John and Nanci Lamar v. Eric Poncon and Morgan's Rock Hacienda & Ecolodge

Opinion issued October 1,

2009

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of

Texas

NO. 01-08-01036-CV

JOHN AND NANCI LAMAR, Appellants

V.

ERIC PONCON AND MORGAN’S ROCK HACIENDA AND ECOLODGE,

Appellees

On Appeal from the 215th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2006-01572

O P I N I O N

This is an appeal from

trial court orders refusing to allow jurisdictional discovery and granting the

defendants’ special appearances. John and Nanci Lamar sued Eric Poncon and

Morgan’s Rock Hacienda and Ecolodge (Morgan’s Rock), a Nicaraguan corporation,

for its negligence in causing personal injuries arising out of a car accident

that allegedly occurred when the Morgan’s Rock driver fell asleep at the wheel

while driving the Lamars from the airport to the Morgan’s Rock resort in

Nicaragua. After Morgan’s Rock and Poncon filed a special appearance, the

Lamars moved for jurisdictional discovery and twice amended their motions.

Each time, the trial court denied jurisdictional discovery and in December

2008, granted the special appearances. The Lamars appeal, contending that the

trial court erred in granting the special appearance and in denying their

requests for jurisdictional discovery. [1]

We conclude that the Lamars have not established that the trial court has

personal jurisdiction, but the trial court erred in refusing to allow limited

jurisdictional discovery, which was reasonably calculated to lead to admissible

evidence on the matter. We therefore reverse and remand the cause for further

proceedings.

Background

In August 2005, the Lamars traveled

to Morgan’s Rock resort in Nicaragua on vacation. Nanci Lamar purchased and

arranged the trip through Austin travel agency Anderson Mill Travel Services

(Anderson Mill). The trip the Lamars purchased included ground transportation

from the airport to the resort. While driving the Lamars to the resort, the

driver of the vehicle fell asleep at the wheel, lost control, and crashed into

a tree. The Lamars suffered serious injuries: John sustained back and neck

injuries, a broken rib, and multiple lacerations, and Nanci suffered back

injuries, and a severe knee injury and a laceration near her eye and nose, both

of which required surgery to repair. Medical personnel treated the Lamars in

Nicaragua and then flew them back to Houston to receive care at The Methodist

Hospital. The Lamars sought payment of their medical bills from Morgan’s Rock,

and Morgan’s Rock refused.

The Lamars then filed suit against

Anderson Mill, Morgan’s Rock, and Poncon in Texas state court. [2]

It was over a year before the Lamars were able to serve process on Poncon and

Morgan’s Rock. [3]

Poncon and Morgan’s Rock specially appeared, supported by the affidavit of

Poncon, a French citizen and the president of the Nicaraguan corporation that

owns Morgan’s Rock. Poncon and his family members are the sole shareholders of

that corporation. Poncon averred that neither Morgan’s Rock nor Poncon

maintain an address in the United States, have employees in the United States,

advertises in the United States, owns or leases property in the United States,

or has a bank account here. He further averred that Morgan’s Rock does not

conduct any business or operations in Texas through a business subsidiary,

affiliate company, joint venture, or agent or independent contractor, and

Morgan’s Rock has never entered into any contracts in Texas. According to

Poncon, Morgan’s Rock does not produce any advertising or printed materials for

distribution in the United States or Texas and does not maintain a toll-free

telephone number or United States telephone number to receive United States

phone calls. Poncon acknowledged, however, that United States guests come to

the hotel, frequently booking their trips through United States travel agents.

According to Poncon, Morgan’s Rock pays a fee to any travel agent who books a

hotel guest, but it does not have an ownership interest in any United States

travel agency.

In July 2007, the Lamars moved for

jurisdictional discovery, requesting leave to depose Eric Poncon and a

corporate representative for Morgan’s Rock, and to serve interrogatories,

requests for production, and requests for admission, in an effort to establish

that Morgan’s Rock is subject to jurisdiction in Texas. The Lamars attached

the affidavit of their attorney Kurt Arnold, averring that the Lamars used all

avenues available for discovering Morgan’s Rock’s contacts with Texas other

than direct discovery from Morgan’s Rock, and that discovery was the only

method possible for determining Poncon and Morgan’s Rock’s specific and general

contacts with Texas. At the same time, the Lamars served written discovery

requests and notices of depositions on Poncon and the corporate representative

of Morgan’s Rock. The Lamars stipulated that their counsel would travel to

Nicaragua for any jurisdictional depositions the trial court allowed.

Morgan’s Rock moved to quash the

depositions and refused to respond to written discovery, complaining that

Arnold’s affidavit was insufficient under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120a(3)

because it did not establish the steps that the Lamars had taken to justify

their need for written discovery. See Tex.

R. Civ. P. 120a(3). After a hearing, the trial court quashed the

depositions, and refused to allow the written discovery.

In November 2007, the Lamars amended

their motion for jurisdictional discovery, attaching additional affidavits.

Caj Boatwright, another of the Lamars’ attorneys, described the resources used

by his firm in attempting to determine Morgan’s Rock’s contacts with Texas, specifically internet databases such as Westlaw, Accuring, Yahoo! People Finder, and

PACER. Boatwright averred that these databases cannot show whether Poncon or

another Morgan’s Rock representative has traveled to Texas, and do not contain

contracts that might have been signed, negotiated or entered into in Texas.

Furthermore, these databases do not allow the Lamars to cross-examine Poncon on

the statements in his affidavit. Nanci Lamar averred that she was unaware of

the extent of Morgan’s Rock’s contacts in Texas, but that she understood that

Morgan’s Rock worked with Anderson Mill to book trips for Texans to the

resort. Finally, Arnold executed another affidavit similar to Boatwright’s in

which he described the search terms he used when searching additional internet

databases in an attempt to uncover Morgan’s Rock’s contacts in Texas. The

trial court again heard and denied the Lamars’ motions.

In February 2008, the Lamars again

amended their motion for jurisdictional discovery. This time, the Lamars

included two additional affidavits along with the previously included

affidavits of Arnold, Boatwright, and Lamar. Boatwright executed one of these

additional affidavits, again describing his efforts to search internet

databases for Morgan’s Rock and Poncon’s Texas contacts. Boatwright also

averred that the Lamars sought the dates that Poncon or another Morgan’s Rock

representative traveled to Texas on business, copies of contracts or business

agreements executed in Texas, letters, phone calls, emails, and other

communications directed to Texas for business purposes, all of which the Lamars

expected jurisdictional discovery to show. Further, Boatwright reiterated the

Lamars’ desire to cross-examine Poncon on his affidavit supporting his special

appearance. The Lamars also included a new affidavit from Kevin Pipkins, a

private investigator they hired to investigate Morgan’s Rock and Poncon’s

contacts with Texas. Pipkins averred that it is difficult to determine a

foreign corporation’s business contacts with Texas because no method exists for

searching contracts, transactions, investments, and communications made with

Texas, and most foreign corporations have no property in Texas and are not

registered to do business in Texas, even if they have extensive contacts. He

averred that he had used all known internet, financial, and property resources

to try to establish Morgan’s Rock and Poncon’s contacts to Texas. The Lamars

again attached written discovery requests to their motion. The trial court

held another hearing, where it noted that nothing in the Lamars’ attached

affidavits contradicted the statements in Poncon’s affidavit attached to his

special appearance. On this basis, the trial court again quashed both the written

requests for discovery and depositions.

Ultimately, the Lamars responded to

Morgan’s Rock and Poncon’s special appearance, alleging that Morgan’s Rock is

subject to general jurisdiction because it has continuous and systematic

contacts with Texas based on its relationship with Anderson Mill and that it is

subject to specific jurisdiction because the Lamars’ cause of action arose out

of Morgan’s Rock’s relationship with Anderson Mill. In support of their

response, the Lamars included the deposition of Leigh Ann Cloutier, the

president of Anderson Mill, which describes Anderson Mill’s contacts with

Morgan’s Rock, the affidavit of Tom Stanley, an expert in international tour

operations and travel industry standards, regarding his analysis of those same

contacts, and the affidavit of Nanci Lamar. According to Stanley’s affidavit,

the documents produced to him by Anderson Mill indicated that in Morgan’s

Rock’s first year of operation, when the Lamars visited, Anderson Mill provided

approximately 100 clients to Morgan’s Rock, which Stanley estimated accounted

for ten to nineteen percent of Morgan’s Rock’s total bookings made by travel

agents worldwide and Morgan’s Rock’s reservations staff. Nanci Lamar stated in

her affidavit that she understood from her conversations with Anderson Mill

that the travel agent and Morgan’s Rock worked together to book trips for

Texans to the resort and to provide all requisite services, including

transportation.

Cloutier testified that Anderson Mill

booked a significant number of travelers on trips to Morgan’s Rock in the first

year. Cloutier estimated that she sent one hundred clients to Morgan’s Rock.

Each trip cost an estimated two thousand dollars, thus resulting in an estimated

two hundred thousand dollars overall, of which Morgan’s Rock receives a

significant portion. Cloutier agreed that Anderson Mill regularly communicates

with employees of Morgan’s Rock in the booking process. Anderson Mill received

media CDs and brochures from Morgan’s Rock at a trade show, which Anderson Mill

uses in marketing the resort. Additionally, Morgan’s Rock provided Cloutier

with three free stays at the resort in order for her to inspect the property so

that she can recommend it to her Texas clients. Cloutier did not know whether

any other travel agents in Texas also booked vacations with Morgan’s Rock.

The trial court sustained Morgan’s

Rock and Poncon’s special appearance in December 2008. The Lamars appeal,

alleging that (1) the trial court should have granted jurisdictional discovery,

in particular to test the statements Morgan’s Rock proffered via Poncon’s

affidavit, and (2) the Lamars nevertheless established that Morgan’s Rock is

subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas, making the trial court’s granting of

the special appearance improper.

Discussion

Special appearances are

governed by Rule 120a, which provides that “a special appearance may be made by

any party . . . for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of

the court over the person or property of the defendant on the ground that such

party or property is not amenable to process by the courts of this State.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 120a.

On appeal, we review de

novo the trial court's determination to grant or deny a special

appearance. Am. Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman , 83 S.W.3d

801, 806 (Tex. 2002). The plaintiff bears the initial burden of pleading

sufficient allegations to bring a nonresident defendant within the provisions

of the Texas long-arm statute. BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand , 83

S.W.3d 789, 793 (Tex. 2002). A nonresident defendant challenging the court's

exercise of personal jurisdiction carries the burden of negating all grounds

for personal jurisdiction alleged by the plaintiff. Id. ; Glattly v.

CMS Viron Corp. , 177 S.W.3d 438, 446 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005,

no pet.). We review all evidence in the record to determine if the nonresident

defendant met this burden. N803RA, Inc. v. Hammer , 11 S.W.3d 363, 366 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (citing Gen. Elec. Co v. Brown & Ross

Int’l Distribs., Inc. , 804 S.W.2d 527 , 529–30 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 1990, writ denied)).

Once the parties join the

jurisdictional issue, the Texas long-arm statute must authorize the exercise of

jurisdiction, and the exercise of jurisdiction must be consistent with the

guarantees of due process. Coleman , 83 S.W.3d at 806 ; Tri-State

Bldg. Specialties, Inc. v. NCI Bldg. Sys., L.P. , 184 S.W.3d 242, 248 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). The Texas long-arm statute provides

that a nonresident does business in Texas if it contracts by mail or otherwise

with a Texas resident and either party is to perform the contract in whole or

in part in Texas. Tex. Civ. Prac. &

Rem. Code Ann. § 17.042(1) (Vernon 2008).

Federal due process requires two

things. First, the nonresident defendant must have purposefully established

such minimum contacts with the forum state that the defendant could reasonably

anticipate being sued in that state. Glattly , 177 S.W.3d at 446 (citing

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz , 471 U.S. 462 , 475–76, 105 S.Ct. 2174 ,

2183–84 (1985)). The relevant inquiry is whether the nonresident defendant

purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the

forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Moki

Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg , 221 S.W.3d 569, 575 (Tex. 2007) (citing Hanson

v. Denckla , 357 U.S. 235, 253 , 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1240 (1958)). If the

nonresident defendant has purposefully established minimum contacts with the

forum, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must also comport with traditional

notions of fair play and substantial justice. Glattly , 177 S.W.3d at 447

(citing Burger King , 471 U.S. at 476 , 105 S.Ct. at 2184 ). Only in rare

cases, however, will a Texas court's exercise of personal jurisdiction not

comport with fair play and substantial justice if the nonresident defendant has

purposefully established minimum contacts with Texas. Guardian Royal Exch.

Assur., Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C. , 815 S.W.2d 223, 231 (Tex.

1991).

There are three parts to a purposeful

availment inquiry. Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten , 168

S.W.3d 777, 785 (Tex. 2005). First, only the defendant’s contacts with the

forum are relevant, not the unilateral activity of another party or a third

person. Id. Second, the contacts relied upon must be purposeful rather

than random, fortuitous, or attenuated. Id. Thus, a seller who reaches

out and creates continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of

another state is subject to the jurisdiction of that state based on his or her

activities. Id. Finally, the defendant must seek a benefit, advantage,

or profit by availing itself to the jurisdiction. Id. Conversely, it

is possible for a defendant to purposefully avoid a particular forum by

structuring its transactions so as to neither profit from the forum’s laws nor

subject itself to its jurisdiction. See Burger King , 471 U.S. at 472 ,

105 S.Ct. at 2184 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson , 444

U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).

Two types of personal jurisdiction

may arise from a nonresident defendant’s contacts with the forum state. BMC

Software , 83 S.W.3d at 795–96. If the defendant made continuous and

systematic contacts with the forum, general jurisdiction is established

regardless of whether the defendant’s alleged liability arises from those

contacts. Id. at 796. Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand,

requires analysis of the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the

litigation. Moki Mac , 221 S.W.3d at 575–76 (citing Guardian Royal ,

815 S.W.2d at 228 ). Specific jurisdiction exists if the defendant’s alleged

liability arises out of or is related to an activity located within the forum.

Id. at 576 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall ,

466 U.S. 408 , 414 n.8, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 1872 (1984)).

A. Specific Jurisdiction

In Moki Mac , the plaintiffs’

son, a Texas resident, died in an accident while on a hiking and river rafting

trip in Arizona. Id. Moki Mac, the Utah-based company that coordinated

the trip, intentionally solicited business in Texas through the following:

regular national and local media advertisements; a mass and targeted

direct-marketing email campaign; a mailing list; using particular customers in

the Texas market as “group leaders” to plan, organize, and promote its trips;

certain complimentary benefits as incentives to customers to book a trip; and

the use of a travel agent in Houston, for which Moki Mac paid a fee. Id. at 577–78. Evidence existed that, in the previous five years, between seven and

eleven percent of Moki Mac’s customers were Texas residents. Id. at

579. The Texas Supreme Court held that Moki Mac’s business with Texas residents stemmed from its marketing and advertising activities purposefully directed

at gaining Texas customers, thus doing business in Texas. Id.

Nevertheless, the court concluded

that the plaintiffs had not established specific jurisdiction over Moki Mac in Texas. Purposeful availment alone will not support the exercise of specific jurisdiction.

Id. For specific jurisdiction, purposeful availment is only relevant if

the defendant’s liability arises from or relates to the forum contacts. Id.

In Moki Mac , the court held that there must be a substantial connection

between the defendant’s forum contacts and the operative facts of the

litigation. Id. at 585. The plaintiff alleged that her son’s death

arose out of Moki Mac’s conduct because she was induced to send her son on the

trip by the assurances of safety in Moki Mac’s brochures. Id. The

plaintiffs argued that, but for these assurances, they would not have sent

their son on the rafting trip, and he would not have died on the hiking trail.

Id. The Texas Supreme Court observed that the operative facts of the

lawsuit primarily concerned the Moki Mac employees’ conduct of the hiking

expedition and whether they exercised reasonable care in supervising the

plaintiffs’ son. Id. Thus, the court held that the alleged

misrepresentation was not the subject matter of the case or related to the

operative facts of the negligence action, making the assurances in the

promotional materials too attenuated to establish specific jurisdiction. Id.

Applying the court’s analysis in

Moki Mac here, the Lamars cannot establish specific jurisdiction over

Morgan’s Rock in Texas. Much like the plaintiffs in Moki Mac , the

Lamars allege that the accident arose out of Morgan’s Rock’s contacts with

Texas, and the assurances that their travel from the airport to Morgan’s Rock

would be safe. The assurances here, however, are even more attenuated than in Moki

Mac , as Anderson Mill, not Morgan’s Rock, allegedly assured Nanci Lamar

that their car travel would be safe. Thus, Morgan’s Rock’s alleged contacts

with Texas are not related to the operative facts of their negligence action

against Morgan’s Rock, and specific jurisdiction does not exist. But the

answer to the jurisdiction inquiry is incomplete—we must also examine general

jurisdiction. The Texas Supreme Court’s analysis in Moki Mac is again

instructive: noting the general contacts the defendant had with the forum, the

court remanded the case for consideration of whether Moki Mac was subject to

general jurisdiction in Texas. Id. at 588.

B. General Jurisdiction

General jurisdiction is personal

jurisdiction over a defendant which does not arise out of or relate to the

defendant’s contacts with the forum. PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark

Corp. , 235 S.W.3d 163, 167 (Tex. 2007). General jurisdiction is based

solely on the defendant’s continuous and systematic contacts with the forum. Id. at 169 . A general jurisdiction inquiry requires a more demanding minimum

contacts analysis than a specific jurisdiction inquiry. Id. at 168 .

General jurisdiction requires that the defendant be engaged in a longstanding

business in the forum state, such as marketing or shipping products, performing

services, or maintaining one or more offices there. Id.

In Minden , the Texas

Supreme Court analyzed whether a Louisiana hospital’s contacts with Texas were

sufficient for supporting general jurisdiction. The hospital’s only facility

was located in Minden, Louisiana, and it did not advertise or own property in

Texas, nor did it have a Texas office, bank account, or registered agent for

service of process. Id. at 170 . The plaintiffs relied on two isolated

trips by employees traveling to Texas for seminars, Minden’s purchases from

Texas vendors, and three contracts with Texas entities to support general

jurisdiction. Id. The Texas Supreme Court relied on the United States

Supreme Court’s holding in Helicopteros to conclude that the hospital’s

limited contacts with Texas were insufficient to support general jurisdiction because

the Helicopteros Court had held that (1) multiple trips to Fort Worth

did not support general jurisdiction because the trips did not enhance the

company’s contacts with Texas; and (2) mere purchases are not enough to support

general jurisdiction if the cause of action is not related to those purchase

transactions. Id. at 170–71 (citing Helicopteros , 466 U.S. at

418 , 104 S.Ct. at 1868 ). Additionally, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that

the hospital’s contracts with Texas companies were “sporadic,” not continuous

and systematic. Id. at 171.

Here, the Lamars did not

prove that Morgan’s Rock and Poncon engaged in continuous and systematic

contacts with Texas. That inability, however, may be attributed to the fact

that Morgan’s Rock refused to participate in even written jurisdictional

discovery.

C. Jurisdictional

Discovery

Jurisdictional discovery is governed

by Rule 120a(3) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 120a(3) provides

that a trial court may order a continuance to permit discovery to be had or

depositions to be taken, or make any other order as is just, where it appears

from the affidavits of a party opposing a special appearance that he cannot,

for reasons stated in the affidavit, present facts essential to justify his

opposition to the special appearance. Tex.

R. Civ. P. 120a(3). Here, the Lamars moved three times for

jurisdictional discovery, attaching affidavits to their motions each time. We

review the trial court’s denial of jurisdictional discovery for an abuse of

discretion. Barron v. Vanier , 190 S.W.3d 841, 847 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2006, no pet.) (citing BMC Software , 83 S.W.3d at 800 ). Jurisdictional

discovery “can be a vital part of resolving a special appearance.” Exito

Elecs. Co. v. Trejo , 142 S.W.3d 302, 307 (Tex. 2004).

Morgan’s Rock refused to participate

in jurisdictional discovery because, it alleged, the affidavits attached to the

Lamars’ motions were insufficient to support jurisdictional discovery. Barron

addressed the requirements of affidavits supporting a motion for

jurisdictional discovery. 190 S.W.3d at 848–50. There, the Fort Worth Court

of Appeals explained that jurisdictional discovery should seek evidence

supporting jurisdiction over the case, or it is unnecessary. See id. at

848 (citing Wyatt v. Kaplan , 686 F.2d 276, 283 (5th Cir. 1982)). The

plaintiff in Barron attached a list of information he sought to obtain

through jurisdictional discovery, including information about the defendants’

business dealings in Texas, communications with Texas residents, advertising in

Texas, Texas clients, mail, electronic, and telephone communications with

Texas, travels to Texas, and information from one of the defendants regarding a

portion of his affidavit. Id. at 849 . The court granted jurisdictional

discovery because it was possible that at least some of these categories would

relate to personal jurisdiction. Id. ; see also El-Fadl v. Cent. Bank

of Jordan , 75 F.3d 668, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Even though El-Fadl’s

present jurisdictional allegations are insufficient, he has sufficiently

demonstrated that it is possible that he could supplement them through discovery.”);

Caribbean Broad. Sys. Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC , 148 F.3d 1080,

1090 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[I]n order to get jurisdictional discovery a plaintiff

must have at least a good faith belief that such discovery will enable it to

show that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants.”).

Similar to the defendant in Barron ,

Poncon averred in his affidavit that Morgan’s Rock does not have an office or

bank account in Texas, does not produce any advertising or printed materials

for distribution in the United States, and has never entered into any contracts

in Texas. Morgan’s Rock contends that none of the affidavits produced by the

Lamars in their efforts to gain jurisdictional discovery are sufficient because

they do not directly contradict Poncon’s affidavit. Cloutier’s testimony,

however, suggests that, at the very least, Morgan’s Rock developed brochures

and media CDs that it gave to Anderson Mill for use in promoting Morgan’s Rock

in Texas, and that Morgan’s Rock derived a significant amount of business from

Texas clients directed through its marketing efforts with Anderson Mill. In

addition, the Lamars contend that Morgan’s Rock markets to Texas clients

through an interactive website. The list of information the Lamars sought in

jurisdictional discovery includes times Poncon or a Morgan’s Rock

representative traveled to Texas on business, copies of contracts or business

agreements executed in Texas, and letters, phone calls, emails, and other

communications directed to Texas for business purposes. Additionally, the

Lamars asked to cross-examine Poncon on the statements in his affidavit in

light of Cloutier’s testimony. Essentially, the Lamars sought to establish the

degree to which Poncon and Morgan’s Rock may solicit and conduct business in Texas

in ways that are not easily investigated without procuring information directly

from Poncon and Morgan’s Rock. Given that the Texas Supreme Court in Moki

Mac remanded the case for consideration of general jurisdiction where the

plaintiffs established extensive business contacts with Texas, we conclude that

the Lamars should have the opportunity to conduct discovery to determine if

Poncon and Morgan’s Rock have similar contacts. Thus, we hold that the trial

court abused its discretion in denying jurisdictional discovery.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s

determination that Poncon and Morgan’s Rock are not subject to specific

jurisdiction in this case, but the trial court erred in denying jurisdictional

discovery. The discovery sought could lead to admissible evidence on the issue

of general personal jurisdiction. Thus, we reverse the trial court’s order

granting the special appearance, and remand the case for further proceedings.

Jane

Bland

Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack

and Justices Bland and Massengale.

[1] In January 2009, the Lamars filed a motion for new

trial, hoping that the new trial judge who had just taken office would

reconsider the previous trial judge’s grant of the special appearance. In

February 2009, the trial court stayed the motion for new trial at Morgan’s

Rock’s request, and allowed the Lamars’ interlocutory appeal to proceed.

[2] Anderson Mill settled the claim against it.

[3] Nicaragua is not a signatory to the Hague Convention,

making service on the Morgan’s Rock defendants difficult. The Lamars served

Eric Poncon when he attended a conference in New York.