Opinion

William Howard Brown v. State

Court
Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin)
Filed
Aug 16, 1995
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 35.7%

The opinion

cr4-567.brown

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-94-00567-CR

William Howard Brown, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT NO. 9 OF DALLAS COUNTY,

NO. MB94-40537-K, HONORABLE MOLLY FRANCIS, JUDGE PRESIDING

PER CURIAM

In a bench trial, William Howard Brown was convicted of driving while

intoxicated. (1) The court assessed a $400 fine and sentenced him to 90 days in jail, probated for

two years. Brown appeals by a single point of error challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.

He contends that the State failed to corroborate independently his extra-judicial statement that he

was driving the vehicle while intoxicated. We will affirm.

The Standard of Review

In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we examine the evidence in the light

most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307

(1979); Geesa v. State , 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Griffin v. State , 614 S.W.2d

155 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). In a bench trial, the trial judge is the sole judge of the credibility

of witnesses and may accept or reject any part or all of a witness's testimony. Alexander v. State ,

823 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tex. App.--Austin 1992, no pet.).

Proof of the body of the crime ( corpus delicti ) may not be made by an extrajudicial

confession alone. Folk v. State , 797 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Tex. App.--Austin 1990, pet. ref'd). The

body of the crime of driving while intoxicated is someone driving or operating a motor vehicle

in a public place while intoxicated. Id. at 144 . Some evidence must corroborate an out-of-court

confession. Id. The corroborating evidence is sufficient if, when joined with the extrajudicial

admission, it permits a rational finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

The information, against which we test the evidentiary sufficiency, charged that

Brown

did then and there drive and operate a motor vehicle in a public place in Dallas

County, Texas, to-wit: a street and highway, while intoxicated, in that the

defendant did not have the normal use of his mental and physical faculties by

reason of the introduction of alcohol, a controlled substance, a drug, a substance

or its vapors that contain a volatile chemical, an abusable glue, an aerosol paint,

and a combination of two or more of those substances into defendant's body.

Brown stipulated to many aspects of the information including his intoxication; the only contested

issue was whether he drove on streets or highways.

The Evidence

Albert Vanlandingham was the only witness at trial. He awoke upon hearing a loud

noise in his front yard. He jumped up and looked out to see a pickup truck in his front yard. He

saw Brown walking around the truck.

Vanlandingham testified that Brown told him how the accident occurred. Brown

said that, as he turned left, his right front tire blew out. Headed directly toward a parked car, he

swerved to the left. His truck jumped the curb and skidded across a neighbor's yard and

Vanlandingham's driveway, ending up in Vanlandingham's yard. Vanlandingham said he saw

skid marks that comported with Brown's account of the incident.

On cross examination, Vanlandingham admitted that he never saw Brown behind

the wheel or in his truck. He said he could not recall whether Brown was on the porch or out by

the truck when he first saw him, but then reiterated that he believed Brown was out by the truck.

Vanlandingham recalled seeing a woman sitting in the passenger side of the truck.

The Analysis

Vanlandingham's testimony regarding the progression of the tire marks and furrows

in yards leading from the street, over the curb, and toward the resting position of the truck

substantiate a finding that someone drove the vehicle on the street.

The State corroborated Brown's out-of-court statement that he was the driver. This

case is similar to Wilson v. State , 688 S.W.2d 212, 212-13 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1985, no

pet.). In Wilson , the court heard the testimony of a man who arrived on the crash scene from his

home nearby two to three minutes after hearing crunching metal. Id. at 212 . Upon arriving, the

man saw the defendant standing fairly close to the open driver's door and two others seated in the

middle and right passenger seats. The court held that the testimony corroborated the defendant's

extrajudicial confession that he had been the driver sufficiently to sustain a conviction for driving

while intoxicated. Id. at 213 . In this case, Vanlandingham testified that, just after he heard the

strange noises in his front yard and found the truck embedded in his lawn, he saw Brown standing

outside the truck and the woman in the passenger seat. Under Wilson , this testimony is enough

to show him as the driver and corroborate his extrajudicial statements indicating that he was the

driver.

Brown's stipulation that he was intoxicated on the day of the incident completed

the proof required to sustain a conviction.

Viewed most favorably to the judgment, the evidence and stipulations support the

conviction. We overrule the point of error.

Conclusion

We affirm the conviction.

Before Justices Powers, Kidd and B. A. Smith

Affirmed

Filed: August 16, 1995

Do Not Publish

1. Act of May 27, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 303, § 3, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 1568 , 1574

(Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. Art. 6701 l -1(b), since amended and codified at Tex. Penal Code

Ann. §§ 49.04 , 49.09).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.