Olin M. Blanton v. City of Martindale

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-97-00479-CV

Olin M. Blanton, Appellant

v.

City of Martindale, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CALDWELL COUNTY, 207TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 95-0-348, HONORABLE JACK ROBISON, JUDGE PRESIDING

Olin M. Blanton appeals from a summary judgment that he take nothing on his

causes of action against the City of Martindale. We will affirm the judgment.

THE CONTROVERSY

During Blanton's fifth year as chief of the city's two-member police force, the city

council became dissatisfied with his performance. Actions they disliked included Blanton's failure

to establish and maintain regular office hours, failing to notify staff of his whereabouts when out

of the office during office hours, conducting city business outside the office, and using or

appearing to use his city motor car for personal errands. Additionally, one council member

believed police had not properly investigated the disappearance of the council member's canoe.

At the council's direction in November 1994, the mayor instructed Blanton in writing to improve

certain aspects of his performance. Blanton appeared at a December 1994 council meeting to

dispute his low performance ratings and to rebut comments in the mayor's evaluation of his

performance; the council changed some ratings, but left the overall rating as "needs

improvement."

In 1995, the city council twice voted to dismiss the fifty-nine-year-old Blanton. The

council posted notice that it would consider dismissing Blanton at a specially called council

meeting on February 20, 1995 . Blanton was sent notice of the meeting. Two of the three council

members present stated they wanted to dismiss Blanton for "loss of confidence." Blanton

requested a signed complaint from the council stating the reasons for his dismissal. Twelve

citizens spoke in favor of retaining him as police chief. The three members present all voted to

dismiss him. On April 25, 1995, the council again considered Blanton's dismissal. This time the

motion carried 5-0. In June 1995, the city named the other police officer, forty-eight-year-old

Clint Meadows, the police chief.

Blanton alleged causes of action against the city for breach of contract, age

discrimination, conversion, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. He also requested a

declaratory judgment that the council's February vote violated the statutory requirement that a

dismissal for loss of confidence must be approved by two-thirds of the council.

The city moved for summary judgment. It contended Blanton was an at-will

employee who was discharged after having an opportunity to defend himself at the council

meeting. It contended Meadows was not so much younger than Blanton as to create a presumption

of age discrimination. The city argued it was immune from liability on the conversion and

emotional distress causes of action. It also directly attacked the factual basis for the conversion

claims. The city filed a second motion for summary judgment additionally contending that a

statutory enactment retroactively validated the February 20 discharge.

The trial court granted the City's motion for summary judgment without specifying

the grounds therefor.

DISCUSSION AND HOLDINGS

We begin by addressing Blanton's two challenges directed at the summary-judgment

affidavits. By point of error six, he contends the affidavit of Mayor Maebeth Bagley, regarding

the city records attached to her affidavit, is deficient because she did not prepare or direct the

preparation of the records. Because she was not mayor when Blanton was discharged, Blanton

reasons she therefore has no personal knowledge of the act, event, condition, or opinion reflected

in the records; consequently, her affidavit does not satisfy the business-records exception to the

hearsay rule. See Tex. R. Evid. 803(6). By point of error seven, he contends the affidavit of city

council member Walter Bagley, who was mayor when Blanton was discharged, is deficient

because it contains unsubstantiated opinion and was based on hearsay. Blanton also contends the

Bagleys' affidavits cannot be considered because they are from interested parties.

Blanton's failure to object timely to the affidavits in the trial court waived his

appellate complaints. Failure to object to defects in the form of affidavits constitutes a waiver of

those defects on appeal. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(f); Grand Prairie Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Vaughn , 792

S.W.2d 944, 945 (Tex. 1990). Inadmissible hearsay in a summary-judgment affidavit has

probative value if the opposing party fails to object to it. In re J.A.M. , 945 S.W.2d 320, 322

(Tex. App.--San Antonio 1997, no writ). A summary judgment may be based on the

uncontroverted testimonial evidence of an interested party provided the evidence is "clear,

positive, direct, otherwise credible . . . and could have been readily controverted." Tex. R. Civ.

P. 166a; see also Galvan v. Public Util. Bd. , 778 S.W.2d 580, 583 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi

1989, no writ) . The critical aspect of Maebeth Bagley's affidavit (verifying the authenticity of the

city records) is clear, positive, direct, credible and could have been readily controverted. It was

not controverted. We overrule points six and seven.

We turn to Blanton's challenges to the merits of the judgment. We review the

summary-judgment record to determine whether the movant established the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c);

City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth. , 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979). We view the

record and its reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and resolve against

the movant all doubts about the existence of a genuine issue of a material fact. Great Am. Reserve

Ins. Co. v. San Antonio Plumbing Supply Co. , 391 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex. 1965).

Blanton contends by point of error one that the summary judgment against his

breach-of-contract claim was erroneous because he was not an at-will employee. He argues the

city's employment-policy manual created a contract the city violated in discharging him. For well

over a century, Texas courts have held that, absent a specific agreement to the contrary, the

employer or the employee may terminate the employment at will, whether for good cause, bad

cause, or no cause at all. See Montgomery County Hosp. Dist. v. Brown , 965 S.W.2d 501, 502

(Tex. 1998). Any agreement to modify at-will status must be express, clear, and specific. Byars

v. City of Austin , 910 S.W.2d 520, 523-24 (Tex. App.--Austin 1995, writ denied) (manual's

nonexclusive list of disciplinary steps does not modify at-will status). The City of Martindale's

personnel policy manual does not expressly alter the at-will status of its employees and officers.

The manual states that "[a]ll employees are subject to termination either voluntarily or

nonvoluntary [sic]." It lists several possible grounds for involuntary termination of employment.

Regarding dismissals for cause, it states:

Employees may be dismissed for cause. Among the reasons, but not limited to, for

dismissal are the following:

* * *

9. Any other circumstances which jeopardize the best interests of

the City.

Any regular full-time employee dismissed for cause shall be advised by the Mayor

in writing [of] the reason for termination. The employee will have the right, within

five working days, to appeal the termination to the Mayor. The Mayor will have

five days to hear the appeal and render a decision. The City Council will be

advised and the Council's decision is final.

City of Martindale Personnel Policy Manual, pp. 22-23.

The manual's nonrestrictive language defeats Blanton's claim as a matter of law.

The manual states dismissals may be for cause, but does not require all involuntary dismissals to

be for cause. Thus, the manual does not limit in any meaningful way the city's right to dismiss

employees without cause. It is not a contract that prohibits dismissals without cause. We overrule

point of error one.

By point of error two, Blanton contends the court erred in granting summary

judgment because there was a genuine issue of material fact about whether the city dismissed him

for loss of confidence, incompetence, or just cause. He asserts this dispute is material because he

is entitled to vacation-time payments if he was dismissed for loss of confidence. We find no basis

for his assertion of this entitlement in the employee manual or any other part of the summary-judgment record. The manual states that employees who resign may receive pay for accrued

vacation time and that those who lose their jobs due to reorganization, elimination of position,

retirement, lack of funds, or for other administrative reasons may get vacation pay plus two weeks

pay as severance compensation. The manual does not entitle employees involuntarily dismissed

for other reasons (including cause) to vacation-time payments. Thus, Blanton is not entitled to pay

for accrued vacation time if he was dismissed on any of the grounds he asserts are in dispute.

Because resolution of this dispute is immaterial to whether he receives pay for accrued vacation

time, the existence of any dispute does not make the summary judgment erroneous. We overrule

point two.

Blanton contends by point of error three that the court erred in granting summary

judgment because there was a genuine issue of material fact about whether he received written

notice of the reason for his termination as required by Texas Local Government Code section

22.077 and the personnel-policy manual.

The city did not violate the notice provisions of the statute regardless of whether

he was dismissed for incompetence or loss of confidence. Municipal officers dismissed for

incompetence in office are entitled to "due notice and an opportunity to be heard." Tex. Loc.

Gov't Code Ann. § 22.077 (a) (West 1988). The statute does not require written notice of such

a dismissal, only "due" notice. The city council sent a letter to Blanton requesting his attendance

at the specially called February 20 meeting. In response, Blanton and twelve others spoke against

his termination. He thus had an opportunity to be heard regarding his competence before either

of the votes to dismiss him. If he was instead dismissed for lack of confidence, he was not

deprived of statutory notice because that subsection has no notice requirement. See id.

§ 22.077(b). Subsection (b) allows dismissals for lack of confidence at any time. See id.

Nor did the city breach the written-notice requirement found in the personnel

manual . The manual only requires written notice of the basis for dismissal when the dismissal is

for cause. As discussed above, the city had the right to dismiss Blanton without cause. Though

the mayor and council recited the litany of low ratings at the late-1994 council meetings, the only

reference to a cause for the dismissal at the February 1995 meeting is the statement that the council

had lost confidence in Blanton. Loss of confidence is not among the list of causes of dismissal for

which the manual requires notice.

Even if dismissals for loss of confidence or incompetence were deemed for-cause

dismissals within the manual provision, Blanton received a hearing before the mayor and council as

the manual requires. The written notification is intended to start an administrative process that

begins with a hearing before the mayor who decides and notifies the city council; the council's

decision is final. (The council is not required to hear an appeal, only to decide after being advised

of the mayor's decision.) The manual does not address dismissal by the city council itself, as

happened here. At the February meeting, Blanton and twelve citizens made their plea to retain him

before the mayor and city council. The council then voted 3-0 to discharge him and, two months

later, the full city council voted 5-0 to discharge him. The city council's initiation of the discharge

process preempted the appellate process the notice was designed to trigger. Because the council's

discharge of Blanton was final under the procedure, no lack of notice deprived him of his right to

appeal his dismissal. We overrule point three.

By point of error four, Blanton contends the court erred in granting summary

judgment against his age-discrimination claim because a genuine issue of material fact persists

regarding the existence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Blanton's dismissal. For

purposes of the summary-judgment motion, the city conceded Blanton laid out a prima facie case

of age discrimination--he was at least forty years of age (fifty-nine), was qualified for the job, was

discharged, and was replaced by someone younger (forty-eight years of age). See O'Connor v.

Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. , 116 S. Ct. 1307, 1309-10 (1996) (setting out elements of prima

facie case).

The burden then shifted to the city to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis

for dismissal. See Gold v. Exxon Corp. , 960 S.W.2d 378, 381 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.]

1998, no pet.). The city asserted in its original motion for summary judgment that Blanton was

discharged because "[a]fter months of unsuccessful attempts to convince Blanton to perform within

the parameters set by the City Council and the City's personnel policy manual, the Mayor and City

Council had lost confidence in Blanton's ability to perform as a police chief." The city asserted

in its motion and the record shows that in late 1994 the city council had criticized Blanton for his

failing to establish and maintain regular office hours, failing to notify staff of his whereabouts

when out of the office during office hours, conducting city business outside the office, and using

or appearing to use his city vehicle for personal errands. One council member also was

dissatisfied with how Blanton investigated the theft of his canoe; at the December 1994

performance review, the council member stated "no matter what, he would not change his attitude

about the Chief of Police." At the February 20 council meeting, called to terminate Blanton's

employment, that council member seconded the motion to dismiss him. The council members

stated they had lost confidence in Blanton as police chief.

In response to the city's articulation of legitimate, nondiscriminatory grounds for

the dismissal, Blanton's sole argument was that incompetence could not be a legitimate basis for

his dismissal because he had been previously told only that he was discharged for loss of

confidence. This argument is ineffectual for two reasons: (1) the employer's obligation to give

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the dismissal arises only in the litigation; and (2) the

city stated in both its summary-judgment motions that the council members discharged Blanton

after they lost confidence in him as police chief.

The judgment can stand even if Blanton did not hear, until the summary-judgment

motion, that he was dismissed for incompetence. The time-frame for notification of the reason

for dismissal under the age-discrimination scheme is different from the statutory and policy-manual

requirements for notifying the employee of a dismissal. Unlike the statutory and policy-manual

timelines discussed above, which require notification before dismissal is effective, the requirement

that the employer articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for the dismissal arises only

during a lawsuit and after the employee makes a prima facie case of age discrimination. See Gold ,

960 S.W.2d at 381 . Although a delayed announcement of a reason or a statement of inconsistent

reasons could cast doubt on the legitimacy of the reasons, we find no room for such doubt here.

The performance review and related criticisms at the council meetings in late 1994 support the

incompetence basis articulated in the first summary-judgment motion, are consistent with the loss-of-confidence basis stated at the council meeting, and were reiterated after Blanton alleged a prima

facie case.

Further, while the judgment stands on incompetence, we note the loss-of-confidence

basis about which Blanton admits knowing is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, statutorily

authorized basis for dismissal. Once the city articulated loss of confidence as a basis, the burden

shifted to Blanton to produce evidence that it was mere pretext for age discrimination; this burden

existed even before the rules of civil procedure authorized a no-evidence summary-judgment

motion. See Gold , 960 S.W.2d at 384-85 . Though Blanton complained after the first motion that

loss of confidence was the only basis he had heard for his firing, nothing in the summary-judgment

record suggests that the alleged loss of confidence was a mere pretext for age discrimination.

The city timely articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory grounds for dismissal for

incompetence and loss of confidence. The summary-judgment record shows no genuine dispute

regarding whether the city raised both grounds in dismissing Blanton and during the litigation.

We overrule point four.

By point of error five, Blanton contends the trial court should not have granted

summary judgment because there is a genuine issue of material fact about whether Blanton was

eligible for vacation time and compensatory time. As discussed above, Blanton did not leave his

employment under any of the circumstances listed in the manual authorizing compensation for

accrued vacation time. Neither was Blanton eligible for remuneration for accrued compensatory

time. The manual states the police chief is an exempt employee and will not be paid overtime.

The only exception states that when the police chief is "required to work excessive amounts,

compensatory time will be granted with City Council approval." The current mayor averred in

her affidavit that she examined city records including council minutes and found no indication that

any such request was ever made or acted upon; this was not controverted. The city produced a

1990 memo to Blanton referring him to the policy manual and reiterating "that the chief of police

has been and will be exempt from comp time. The city council, however, will expect the chief

of police to maintain a fair and flexable [sic] schedule at all times." The former mayor's

deposition testimony that he consented to Blanton taking time off to compensate for long hours

does not create a fact question regarding whether Blanton was entitled to monetary compensation

for accrued compensatory time following an involuntary dismissal. The personnel policy manual

does not authorize payment for unused compensatory time upon termination of employment; the

manual addresses only accrued vacation time. We overrule point five.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled all the points of error, we affirm the summary judgment that

Blanton take nothing by his claims.

John Powers, Justice

Before Justices Kidd, B. A. Smith and Powers *

Affirmed

Filed: January 28, 1999

Do Not Publish

* Before John Powers, Senior Justice (retired), Third Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment.

See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 74.003 (b) (West 1998).

m the statutory and policy-manual

requirements for notifying the employee of a dismissal. Unlike the statutory and policy-manual

timelines discussed above, which require notification before dismissal is effective, the requirement

that the employer articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for the dismissal arises only

during a lawsuit and after the employee makes a prima facie case of age discrimination. See Gold ,

960 S.W.2d at 381 . Although a delayed announcement of a reason or a statement of inconsistent

reasons could cast doubt on the legitimacy of the reasons, we find no room for such doubt here.

The performance review and related criticisms at the council meetings in late 1994 support the

incompetence basis articulated in the first summary-judgment motion, are consistent with the loss-of-confidence basis stated at the council meeting, and were reiterated after Blanton alleged a prima

facie case.

Further, while the judgment stands on incompetence, we note the loss-of-confidence

basis about which Blanton admits knowing is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, statutorily

authorized basis for dismissal. Once the city articulated loss of confidence as a basis, the burden

shifted to Blanton to produce evidence that it was mere pretext for age discrimination; this burden

existed even before the rules of civil procedure authorized a no-evidence summary-judgment

motion. See Gold , 960 S.W.2d at 384-85 . Though Blanton complained after the first motion that

loss of confidence was the only basis he had heard for his firing, nothing in the summary-judgment

record suggests that the alleged loss of confidence was a mere pretext for age discrimination.