Nathan J. Snowden v. Linda Garcia and Risse Owens

Opinion issued February 18, 2010

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

NO. 01-08-00687-CV

NATHAN SNOWDEN, Appellant

V.

RISSIE OWENS AND LINDA GARCIA, Appellees

On Appeal from the 412th District Court

Brazoria County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 48329

MEMORANDUM

OPINION

Appellant

Nathan Snowden appeals the trial court’s judgment dismissing his case with

prejudice. Snowden filed suit against

two employees of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles alleging that they

violated his rights in denying him parole.

Snowden prayed for a declaratory judgment, a court order, and a permanent

injunction requiring the Board of Pardons and Paroles to follow certain

procedures in evaluating his eligibility for parole in the future. The trial court dismissed Snowden’s claims

with prejudice because he “failed to state a cause of action as a matter of

law.” In two issues, Snowden challenges

the trial court’s dismissal of his case and the fact that the trial court

dismissed it with prejudice. We modify

the trial court’s judgment to show dismissal without prejudice, and we affirm

the judgment as modified.

Background

In 1991,

Snowden was convicted of murder. He is

currently incarcerated at the Darrington Unit of the Texas Department of

Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”). In May 2008,

Snowden filed suit, pro se, against Rissie Owens and Linda Garcia, employees of

the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles.

Snowden asserted claims under sections 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of

title 42 of the United States Code.

Specifically, Snowden alleged the following:

Plaintiff asserts

claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 , 1983, 1985, and 1986 for violation of

Plaintiff’s right by conspiring to, and arbitrarily and capriciously denying

Plaintiff parole through the retroactive use of law, policies, guidelines and

procedures that were not in effect when Plaintiff’s commitment offense was

committed that makes it harder for Plaintiff to make parole, use of racial

discrimination to deny Plaintiff parole, retaliation for Plaintiff’s legal

activities, a failure to supervise and train, and a violation of Texas law in

reviewing Plaintiff for parole.

Snowden filed unsworn declarations of inability to pay costs

and his previous filings. In his

declaration of previous filings, Snowden disclosed that he had filed only one

lawsuit during his incarceration, and he described the claims as:

“unconstitutional parole policies, procedures, denial of due process in parole

review, ex post facto application of parole law, unconstitutional parole

guidelines.” Snowden also filed a motion

for in camera inspection, in which he asked the trial court to order Owens and

Garcia to file essentially all records regarding parole decisions since January

2004. [1] The appellate record does not disclose

whether Owens and Garcia were served or responded. [2]

On July 23, 2008, the trial court dismissed

Snowden’s case with prejudice because he “failed to state a cause of action.”

Standard of Review

We generally review a trial court’s

dismissal of an inmate’s suit under Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and

Remedies Code for abuse of discretion. See Thompson v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice—Institutional

Div. , 33 S.W.3d 412, 414 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). We will affirm a dismissal under any correct

legal theory applicable to the case. See Birdo v. DeBose , 819 S.W.2d 212, 215

(Tex. App.—Waco 1991, no writ).

Inmate Litigation

Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil

Practice and Remedies Code governs inmate litigation. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§

14.001–.014 (Vernon 2002). When an

inmate files an unsworn declaration of inability to pay, the trial court has

broad discretion to dismiss the suit as frivolous or malicious. Id.

§ 14.003(a)(2); Lentworth v. Trahan , 981

S.W.2d 720, 722 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.). In determining whether a claim is frivolous or

malicious, a trial court may consider whether (1) the claim’s realistic chance

of ultimate success is slight; (2) the claim has no arguable basis in law or in

fact; (3) it is clear that the party cannot prove facts in support of the

claim; or (4) the claim is substantially similar to a previous claim filed by

the inmate because the claim arises from the same operative facts. Id.

§ 14.003(b)(1)–(4).

An inmate seeking to proceed in forma pauperis must file a separate

affidavit or declaration describing each suit the inmate has previously filed

pro se, other than a suit under the Family Code. Tex.

Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.004 (Vernon 2002). The affidavit or declaration must (a) describe

the operative facts for which relief was sought; (b) list the case name, cause

number, and the court in which the suit was brought; (c) identify each party

named in the suit; and (d) state the result of the suit, including whether the

suit was dismissed as frivolous or malicious. Id. § 14.004(a)(2). These

requirements were enacted to allow the trial court to determine whether an

inmate’s present claim is similar to a previously-filed claim. See Clark v. J.W. Estelle Unit , 23

S.W.3d 420, 422 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (stating that

“[t]he purpose of section 14.004 is to curb the constant, often duplicative,

inmate litigation, by requiring the inmate to notify the trial court of

previous litigation and the outcome”). In

addition, the affidavit or declaration relating to previous filings must be

accompanied by a certified copy of the inmate’s trust account statement. Tex.

Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 14.004(c), 14.006(f) (Vernon 2002).

Dismissal

In his first

issue, Snowden argues that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing

his suit for failure to state a claim. Under

Chapter 14, dismissal of Snowden’s suit was not an abuse of discretion because it

was substantially similar to a previous claim and because Snowden did not file

a copy of his inmate trust account statement.

Substantially Similar

to Previous Claim

Snowden’s declaration of previous

filings showed one prior lawsuit for “unconstitutional parole policies,

procedures, denial of due process in parole review, ex post facto application

of parole law, unconstitutional parole guidelines.” These are the same kinds of claims that he

raised in this case. Snowden did not

describe the operative facts or the outcome of the previous litigation. In Clark ,

this Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim

because Clark’s affidavit of previous filings did not state the operative facts

for which he sought relief in prior suits and, thus, did not satisfy the

requirements of section 14.004. Clark , 23 S.W.3d at 422 . “As such, we must assume the suit is

substantially similar to a previously filed suit by the inmate, and is,

therefore, frivolous.” Id.

Similarly, Snowden’s declaration of previous filings did not satisfy the

requirements of section 14.004, because it did not state the operative facts or

outcome of his prior suit. Moreover, it

described claims similar to those brought in this suit. Dismissing Snowden’s case under these

circumstances was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. See id.

No Trust Account

Statement

In addition, Snowden did not file the

inmate trust account statement required by Section 14.004(c). “Chapter 14 does not provide an inmate with

the right to file a suit without the trust account statement, no matter the

reason that the inmate has not provided it.”

Jedkins v. Varghese , No.

14-08-00895-CV, 2009 WL 5149877 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 31,

2009, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Thus, we

hold that Snowden’s suit was subject to dismissal for noncompliance with the

statutory requirements for inmate suits filed in forma pauperis . [3] See

Williams v. Brown , 33 S.W.3d 410, 412 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no

pet.); Jedkins , 2009 WL 5149877 , at

*2; Mullins v. Schumacher , No. 09-03-497-CV,

2004 WL 1299991 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 10, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.).

We conclude that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion by dismissing Snowden’s case. [4]

We overrule Snowden’s first issue.

Dismissal with Prejudice

In his second

issue, Snowden contends that the trial court abused its discretion by

dismissing his case with prejudice. A

dismissal with prejudice constitutes an adjudication on the merits and operates

as if the case had been fully tried and decided. Ritchey

v. Vasquez , 986 S.W.2d 611, 612 (Tex. 1999); Williams , 33 S.W.3d at 412 ; Lentworth ,

981 S.W.2d at 722 ; Jedkins , 2009 WL

5149877 , at *3. In Lentworth , this Court said:

Dismissal is properly made with prejudice in the

following situations: (1) as a sanction for abuse of discovery, see Tex.

R. Civ. P. 215; (2) on the failure of a plaintiff to amend deficient

pleadings when given that opportunity, see

Hubler v. City of Corpus Christi , 564 S.W.2d 816, 823 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus

Christi 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.); (3) for the violation of a pretrial order, see Koslow’s v. Mackie , 796 S.W.2d 700,

704 (Tex. 1990); and (4) on agreement of the parties, see generally Golodetz

Trading Corp. v. Curland , 886 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

1994, no writ) (allowing that parties could agree to dismiss suit with

prejudice).

Lentworth , 981 S.W.2d at 722–23. None of these factors is present in this

case, and the proper order is dismissal without prejudice. See

Williams , 33 S.W.3d at 412 (reforming judgment dismissing case based on

failure to comply with Chapter 14 to show dismissal without prejudice); Lentworth , 981 S.W.2d at 723 (reforming

judgment dismissing case with no arguable basis in law to show dismissal

without prejudice); Mullins , 2004 WL

1299991 , at *3 (reforming judgment dismissing case for failure to file inmate

trust account statement to show dismissal without prejudice); contra Cain v. Tx. Bd. of Pardons and

Paroles , 104 S.W.3d 215, 219 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.) (affirming

dismissal with prejudice because case had no arguable basis in law).

Conclusion

We

modify the trial court’s judgment to state that Snowden’s case is dismissed

without prejudice. As modified, the judgment

is affirmed.

Michael

Massengale

Justice

Panel consists of

Justices Keyes, Sharp, and Massengale.

[1]

Snowden

requested the trial court order the defendants to file “a copy of the

Plaintiff’s parole file and any other records concerning Plaintiff and parole

held by the Board of Pardons and Paroles and the Texas Department of Criminal

Justice,” “all records concerning denial or release on parole of all prisoners

by race in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice from January 2004 to

present,” “all their records showing how they voted for prisoners in the Texas

Department of Criminal Justice concerning denial or granting release on parole

by race,” “all the records of all the Parole Board members and commissioners

concerning the granting or denial of release by race since January 2004 to

present.”

[2] The appellate record shows no responses

or motions filed by Owens or Garcia in the trial court. Similarly, Owens and Garcia filed no brief in

our Court.

[3] In his

brief, Snowden argues, “In the instant case, the Appellant correctly named all

defendants and complied with all the rules governing the filing of in forma pauperis suits in state

court.” The appellate record does not

substantiate this statement.

[4] Because we

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing

Snowden’s case, we need not address whether Snowden’s claims have an arguable

basis in law.