Opinion

Travis Arthur Brown v. Erica Lynn Foster

Court
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston)
Filed
Jul 21, 2005
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 35.2%

The opinion

Opinion Issued July 21, 2005

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

NO. 01-04-00482-CV

TRAVIS ARTHUR BROWN, Appellant

V.

ERICA LYNN FOSTER, Appellee

On Appeal from the 257th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2003-07248

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Travis Arthur Brown, an inmate appearing pro se , appeals from the

trial court’s final order in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship. We determine

whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to make an express ruling on

appellant’s motion to participate by telephone and in denying appellant’s request to

participate at trial by telephone. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

Appellant filed an original suit affecting the parent-child relationship between

himself and one minor child, Ethan Tyler Brown. In his petition, appellant alleged

that he was the natural father of the child and requested that he be named possessory

conservator and that the child’s mother be named managing conservator. Appellant

also requested visitation rights with the child. Appellant filed a notice of desire to

testify and motion for hearing by telephone conference call. The record does not

reflect an explicit ruling on appellant’s request, but the trial court proceeded to trial

without appellant’s participation by telephone. However, the court did allow

appellant to file an affidavit.

The case was called to trial on November 17, 2003. Appellant participated by

his affidavit and pleadings on file, but did not participate by telephone. Appellee

testified that appellant was the natural father of her child. However, appellee testified

that she had moved with her children and fiancé to Virginia and that she believed

visitation with appellant at prison would not be in the best interest of her child. On

that day, the trial court entered an order adjudicating appellant as the biological father

of Ethan Tyler Brown, but denied appellant’s request to be named possessory

conservator or to have access to the child. Access to Court

Appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to address his request

to participate at trial by telephone and by failing to balance the interests of the State

with his right of access to the courts.

In this case, the trial court proceeded to trial without ruling expressly on

appellant’s request to participate by telephone. Consistent with rule 33.1(a)(2)’s

language, the Supreme Court has recognized that an implicit ruling may be sufficient

to present an issue for appellate review. In the Interest of Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163 ,

165 (Tex. 2003); see Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 13 (Tex. 2002). By proceeding to

trial without making an express ruling on appellant’s request to participate by

telephone, it is clear that the trial court implicitly denied appellant’s request. The trial

court did not err in failing to rule expressly on appellant’s motions, and we review the

court’s ruling for abuse of discretion. In the Interest of Z.L.T. , 124 S.W.3d at 165 ; In

re J.D.C. , No. 12-03-00262-CV, 2005 WL 110342 at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler Jan. 19,

2005, no pet.).

It is well-established that litigants cannot be denied access to the courts simply

because they are inmates. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 , 104 S. Ct. 3194,

3198 (1984). However, an inmate does not have an absolute right to appear in person

in every court proceeding. In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d at 165 . Instead, the inmate’s

right of access to the courts must be weighed against the protection of our

correctional system’s integrity. Id. If a trial court refuses to grant an inmate’s request

for a bench warrant, the trial court should allow the inmate to proceed by affidavit,

deposition, telephone, or other effective means. In re Taylor , 28 S.W.3d 240, 249

(Tex. App.—Waco 2000, no pet.) (quoting Byrd v. Attorney Gen. , 877 S.W.2d 566,

569 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1994, no writ) , overruled on other grounds , 124 S.W.3d

163 (Tex. 2003)).

In essence, appellant contends that the trial court failed to balance his interests

and those of the State by refusing to allow him to participate at trial by telephone

conference call. Appellant contends that his inability to participate deprived him of

the opportunity to present evidence or to contradict evidence presented by appellee.

The record reflects that appellant filed a notice of desire to testify and motion

for hearing by conference call as well as a motion for appointment of an attorney ad

litem. Appellant also filed a response to appellee’s amended answer and

counterclaim, in which he renewed his motion to participate at trial by telephone.

The only indication that the trial court had considered appellant’s request to

participate by telephone is the trial court’s statement that appellant wished to

participate by conference call, and a question to appellee, “Is there any reason not to

do that?” Appellee responded that she did not object to appellant’s participation by

telephone. The record does not reflect why the trial court did not allow participation

by teleconference.

Here, the trial court implicitly denied appellant’s requests to participate by

teleconference at trial, but accommodated appellant’s desire to participate in the

proceeding by allowing the submission of his personal affidavit. In appellant’s

affidavit, he averred that he had cared for his child in the past, that he questioned the

suitability of one of his child’s caregivers, and that he believed that contact with his

son was vital, among other things. Appellant’s affidavit allowed him to present

evidence and to contradict evidence presented by appellee. Thus, appellant was

properly afforded an effective means of participation, other than teleconference, by

the trial court. See In re D.D.J. , 136 S.W.3d 305, 314 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004,

no pet.) (holding that if court finds that inmate in civil action is not entitled to leave

to appear personally, then prisoner should be allowed to proceed by affidavit,

deposition, telephone, or other effective means) ; Birdo v. Holbrook , 775 S.W.2d 411,

414 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1989, writ denied). We conclude that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in denying appellant the opportunity to participate at trial by

telephone when the court allowed appellant to participate by affidavit, an effective

alternative means to a personal appearance.

We overrule appellant’s sole issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tim Taft

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Taft, Alcala, and Higley.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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