Opinion

Harris County Appraisal District (Herein the "District") v. Chein-Li Kang Shen Etal, as the Property Owners and the Property Owners

Court
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston)
Filed
Apr 29, 2010
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 35.3%

stating that some evidence supported application of Rule 28 when stationery and phone-number listing used by one-person professional association contained name of individual

How later courts described this case

  • stating that some evidence supported application of Rule 28 when stationery and phone-number listing used by one-person professional association contained name of individual
  • concluding that evidence supported assumed-name finding when Sixth RMA presented evidence that RMA Partners, L.P. was used as trade name for various RMA partnerships, RMA letterhead was used, and payments on notes were made to RMA

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Opinion issued April 29, 2010.

In The

Court of

Appeals

For The

First District

of Texas

————————————

NO. 01-09-00652-CV

———————————

Harris County Appraisal District , Appellant

V.

Chien-Li

Kang Shen and Norberwick Limited Partnership , Appellees

On Appeal from the 151st District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2007-52296

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Harris County Appraisal District

[“HCAD”] brings this appeal from the trial court’s order denying its plea to

the jurisdiction. In its plea, HCAD contended Chien-Li Kang Shen had no

standing to seek judicial review of HCAD’s resolution of an ad valorem tax

protest because Chien-Li Kang Shen was not the property owner for that tax

year. We reverse and render.

BACKGROUND

The property at issue is located at 22008

N. Berwick Drive in Houston. Chien-Li Kang Shen, his wife, Elizabeth L. Shen,

and Eve Yi Shen, sold the property to Norberwick Limited Partnership

[“Norberwick”] by general warranty deed, and , according to the record, Norberwick was the legal owner of

the property on January 1, 2007. Nevertheless, Chien-Li Kang Shen, but not Norberwick,

filed a notice of protest with HCAD’s Appraisal Review Board concerning the

2007 tax assessment for this property. On July 13, 2007, the chairman of the Appraisal Review Board signed an

Order Determining Protest, ordering a reduction in the appraised value of the

property, which was received on August 15, 2007. Norberwick did not pursue a

protest as the owner of the property.

“Chien-Li Kang Shen, Et Al,” filed an

original petition for judicial review on August 29, 2007, “as the property

owners,” challenging the Appraisal Review Board’s determination. Chien-Li Kang

Shen continued to assert that he owned the property. On November 17, 2008, HCAD

filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that (1) Chien-Li Kang Shen was not

the owner of the property as of January 1, 2007, (2) only the property owner

had standing to appeal from the Appraisal Review Board’s order, and, therefore,

(3) the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. HCAD attached a copy of

the general warranty deed to its plea.

On June 17, 2009, Chien-Li Kang Shen filed a response to

HCAD’s plea to the jurisdiction and a motion to substitute Norberwick as the

plaintiff pursuant to Rule 28 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. On that same date, Chien-Li Kang Shen also

filed a first amended original petition adding Norberwick as a plaintiff in the

suit for judicial review. Chien-Li Kang

Shen’s response also alleged that he was “permitted and authorized to change

the name of a party [to the suit for judicial review] pursuant to the

provisions of Section 42.21(e) of the Property Tax Code.”

On July 2, 2009, the trial court denied

HCAD’s plea to the jurisdiction. The

trial court also denied Chien-Li Kang Shen’s Rule 28 motion to substitute

Norberwick as the plaintiff. Despite a

holding from this Court to the contrary, the trial court held that Section

42.21(e) of the Tax Code permits “a different party to be substituted in by amendment”

even after the jurisdictional deadline for filing the suit has passed. In so holding, the trial court stated as

follows:

The Court is aware that in Koll Bren Fun [sic] VI, LP v. Harris County

Appraisal District , No., 01-07-00321, 2008 WL 525799 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.], February 28, 2008, pet. denied), the appellate court interprets

section 42.21(e) differently, and imposes upon it a further requirement of

standing based on the identity of the party who pursued the administrative

appeal. The statute does not talk about

this, though. The Koll Bren court’s interpretation of section 42.21(e) likewise

nullifies it. This Court believes Koll Bren was decided incorrectly, and without

deference to the plain working of the statute.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Standing

is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction that cannot be waived. Bland

Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue , 34

S.W.3d 547, 553-53 (Tex. 2000). If a party has no standing, a trial court has

no subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. If a jurisdictional

defect cannot be cured by an amendment, a party may file a plea to the

jurisdiction, and, if the trial court finds the plea meritorious, it may grant

it without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend. See

County of Cameron v. Brown , 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002). A defendant may prevail on a plea to the

jurisdiction by demonstrating that, even if all of the plaintiff’s pleaded

allegations are true, an incurable jurisdictional defect remains on the face of

the pleadings that deprives the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction. Harris

County Appraisal Dist. v. O’Connor & Assocs., 267 S.W.3d 413, 416 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.). A trial court decides a plea to the

jurisdiction by reviewing the pleadings as well as any evidence relevant to the

jurisdictional inquiry. Blue , 34 S.W. 3d at 555 . We review a trial court’s ruling on a plea to

the jurisdiction de novo, construing the pleadings liberally in favor of the

plaintiff while considering the pleader’s intent. Tex.

Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217, 226, 228 (Tex.

2004). In a review of a plea to the

jurisdiction, we cannot examine the merits of the case. See Houston Indep.

Sch. Dist. v. 1615 Corp., 217 S.W.3d 631, 635 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g).

JURISDICTION OVER SUIT FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

In a single issue, HCAD asserts that the trial court erred

in denying its plea to the jurisdiction. Specifically, HCAD contends that the

trial court lacked jurisdiction because, although Chien-Li Kang Shen timely

filed a petition for judicial review in the name of “Chien-Li Kang Shen Et Al,

as the property owners and the property owners” following the Appraisal Review

Board’s order, Norberwick, not Chien-Li Kang Shen was the property owner at the

relevant time. HCAD also argues that Chien-Li Kang Shen could not amend his

petition to include Norberwick pursuant to section 42.21(e)(1) of the Tax Code

and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 28.

Standing

This Court and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals have

repeatedly addressed these jurisdictional issues. See

Woodway Drive, LLC v. Harris County Appraisal Dist. , No. 14-09-00340-CV,

2010 WL 1372702 (Tex. App.—Houston 14th Dist.] April 8, 2010, no pet. h.) (memo

op.); See Woodway Drive, LLC v. Harris

County Appraisal Dist. , No. 14-09-00524-CV, 2010 WL 724174 (Tex.

App.—Houston 14th Dist.] March 4, 2010, no pet.) (memo op.); Scott Plaza Assocs., Ltd. v. Harris County

Appraisal Dist. , No 14-09-00707-CV, 2010 WL 724189 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] March 4, 2010, no pet.) (memo op.); SWP Remic Props. II, LP v. Harris County Appraisal Dist. , No. 14-08-00425-CV, 2010 WL 26524 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist] Jan. 7. 2010, no pet.) (memo op.); CL Louetta

Village Square, LP v. Harris County Appraisal Dist. , No. 14-08-00549-CV, 2009

WL 4913259 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 22, 2009, no pet.) (memo op.); Skylane

West, Ltd. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist. , No. 14-08-00507-CV, 2009 WL

4913256 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 22, 2009, no pet.) (memo op.);

KM-Timbercreek, LLC v. Harris County Appraisal Dist. , No. 01-08-00689-CV, 2009 WL 3321332 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 15, 2009, no pet.); Mei Hsu Acquisition Corp.

v. Harris County Appraisal Dist. , No. 01-08-00690-CV, 2009 WL 3152152 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 1, 2009, no pet.) (memo op.); BACM 2002 PB2 Westpark Dr., LP v. Harris

County Appraisal Dist. , No. 14-08-00493-CV, 2009 WL 2145922 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 21, 2009, no pet.) (memo op.); Koll Bren Fund, VI, LP v. Harris County

Appraisal District , No. 01-07-00321-CV, 2008 WL 525799 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] February 28, 2008, pet. denied) (memo op.). We decline the trial

court’s invitation to overrule these cases, and we reach the same outcome here

in holding that Chien-Li Kang Shen lacked standing to prosecute Norberwick’s

tax protest.

For a party to be entitled to judicial

review, the party must be the record legal owner of the property and must

protest the initial valuation to the appraisal review board. Timbercreek , 2009 WL 3321332, at *3 ; Koll Bren , 2008 WL 525799 , at *3. Section

42.21(a) of the Tax Code requires a party who appeals as provided by Chapter 42

of the Tax Code to timely file a petition for review with the district court.

Failure to timely file a petition bars any appeal under the chapter. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 42.21(a) (Vernon

Supp. 2009). [1] Section 42.01 of

the Tax Code specifies that a “ property owner is entitled to appeal . . .

an order of the appraisal review board determining . . . a protest by the property

owner ” as provided by sections 41.41 et seq. of the Property Tax

Code. Id. § 42.01(1)(A) (emphasis

added) (Vernon 2008). Alternatively, a property owner may designate a lessee or

an agent to act on the property owner’s behalf for any purpose under the Tax

Code, including filing a tax protest. Id.

§§ 1.111 (Vernon 2008) (authorizing a designated lessee or agent to act for a

property owner), 41.413(b) (Vernon 2008) (authorizing a lessee to protest for

the property owner in certain circumstances).

Therefore, to qualify

as a “party who appeals” by seeking judicial review of an appraisal-review

board’s tax determination under section 42.21(a), Chien-Li Kang Shen had to be

an owner of the property, a designated agent of the owner, or the authorized

lessee of the property under the circumstances stated in section 41.413. See Timbercreek , 2009 WL 3321332, at *3 ; Koll Bren , 2008 WL 525799 , at *3. A party who does not meet one of the above

criteria lacks standing under the Tax Code. Timbercreek , 2009 WL 3321332, at *3 ; Koll

Bren , 2008 WL 525799 , at *3. If the

litigant lacks standing, the trial court is deprived of subject-matter

jurisdiction to consider a suit for judicial review based on an ad valorem tax

protest. Timbercreek , 2009 WL 3321332, at *3 ; Koll Bren , 2008 WL 525799 , at *3.

Here, Chien-Li Kang Shen did not own the property as of

January 1, 2007. Chien-Li Kang Shen did not claim rights to protest under the

Tax Code as either a lessee or an agent. Therefore, Chien-Li Kang Shen lacked

standing to pursue judicial review as a “party who appeals” under section

42.21(a). The record does not reflect that Norberwick pursued its right of

protest as the actual property owner. According to the record, Norberwick was

not named as a party until June 17, 2009, when Chien-Li Kang Shen filed a first

amended original petition. Therefore, the Appraisal Review Board had not

determined a protest by the actual property owner, Norberwick, upon which Norberwick

could premise a right to appeal as the property owner. See Tex.

Tax Code Ann. §§ 42.01(1)(A), 42.21(a); Timbercreek, 2009 WL 3321332,

at *4 .

Application of

Section 42.21(e)(1)

HCAD also argues that the trial court had no jurisdiction

because section 42.21(e)(1) does not allow an amendment to substitute the

correct plaintiff after the 45-day period for filing suit has passed. We agree for the reasons stated in Koll Bren and Timbercreek .

Section 42.21(e) specifies that only petitions that are

“timely filed under Subsection (a)” may later be amended to correct or to change

a party’s name. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. 42.21(e)(1). To seek judicial review under Subsection (a),

the plaintiff must be a “party who appeals as provided by [Chapter 42],”

meaning the plaintiff must be the property owner, a properly designated agent,

or a lessee. Id. § 42.21(a); see also id. §§ 1.111, 41.413(b).

Chien-Li Kang Shen timely filed a petition for review;

however, Chien-Li Kang Shen did not own the property on January 1, 2007, and

thus lacked standing to seek judicial review. See Timbercreek , 2009 WL 3321332, at *5. Appellants’

argument that subsection 42.21(e)(1) operates to allow Chien-Li Kang Shen to

correct or to change the party’s name presupposes that Norberwick was a proper

party entitled to seek judicial review. Id.

However, Norberwick did not pursue its

right of protest as the property owner. When no proper party timely appealed to

the district court, the trial court did not acquire subject-matter jurisdiction,

and the Appraisal Review Board’s determination became final. See id.

Chien-Li Kang Shen contends that

because suit was filed in the name of “Chien-Li Kang Shen et al, as the

property owners and the Property Owners,” the suit encompasses Norberwick, the

record legal owner of the property, as a plaintiff. Again, this contention

presupposes that Norberwick was a proper party to seek judicial review under

Chapter 42. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 42.01(1)(A); Timbercreek , 2009 WL 3321332, at *5 ; BACM,

2009 WL 2145922 , at *5. Norberwick did

not pursue its administrative remedies by protesting the valuation of the

property before the Appraisal Review Board and, thus, it failed to satisfy the

jurisdictional requirements to seek judicial review. Timbercreek ,

2009 WL 3321332, at *5 ; BACM, 2009 WL 2145922 , at *5.

Application

of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 28

Lastly, Chien-Li Kang

Shen contends that the trial court erred in overruling his Rule 28 motion. [2] He argue that the trial court had

jurisdiction to hear the case because Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 28, which

governs suits by or against entities doing business under an assumed name,

permits substitution of Norberwick as Chien-Li Kang Shen’s “true name.” Rule 28 states:

Any partnership, unincorporated

association, private corporation, or individual doing business under an assumed

name may sue or be sued in its partnership, assumed or common name for the

purpose of enforcing for or against it a substantive right, but on a motion by

any party or on the court’s own motion the true name may be substituted.

Tex. R. Civ. P. 28. Chien-Li Kang Shen contends that the name Chien-Li

Kang Shen is the “common name” for the “true name” Norberwick.

In this case, Chien-Li Kang Shen attempted to substitute Norberwick

by filing a motion and an amended petition arguing that Rule 28 permitted the

substitution. For a party to take

advantage of Rule 28 and to sue in its common name, “there must be a showing

that the named entity is in fact doing business under that common name.” Timbercreek , 2009 WL 3321332, at *6 ; Seidler

v. Morgan, 277 S.W.3d 549, 553 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, pet. denied).

Whether an entity does business under an assumed or common name is a question

of fact for the trial court. Sixth RMA Partners, L.P. a/k/a RMA Partners,

L.P. v. Sibley, 111 S.W.3d 46, 52 (Tex. 2003); Timbercreek , 2009 WL 3321332, at *6 .

Chien-Li Kang Shen did not make a showing that Norberwick

was in fact doing business under the common name Chien-Li Kang Shen, nor was

there evidence that the entities, themselves, used the name Chien-Li Kang Shen

as an assumed or common name to warrant application of Rule 28. Compare

Sixth RMA Partners, 111 S.W.3d at 52 (concluding that evidence supported

assumed-name finding when Sixth RMA presented evidence that RMA Partners, L.P.

was used as trade name for various RMA partnerships, RMA letterhead was used,

and payments on notes were made to RMA) and Chilkewitz v. Hyson, 22

S.W.3d 825, 829 (Tex. 1999) (stating that some evidence supported application

of Rule 28 when stationery and phone-number listing used by one-person

professional association contained name of individual). Although

Chien-Li Kang Shen cites HCAD’s records, which reflect Chien-Li Kang Shen as

the property owner even after the property sale, HCAD’s records alone are not

sufficient to establish Norberwick operated its business under the common name

of Chien-Li Kang Shen. See

Timbercreek , 2009 WL 3321332, at *7 (stating that only Timbercreek could

establish whether it operated its business under an assumed or common name).

There is no evidence that Norberwick held itself out as Chien-Li Kang Shen or

requested HCAD refer to it as Chien-Li Kang Shen in its records. Id.

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying

Chien -Li Kang Shen’s Rule 28 motion.

CONCLUSION

Chien-Li Kang Shen and Norberwick

lacked standing to bring suit, and therefore the trial court lacked

subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the dispute. Because neither Chien-Li Kang

Shen nor Norberwick was a proper party entitled to judicial review under the

Tax Code, section 42.21(e)(1) of the Tax Code did not apply to change the name

of the plaintiff. Likewise, because there was no evidence in the record that Norberwick

was doing business as Chien-Li Kang Shen or that the entities used the name Chien-Li

Kang Shen as a common name for Norberwick, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 28

could not be used to substitute Norberwick for Chien-Li Kang Shen. Therefore,

the trial court erred in denying HCAD’s plea to the jurisdiction. We reverse

the order denying HCAD’s plea to the jurisdiction, and we render judgment

granting the plea and dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction.

Sherry

Radack

Chief

Justice

Panel

consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Alcala and Higley.

[1] We note that the Texas Legislature

amended subsection 42.21(a), effective June 19, 2009, to extend the time to

file a petition for review from 45 days to 60 days after the party receives

notice that a final order has been entered from which an appeal may be had or

at any time after the hearing but before the 60-day deadline. See Act of

May 29, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 905, §§ 1, 5, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 2435 ,

2435-36 (current version at Tex. Tax

Code Ann. § 42.21(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009)). These changes to this

subsection do not affect our resolution of this issue.

[2]

We consider this as a cross-point on appeal because

it presents additional, independent grounds for affirming the trial court’s

judgment. Thus, appellees were not

required to file a notice of appeal to raise this issue. See

Dean v. Lafayette Place (Section One) Council of Co-Owners, Inc. , 999

S.W.2d 814, 818 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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