remove a child from a parent’s custody without prior judicial
authorization unless they possess information at the time of the seizure that
establishes “reasonable cause to believe that the child is in imminent danger of
serious bodily injury and that the scope of the intrusion is reasonably necessary to
avert that specific injury”).
2 13-55044
We do not consider issues or arguments not specifically and distinctly raised
and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first
time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam).
AFFIRMED.
3 13-55044