the City of Fort Worth and Gary W. Jackson v. John W. Cornyn, Attorney General of Texas

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-02-00074-CV

The City of Fort Worth and Gary W. Jackson, Appellants

v.

John W. Cornyn, Attorney General of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 345TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 99-12126, HONORABLE LORA J. LIVINGSTON, JUDGE PRESIDING

This appeal in a declaratory judgment action presents the issue of whether section

552.108(b)(1) of the Texas Public Information Act authorizes the City of Fort Worth to withhold

from an individual seeking a position as a police officer background and reference information it

obtains from third parties as part of its evaluation of his employment application. See Tex. Gov't

Code Ann. § 552.108 (b)(1) (West Supp. 2002). We hold that section 552.108(b)(1) does not permit

the City to withhold such documents from a police officer applicant making a valid disclosure

request under the Act. In so holding, we overrule appellants' sole issue and affirm the judgment of

the district court.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The events giving rise to this suit stem from the City of Fort Worth's response to

Frederick Tiede's application for employment as a police officer. After conducting a background

investigation, administering tests to and interviewing Tiede, the City notified him of its decision not

to hire him as a police officer. Thereafter, Tiede submitted an open records request to the City

asking for "copies of any documents or information to which I am entitled for the purpose of

discovering the basis of your determination regarding my application with the Forth Worth Police

Department." Believing the information to be exempt from disclosure, the City requested a decision

from the Attorney General regarding the applicability of section 552.108 of the Texas Government

Code ("the law enforcement exception"), which permits the government to withhold internal records

that relate to and, if released, would interfere with law enforcement. See id. ; see also id.

§ 552.301(a) ("A governmental body that receives a written request for information that it wishes

to withhold from public disclosure and that it considers to be within one of the exceptions under [the

Act] must ask for a decision from the attorney general about whether the information is within that

exception . . . .").

The Attorney General issued an informal letter ruling stating, inter alia , that section

552.108(b)(1) did not apply to documents containing information relating to the City's investigation

into an applicant's fitness for being a police officer. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-2784 (1999). The

Attorney General advised the City that it could not withhold from the rejected applicant the

information he requested. Id. Pursuant to section 552.324 of the Public Information Act, the City

filed a declaratory judgment action in district court challenging the Attorney General's ruling. See

Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 552.324 .

Before the district court, the City took the position that the information it obtained

in connection with evaluating Tiede's application for employment as a police officer constituted

internal records of the police department. The City asserted that, because it maintained such records

for internal use in matters relating to law enforcement, i.e. , selecting "the most highly qualified

individuals to detect, investigate, and prosecute crime," the records were exempt from the Act's

disclosure requirements. See id. § 552.108(b). Both parties filed summary judgment motions. The

district court rendered judgment denying the City's motion and granting the Attorney General's. On

appeal to this Court, the City challenges that judgment.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The City's appeal does not raise factual issues about the nature of the information

sought. Therefore, the question before this Court is one of law which we review de novo . See City

of Garland v. Dallas Morning News , 22 S.W.3d 351, 356 (Tex. 2000); Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc. , 875

S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. 1994). On cross-motions for summary judgment, each party bears the burden

of establishing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Guynes v. Galveston County ,

861 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Tex. 1993). When the district court grants one party's motion and denies the

other's, the reviewing court should determine all questions presented and render the judgment that

the court below should have rendered. See Commissioners Court v. Agan , 940 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Tex.

1997). If the district court fails to specify the grounds for granting summary judgment, the reviewing

court must affirm the district court's judgment if any of the grounds asserted by the prevailing party

are meritorious. FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin , 22 S.W.3d 868, 873 (Tex. 2000). Here,

although the district court did not specify the grounds on which it rendered judgment, because the

Attorney General's motion is based only on the law enforcement exception, we must affirm the

judgment only if that argument has merit. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth. , 589 S.W.2d

671, 677 (Tex. 1979); Arlington Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Texas Att'y Gen. , 37 S.W.3d 152 , 157 (Tex.

App.--Austin 2001, no pet.).

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Controversy

On appeal, the City's only contention is that "items dealing with the confidential

character recommendation letters and confidential background information obtained from third

parties" are exempt from disclosure under the law enforcement exception. (1) The crux of the City's

argument is that, because it must make prudent, informed decisions regarding its initial

determination of whether to hire a police officer applicant, the information it obtains from third

parties in furtherance of that objective is "related to law enforcement." The City then contends that

disclosing such information to the applicant requestors would discourage third parties from

providing candid evaluations of applicants, without which, the City asserts, it could not properly

evaluate an applicant's qualifications. Therefore, argues the City, the requested information is

exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 552.108(b)(1). (2) The Attorney General disagrees,

asserting that the law enforcement exception "does not apply to administrative records that relate

solely to the City's hiring process for a police officer." To fully understand the merits of the parties'

respective arguments, we begin with a brief history of the Texas Public Information Act.

B. Texas Public Information Act

Using the Federal Freedom of Information Act as a model, in 1973 the Texas

Legislature enacted the Texas Open Records Act, now known as the Texas Public Information Act. (3)

The effect of the TPIA is to permit private citizens to obtain documents held by governmental

entities and officials. See generally Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 552.001 -.353 (West 1994 & Supp.

2002). In clear and unequivocal language, the TPIA mandates that "each person is entitled, unless

otherwise expressly provided by law, at all times to complete information about the affairs of

government and the official acts of public officials and employees." Id. § 552.001(a) (West 1994).

This notion of full disclosure is premised on the basic principle "that government is the servant and

not the master of the people," and to retain control over the government that they created, the people

must remain informed. Id.

The statute's intent to prevent the government from withholding all but the most

sensitive documents is evidenced by the Legislature's directives in section 552.001, requiring courts

to liberally construe the TPIA in favor of granting a request for information, and section 552.006,

providing that the Act "does not authorize the withholding of public information or limit the

availability of public information to the public, except as expressly provided." Id. §§ 552.001(a),

(b), .006 (West 1994 & Supp. 2002). To withhold information, a governmental body must establish

that the requested information is not subject to the Act, or, withholding the information is permitted

by one of the TPIA's enumerated exceptions to disclosure. See Thomas v. Cornyn , 71 S.W.3d 473,

490 (Tex. App.--Austin 2002, no pet.) (holding government, not the requestor, must "produce

evidence that an exception to disclosure applies"). Whether information is subject to the Act and

whether an exception to disclosure applies are questions of law. A & T Consultants v. Sharp , 904

S.W.2d 668, 674 (Tex. 1995). Here, the parties do not dispute that the requested documents are

public information as defined by the Act; rather, the only question is whether the City may withhold

that information pursuant to section 552.108(b)(1).

C. The Law Enforcement Exception

The law enforcement exception contains three subsections. See Tex. Gov't Code

Ann. § 552.108 (a)-(c) (West Supp. 2002). The specific provision at issue in this appeal is subsection

(b)(1), which provides:

An internal record or notation of a law enforcement agency or prosecutor that is

maintained for internal use in matters relating to law enforcement or prosecution is

excepted from the requirements of [disclosure] if . . . release of the internal record or

notation would interfere with law enforcement or prosecution[.]

Id. § 552.108(b)(1). (4) The parties do not contend that this provision is ambiguous; rather, each party

maintains that the other's interpretation of the statute is contrary to its plain language and the

legislative intent.

To interpret this provision, we adhere to the well-settled principles of statutory

construction. In applying the plain and common meaning of a statute, a court may not by implication

enlarge the meaning of any word in the statute beyond its ordinary meaning, especially when the

court can discern the legislative intent from a reasonable interpretation of the statute as it is written.

Sorokolit v. Rhodes , 889 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex. 1994). Courts should be careful not to give one

provision a meaning out of harmony or inconsistent with other provisions, although it might be

susceptible to such a construction standing alone. Barr v. Bernhard , 562 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex.

1978). To be sure, a court must presume that the Legislature intends an entire statute to be effective

and that a just and reasonable result is intended. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021 (2), (3) (West

1998). Thus, even when a statute is not ambiguous on its face, a court may consider numerous

factors to determine the Legislature's intent, including: the object sought to be obtained; the

circumstances of the statute's enactment; the legislative history; the common law or former statutory

provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects; the consequences of a particular

construction; the administrative construction of the statute; and the title, preamble, and emergency

provisions. Id. § 311.023; Ken Petroleum Corp. v. Questor Drilling Corp. , 24 S.W.3d 344, 350

(Tex. 2000).

The plain language of section 552.108(b)(1) sets forth three requirements that must

be met to withhold information under that provision: the information must (i) be an internal record

or notation (ii) maintained for internal use relating to law enforcement and, (iii) if released, interfere

with law enforcement. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 552.108 (b)(1). Because the parties do not dispute

that the requested documents are maintained for internal use, we focus on whether they relate to, and

their release would interfere with, law enforcement.

The City urges us to follow a federal court of appeals' opinion that found that

information obtained as part of a pre-employment background investigation was related to law

enforcement and therefore exempt from disclosure. See Mittleman v. Office of Personnel Mgmt. , 76

F.3d 1240 , 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In Mittleman , the court began its analysis with a discussion of

the federal law relating to background investigations, noting that such investigations were authorized

by executive order, as well as other provisions of federal law, to ensure that employing "the person

being investigated [was] clearly consistent with the interest of national security." Id. (citing, inter

alia , 5 U.S.C. §§ 1104 , 1303-1305, 2301, 3301, 7312, 2455, and Executive Order No. 10450). Next,

the court noted the multi-purpose objectives behind background checks, namely, to ensure that a

prospective employee is not ineligible for the position as a result of prior violations of the law and

discovering past conduct that could affect his ability to fulfill the position's requirements. Id.

Finally, the court reasoned that, because "'enforcement' of the law fairly includes not merely the

detection and punishment of violations of law but their prevention," background investigations were

related to law enforcement. Id.

Giving due consideration to the distinctions between the Freedom of Information Act

and the TPIA, and the paucity of the Mittleman court's analysis, we conclude that the present case

is sufficiently distinguishable from Mittleman to warrant a contrary result. See Holmes v. Morales ,

924 S.W.2d 920, 925 (Tex. 1996) ("When the Texas Legislature used the FOIA as a model for the

Texas Open Records Act, it appears to have intentionally declined to limit its law enforcement

exception in the manner the United States Congress chose."). In reaching its decision, the Mittleman

court failed to consider the history or purpose of the FOIA and was further influenced by its

consideration of other federal law concerning background investigations. Additionally, the court

offered no support for its holding, other than a conclusory assertion, that because law enforcement

encompassed the prevention of crime, background investigations conducted to assess an applicant's

qualification must relate to law enforcement. We are not persuaded by such reasoning. Unlike its

federal counterpart, the TPIA "contains a strong statement of public policy favoring public access

to governmental information and a statutory mandate to construe the Act to implement that policy

and to construe it in favor of granting a request for information." City of Garland , 22 S.W.3d at 364 .

The singularity of the TPIA alone warrants our decision to depart from the Mittleman court's

reasoning.

In its brief, as in the court below, the City relies on Fort Worth Police Chief Ralph

Mendoza's affidavit to establish that the requested documents are exempt from disclosure. Chief

Mendoza's affidavit, however, is conclusory and fails to explain either how the requested

information relates to law enforcement or in what manner releasing such information would interfere

with law enforcement. Mendoza asserts that "[t]he records at issue are records or notations

maintained by the Fort Worth Police Department for internal use in matters related to law

enforcement. They relate to a civil investigation of a potential police officer and were developed and

maintained only for use in an internal hiring decision." None of Mendoza's statements, however,

support the conclusion that the requested documents relate to law enforcement as the term is

commonly understood.

The City admittedly conducts its "civil investigation" not in its official capacity as

the Fort Worth Police Department acting under the color of law, but as a potential employer. We

do not believe that the Legislature intended section 552.108 to permit a police department to

withhold information related solely to its hiring decisions. Instead, the exception evidences the

Legislature's recognition of the peculiar considerations release of internal police records could have

on a police department's ability to enforce the law . See Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-287 (1981) (stating

that "the 'law enforcement' exception was not intended by the legislature to shield from public view

information in the hands of police units that . . . would ordinarily be available to the public if

possessed by a different governmental unit"). When a police department acts as an employer, its

concerns are similar to those of other governmental agencies--to hire the most qualified

applicants--and, when acting in such a capacity, its activities do not "relate to law enforcement."

That there may be incidental effects stemming from an initial hiring decision is insufficient, we

believe, to warrant a strained reading of section 552.108 that would result in denying an applicant

requestor information not clearly specified by that exception. To find otherwise would also be

inconsistent with the Legislature's directive to liberally construe the Act in favor of disclosure.

Further, to conclude that the requested information is exempt from disclosure, we would be ignoring

the special purpose behind the law enforcement exception and would bestow upon police

departments a withholding privilege not available to any other government employer. Accordingly,

we cannot say that background and reference information obtained from third parties in the ordinary

course of conducting a background investigation is related to law enforcement.

Nor can we conclude that such information would, if released, interfere with law

enforcement. To establish this element, the City again refers us to Mendoza's affidavit, in which he

avers: "Release of this type of information will deprive the Fort Worth Police Department of the

ability to hire the best candidates for its police force because . . . [it] would have a chilling effect on

citizens who would be willing to comment on an applicant only if their identity was kept

confidential." While this statement may well be true, we cannot say that release of background and

reference information obtained from third parties would have any effect on the City's ability to

enforce the law, at least not in the manner contemplated by the Legislature in enacting section

552.108. Cf. Hubert v. Harte-Hanks Tex. Newspapers , 652 S.W.2d 546, 551 (Tex. App.--Dallas

1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (rejecting argument that "qualified candidates for university administrative

positions would be discouraged from applying for a position if they thought their names might be

disclosed" and stating, "While this factor might persuade the legislature to create an Open Records

Act exception for such applicants, it is not evidence of a 'clearly unwarranted invasion of personal

privacy' under . . . the Open Records Act."). A more reasonable interpretation of the statutory

language reveals that the type of internal records that could interfere with law enforcement are those

that would divulge a police department's methods, techniques, and strategies for preventing and

predicting crime. See A & T Consultants, Inc. , 904 S.W.2d at 678 . Examples of these types of

documents include: police officer training guides, policy and procedure manuals, shift change

schedules, security details, and blueprints of secured facilities. See, e.g. , Tex. Att'y Gen. LR2002-0159 (2002) (shift rosters); Tex. Att'y Gen. LR2001-32 (2001) (policy and procedure manuals); Tex.

Att'y Gen. ORD-413 (1984) (security details at execution). Releasing these types of documents

would make available information that would make it more difficult for police officers to perform

their mission. See A & T Consultants, Inc. , 904 S.W.2d at 678 .

Absent clear and unequivocal language to the contrary, we may not presume that the

Legislature intended to include within the scope of section 552.108, as "information relating to law

enforcement," background and reference information obtained from third parties as part of the City's

application-review process. Were we to interpret section 552.108(b)(1) to include pre-employment

background and reference information obtained from third parties, we believe we would be

extending beyond permissible bounds the statute's plain language. In three separate instances, the

statute links the words law enforcement and prosecutor. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 552.108 (b)(1).

The doctrine of construction-- noscitur a sociis-- teaches that "the meaning of particular terms in a

statute may be ascertained by reference to words associated with them in the statute; and that where

two or more words of analogous meaning are employed together in a statute, they are understood to

be used in their cognate sense, to express the same relations and give color and expression to each

other." County of Harris v. Eaton , 573 S.W.2d 177, 181 (Tex. 1978).

Under this rule of construction, we construe the phrases "information relating to law

enforcement" and "would interfere with law enforcement" in reference to the type of information

that would also "relate to prosecution" or "interfere with prosecution." See id. at 179 . So doing, we

conclude that the phrase "law enforcement," in light of the immediately following words

"prosecutor" or "prosecution," evidences an intent by the Legislature to include within the law

enforcement exception only that type of information that relates to violations of the law. If, instead

of limiting the scope of the law enforcement exception as we do, we accepted the City's argument

that any activity engaged in by a police department is exempt from disclosure under section 552.108,

we would allow the exception to swallow the rule. See City of Garland , 22 S.W.3d at 364 ; Arlington

Indep. Sch. Dist. , 37 S.W.3d at 158. Because everything a police department does arguably involves

law enforcement, were we to adopt the City's interpretation, none of a police department records

would be subject to disclosure. See Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-287 (1981) ("In one sense, any

information that a law enforcement agency possesses may someday become useful to it in the

discharge of its law enforcement duties . . . .").

The more reasoned approach, and the one we adopt, limits section 552.108(b)(1) to

that type of information which, if released, would permit private citizens to anticipate weaknesses

in a police department, avoid detection, jeopardize officer safety, and generally undermine police

efforts to effectuate the laws of this State. Although the term "law enforcement" is not statutorily

defined, it is commonly understood to contemplate a state official acting under the color of law.

Thus, construing section 552.108 as a whole, we believe that section 552.108(b)(1)'s "relating to law

enforcement" requirement evidences an intent by the Legislature to exempt from disclosure

documents that facilitate a police department's ability to actively anticipate, plan for, and react to

violations of the law, not information obtained from third parties as a result of a pre-employment

investigation.

Our conclusion gives effect to, but does not infringe upon, the other two categories

of information excepted by subsections (a) and (c) (5) and is supported by numerous attorney general

opinions interpreting the scope of section 552.108. Although attorney general opinions are not

binding on this Court, we consider them persuasive authority and accordingly give them due

consideration. Arlington Indep. Sch. Dist. , 37 S.W.3d at 159. We find particularly instructive a

1983 attorney general ruling construing the forerunner of section 552.108 to require disclosure of

information compiled by the Harris County Sheriff's Department as part of its background

investigation of an applicant. See Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-361 (1983). In that case, the sheriff's

department resisted disclosure, asserting that the information was related to law enforcement because

the background information might reveal "any problems a person might have in fulfilling his

employment responsibilities." Id. at 3. As in this case, the sheriff's department argued that releasing

the information would discourage other people from coming forward with similar information in the

future. Id. Rejecting both arguments, the Attorney General determined that the law enforcement

exception did not authorize the Harris County Sheriff's Department to withhold the results of its

background investigation. Id. In addition to ORD-361, there are numerous attorney general opinions

similarly construing the scope of the law enforcement exception. See, e.g. , Tex. Att'y Gen. LR2001-0032 (2001) (finding section 552.108 exempted from disclosure policy and procedure documents

but not a police department's internal administrative investigations not involving an investigation

of crime); Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-531 (1989) (holding that detailed use-of-force guidelines were

exempt from disclosure because disclosure would interfere with law enforcement and crime

prevention); Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-456 (1987) (explaining that the law enforcement exception

protects "information which, if revealed, might endanger the life or physical safety of law

enforcement personnel"); Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-71 (1986) ("The public has an obvious interest in

having access to information concerning the qualifications and performances of governmental

employees, particularly employees who hold positions as sensitive as those held by members of a

sheriff's department."). That the Legislature has had numerous opportunities to address the Attorney

General's construction of the Act, but has failed to do so, adds to the persuasiveness of these

opinions.

The TPIA was intended to provide the public with broad access to government

documents. The Act includes specific language directing courts and government agencies to liberally

construe its provisions in favor of disclosure. It also provides that the government may not withhold

information unless an express provision of law authorizes it to do so. Texas courts have consistently

adhered to these requirements by narrowly construing the type of information that may be withheld

under the statute's exceptions. Following this precedent, we hold that section 552.108(b)(1) does

not exempt from disclosure to an applicant requestor documents obtained by a police department

from third parties for the sole purpose of evaluating an applicant's qualifications. While it is clear

that the law enforcement exception evidences an intent by the Legislature to permit government

agencies to withhold internal documents that would enable citizens to circumvent policies,

procedures, and techniques used by police departments in carrying out their missions, we are certain

that it was not intended to prevent an applicant requestor from obtaining information provided by

third parties that is unrelated to the actual enforcement of the law, i.e. , information the City uses for

the sole purpose of evaluating the applicant's fitness for employment. See Ken Petroleum Corp. ,

24 S.W.3d at 350 . Thus, we hold that the law enforcement exception does not permit the City to

withhold from an applicant requestor background and reference information it obtained from third

parties to aid in its determination of whether to hire the police officer applicant. We overrule the

City's sole issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Texas Public Information Act does not authorize the withholding of information

from the public except as expressly provided. Having determined that section 552.108(b)(1) does

not exempt from disclosure to an applicant requestor background and reference information obtained

from third parties solely to aid a police department in its hiring decisions, we overrule the City's sole

issue and affirm the judgment of the district court.

Jan P. Patterson, Justice

Before Justices Kidd, Patterson and Puryear

Affirmed

Filed: September 12, 2002

Publish

1. In the court below, the City argued that, in addition to the character references and

background information it obtained from third parties, the tests it administered to Tiede and the

interviews it conducted with him were also exempt from disclosure. In this appeal, we address solely

the applicability of the law enforcement exception to background and reference information, as it

is the only ground asserted by the City as a basis for withholding that information.

2. Our references to "the requested documents/information" throughout this opinion are

intended to refer only to the background and reference information the City contends is exempt from

disclosure.

3. See Act of June 14, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 424, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1112 (amended

1993) (current version at Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 552.001 -.353 (West 1994 & Supp. 2002)); Act

of May 29, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 1035, § 29, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 5127 , 5142 (effective Sept.

1, 1995) (renaming Texas Open Records Act as Texas Public Information Act); City of Garland , 22

S.W.3d at 355 (stating Federal Freedom of Information Act used as model for Texas Open Records

Act).

4. In its entirety, section 552.108(b) reads:

An internal record or notation of a law enforcement agency or prosecutor that is

maintained for internal use in matters relating to law enforcement or prosecution

is excepted from the requirements of Section 552.021 if:

release of the internal record or notation would interfere with law

enforcement or prosecution;

the internal record or notation relates to law enforcement only in relation to

an investigation that did not result in conviction or deferred adjudication; or

the internal record or notation:

is prepared by an attorney representing the state in anticipation of or in

the course of preparing for criminal litigation; or

reflects the mental impressions or legal reasoning of an attorney

representing the state.

Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 552.108 (b) (West Supp. 2002). Because the Legislature's amendments to

this provision subsequent to this suit do not affect our analysis, we refer to the current Code for

convenience.

5. In construing subsection (b), we must be careful not to ascribe to it a meaning that would

be inconsistent with or render meaningless subsections (a) and (c). See Continental Cas. Ins. Co.

v. Functional Restoration Assocs. , 19 S.W.3d 393, 402 (Tex. 2000) (stating courts should give effect

to all words of a statute and, if possible, avoid treating any statutory language as mere surplusage).

Subsection (a) permits documents relating to the detection, prosecution, and prevention of crime to

be withheld from public disclosure. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 552.108 (a) ("Information held by a law

enforcement agency or prosecutor that deals with the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime

is excepted from the requirements of" disclosure if it falls within one of the four enumerated

subsections.). Subsection (c) provides that basic information pertaining to an arrested person, an

arrest, or a crime is not excepted from the Act's disclosure requirements. Id. § 552.108(c) ("This

section does not except from the requirements of [disclosure] information that is basic information

about an arrested person, an arrest, or a crime."). Subsection (b), then, pertaining to internal records

maintained for matters relating to law enforcement or prosecution, must encompass something other

than those associated with traditional police activity (as described in subsection (a)) and information

of a statistical nature (as described by subsection (c)). See id. § 552.108(a), (c). The distinction

between subsection (b) and subsections (a) and (c), then, is that the latter subsections explicitly

encompass matters relating to traditional law enforcement, i.e. , ferreting out criminal behavior and

apprehending law offenders; the former is intended to protect internal police policies, procedures,

and techniques used to combat crime.