Opinion

Lance Biagas v. State

Court
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston)
Filed
Feb 3, 2005
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 35.2%

holding appropriate standard of review for ineffective assistance claim brought forth in motion for new trial is abuse of discretion

How later courts described this case

  • holding appropriate standard of review for ineffective assistance claim brought forth in motion for new trial is abuse of discretion
  • holding juror not disqualified as matter of law, despite his statement that he might believe law enforcement officers over others because he also stated he would listen to both sides and make his decision based on facts and circumstances presented
  • holding that disqualification of defendant’s counsel of choice, based on counsel’s possible dual role as both advocate and witness with respect to allegations that defendant attempted to bribe State’s key witness, was warranted
  • observing that mistrials are extreme remedy and should not be granted if less drastic relief is available

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Opinion issued February 3, 2005

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

NO. 01-03-00628-CR

LANCE GERARD BIAGAS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 176th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 913949

O P I N I O N

A jury found Lance Gerard Biagas guilty of the felony offense of theft of

property, aggregated at a total value of over $1,500.00 and under $20,000.00, as

charged in the indictment. The trial court assessed punishment at two years’

confinement, suspended the sentence and placed Biagas on community supervision,

and fined him $500.00. In this appeal, Biagas contends: (1) the evidence is legally

insufficient to support the jury’s verdict; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to permit

him to replace a biased juror; (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (4) the

trial court erred in admitting the trial prosecutor’s affidavit at a hearing on a motion

for new trial; (5) the trial court erred in excluding certain testimony essential to his

defense; and (6) the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a mistrial after the

prosecutor’s improper jury argument. Facts

Angela Holden, Biagas’s mother, formerly served as Chief Clerk in the office

of Harris County Precinct 7 Constable Perry Wooten. During her employment, Harris

County contracted with A-Temps Corporation to provide temporary workers to staff

various Harris County departments, including the constable’s office. Holden, as a

supervisor in the constable’s office, approved the temporary employees’ time sheets

on behalf of Harris County. Based on the workers’ representations on the time sheets,

and a Harris County supervisor’s signature, the county remitted funds to A-Temps to

pay the temporary workers upon receipt of an invoice. Harris County also paid A-Temps a commission of 15–18% of the total funds paid.

Holden assigned several of her relatives, including her son Biagas, to work at

the constable’s office as employees of A-Temps. The relatives, including Biagas,

submitted falsified time sheets for hours they never worked, which Holden approved

as a Harris County supervisor. She then submitted the time sheets to A-Temps. A-Temps forwarded an invoice together with the false time sheets to the Harris County

accounts payable department. Harris County remitted funds to A-Temps for the time

reflected on the time sheets, and a commission, as directed by the Harris County

auditor’s office. Biagas received A-Temps checks payable to him in the amount of

$8,662.68 for time he had never worked. Biagas either cashed and spent the checks

or he deposited them in Holden’s account at the Harris County Federal Credit Union. Legal Sufficiency of the Evidence

In determining the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence

in a light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational fact finder

could have found the essential elements of the criminal offense beyond a reasonable

doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979);

Escamilla v. State, 143 S.W.3d 814, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Although our

analysis considers all evidence presented at trial, we may not re-weigh the evidence

or substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder. King v. State, 29 S.W. 3d 556,

562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

Biagas contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s

verdict because the State failed to prove an essential element of felony

theft—ownership. To prove felony theft, the State must prove that a person

unlawfully appropriated property with intent to deprive the owner of the property.

Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 31.03(a) (Vernon 2003) . Here, the indictment alleged that

Steve Garner, in his capacity as chief assistant auditor for Harris County, was the

owner of the funds. Biagas asserts that Garner and Harris County were not the

“owners” of the money at the time he misappropriated it, and that the county did not

have any right, title, or interest in the funds he received from A-Temps.

The State responds that Steve Garner and the county possessed the funds at the

time Biagas misappropriated them. The State concedes that although A-Temps “may

have been in possession of the funds after they were appropriated, the corporation had

no right to possession of the funds whatsoever because of appellant’s fraud and

therefore did not have and could not have a greater right to possession of same than

Harris County.”

The Texas Penal Code defines an owner as a person who “has title to the

property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to

possession of the property than the actor.” Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(35)(A)

(Vernon 2003). Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as “actual care, custody,

control, or management.” Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(39) (Vernon 2003). Here,

it is undisputed that A-Temps was an independent contractor hired by Harris County

to provide temporary employees to the constable’s office. A-Temps employed

Biagas, who falsified the time sheets for work he did not perform at the constable’s

office. Based upon the verified (but false) time sheets, A-Temps paid Biagas, and

submitted invoices, with the time sheets for supporting documentation, to Harris

County for reimbursement. At trial, Garner conceded that the county did not have

authority or control over A-Temps funds. Harris County personnel, however,

supervised Biagas and approved his payment claims based on time sheets Biagas

falsified and submitted to the county. By falsifying the time records, Biagas caused

the county to release its money to a conduit corporation from which he ultimately

took possession of the funds. Thus, Harris County released funds in its possession

based upon Biagas’s misrepresentation.

Biagas relies on Bailey v. State , 87 S.W.3d 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), for his

contention that Harris County is not an owner of the funds. In Bailey , the City of

Houston entered into a contract with C & C Services to provide flagmen. Id. at 125 .

The flagmen allegedly submitted false time sheets to the City of Houston. Id. C &

C Services paid the defendants based on their daily time sheets. Id. The City of

Houston later reimbursed C & C Services. Id. The trial court granted the defendants’

motions for directed verdicts because the State had alleged the City as the owner of

the funds, as opposed to the owner of C & C Services. Id. The issue on appeal in

Bailey , however, was whether the State could re-indict the defendants on behalf of

another owner. Id. The facts in Bailey are distinguishable from this case. In Bailey ,

an attorney for the City testified during the bench trial that she was not aware of any

conditions in the contracts that would require the city to monitor checks written by

the independent contractor to the workers and the opinion does not indicate that the

defendants ever misrepresented their work directly to the City. Id. Here, t he record

shows that Harris County required Biagas and a Harris County supervisor to verify

his work before it would release funds to A-Temps. Thus, Harris County actually

approved the time sheets before A-Temps received payment and issued a check to

Biagas. Such evidence shows that Harris County maintained control over the funds,

and absent Biagas’s misrepresentations, would not have released the funds.

Biagas also relies on United States v. Howard , 787 F.Supp. 769, 771 (S.D.

Ohio, 1992) for the proposition that Garner was not the proper owner of the stolen

funds. The Howard court observed that if “the government no longer has supervision

or control over funds or the ultimate use of the funds, and no longer has any

pecuniary interest in the funds, it would grossly distort the English language to call

those funds money . . . of the United States.” Id. In Howard , the court held that the

evidence was insufficient to prove that the federal government was the owner of

social security benefits that had been properly deposited into a personal banking

account. Id. The court noted that the deposits were made correctly, because the

recipient was entitled to the monthly payments and had not defrauded the

government. Rather, the defendant had defrauded the social security recipient. Id.

In this case, however, Biagas wrongfully submitted false time sheets to both A-Temps

and Harris County, causing Harris County to release the funds.

Biagas correctly observes in his brief that in Freeman v. State , 707 S.W.2d 597,

603 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that “the key to

answering the question of which person has the greater right to possession of the

property is who, at the time of commission of the offense , had the greater right to

possession of the property.” The record here shows that Biagas committed the

offense when he forged time sheets and sought and obtained Harris County approval

for compensation to him. See Salazar v. State , 711 S.W.2d 720, 723 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christ 1986, pet. ref’d) (holding fact that defendant’s conduct caused

owner to part with merchandise was sufficient to show that defendant “exercised

control” over same irrespective of fact that nothing showed defendant actually

received merchandise); see also Freeman , 707 S.W. 2d at 605 (stating that implicit

in meaning of word “appropriation,” when it comes to competing and equal

possessory interests in property, is that accused must have exercised “unauthorized”

control over property).

Harris County retained control and supervision over the funds absent Biagas’s

false time sheets, which he submitted to Harris County for approval, and thus we hold

that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Harris County,

and Garner as its representative, was an owner of the funds for the purposes alleged

in the indictment. We therefore overrule Biagas’s first issue. Replacing a Biased Juror

In his second issue, Biagas contends that the trial court erred in refusing to

permit him to replace a biased juror because his counsel believed that he had made

an agreement with the prosecutor to excuse the juror. During the voir dire

examination, Biagas’s counsel asked Juror #38, a Harris County Sheriff’s Deputy,

whether he believed that all law enforcement officers tell the truth at all times. The

juror answered affirmatively.

Biagas’s trial counsel never challenged Juror #38 for cause, either during or

after the voir dire examination. Subsequently, both lawyers for the State and Biagas

announced their agreed strikes to the judge on the record. Their discussion did not

include Juror #38. After the clerk empaneled the jury, Biagas’s attorney objected to

the jury as empaneled because it included Juror #38, and moved for a mistrial. He

stated that he believed that Juror #38 had been stricken for cause. The trial judge

denied the motion.

Biagas contends that the trial court’s refusal to remove a biased juror is an error

of constitutional dimension that warrants the reversal of his conviction. In his brief,

Biagas cites to Hughes v. United States , 258 F.3d 453, 463 (6th Cir. 2001) for the

contention that the “impaneling of a biased juror warrants a new trial.” The State, on

the other hand, maintains that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Biagas’s request for a mistrial, because a mistrial was not warranted, and Biagas’s

counsel asked for no other relief—not to grant the challenge, or to reseat a different

juror. He also did not request an additional peremptory strike.

We review the trial court’s ruling under an abuse of discretion standard. Ladd

v. State , 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). We agree that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in denying Biagas’s motion for a mistrial. The record

demonstrates that the jury had not been sworn, the panel from which the jury was

selected was present, and the trial could have acted within its discretion in

considering or granting a challenge for cause, or its equivalent, had such lesser relief

been requested . See Bauder v. State, 921 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)

(observing that mistrials are extreme remedy and should not be granted if less drastic

relief is available).

As Biagas acknowledges in his brief, it is the responsibility of the parties to

assure that the empaneled jury does not include a struck juror. Truong v. State , 782

S.W.2d 904, 905 (Tex. App.—Houston 14th Dist.] 1989, pet. ref’d). Biagas relies on

both Truong and Pogue v. State , 553 S.W.2d 368, 370-71 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977), in

support of his position that the trial court should have replaced Juror #38. In Pogue ,

however, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court erred in not

allowing the defendant to use a peremptory challenge on a prospective juror before

the jury was sworn. 553 S.W.2d at 370-71 ; see also Truong , 782 S.W.2d at 905

(concluding trial court erred in denying defendant peremptory challenges allotted to

him by statute). Here, however, trial counsel moved for a mistrial, and did not seek

additional peremptory challenges to remove Juror #38.

Biagas further contends that Juror #38’s responses indicate he was subject to

a challenge for cause pursuant to article 35.16(c)(2), because he has a bias or

prejudice. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 35.16(c)(2) (Vernon 1989 & Supp.

2004-2005). He relies on Brown v. State , 925 S.W.2d 1, 5-6 (Tex. App.—Tyler

1994), rev’d , 913 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), in which the court held

that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a challenge for cause to a juror who was

unable to follow court’s instructions regarding the defendant’s failure to testify.

However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment and held that

appellate courts were bound to defer to a trial court’s ruling in refusing to grant a

challenge for cause of a venireperson who vacillated between stating that she would

be able to follow the law and stating that she did not know for sure whether she could

follow the law. 913 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). If a prospective juror

states unequivocally that he would always believe a police officer in every case over

an ordinary citizen, then that could be bias as a matter of law. See Hernandez v.

State , 563 S.W.2d 947, 950 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Here, however, the failure of

defense counsel to raise a challenge for cause deprived the trial court of the ability to

assess whether Juror #38 was unequivocally biased. See, e.g., Smith v. State , 907

S.W.2d 522, 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (holding juror not disqualified as matter of

law, despite his statement that he might believe law enforcement officers over others

because he also stated he would listen to both sides and make his decision based on

facts and circumstances presented). We therefore hold that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial and overrule Biagas’s second

issue. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his third issue, Biagas contends that his trial attorney failed to render

effective assistance of counsel. Biagas contends that his trial counsel was ineffective

because he failed to take steps to ensure that Juror #38 did not sit on the jury. To

prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show (1)

his counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) a reasonable probability exists that

the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington ,

466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984).

The first prong of Strickland requires the defendant to show that counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Thompson v. State ,

9 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Thus, the defendant must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that his counsel’s representation objectively fell below

professional standards. Mitchell v. State , 68 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex. Crim. App.

2002).

The second prong requires the defendant to show a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. See Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S. Ct. at 2068 ; see also Thompson , 9

S.W.3d at 812 . The Court of Criminal Appeals has observed that the “purpose of this

two-pronged test is to judge whether counsel’s conduct so compromised the proper

functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be said to have produced

a reliable result.” Mallett v. State , 65 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); see also

Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 812-13 ( citing McFarland v. State , 845 S.W.2d 824, 843

(Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). A reviewing court must indulge a strong presumption,

however, that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that,

under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial

strategy.” Strickland , 466 U.S. at 689 , 104 S. Ct. at 2065 . Any allegation of

ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the record, and the record affirmatively

must demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness. Thompson , 9 S.W.3d at 813 (citing

McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). Failure to make

the required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats

an ineffectiveness claim. Thompson , 9 S.W.3d at 813.

Biagas presented his ineffective assistance claim to the trial court in a motion

for new trial. The trial court overruled Biagas’s complaint by denying his motion for

new trial. We therefore analyze his ineffective assistance of counsel issue as a

challenge to the denial of his motion for new trial. See Charles v. State , 146 S.W.3d

204, 208 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (holding appropriate standard of review for

ineffective assistance claim brought forth in motion for new trial is abuse of

discretion); see also Schoenbauer v. State , 85 S.W.3d 400, 402 (Tex. App.—Tyler

2002, no pet.) In such circumstances, we review the Strickland test through an abuse

of discretion standard. Charles , 146 S.W.3d at 208 . Thus, we reverse only if the trial

court’s decision is arbitrary or unreasonable, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the ruling. Id.

At the outset, we note that Biagas’s trial counsel submitted an affidavit at the

hearing on Biagas’s motion for a new trial. In it, trial counsel avers that his failure

to challenge Juror #38 for cause was not part of his trial strategy, but instead was an

oversight on his part. Biagas thus has rebutted the presumption that his trial

counsel’s inaction was a reasonable trial strategy.

Biagas contends that the affidavit by his trial counsel cannot be contradicted

by the State and thus the trial court had no option but to grant his motion for new

trial. In Charles , the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals squarely rejected such an

analysis. 146 S.W.3d at 213 . The defendant in Charles moved for a new trial based

upon ineffective assistance of counsel grounds. Id. at 207 . He offered affidavits that

averred that trial counsel had not conducted any independent investigation into the

voluntariness of the defendant’s confession. The State offered no contrary affidavit,

and thus the defendant contended that the facts were uncontradicted and required a

new trial. Id. at 207-08 .

The Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed. The court first noted that ambiguous

and conclusory statements are an inherent problem associated with affidavit

evidence—such evidence does not allow the witness to clear up ambiguities, nor for

an examination into the factual basis of a conclusion. Id. at 209-10 . Next, the court

held that a court of appeals should presume that all reasonable implied findings that

could be made against the losing party were, indeed, made by the trial court. Id. at

208, 211 . Finally, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a trial judge need not

believe the statements made in an affidavit—rather, the trial court may believe “all,

some, or none of the affidavit, even though it may be difficult (if not impossible) to

assess an affidavit’s credibility.” Id. at 213 .

Applying the analysis in Charles to this case, we hold that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in denying Biagas’s motion for new trial based upon

ineffective assistance of counsel. In his affidavit, trial counsel states that he “felt that

[Juror #38] was a biased juror subject to my challenge for cause.” He further states

that he “mistakenly believed that Juror #38 was among those jurors whom both sides

had agreed to excuse by agreement and did not object when the trial judge called out

the numbers of those jurors who were either being challenge [sic] for cause or who

were being excused by agreement.” The affidavit concludes: “My failure to ensure

that [Juror #38] did not serve on this jury given his bias by taking action at a time

when the judge could have corrected my oversight was not the result of any reasoned

trial strategy. I simply made a mistake.”

The State offered the trial prosecutor’s affidavit, in which she averred that both

sides agreed to strike six jurors, not including Juror #38. In addition, the record

reflects that the trial court struck four other jurors for cause and denied two

challenges for cause. Defense counsel’s strike list does not reflect either a strike for

cause, nor a peremptory challenge to Juror #38.

As the Court of Criminal Appeals held in Charles :

Statements in affidavits of interested witnesses concerning their own

state of mind are “uncontrovertible” because the “mental workings of an

individual’s mind are matters about which adversaries have no

knowledge or ready means of confirming or controverting.” A trial

judge has discretion to discount factual assertions in an affidavit by an

interested party that do not meet this test. And an appellate court, in its

review, must defer to the trial court’s ruling to the extent that any

reasonable view of the record evidence will support that ruling.

146 S.W.3d at 210 (citations omitted).

Jury selection, in particular, involves strategy. This case involves a theft within

the constable’s office, allegedly organized by a constable’s employee. Juror #38, who

was not challenged, is a peace officer. Defense counsel’s affidavit concludes that his

decision was a mistake, but the trial judge who oversaw voir dire was in a position

to evaluate whether trial counsel’s statement was credible. The trial judge could have

found otherwise, given the agreement as to six other jurors, as well as the fact that

trial counsel did not ask for further examination of the juror, to reseat a different

juror, or for an additional peremptory strike—even after he discovered his error.

Following Charles , we defer to the trial court’s ruling. Biagas fails to demonstrate

that no reasonable view of the record supports the trial court’s ruling, because the trial

court could have concluded that trial counsel’s affidavit was not credible. See id.

Even if trial counsel had been deficient, Biagas has not shown that a different

outcome would have resulted from more effective representation. Biagas claims

automatic harm from the presence of a biased juror on the jury, but we cannot reach

such a conclusion here, where the juror was not sufficiently questioned to determine

whether he absolutely should have been excused for cause, because no challenge was

ever made, and counsel never sought to further examine the juror. We therefore hold

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial based upon

ineffective assistance of counsel.

Evidentiary Rulings

Prosecutor’s Affidavit

Rule 21.7 allows a trial court to receive evidence by affidavit at a hearing on

a motion for new trial. Tex. R. App . P. 21.7. In his fourth, fifth, and sixth issues,

Biagas maintains that the trial court erred in admitting the trial prosecutor’s affidavit

at the new trial hearing. He contends that the affidavit is inadmissible under Texas

Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 3.08 and Texas Rules of Evidence 401 and

403. Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof’l Conduct 3.08(a), reprinted in Tex. Gov’t Code

Ann. , tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (Vernon 1998) ( Tex. State Bar R. Art. X, § 9). We review the trial court’s admission or exclusion of evidence under an abuse

of discretion standard. See Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App.

1997); see also Goff v. State , 931 S.W.2d 537, 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). A trial

court has wide discretion in its decision to admit or exclude evidence. Guzman, 955

S.W.2d at 89 ; Theus v. State , 845 S.W.2d 874, 881 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). A trial

court’s evidentiary ruling should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is an abuse of

discretion. Goff , 931 S.W.2d at 553 ; Erdman v. State , 861 S.W.2d 890, 893 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1993). If the trial court’s ruling is within the reasonable zone of

disagreement, then an appellate court should not disturb it. Pierre v. State , 2 S.W.3d

439, 442 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d) (citing Montgomery v.

State , 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)).

Disciplinary Rule 3.08(a) provides that a lawyer shall not continue employment

as an advocate before a tribunal in an adjudicatory proceeding if the lawyer knows

or believes that the lawyer is or may be a witness necessary to establish an essential

fact on behalf of the lawyers’s client. Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof’l Conduct

3.08(a) . The rule provides an exception that allows a lawyer to testify if “the

testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case.” Tex.

Disciplinary R. Prof’l Conduct 3.08(a)(3).

In support of his contention that Rule 3.08 prohibits a prosecutor from

introducing her own affidavit into evidence, Biagas maintains that “the core concern

is the possible confusion for the trier of fact as to whether statements by an advocate-witness should be taken as evidence or argument.” See Gonzalez v. State , 117 S.W.3d

831, 840-41 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (holding that disqualification of defendant’s

counsel of choice, based on counsel’s possible dual role as both advocate and witness

with respect to allegations that defendant attempted to bribe State’s key witness, was

warranted).

The State responds that: (1) the prosecutor’s affidavit fell within an exception

to rule 3.08; (2) Biagas’s trial counsel also attached an affidavit to his motion for a

new trial; and (3) even if the affidavit violates rule 3.08(a), Biagas has not

demonstrated that the violation affected his substantial rights or deprived him of a fair

trial. See Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof’l Conduct 3.08(a).

We agree with the State. The exception to Disciplinary Rule 3.08 allows a

lawyer to testify if “the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services

rendered in the case.” Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof’l Conduct 3.08(a)(3). The

prosecutor presented her affidavit to the judge at a hearing on the defense’s motion

for new trial—a hearing at which the effectiveness of defense counsel was an issue.

Unlike Gonzalez , the prosecutor’s affidavit here was offered for the purpose of

demonstrating that Biagas’s trial counsel was neither deficient nor prejudicial, and

did not relate to an issue in the trial. In such an instance, where the affidavit was not

presented to the jury, little likelihood of confusion exists. The trial judge has

firsthand knowledge of the matter in issue, and thus, is less dependent on the

adversary process to test the credibility of the testimony. See Tex. Disciplinary R.

Prof’l Conduct 3.08 cmt. 6.

Next, Biagas contends that the trial court erred in admitting the prosecutor’s

affidavit over his objection that it is irrelevant under Texas Rules of Evidence 401.

Evidence is relevant under Rule 401 if it “influences consequential facts, i.e., facts

which have something to do with the ultimate determination of guilt or innocence in

a particular case.” Mayes v. State , 816 S.W.2d 79, 84 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

Biagas did not expressly direct the trial court to the particular statement within

the affidavit that he asserts was irrelevant on Rule 401 or Rule 403 grounds. Tex. R.

Evid . 401, 403. In the absence of any request to limit the scope of the affidavit, we

will uphold the trial court’s ruling if any of the material in the affidavit is relevant.

Tex. R. Evid . 105(a).

We have reviewed the affidavit, and conclude that, although of limited

relevance, it contains statements that the trial judge could properly consider in

connection with a motion for new trial. For example, it recounts the prosecutor’s

recollection regarding voir dire, and refutes defense counsel’s assertion that an

agreement as to a challenge for cause for Juror #38 existed between the prosecutor

and the defense attorney.

Finally, Biagas contends that the prosecutor’s affidavit is inadmissible under

Texas Rule of Evidence 403. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has a “tendency to

suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an

emotional one.” See Montgomery v. State , 810 S.W.2d 372, 389 (Tex. Crim. App.

1990) (citing Advisory Committee’s Note to Fed. R. Evid . 403). The affidavit

contains speculation that the outcome of this trial would not have been different had

the trial court removed Juror #38, because the jury reached a “swift verdict.” Where

the trial court was the fact finder at the motion for new trial hearing, however, there

is less danger that it would be influenced by improper suggestion. See Tex. R. Evid.

403 (including “misleading the jury” as special ground for exclusion of relevant

evidence). On balance, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in deciding that the probative value of the affidavit was not “substantially

outweighed” by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Tex. R. Evid . 403.

Excluded Hearsay Testimony

In his seventh issue, Biagas contends that the trial court erred in excluding the

testimony of Dan McAnulty, an investigator with the Harris County District

Attorney’s office. During cross-examination of McAnulty, Biagas attempted to elicit

a statement that his mother, Angela Holden, made to McAnulty. The record

demonstrates the following exchange:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Now, you had several conversations with

Angela Holden, Ms. Holden, during this matter, didn’t you?

MCANULTY: Yes, I did.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. And she told you that Lance Biagas

didn’t know anything about what was going on, did she?

Biagas contends that Holden’s out-of court statement made to McAnulty is a

statement against her penal interest, which is an exception to the hearsay rule, and

therefore, the trial court should have admitted it. See Tex. R. Evid . 803(24).

Rule 803(24) defines a statement against interest as one which, at the time of

its making, so far tended to subject the declarant to criminal liability, that a

reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement

unless believing it to be true. Tex. R. Evid . 803(24). In criminal cases, a statement

tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability is not admissible unless

corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. Id.

The rule does not limit the exception to cases in which the defendant is the declarant.

Bingham v. State , 987 S.W.2d 54, 56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). In our review of the

admissibility of Holden’s statement, we determine: (1) whether it tended to expose

her to criminal liability; and (2) whether there were any corroborating circumstances

that clearly indicated its trustworthiness. Davis v. State , 872 S.W.2d 743, 747-48

(Tex. Crim. App. 1994).

The State responds that, without more in the record, it is impossible to

determine whether the purported statements of Holden to McAnulty were actually

against her penal interest within the meaning of Rule 803(24). Biagas’s trial counsel

did not make an offer of proof or present a bill of exceptions to the trial court

showing McAnulty’s answer to the question propounded. Furthermore, the State

points out that nothing in the record corroborates Holden’s purported statements.

Texas Rule of Evidence 103(a)(2) requires an offer of proof of the proposed

evidence to the trial court, unless the substance is apparent from the context, if the

ruling of the trial court excludes the evidence. Guidry v. State , 9 S.W.3d 133, 153

(Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Gutierrez v. State , 764 S.W.2d 796, 798 (Tex. Crim. App.

1989); Howard v. State , 962 S.W.2d 119, 122 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997,

pet. ref’d). An offer of proof must show that the excluded evidence is relevant and

admissible. See Warner v. State , 969 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).

We hold that Biagas failed to show the trial court that Holden’s statement was

against her penal interest within the meaning of Rule 803(24). Tex. R. Evid .

803(24). Additionally, no evidence corroborates the trustworthiness of her purported

statements. We conclude that Biagas failed to show that the trial court abused its

discretion in refusing to admit the hearsay evidence.

Excluded Character Evidence

In his eighth issue, Biagas alleges that the trial court erred in refusing to admit

character evidence supporting his reputation for honesty and trustworthiness. During

his defense, Biagas attempted to elicit testimony from his former employer, Charles

Johnson. After the trial court sustained the State’s relevancy objection, Johnson

testified outside the presence of the jury that Biagas was a reliable employee who

handled large sums of money, and had never stolen anything from him. Johnson also

testified that he was of the opinion Biagas was not the kind of person who would

steal, and based on his experience in working with Biagas, he was of the opinion that

Biagas was honest and trustworthy.

Biagas asserts that the testimony of Johnson is admissible under Texas Rule of

Evidence 404(a)(1)(A). We agree that Rule 404(a)(1)(A) allows a criminal defendant

to offer evidence of a pertinent character trait. Tex. R. Evid . 404(a)(1)(A). The

indictment alleges Biagas committed an offense involving moral turpitude, thereby

placing his reputation and character for honesty in issue. See Canto-Deport v. State ,

751 S.W.2d 698, 700 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref’d) (finding trial

court erred, in trial for fraudulent removal of a writing, in refusing to admit evidence

of defendant’s reputation for honesty and fair dealing).

The record demonstrates, however, that Biagas failed to sort out the admissible

portions of Johnson’s testimony from the inadmissible portions. Here, part of

Johnson’s testimony involved specific instances of conduct, e.g., that Biagas had

never stolen from him at work. Direct testimony regarding specific instances of

conduct is not admissible under Texas Rules of Evidence 404(a)(1)(A) or 405(b),

because a person’s character trait is not an essential element of a theft charge. See

Valdez v. State , 2 S.W.3d 518, 519-20 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet.

ref’d) (providing that if evidence of accused’s character or character trait is

admissible, proof may be made through reputation or opinion testimony, but specific

instances of conduct are inadmissible to show inference that accused did or did not

commit offense). If a judge is presented with a proffer of evidence containing both

admissible and inadmissible evidence and the proponent fails to segregate and

specifically offer the admissible evidence, the trial judge may properly exclude all the

evidence. Willover v. State , 70 S.W.3d 841, 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). We

therefore hold that the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the

evidence.

Improper Jury Argument

In his final issue on appeal, Biagas maintains that “the trial court erred in not

overruling appellant’s objection after the prosecutor improperly referred to

appellant’s failure to testify during final argument in the guilt-innocence stage of

trial.” The record reflects the following exchange:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: . . . [Appellant] didn’t know what was going on.

He didn’t have a clue.

Should he be found guilty of a felony because he was doing what he was

told to do? He didn’t know about this elaborate scheme of overtime

sheets with Harris County.

PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, I’m going to object to the defendant has

not testified of him going into what the defendant knew or did not know

[sic].

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I’m going to object to that as–

PROSECUTOR: It’s outside the record is my objection.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I object to that as a comment on

the defendant not testifying; and I move for a mistrial.

THE COURT: That will be overruled.

We review the trial court’s ruling on Biagas’s motion for mistrial under an

abuse of discretion standard of review. Wead v. State , 129 S.W.3d 126, 129 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2004); Ladd v. State , 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). We

uphold the trial court’s ruling if that ruling was within the zone of reasonable

disagreement. Wead , 129 S.W.3d at 129 ; Montgomery v. State , 810 S.W.2d 372, 391

(Tex. Crim. App. 1990). In addition, an appellate court must review the trial court’s

ruling in light of the arguments that were before the court at the time it ruled. See

Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Wead , 129 S.W.3d at 129 ; Dragoo v. State , 96 S.W.3d 308, 313

(Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

Biagas correctly states that the prosecutor may not use final argument at either

stage of the trial to comment on a defendant’s failure to testify. See Bustamante v.

State , 48 S.W.3d 761, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). The law is well settled that a

prosecutor’s comment to the jury on an accused’s failure to testify violates the state

and federal constitutional privileges against self-incrimination. Bird v. State , 527

S.W.2d 891, 893-94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). The failure of a defendant to testify

shall not be alluded to or commented on by counsel. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc.

Ann. art. 38.08 (Vernon 1979).

Biagas argues that the prosecutor’s objection “amounted to a direct comment

on Appellant’s failure to testify.” He also cites to several cases for the proposition

that improper prosecutorial remarks warrant reversal. See, e.g., Haddad v. State , 860

S.W.2d 947, 954-55 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, pet. ref’d)(holding that defendant was

entitled to mistrial due to prosecutor’s comment on organized crime during voir dire

and continued indirect references to organized crime throughout trial); Godfrey v.

State , 859 S.W.2d 583, 584 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no pet.) (holding

defendant did not receive fair trial due to prosecutor’s misstatement during voir dire

of the law regarding his right not to testify). The State, on the other hand, responds

that the comment by the prosecutor was not a direct comment on Biagas’s failure to

testify.

Although the prosecutor’s remark was improper, the remark does not

demonstrate any willful or calculated effort on the part of the State to deprive Biagas

of a fair and impartial trial. Biagas moved for a mistrial, as opposed to seeking a

limiting instruction. Any harm from the prosecutor’s remark could have been cured

by a prompt instruction to the jury to disregard the comment. See Moore v. State , 999

S.W.2d 385, 405-06 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (holding harm from comment upon

defendant’s failure to testify cured by instruction to disregard). Moreover, the jury

charge instructed the jury not to consider the defendant’s failure to testify, and thus

nothing in the record indicates that the trial judge would not have heeded a proper

request to instruct the jury to disregard the comment. The denial of a mistrial is not

improper if a lesser remedy would have cured any harm and was not requested.

Young v. State , 137 S.W.3d 65, 70-72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). We therefore hold

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Biagas’s motion for a

mistrial. Conclusion

After reviewing the record, we conclude that (1) the evidence is legally

sufficient to support the jury’s verdict; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in refusing to permit Biagas to replace Juror #38; (3) the trial court did not err in

denying Biagas’s motion for new trial on the ground that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel at trial; (4) the trial court did not err in admitting the trial

prosecutor’s affidavit at a hearing on the motion for new trial; (5) the trial court did

not err in excluding the hearsay testimony of Angela Holden, or the character

evidence of Charles Johnson; and (6) the trial court did not err in overruling Biagas’s

motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor’s comment on Biagas’s failure to testify.

We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jane Bland

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Taft, Jennings, and Bland.

Publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2( b) .

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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