Opinion

Donald R. Crow v. David Smith and Texas Department of Health

Court
Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin)
Filed
Jun 21, 1995
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 35.8%

"A person's interest in a benefit is a `property' interest for due process purposes if there are rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit . . . ."

How later courts described this case

  • "A person's interest in a benefit is a `property' interest for due process purposes if there are rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit . . . ."
  • concluding that evidence of employer's oral assurance that appellant would keep her job as long as she performed satisfactorily was sufficient evidence to support jury's finding that appellant had employment contract

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

CROW

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-94-00375-CV

Donald R. Crow, Appellant

v.

David Smith and Texas Department of Health, Appellees

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 167TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 93-10570, HONORABLE MARGARET A. COOPER, JUDGE PRESIDING

Appellant Donald Crow sued appellees David Smith and the Texas Department of

Health ("TDH"), claiming interference with his property interest in his job at TDH and tortious

interference with his employment contract. The trial court granted appellees' motion for summary

judgment, and Crow appeals. We will affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court's judgment

and remand a portion of the cause for trial on the merits.

BACKGROUND

Crow, a state-licensed dentist, began working for TDH in 1987 and was

subsequently selected as Bureau Chief for the Bureau of Dental and Chronic Disease Prevention.

Crow asserts that when he applied for the position of Bureau Chief, he was told that the position

was not "at will" and that he could be removed only for cause. In early 1992, the TDH Board

named as new TDH Commissioner David Smith, who decided to reorganize the agency. As part

of this reorganization, Smith replaced the Bureau of Dental and Chronic Disease Prevention with

the Bureau of Dental Health and designated Crow as the "acting" Bureau Chief of the new bureau.

Smith then posted the position of Bureau Chief for Dental Health Services and conducted a

selection process. Crow applied for the position but was not selected. Although Crow concedes

that his salary and employment have remained constant and unchanged despite his nonselection,

he contends that his nonselection was a termination without cause from his position as Bureau

Chief. TDH denied Crow's request for an internal due process hearing concerning his

nonselection on the grounds that Crow had been neither demoted nor terminated.

Crow filed a petition against appellees claiming both deprivation of a property

interest and tortious interference with his employment contract. Appellees filed a motion for

summary judgment, asserting the state law defense of sovereign immunity. Appellees further

contended in their summary judgment motion that Crow had neither a property interest in his

position as Bureau Chief nor an employment contract that triggered either a denial-of-due-process

or tortious-interference-with-contract claim. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor

of appellees.

DISCUSSION

In a single point of error, Crow challenges the trial court's granting of appellant's

motion for summary judgment. The standards for reviewing a motion for summary judgment are

well established:

(1) The movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing that no

genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.

(2) In deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding

summary judgment, evidence favorable to the nonmovant will be taken as

true.

(3) Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the nonmovant and

any doubts resolved in its favor.

Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985).

The question on appeal is not whether the summary-judgment proof raises a fact

issue, but whether the summary-judgment proof establishes as a matter of law that no genuine

issues of material fact exist as to one or more of the essential elements of the plaintiff's cause of

action. Gibbs v. General Motors Corp. , 450 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex. 1970). When the order does

not give a specific reason for granting the judgment, the nonmovant must show on appeal why

each ground asserted in the motion is insufficient to support the order. Rogers v. Ricane Enters.,

Inc. , 772 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex. 1989).

A. Sovereign Immunity

Appellees contend that the doctrine of sovereign immunity prohibits suit against

TDH and Smith acting in his official capacity absent the State's prior consent to be sued. (1) Under

the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a suit against TDH and Smith acting in his official capacity

under the authority granted by the State is a suit against the State. See Courtney v. University of

Tex. Sys. , 806 S.W.2d 277, 281 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1991, writ denied); see also Director of

the Dep't of Agric. & Env't v. Printing Indus. Ass'n , 600 S.W.2d 264, 265 (Tex. 1980). The

doctrine of sovereign immunity bars contractual claims against the State. See Pickell v. Brooks ,

846 S.W.2d 421, 424 (Tex. App.--Austin 1992, writ denied); Courtney , 806 S.W.2d at 282 .

Thus, if Crow's suit were based upon a contractual claim, appellees would be correct in their

assertion that his suit is barred by sovereign immunity. However, Crow did not sue appellees for

breach of contract but rather for deprivation of his property interest in his position as Bureau

Chief without due process. "[S]uits for property alleged to be unlawfully or wrongfully withheld

from the rightful owner by officers of the state are not suits against the sovereign itself and may

be maintained without permission of the sovereign." W.D. Haden Co. v. Dodgen , 308 S.W.2d

838, 841 (Tex. 1958); see also Courtney , 806 S.W.2d at 284 . Therefore, the trial court could

not properly grant appellees' motion for summary judgment on grounds of sovereign immunity.

B. Crow's Property Interest in his Position as Bureau Chief

Our resolution of this appeal turns in part on whether appellees established as a

matter of law that Crow had no property interest in his position as Bureau Chief. We need not

decide and express no opinion on whether Crow established or can establish such a property

interest.

This is not a review of a trial court's judgment on the merits. Rater, it is merely

a review of a summary judgment. If Crow's summary-judgment proof created a fact issue

regarding a property interest in his position as Bureau Chief, the trial court erred in granting

summary judgment.

Crow claims that he had an oral employment contract with TDH that he could be

removed from his position only for cause and, thus, had a property interest in his position.

Viewed in the light most favorable to Crow, the summary-judgment proof established that Dr.

Cecil Chandler, Crow's predecessor as Bureau Chief, told him the position of Bureau Chief was

not "at will" and that he could removed only for cause. Crow also claimed that another individual

in the Houston personnel office--whose name Crow cannot remember--told him the same thing.

In order to prevail on a due process claim in the public employment context, a

plaintiff must initially show that he had a constitutionally protected property interest in his

continued employment. Board of Regents v. Roth , 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); see also Pickell ,

846 S.W.2d at 426-27 . Property interests protected by the Due Process Clause are not created

by the Constitution; rather, they are created and defined by existing rules or understandings that

stem from an independent source, such as state law. Bishop v. Wood , 426 U.S. 341 , 344 n.7

(1976); see also Perry v. Sindermann , 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) ("A person's interest in a benefit

is a `property' interest for due process purposes if there are rules or mutually explicit

understandings that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit . . . .") (emphasis added). A

protected property interest in the public employment context derives from the concept of a

reasonable expectation in continued employment. Roth , 408 U.S. at 577 ; see also Perry , 408

U.S. at 601 . According to Crow, he had a reasonable expectation in continued employment

resulting from the oral employment contract that guaranteed he could be removed from his

position only for cause. (2)

Texas has long followed the rule that employment for an indefinite term may be

terminated at will and without cause. Gerstacker v. Blum Consulting Eng'rs , 884 S.W.2d 845,

849 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1994, writ denied); see also Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Portilla , 879

S.W.2d 47, 51 (Tex. 1994); Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc. , 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex.

1991). Thus, there is a presumption of at-will employment unless the parties agree to limit the

employer's right to terminate the employee. See Zep Mfg. Co. v. Harthcock , 824 S.W.2d 654,

659 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1992, no writ). According to appellees, it is "well-settled law" that an oral

employment contract that states no definite duration is terminable at will by either party, and thus

an oral contract that an employee will be removed only for cause is unenforceable. (3) We disagree.

The employment-at-will presumption applies only absent a specific contractual

provision to the contrary. Gerstacker , 884 S.W.2d at 849 . The parties may agree to modify at-will employment by agreement, which may be either written or oral. Goodyear Tire & Rubber

Co. v. Portilla , 836 S.W.2d 664, 667-68 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1992), aff'd , 879 S.W.2d

47 (Tex. 1994); Morgan v. Jack Brown Cleaners, Inc. , 764 S.W.2d 825, 826 (Tex. App.--Austin

1989, writ denied). Thus, an employer's oral promise not to fire appellant except for good cause

removes the position from the at-will category. See Gerstacker , 884 S.W.2d at 849 ; see also

Portilla , 836 S.W.2d at 666-69 (concluding that evidence of employer's oral assurance that

appellant would keep her job as long as she performed satisfactorily was sufficient evidence to

support jury's finding that appellant had employment contract); Hardison v. A.H. Belo Corp. , 247

S.W.2d 167, 168 (Tex. Civ. App.--Dallas 1952, no writ) (holding that satisfaction contract is

formed when employer represents to employee that employee will be discharged only for

unsatisfactory employment).

A defendant is not entitled to summary judgment if a fact issue is raised concerning

the existence of an agreement that modified the plaintiff's employment-at-will status. Morgan ,

764 S.W.2d at 826 . Viewing the summary-judgment proof in the light most favorable to Crow,

we conclude that when Chandler told Crow that he would not be removed from his position except

for good cause, the employment relationship was removed from the at-will category. Crow's

summary-judgment proof thus raised a fact issue about the existence of a property interest in his

position. (4)

Appellees further assert that even if Crow had a property interest in his continued

employment, he did not have a property interest in his job title, thereby distinguishing Courtney

on several grounds. We have determined that the situation in Courtney is analogous to the case

at bar. In Courtney , appellant, a lecturer at a state university with a year-to-year contract, was

fired without a hearing and claimed that he had an expectation of future employment subject to

dismissal only for cause based upon certain rules and understandings. 806 S.W.2d at 280 .

Similarly, Crow contends that certain conversations and understandings created in him the

expectation of future employment subject to dismissal only for cause. Appellees attempt to

distinguish Courtney on the ground that it involved issues surrounding a lecturer's tenure.

However, Courtney was not, and did not claim to be, a tenured employee; rather, his claim

derived from an alleged employment contract analogous to a satisfaction contract. (5) Appellees

further attempt to distinguish Courtney on the ground that Courtney was terminated from his job,

not just deprived of a job title. Appellees cite several cases for the proposition that an employee

has no property interest in a specific job title or position. See Kinsey v. Salado Indep. Sch. Dist. ,

950 F.2d 988, 997 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 112 S. Ct. 2275 (1992); Kelleher v. Flawn , 761 F.2d

1079, 1086-87 (5th Cir. 1985). However, the case at bar is distinguishable from those cases.

Crow has lost his job as Bureau Chief and the benefits that he claims accompanied that position,

most importantly the right to retain his job absent good cause to terminate him. He still has a job

with TDH at the same salary he drew as Bureau Chief; however, he is now clearly an at-will

employee. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Crow, appellees deprived him of

his property interest in his position as Bureau Chief without due process. Therefore, the trial

court could not properly grant summary judgment on the basis that appellees proved as a matter

of law that Crow had no property interest in his continued employment as Bureau Chief.

C. Tortious Interference with Contract

The elements of a cause of action for tortious interference with an existing contract

are as follows: (1) the existence of a contract subject to interference; (2) a willful and intentional

act of interference; (3) such act was a proximate cause of damages; and (4) actual damage or loss.

Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Reyna , 865 S.W.2d 925, 926 (Tex. 1993). Crow asserts that his

summary-judgment proof created a material fact issue concerning Smith's actions in his individual

capacity that interfered with the employment contract. Appellees argue that because a claim for

tortious interference with a contract hinges on the existence of a contract, the trial court properly

granted summary judgment on this claim because Crow failed to establish a disputed issue

concerning the existence of a contract. As previously discussed, we conclude that Crow's

summary-judgment proof established a triable fact issue concerning the existence of a contract.

Appellees contend that assuming arguendo that a valid contract existed, Smith

cannot be found liable for tortious interference with a contract because he was an agent of a

contracting party, not a third party to the contract. A party to a contract cannot tortiously

interfere with the contract. Liability must be founded upon the acts of an interfering third party.

Baker v. Welch , 735 S.W.2d 548, 549 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ dism'd).

Employees or agents of a contracting party are not generally regarded as third parties capable of

interfering with contractual relationships. Id. ; see also Tarleton State Univ. v. Rosiere , 867

S.W.2d 948, 952-53 (Tex. App.--Eastland 1993, writ dism'd by agr.). However, an agent can be

held liable for inducing a breach of its principal's contract if, for example, it acted outside the

scope of its agency, in furtherance of personal objectives, or with malice. See Holloway v.

Skinner , 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 582 , 584 (May 11, 1995); see also Gonzalez v. Gutierrez , 694

S.W.2d 384, 388-89 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1985, no writ) (suggesting that if actions of

municipal airport's director exceeded scope of his authority, he could be held liable for tortious

interference).

Appellees assert that Crow failed to establish a disputed fact issue concerning third-party interference with the alleged contract. We agree. As movant for summary judgment,

appellees met their burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact regarding an element

of the tortious interference claim exists; they offered summary-judgment proof that Smith's

reorganization of the agency and nonselection of Crow for the permanent Bureau Chief position

were actions taken in furtherance of his official duties and legislative mandates. Crow produced

no summary-judgment proof contradicting appellees' assertion that Smith was acting within the

scope of his employment and was thus not capable of third-party interference. Therefore, we

affirm in part the trial court's judgment to the extent the court granted appellees' motion for

summary judgment on the ground that no genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to the

claim of tortious interference with a contract.

CONCLUSION

We reverse the trial court's judgment with regard to Crow's claim for deprivation

of a property interest without due process and remand that claim for trial on the merits. We

affirm the remainder of the judgment.

Jimmy Carroll, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Carroll, Justices Aboussie and Jones

Affirmed in Part; Reversed and Remanded in Part

Filed: June 21, 1995

Do Not Publish

1. Appellees concede that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not bar a claim

against Smith in his individual capacity for wrongful taking of property without due

process. Instead, they argue that the claim against Smith for due process violations was

correctly disposed of because they established as a matter of law that there was no

disputed fact concerning Crow's alleged property interest in his position as Bureau Chief.

2. Appellees claim in their brief that Crow relies on a provision in the TDH

employment manual as giving him a property interest in continued employment.

However, they misconstrue Crow's argument. Crow alleges that the oral representations

that he could be removed only for cause amounted to an oral contract. He identifies the

employment manual as corroborating evidence that his position as Bureau Chief was not

an "at will" position; he does not assert that the manual itself constituted an employment

contract.

3. Appellees apparently argue that the presumption of employment at will is defeated

only when the parties to an oral contract agree to an exact term of employment. We

rejected such an argument in Morgan v. Jack Brown Cleaners , 764 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex.

App.--Austin 1989, writ denied). Appellees suggest that any oral promise made to Crow is

unenforceable under the statute of frauds. The statute of frauds is set forth in § 26.01 of the

Texas Business and Commerce Code. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 26.01 (West 1987).

Section 26.01(b)(6) of the statute of frauds bars only oral contracts that cannot be completed

within one year; thus, if an oral agreement can be performed within one year, it is not within

the statute of frauds. Miller v. Riata Cadillac Co. , 517 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1974);

Gerstacker , 884 S.W.2d at 849 . "Indefinite-term employment contracts are considered

performable within one year and therefore do not fall within section 26.01(b)(6) of the statute

of frauds." Gerstacker , 884 S.W.2d at 849 . Thus, Crow's employment contract, under which

employment is to cease only upon the happening of a contingency capable of occurring within

one year, is not within the statute of frauds. See Hardison v. A.H. Belo Corp. , 247 S.W.2d

167, 168 (Tex. Civ. App.--Dallas 1952, no writ).

4. In order to prevail on his claim at trial, Crow will have to establish that the promise

of removal only for cause was made by an agent of TDH acting within the scope of his

authority. Portilla , 836 S.W.2d at 668 . However, appellees did not offer summary-judgment

proof showing that no issue of material fact exists regarding this element. Thus, Crow did not

have to produce summary-judgment proof to establish a disputed issue of fact.

5. Courtney's contract provided that it would be renewed each year as long as his

performance was satisfactory. Courtney , 806 S.W.2d at 280 .

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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