Opinion

Robert Lee Coggin v. State

Court
Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin)
Filed
Oct 9, 2003
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 36.0%

defining disorderly conduct as "acts such as intend to excite violent resentment or to provoke or excite others to break the peace"

How later courts described this case

  • defining disorderly conduct as "acts such as intend to excite violent resentment or to provoke or excite others to break the peace"
  • describing fighting words as speech or gestures that, "when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction"
  • stating that the expressive conduct at issue must fall within the narrow class of speech constituting fighting words likely to provoke an average person to retaliate

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-02-00690-CR

Robert Lee Coggin, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF CALDWELL COUNTY

NO. 29,925, HONORABLE EDWARD L. JARRETT, JUDGE PRESIDING

DISSENTING OPINION

Few principles are as basic as the general notion that a reviewing court, when reviewing

issues of fact, should never substitute its judgment for that of the jury when some

evidence exists to support the finding made by the jury. Because the majority today

violates that principle, I respectfully dissent.

The majority opinion concludes that no rational trier of fact could have found the

elements of the offense of disorderly conduct beyond a reasonable doubt by asserting that

no evidence exists to support such a finding. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 42.01(a)(2)

(West 2003). In doing so, the majority strays from the basic mandate that a reviewing

court should so find only when the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support a

finding of guilt and that the issue therefore should never have been submitted to the jury.

See Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

The penal statute in question provides that "[a] person commits an offense if he

intentionally or knowingly: . . . makes an offensive gesture or display in a public place,

and the gesture or display tends to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Tex. Pen.

Code Ann. § 42.01(a)(2) (West 2003). The only element at issue in this case is whether

the offensive gesture "tends to incite an immediate breach of the peace." See id. Thus, we

should not assess the result of the incident, but rather assess the potential for violence as a

result of the gesture. Clearly, the state may prohibit speech or conduct which has a

tendency to incite or produce immediate violence. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,

409 (1989); Gooding v. United States, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972); Cohen v. California,

403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Chaplinsky v.

New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308

(1940). Whether the offensive gesture "tends to incite an immediate breach of the peace"

is a question of fact. See Woods v. State, 213 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 1948);

State v. Rivenburgh, 933 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1996, no pet.); Estes

v. State, 660 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1983, pet. ref'd) ("We must

consider if the gesture in this case, under all of the attendant circumstances, amounted to

fighting words."). In determining whether an offensive gesture tends to incite imminent

violence, we must "consider the gesture as being directed to an average person" and not

the intended recipients. Estes, 660 S.W.2d at 875. That the intended recipients did or did

not become violent is irrelevant. Rather, we are to consider how the average person

would have reacted when considering whether the offensive gesture amounted to fighting

words. Id.; see also Johnson, 491 U.S. at 409 (stating that the expressive conduct at issue

must fall within the narrow class of speech constituting fighting words likely to provoke

an average person to retaliate). Of course, the determinatio n of how an average person

would react is properly made by the jury and it "is not the function of this court to

substitute its finding for that of the jury." Estes, 660 S.W.2d at 687.

Even if the majority's approach--measuring the degree to which the Pastranos reacted to

appellant's gesture--were applicable, there is evidence in the record that John Pastrano

restrained himself from violence. John Pastrano said he was so angered by the gesture he

wanted to defend himself and his wife. If the measure is whether a particular recipient

reacted violently, there could be no uniform application of this law because its

application would rest on whether there was, in fact, violence and not on whether the

speech or conduct would have a tendency to produce violence in the average person. See

Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20 (describing fighting words as speech or gestures that, "when

addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently

likely to provoke violent reaction"); Woods, 213 S.W.2d at 687 (defining disorderly

conduct as "acts such as intend to excite violent resentment or to provoke or excite others

to break the peace"). The majority's application of the standard would defeat the purpose

for the law--to prevent gestures, words, and conduct that incite violence. See Woods, 213

S.W.2d at 687.

The majority then commits its second error in conducting its legal sufficiency review of

the case at hand. A review of a criminal conviction under a legal sufficiency standard

requires a court to consider "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).

Thus, an appellate court must look at all the evidence and consider which evidence

supports the verdict. Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 132 n.10. Of the evidence which tends to

support the verdict, the appellate court must determine if that evidence rationally supports

a finding of each element of the offense. Id. at 132.

In this case, there is ample testimony supporting the jury's conclusion that the offensive

gesture, in these circumstances, would tend to incite an average person to immediate

violence. John Pastrano was driving in the ins ide lane of U.S. Highway 183 in Lockhart

with his wife, Robin Pastrano. At one point, John looked into his rearview mirror and

noticed behind him a white Crown Victoria driven by appellant. John estimated he was

traveling fifty miles per hour during the time appellant was behind him. Robin estimated

their speed at seventy miles per hour. John testified that appellant was flashing the bright

lights of the car on and off and motioning for John to move over. Appellant tailgated the

Pastranos, at a distance of two to three feet, for approximately one-quarter mile. John,

thinking that he was being pulled over by a police officer, moved into the right lane. Both

John and Robin testified that as appellant passed them, he directed the obscene gesture at

them. (1)

Appellant admitted that he was the driver of the car tailgating the Pastranos. Appellant

said he was running late for his tae kwan do class in Lockhart when he came up behind

the Pastranos in the left lane of the road. As appellant explained the incident:

[The Pastranos were] in the passing lane. There was no traffic in the right lane. I wasn't

going to pass him on the right because I've been told that's illegal here. So I pulled up

behind him. I didn't get real close to him initially. I gave him time to see my car and pull

over. He did not pull over.

I got behind him a little closer and I flashed my lights. I flashed my brights. They don't

wig-wag. They just go like this (indicating). And he didn't pull over even after that. I so

motioned in my windshield, "Hey, could you please get over?" He eventually pulled over

....

Finally, when asked in court if he had told the officer issuing the citation, "Yeah I was on

his ass because he was in the left lane and was going slow[,]" Appellant testified, "[t]hat

sounds like something I would say." Appellant denied making the gesture.

Given these facts and attendant circumstances, the issue is whether a jury could

reasonably find that these circumstances are likely to incite an average person to

violence. For the majority to conclude that no rational trier of fact could reach the

conclusion reached by this jury is quite simply a substitution of its judgment for that of

the jury. Looking at the evidence and attendant circumstances in a light most favorable to

the verdict reveals that appellant rode the Pastranos' bumper for a distance of one-quarter

mile at a speed somewhere between fifty and seventy miles per hour. Appellant could

have passed the Pastranos in the right lane but instead chose to tailgate them and force

them over at the risk of an accident. Appellant was so impatient and so unyielding that he

began motioning and signaling the Pastranos to pull over. He then pulled alongside of the

Pastranos and raised his middle finger in an obscene gesture universally understood to

mean "f--- you." Given these facts, a jury could reasonably believe that the gesture, in the

context of its attendant circumstances, would have a tendency to incite immediate

violence in an average person.

That these facts and attendant circumstances did not incite the Pastranos to immediate

violence is inconsequential, and reversing the verdict premised on the fact that the

Pastranos did not retaliate with the ir own breach of the peace is erroneous. The majority

opinion is premised on the following: because the Pastranos were not moved to violence,

appellant's gesture did not constitute fighting words. Yet, as the majority opinion

correctly sets out, the test is whether the words, "when addressed to the ordinary citizen,

are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction." See

Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20; Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct.1536, 1547 (2003).

The facts of this case are distinguishable from the cases in which courts held the evidence

failed to support a breach of the peace. In Cohen, the Supreme Court reversed a

conviction of a man wearing a jacket bearing the words "F--- the Draft" because "[n]o

individual actually or likely to be present could reasonably have regarded the words on

appellant's jacket as a direct personal insult." Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21. In Cantwell, the

Supreme Court reversed a conviction of members of Jehovah's Witnesses charged with

breaching the peace in distributing religious materials because there was no showing that

in disseminating the material the appellants were "noisy, truculent, overbearing or

offensive." Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309. In Johnson, the Supreme Court reversed the

conviction of a man accused of burning the American flag because the circumstances

surrounding the flag burning indicated that the act was generally directed at inducing a

condition of unrest, creating dissatisfaction and even stirring people to anger about the

policies of the federal government. 491 U.S. at 410. In Cannon, the Tenth Circuit

reversed the conviction of appellants accused of breaching the peace by carrying signs

stating "The Killing Place" outside an abortion clinic. 998 F.2d 867, 873 (10th Cir. 1993).

The majority cites these opinions for the proposition that conduct that angers some

people could not constitute fighting words. Generally, that proposition is true depending

on the circumstances, such as where the conduct was intended as an impetus to change.

See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 410; Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). Cannon does

not stand for the general proposition, though, that conduct that angers people to the point

of violence is constitutionally protected. A necessary prerequisite to retaliatory violence

is anger, so it goes without saying that speech arousing anger may amount to fighting

words in some circumstances.

In addition, I believe that the Rivenburgh case from the San Antonio Court of Appeals

supports my position. See State v. Rivenburgh, 933 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. App.--San Antonio

1996, no pet.). In that case, the court upheld a trial court's order suppressing evidence that

a woman made a vulgar gesture with her middle finger and mouthed an obscenity toward

drivers stopped behind her at a red light in a breach the peace action. See Rivenburgh,

933 S.W.2d at 701. Rivenburgh is an affirmance of a suppression order and a perfect

example of how an appellate court should review a fact finder's conclusion on the issue of

whether particular conduct could tend to incite imminent violence. The court of appeals

said, "[w]e presume the trial court applied the elements of the offense of disorderly

conduct to the facts and found that a prudent man would not believe that Rivenburgh had

committed the offense." Id. In addition, "[t]he trial judge was free to disbelieve any or all

of the testimony" of the one witness who saw the offensive gesture and heard the

obscenities even though there was no indication the witness was, in fact, lying. Id. The

court concluded that "[t]hough it may even rise to the level of common knowledge that

this gesture and these words mouthed by a Texas motorist has led to breaches of the

peace and even the loss of life, the trial court could have found that the gesture did not

tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace at this time and place." Id. (emphasis

added).

In our case, the majority concedes that, in some circumstances, appellant's gesture could

tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace--but not in this case because the contact

was brief, the participants were strangers, and the Pastranos experienced only

momentarily feelings of hostility. That an offensive gesture made and similar words

mouthed by a Texas motorist might have a tendency to lead to a breach of the peace and

even the loss of life at another time and in another place is left open both in Rivenburgh

and in the majority's opinion--and rightly so. What the majority fails to consider is that

once a fact finder has reviewed the evidence, believed the testimony of the witnesses,

observed their demeanor, considered the attendant circumstances and concluded that at

the time and place in question the defendant did engage in conduct an average person

could find would tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace, then a reviewing court

must defer to that determination except for instances where no rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

The majority also relies on the fact that appellant and the Pastranos did not have a face-

to-face encounter, stating that more than an "impersonal, brief encounter" is needed. Left

unstated is the supposition that only a face-to-face encounter can provide the scenario

needed to produce the setting for an immediate breach. In Sandul v. Larion, for example,

a man was accused of shouting the words "f--- you" to a group of abortion protesters and

giving them the finger as he drove by. 119 F.3d 1250, 1252 (6th Cir. 1997). A police

officer, who was talking with the protesters on the street when the defendant drove by

and was the only witness to the gesture and the only person who heard the epithet,

pursued the man and caught up with him at his home. Id. After being acquitted of a

charge of disorderly conduct, the defendant sued the officer for unlawful arrest. Id. The

district court granted the officer summary judgment on the false arrest charge finding the

officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant and was thus immune from suit. Id. The

Sixth Circuit, though, noted that an official loses his immunity where a reasonable person

would have known the defendant had a "clearly established" right to engage in the

challenged conduct. Id. at 1254. The Sixth Circuit held that the arresting officer should

have known that the defendant's speech was constitutionally protected; consequently, the

officer did not qualify for immunity. Id. at 1255. The court also concluded the defendant's

words were not fighting words because the conduct and speech was shouted from the

window of a motorist "traveling at a high rate of speed on the opposite side of the street, a

considerable distance away from the protesters to whom the language was directed" and

thus could not have had a tendency to incite immediate violence. Id. Also relevant to the

court's conclusion was the fact that none of the protesters heard the insult or saw the

gesture. See id.

In the present case, all of the ingredients for immediate violence were present. Both

parties were in automobiles, and both automobiles were traveling in the same direction.

Pastrano had the capacity to react immediately by accelerating in pursuit of appellant.

One must ignore the reality of modern life to not recognize that many instances of "road

rage" begin in just such a manner, and consideration of "road rage" easily could have

factored into the thought process of the jury.

The majority cites numerous cases to support the proposition that a face-to- face

encounter is required. None of the cited cases dictates that factor as a prerequisite, and a

close look at these cases reveals that distinguishing factors are present in each. In Garvey

v. State, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals reversed a woman's conviction for

disturbing the peace by shouting "sooey" to a police officer. 537 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 1975). The court concluded:

Under the evidence here, the defendant's conduct (words) did not amount to 'fighting'

words as contemplated by the statute. There was no direct, face-to- face conduct or other

exigent circumstances here. This word addressed to a police officer trained to exercise a

higher degree of restraint than the average citizen would not be expected to cause a

breach of the peace.

Id. (referring, in part, to Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913, 913 (1972) (Powell, J.,

concurring) (proposing that words spoken by one citizen to another, face-to- face, might,

in some circumstances, amount to fighting words but that those same words, in other

circumstances, spoken by a citizen to a police officer might not amount to fighting

words)).

In Matter of Welfare of S.L.J., the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a

fourteen- year-old girl accused of shouting the words "f--- you pigs" to two police

officers. Matter of Welfare of S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d 412, 415 (Minn. 1978). The reversal of

conviction in that case was premised on two grounds: the relevant statute was overbroad

and the speech did not rise to the level of fighting words because the attendant

circumstances were such that "there was no reasonable likelihood that they would tend to

incite an immediate breach of the peace." Id. at 420.

In Hershfield v. Commonwealth, the Virginia court of appeals reversed the conviction of

a man accused of disorderly conduct for telling his neighbor to "go f--- yourself." 417

S.E.2d 876, 876 (Va. Ct. App. 1992). In reversing the conviction, the court looked at the

attendant circumstances and noted that when the defendant made the comment at issue he

was standing fifty- five to sixty feet away from his neighbor and was separated from her

by a chain- link fence. Id. at 877. The particular statute at issue stated that "[i]f any person

shall, in the presence or hearing of another, curse or abuse such other person, or use any

violent abusive language to such person concerning himself or any of his relations, or

otherwise use such language, under circumstances reasonably calculated to provoke a

breach of the peace, he shall be guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor." See id. Prevailing state

supreme court precedent required the confrontation to be "face to face." See id. at 878.

The court concluded that because an essential element of the offense was "in the presence

or hearing of another," the distance separating the neighbors circumstantially precluded

immediate violence. Id.

As a result, the cases cited by the majority support my contention that whether the

offensive conduct constituted fighting words and thus would tend to incite an average

person to violence is determined by looking at the attendant circumstances. There are as

many cases affirming breach of the peace convictions as there are ones reversing those

convictions. Although the majority contends the facts in Estes are distinguishable, that

case is squarely on point. See 660 S.W.2d 873. In Estes, the defendant "extended the

middle finger of his right hand" a few inches from the school principal's face as he

received his high school diploma from the principal. 660 S.W.2d at 874. The majority

contends Estes is inapplicable because the setting in that case was civil and formal, the

gesture was made only inches away from the recipient's face and was prolonged, and the

parties were in close proximity to each other and knew each other. See id. However, the

only circumstance here at odds with Estes is whether or not the parties knew each other.

And the most significant similarities between the two cases compel a similar outcome.

Here, appellant and the Pastranos were only feet away from each other at all times

relevant to their encounter. Likewise, unlike the circumstances in Sandul and more like

the circumstances in Estes, Pastrano was in a position, if he chose, to chase appellant

down. It is even possible to conclude that, as a jailer in the sheriff's department, Pastrano,

like the principal in Estes and the police officer in Lewis, was self-controlled and able to

restrain himself from retaliation. (2) The entire incident spanned fifteen to twenty seconds,

given speeds of fifty to seventy- five miles per hour for a distance of a quarter mile. All

told, because enough evidence exists for a reasonable jury to believe that the gesture,

coupled with its attendant circumstances, would have a tendency to incite immediate

violence in an average person, appellant's arguments should fail to persuade this court to

reverse the conviction under a legal sufficiency review.

Appellant also claims that the evidence is factually insufficient to support a conviction

for disorderly conduct. (3) A factual sufficiency review considers whether "a neutral

review of the evidence, both for and against the finding" shows the evidence to be so

obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury's determination or that the

evidence supporting the conviction is greatly outweighed by contrary proof. Johnson v.

State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). An appellate court reviews the fact

finder's weighing of the evidence. Id. The appellate court is then free to disagree with the

fact finder's determination. Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 133. Although the appellate court

should be properly deferential to the fact finder's judgment so as avoid a substitution of

judgment, the court should consider all of the evidence to prevent a "manifestly unjust

result." Id. at 133, 135. In other words, to find that the evidence is factually insufficient

means that the court "determines that the verdict is against the great weight of the

evidence . . . so as to be clearly wrong and unjust." Id. at 135.

I fail to see, given all the evidence available in this case, that appellant's conviction of

disorderly conduct resulted in manifest injustice. Although appellant denied making the

gesture in question, his testimony was contradicted by both John and Robin Pastrano. He

offered no other evidence in support of his assertion. In addition, he readily admitted to

all of the "attendant circumstances" that I found compelling in my review of the legal

sufficiency of the evidence. As a result, I would find no basis to determine that a

conviction in this case was clearly wrong and unjust. As a result, I would reject

appellant's argument that the evidence is factually insufficient to support a conviction and

therefore would overrule appellant's fourth issue in its entirety.

Finally, in his fifth issue appellant argues that no probable cause existed for officers to

issue a citation. See Torres v. State, 868 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).

However, appellant does not cite the record in support of his proposition, nor does he

identify what relief he is claiming under this argument. As a result, appellant has not

provided sufficient argument for us to reach the merits of the claim. See Tex. R. App. P.

38.1(h).

While I concur in the majority's analysis of the first three issues, because I would

overrule appellant's legal and factual sufficiency challenges, I would affirm the judgment

of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent.

W. Kenneth Law, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Law, Justices Patterson and Dally*

Filed: October 9, 2003

*

Before Carl E. F. Dally, Judge (retired), Court of Criminal Appeals, sitting by

assignment. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 74.003(b) (West 1998).

1. John Pastrano testified that Appellant nearly caused two more accidents after he passed

them. Robin Pastrano testified that after Appellant passed them, he moved into the slow

lane to pass a tractor trailer then moved back into the fast lane.

2. In fact, John Pastrano testified that he restrained himself from retaliating.

3. Because the majority reversed the conviction under a legal sufficiency review, it never

reached Appellant's factual sufficiency claim or his fifth issue concerning probable cause

for the issuance of the citation.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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