Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

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No. 06-0815

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Jesse C. Ingram, Ph.D. and

Behavioral Psychology Clinic, P.C., Petitioners,

v.

Louis Deere, D.O. and Hillvale Medical Group Association d/b/a Hillvale Medical Association, Respondents

════════════════════════════════════════════════════

On Petition for Review from the

Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of

Texas

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Argued February

16, 2008

Justice Wainwright

delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Jefferson , Justice Hecht, Justice Medina, Justice

Green , and Justice Willett

joined, in which Justice O’Neill

and Justice Brister joined

except as to part II.D.5.a, and in which

Justice Johnson joined except as to part II.D.2.

Justice Johnson filed a

concurring opinion.

In this case, we review a court of appeals judgment reinstating a jury

verdict finding that Louis Deere, D.O. and Jesse C. Ingram, Ph.D. formed a

partnership pursuant to the Texas Revised Partnership Act (TRPA).

TRPA lists five factors to be considered in determining whether a

partnership has been formed. This determination should be made by examining the

totality of the circumstances in each case, with no single factor being either

necessary or sufficient to prove the existence of a partnership. Here, the

evidence is legally insufficient to establish that a partnership existed between

Ingram and Deere. Because the evidence of the formation of a partnership is

legally insufficient, we do not address the issue raised in Ingram’s

cross-petition challenging the court of appeals’ decision that Ingram owed Deere

a fiduciary duty. Accordingly, we reinstate the trial court’s take-nothing

judgment in favor of Ingram and reverse the court of appeals’ judgment.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Ingram, a licensed psychologist, and Deere, a board certified

psychiatrist, entered into an oral agreement in 1997, which provided that Deere

would serve as the medical director for a multidisciplinary pain clinic. Deere

contends that they agreed he would receive one-third of the clinic’s revenues,

Ingram would receive one-third, and the remaining one-third would be used to pay

the clinic’s expenses. Deere also claims that when he and Ingram began working

together, Ingram told him their work “was a joint venture, or [they] were

partners, or [they] were doing this together.” Ingram contends that they only

agreed Deere would receive one-third of the

clinic’s revenues and that there was no agreement as to the other two-thirds.

Deere acknowledges that, during his time at the clinic,

he never contributed money to the clinic, he did not participate in the hiring

of any employees, he did not know any of the clinic staff’s names, he never

purchased any of the clinic’s equipment, his name was not on the clinic’s bank

account, and his name was not on the lease agreement for the clinic

space.

Fourteen months after Deere began working at the clinic, Ingram

prepared a written agreement to memorialize their arrangement. The document was

entitled “Physician Contractual Employment Agreement” and stated that Ingram was

the “sole owner” of the clinic. Deere refused to sign the document, claiming

that it contradicted their initial arrangement. Immediately after Deere received

the document, he ceased working at the clinic.

Deere later sued Ingram, asserting claims of common law fraud, statutory

fraud, fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and

declaratory judgment and seeking specific performance, damages, and attorneys’

fees. The jury found that Deere and Ingram entered into a partnership agreement

and that Ingram breached the agreement and his fiduciary duty to Deere. The

trial court entered judgment on the jury verdict awarding damages of

(1) $34,249.68 for compensation owed Deere through March 1999,

(2) $2,525,437.00 for Deere’s share of the partnership’s revenue from April

1999 through the time of trial, (3) $2,500,000.00 for Deere’s share of

revenue to accrue after trial, and (4) $27,500.00 in attorneys’ fees for

the trial stage with additional fees in the event of a motion for new trial and

various appeals.

Ingram filed a motion for judgment non obstante

veredicto (judgment n.o.v .).

After a hearing, Judge David Evans signed a new judgment, eliminating a portion

of the damages awarded by the jury and reducing the award of attorneys’ fees.

Following his decision, Judge Evans recused himself

without explanation, and the case was assigned to Judge Merrill Hartman. Ingram

then filed a second motion for judgment n.o.v . or, in

the alternative, a motion for new trial. Judge Hartman signed a judgment n.o.v . and rendered a take-nothing judgment in Ingram’s

favor.

The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s take-nothing judgment on

the second motion for judgment n.o.v . and reinstated

the trial court’s judgment on the first motion for judgment n.o.v . The court held that Ingram waived his right to

challenge the existence of a partnership because he failed to raise the issue in

his second motion for judgment n.o.v . 198 S.W.3d 96,

100 . Without discussing whether Deere and Ingram created a partnership, the

court held that there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jury’s

finding that the partnership continued to exist through the time of trial. Id. at 101–02. However, the court affirmed the trial

court’s ruling that Ingram did not owe Deere a fiduciary duty, as there was no

evidence of a confidential relationship between Deere and Ingram that would give

rise to an informal fiduciary duty. Id. at

102–03. On appeal to this Court, Ingram argues that the court of appeals

erred in reinstating the trial court’s judgment on the first motion for judgment

n.o.v . because there is no evidence that Deere and

Ingram created a partnership. Deere principally contends that Ingram waived all

of the alleged errors in one way or another at the trial court. Deere also filed

a cross-petition appealing the court of appeals’ adverse ruling on his breach of

fiduciary duty claim. 1 Because we conclude there is no evidence of a

partnership, we do not reach the other issues raised by Deere or

Ingram.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Preservation of Error

As an initial matter, we must address Deere’s contention that Ingram

failed to preserve his no evidence argument regarding the existence of a

partnership. First, Deere argues Ingram failed to preserve his no evidence

argument because he did not file a verified denial in response to Deere’s claim

that they were partners, which Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 93(5) requires. It

is undisputed that Ingram did not file the requisite verified denial. However,

this issue was tried by consent of the parties. When both parties present

evidence on an issue and the issue is developed during trial without objection,

any defects in the pleadings are cured at trial, and the defects are waived.

Tex. R. Civ. P. 67; Sage St. Assocs. v. Northdale Constr . Co. , 863

S.W.2d 438 , 445–46 (Tex. 1993).

We addressed a similar issue in Sage Street . In that case, we

discussed whether the trial court should have submitted a contract’s ambiguity

to the jury, although neither party pleaded it. Sage St. , 863 S.W.2d at 444–46 . We reiterated the long-standing rule

that an issue is “not tried merely by the hearing of testimony thereon.” Id.

at 446 (citing Harkey v. Tex. Employers’

Ins. Ass’n , 208 S.W.2d 919, 922 (Tex. 1948)).

However, because both parties presented conflicting testimony on the

subject and allowed the issue to be raised in the jury charge, the contract’s

ambiguity was tried by consent. Id. Here, not only did both parties

present evidence at trial to affirm or controvert the existence of a

partnership, but Deere, the party arguing that a partnership existed, also

submitted the issue in the jury charge. The issue was developed at trial, and

both parties understood that it was contested. Accordingly, the failure to file

a verified denial did not preclude Ingram from raising the issue on appeal.

Second, Deere argues that error was not preserved because Ingram’s motion

for a judgment n.o.v . did not assign a no evidence point of error regarding the jury’s answer to the

partnership question. However, Ingram prevailed on his motion for judgment n.o.v . Thus, as the prevailing party, he need only raise the

issue of whether a partnership existed as a cross-point. Tex. R. App. P. 38.2(b). When a trial court

renders judgment n.o.v . and the losing party appeals,

the prevailing party may also appeal and present points

or issues on any ground that would either vitiate the verdict or preclude

affirming the judgment and reinstating the verdict, including grounds not raised

in the judgment n.o.v . See id. ( providing that when a trial court renders a judgment n.o.v ., “the appellee must bring

forward by cross-point any issue or point that would have vitiated the

verdict or that would have prevented an affirmance of

the judgment if the trial court had rendered judgment on the verdict” (emphasis

added)). This is an exception to the general rule that as a prerequisite to

presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record must show that the

complaint was made to the trial court and that the trial court ruled or refused

to rule on the request. See Tex.

R. App. P .

33.1(a). Because Ingram properly raised the issue to the

court of appeals, he did not waive the issue for review by either this Court or

the court of appeals.

B. Standard of Review

When reviewing a court of appeals judgment reversing the trial court’s

judgment n.o.v ., we conduct a legal sufficiency

analysis of the evidence. Guevara v. Ferrer , 247 S.W.3d 662, 665 (Tex. 2007). We

review the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the jury’s

verdict, crediting evidence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could

and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. Id.

C. Partnership Law

1. Texas

Common Law

Under the common law, the Court recognized that a partnership or joint

enterprise “presupposes an agreement to that end,” which could be either express

or implied. Donald v. Phillip s, 13 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Tex.

1929). We explained that the “intention of the parties to a contract is a

prime element in determining whether or not a partnership or joint venture

exists.”2

Coastal Plains Dev. Corp. v. Micrea , Inc. , 572

S.W.2d 285, 287 (Tex. 1978) (citing Luling Oil & Gas Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref.

Co. , 191 S.W.2d 716, 722 (Tex. 1946) (“[A] court would not declare that a

partnership existed unless that intention clearly

appeared . . . .”)). The common law also considered that

profit sharing was the most important factor shedding light on the intention to

establish a partnership. See Friedlander v. Hillcoat , 14 S.W. 786 , 787 (Tex. 1890) (“A common

interest in the profits is an essential element to constitute a partnership.”).

These two elements were incorporated into a five-factor test that developed

under the common law for partnership formation: (1) intent to form a

partnership, (2) a community of interest in the venture, (3) an

agreement to share profits, (4) an agreement to share losses, and

(5) a mutual right of control or management of the enterprise. Coastal

Plains , 572 S.W.2d at 287 (citing Brown v. Cole , 291 S.W.2d 704, 709

(Tex. 1956), and Luling Oil & Gas ,

191 S.W.2d at 722 ). These factors continued to guide the question of partnership

formation when Texas promulgated and later amended statutory regimes governing

partnerships.

2. Texas

Statutory Law

The Texas Uniform Partnership Act (TUPA) was passed in 1961 and

substantially adopted the major provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA), which itself was

adopted in every state except Louisiana after it was approved by the National

Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1914. See Harry J.

Haynsworth , IV

et al., Should the Uniform Partnership Act Be Revised ? , 43 Bus. Law. 121,

121 (1987); Revised Unif. P’ship

Act , 6 U.L.A. 45 (1997). TUPA was replaced by TRPA, effective January 1,

1994,3

the result of a project of the Partnership Law Committee of the State Bar of

Texas Section on Business Law and the Texas Business Law Foundation. Act of May

31, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch . 917, § 1, 1993

Tex. Gen. Laws 3887 , 3893. TRPA carried forward some of the common law

modifications in ways relevant to this case that were promulgated in TUPA. The

partnership in this case was allegedly formed in 1997. It is uncontested that

TRPA governs this dispute; rather, the parties contest whether Deere has proven

the existence of a partnership under TRPA.4

TRPA provides that “an association of two or more persons to carry on a

business for profit as owners creates a partnership.” Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6132b-2.02(a). Unlike TUPA , 5

TRPA articulates five factors , similar to the

common law factors, that indicate the creation of a partnership. They are:

(1) receipt or right to receive a share of profits of the

business;

(2) expression of an intent to be partners in the business;

(3) participation or right to participate in control of the

business;

(4) sharing or agreeing to share:

(A)

losses of the business; or

(B)

liability for claims by third parties against the

business; and

(5) contributing or agreeing to contribute money or property to

the business . 6

Id. art. 6132b-2.03(a). The

common law required proof of all five factors to establish the existence of a

partnership. See Coastal Plains , 572 S.W.2d at

287 . However, TRPA contemplates a less formalistic and more practical

approach to recognizing the formation of a partnership.

First, TRPA does not require direct proof of the parties’ intent to form

a partnership. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6132b-2.02 (stating that two or more persons may form a partnership

regardless of “whether the persons intend to create a partnership”).

Formerly, the intent to be partners was a “prime,” although not controlling,

element in the creation of a partnership. Coastal Plains , 572 S.W.2d at 287 . Instead, TRPA lists the “expression of

intent” to form a partnership as a factor to consider. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6132b-2.03(a )( 2). Second, unlike the common law, TRPA does not require

proof of all of the listed factors in order for a partnership to exist.

Third, sharing of profits—deemed essential for establishing a partnership under

the common law—is treated differently under TRPA because sharing of profits is

not required. Cf. Friedlander , 14 S.W. at 787 (“A common interest in the

profits is an essential element to constitute a partnership.”). Still, TRPA

comments note that the traditional import of sharing profits as well as control

over the business will probably continue to be the most important factors. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6132b-2.03 Comment of Bar Committee. Additionally,

TRPA recognizes that sharing of losses may be indicative of a partnership

arrangement but states that such an arrangement is “not necessary to create a

partnership.” Id . art. 6132b-2.03(c). TRPA also restates and extends the list of

circumstances in TUPA that do not by themselves indicate that a person is a

partner. 7 Id. art . 6132b-2.03(b).

The question of how many of the TRPA factors are required to form a

partnership is a matter of first impression for this Court. The TRPA factors

seem to serve as a proxy for the common law requirement of intent to form a

partnership by identifying conduct that logically suggests a collaboration of a

business’s purpose and resources to make a profit as partners. After examining

the statutory language and considering that TRPA abrogated the common law’s

requirement of proof of all five factors, we determine that the issue of whether

a partnership exists should be decided considering all of the evidence bearing

on the TRPA partnership factors. While proof of all five common law factors was

a prerequisite to partnership formation under the common law, the

totality-of-the-circumstances test was, in some respect, foreshadowed in Texas

case law. As Justice Jack Pope wrote for the San Antonio Court of Appeals,

No single

fact may be stated as a complete and final test of partnership. Each case must

rest on its own particular facts and the presence or absence of the usual

attributes of a partnership relation. The earlier Texas rule indicated that

profit sharing was the controlling test. We think it is now generally held that

such a test is not all-inclusive and controlling . . . . The absence of an

express provision obligating the parties to share in the losses is also

important and indicates that no partnership existed. But this feature too is not

controlling.

Davis v. Gilmore , 244 S.W.2d 671 , 673–74 (Tex. Civ . App—San Antonio 1951, writ ref’d ) (citations omitted). Many states apply this

totality-of-the-circumstances test.8

We note the difficulty of uniformly applying a

totality-of-the-circumstances test, see Perry Homes v. Cull , 258 S.W.3d

580, 592 (Tex. 2008) (explaining the difficulty of applying a

totality-of-the-circumstances test in determining whether a party waived an

arbitration clause in a contract), but we cannot ignore the Legislature’s

decision to codify the essential common law partnership factors in TRPA without

specifying that proof of all or some of the factors is required to establish a

partnership. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6132b-2.03; In re

M.N. , 262 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tex. 2008) (explaining that courts presume that

the Legislature included each word in the statute for a purpose and that words

not included were purposefully omitted). Yet, we can provide additional

guidelines for this analysis. Of course, an absence of any evidence of the

factors will preclude the recognition of a partnership under Texas law. Cf.

Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson , 959 S.W.2d 171, 176 (Tex. 1997)

(applying TUPA). Even conclusive evidence of only one factor normally will be

insufficient to establish the existence of a partnership.9

To hold otherwise would create a probability that some business owners would be

legally required to share profits with individuals or be held liable for the

actions of individuals who were neither treated as nor intended to be partners.

See Tex. Rev.

Civ. Stat. art. 6132b-3.03(a) (explaining that a partnership is liable for the acts

of a partner done with authority or in the ordinary course of the partnership’s

business); see also Kao Holdings, L.P. v. Young , 261 S.W.3d 60, 63

(Tex. 2008). The Legislature does not indicate that it intended to spring

surprise or accidental partnerships on independent business persons, if, for

example, an employee is paid out of business profits with no other indicia of a

de facto partnership under TRPA. On the other end of the spectrum, conclusive

evidence of all of the TRPA factors will establish the existence of a

partnership as a matter of law. The challenge of the

totality-of-the-circumstances test will be its application between these two

points on the continuum.

D. Existence of a Partnership

In this case, we consider whether more than a scintilla of evidence of

any of the factors indicative of a partnership was introduced at trial.

1. Profit

Sharing

Deere argues that he received or had the right to receive a share of the

clinic’s profits because he and Ingram had an agreement in which each of them

would receive one-third of the clinic’s “gross revenue” and the remainder would

be used for expenses. It is true that the “receipt or right to receive a share

of profits of the business” may be indicative of the existence of a partnership

under TRPA, but a share of profits paid as “wages or other compensation to an

employee or independent contractor” is not indicative of a partnership interest

in the business. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.

art. 6132b-2.03(b)(1)(B); see Friedlander , 14 S.W.

at 788; Strawn Nat’l Bank v. Marchbanks , 74

S.W.2d 447, 449 (Tex. Civ . App.—Eastland 1934, writ

ref’d ) (saying that the “oft-repeated quotation

‘profits as profits’” . . . “is to utter jargon” because they are not

profits when paid as compensation for services).

The evidence does not establish that Deere received a share of profits as

contemplated under TRPA for two reasons. First, the agreement between Ingram and

Deere cannot constitute Deere’s receipt of “profits,” but rather of gross

revenue. Be cause TRPA does not define the term

“profits,” we define it using its ordinary meaning. Tex. Gov’t Code § 312.002; Heritage Res., Inc. v. Nations Bank , 939 S.W.2d 118 , 121–22 (Tex. 1996); Ramsay v. Md.

Am. Gen. Ins. Co. , 533 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Tex. 1976). The

ordinary meaning of “profits” is “[t]he excess of revenues over expenditures in

a business transaction.” Black’s Law

Dictionary 1246 (8th ed. 2004). Furthermore, this Court, interpreting

similar language in TUPA, established that the receipt of gross revenue is not

profit sharing. See Schlumberger Tech. Corp. , 959 S.W.2d at 176

(interpreting TUPA, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6132b,

§ 7(3), and explaining that “[e] ntitlement to a

royalty based on gross receipts is not profit sharing.”). There is no

evidence that the allocation for expenses was sufficient to satisfy all the

clinic’s expenses, leaving only profits to be split. Even if some funds may have

been reserved for expenses, as Deere claims, there is no evidence that Deere’s

share would have decreased if expenses grew or increased if expenses shrank.

Simply put, Deere’s share depended on the clinic’s receipts, not its excess of

revenues over expenditures. Therefore, the evidence in this case leads to one

conclusion: Deere did not share the clinic’s profits but agreed to and received

a percentage of the clinic’s gross revenues.

Second, Ingram wrote twenty checks to Deere as compensation from January

1997 until March 1999. These checks referred to Deere as a “medical consultant”

and the payments as “contract labor.” Therefore, they contradict his argument

that he received profits as a partner in the clinic. Under TRPA, receipt of

profits as compensation for an employee’s services or an independent

contractor’s work is not evidence that parties were partners. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6132b-2.03(b )( 1)(B); Strawn Nat’l Bank , 74 S.W.2d at 449 . Because

Deere cashed the checks without challenging the characterizations, this fact

also does not support his argument.

2.

Expression of Intent to Be Partners

“[E] xpression of an

intent to be partners in the business” is one of five factors courts use

in determining whether a partnership exists. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6132b-2.03(a )( 2). This is different from the common law definition of a

partnership that required proof that the parties intended to form a partnership

at the outset of their agreement. Coastal Plains , 572 S.W.2d at 287

(citing Luling Oil & Gas , 191 S.W.2d

at 722 ); cf. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6132b-2.02 (“An

association of two or more persons to carry on a business for profit as owners

creates a partnership, whether the persons intend to create a partnership . . . .” ( emphasis added)). Conversely, TRPA evaluates the parties’

expression of intent to be partners as one factor, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat . art. 6132b-2.03(a )( 2), and it does not by its terms give the parties’ intent

or expression of intent any greater weight than the other factors, see Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6132b-2.03(a).

When analyzing expression of intent under TRPA, courts should review the

putative partners’ speech, writings, and conduct. While under the common law,

evidence probative on other factors is considered evidence of “intent,” under

TRPA, the “expression of intent” factor is an inquiry separate and apart from

the other factors. Courts should only consider evidence not specifically

probative of the other factors. In other words, evidence of profit or loss

sharing, control, or contribution of money or property should not be considered

evidence of an expression of intent to be partners. Otherwise, all evidence

could be an “ expression” of the parties’ intent, making

the intent factor a catch-all for evidence of any of the factors, and the

separate “expression of intent” inquiry would be eviscerated. Such an

interpretation would undermine the language of TRPA, which establishes five

separate factors to be considered when determining the existence of a

partnership. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat .

art. 6132b-2.03.

Evidence of expressions of intent could include, for example, the

parties’ statements that they are partners, one party holding the other party

out as a partner on the business’s letterhead or name plate, or in a signed

partnership agreement. See Reagan v. Lyberger ,

156 S.W.3d 925, 928 (Tex. App.―Dallas 2005, no pet.) (interpreting TRPA and holding

that evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding of the existence of a

partnership where, among other evidence, the plaintiff testified that he

referred to the defendant as his business partner and

other witnesses stated that the defendant identified himself as the plaintiff’s

partner); Brewer v. Big Lake State Bank , 378 S.W.2d 948, 951

(Tex. Civ . App.―El Paso 1964, no writ) (explaining that a party

introducing a person to the bank as the party’s partner is evidence of the

existence of a partnership).

The terms used by the parties in referring to

the arrangement do not control, Coastal Plains , 572 S.W.2d at 288 , and

merely referring to another person as “partner” in a situation where the

recipient of the message would not expect the declarant to make a statement of legal significance is not

enough. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6132b-2.02(a) (“An

association of two or more persons to carry on a business for profit as owners

creates a partnership, whether the . . . association is called a

‘partnership,’ ‘joint venture’ or other name.”). The term “partner” is regularly

used in common vernacular and may be used in a variety of ways. Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary

1626 (1st ed. 1996) (defining “partner” as one who shares in the

possession or enjoyment of something with another, one of two or more persons

who play together in a game against an opposing side, a husband and wife, or

either of a couple who dances together). Referring to a friend, employee,

spouse, teammate, or fishing companion as a “partner” in a colloquial sense is

not legally sufficient evidence of expression of intent to form a business

partnership. See Murphy v. McDermott Inc. , 807 S.W.2d 606, 613 (Tex.

App.―Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. denied)

(explaining that although one party referred to the other party as his partner,

this alone did not create a partnership). However, the same terms could

constitute legally significant evidence of expression of intent when made in a

circumstance that indicates significance to the business endeavor. Thus, courts

should look to the terminology used by the putative partners, the context in

which the statements were made, and the identity of the speaker and

listener.

Deere argues that he expressed his intent to be a partner with Ingram by

sharing the clinic’s profits and losses and having access to the clinic’s

records. His evidence of other factors, sharing of profits and losses and

control of the business, is insufficient to establish expression of intent.

Deere’s evidence is also insufficient because there must be evidence that both

parties expressed their intent to be partners. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6132b-2.03(a) (explaining

that “[f]actors indicating that persons have created a partnership include their . . . expression of an

intent to be partners in the business” (emphasis added)). Because Ingram is the

party denying the existence of a partnership, an expression of intent to be

partners by Ingram would be of particular interest.

The evidence of Ingram’s expression of intent to be business partners is

the following exchange during Deere’s trial testimony:

Q. What

representations did [Ingram] make to you when you were forming this idea that

later turned out to be not true?

A. [Deere]

Well, that number one, that this was a joint venture, or that we were partners,

or we were doing this together.

Deere’s

testimony is unclear and gives the alleged arrangement with Ingram three

different characterizations—that they were joint venturers , partners, or “were doing this together.” It is

unclear from this testimony what Ingram believed to be the nature of their

relationship. Any significance of Deere’s testimony is further obviated because

he testified that partner “means some people working together.” Accordingly,

Deere called the employees he supervised at his clinic “partners.” After Deere’s

counsel explained to him the legal definition of a partnership during his

testimony, Deere referred to his trial attorney as his “partner” because he was

“depending on [him].”

Deere also testified that the clinic kept its established name after he

joined as the medical director, and he and Ingram never discussed a name change.

He never signed a lease agreement for the building owned by Ingram where the

clinic was housed, was not named on the clinic’s bank account, never signed a

signature card for the clinic’s bank account, and never filed taxes representing

that he was co-owner of the clinic. Additionally, Deere paid his own medical

malpractice insurance, which he acknowledged was his common practice when he did

contract work. Deere cannot provide the content, context, or circumstances to

give any of the alleged expressions of intent legal significance as evidence of

a partnership.

3.

Control

Deere argues

he had an equal right to control and manage the clinic’s business because,

although he was never allowed to see the books and records, he repeatedly

requested to see them. He also points to Ingram’s testimony that “maybe” Deere

viewed the clinic’s books on one occasion.10

Furthermore, Deere argues that he had control because Ingram discussed with him

how much the clinic made, the amounts paid to the staff, and the need to hire

Ingram’s wife as personnel director. No other evidence supports support these

statements and proves he participated in or had the right to control the

clinic’s business.

The right to

control a business is the right to make executive decisions. See Brown v.

Cole , 291 S.W.2d 704, 710 (Tex. 1956)

(noting that evidence of control of the business could be exercising authority

over the business’s operations); Guerrero v. Salinas , No. 13-05-323-CV,

2006 WL 2294578 , at *11 (Tex. App.―Corpus Christi

Aug. 10, 2006, no pet.) (concluding that evidence of

management or control of the business was the right to write checks on the

business’s checking account); Tierra Sol Joint Venture v. City of El Paso ,

155 S.W .3d 503, 508

( Tex . App . ―El Paso 2004, pet . denied ) ( noting that a party does not have control of the business if the party does not have control over and access to the business’s books ); Price v.

Wrather , 443 S.W.2d 348 , 351–52 (Tex. Civ . App.―Dallas 1969, writ ref’d n.r.e .) ( noting that control of the business could be receiving and

managing all of the business’s assets and monies) . However, being sporadically provided information regarding the

business does not indicate that Deere had control of or the right to control the

business. At most, Deere’s evidence demonstrates that Ingram talked with

Deere about the business. But owners talk with

consultants, employees, accountants, attorneys, spouses, and many others about

their businesses, and these conversations do not establish that these people

have control of the businesses. Likewise, those same classes of people may have

the opportunity to look at the businesses’ books, but once again, a review of

the books itself is not evidence of control. Deere submitted no evidence that he

made executive decisions or had the right to make executive decisions and has

shown no evidence of this factor.

4. Sharing

of Losses and Liability for Third Party Claims

Contrary to the common law, under TRPA an agreement to share losses

is not necessary to create a partnership. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6132b-2.03(c); see

Coastal Plains , 572 S.W.2d at 287 . Therefore, while under TRPA the absence

of an agreement to share losses is not dispositive of

the existence of a partnership, the existence of such an agreement could support

Deere’s argument that a partnership existed between him and Ingram. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6132b-2.03(a )( 4)(A).

According to Deere, he and Ingram agreed that Deere would receive

one-third of the clinic’s gross revenue, Ingram would receive one-third of the

clinic’s gross revenue, and the remainder would be used to pay clinic expenses.

Deere argues that this agreement determined how losses would be shared, but he

testified that there was never a discussion of how expenses in excess of

one-third of the clinic’s gross revenue would be divided between him and Ingram.

The meaning of “net operating losses” is “the excess of operating expenses over

revenues, the amount of which can be deducted from gross income if other

deductions do not exceed gross income.” Black’s Law Dictionary 963 (8th ed.

2004). Here, Ingram and Deere never discussed what would happen to the

allocation if expenses exceeded one-third of the revenue or gross income. They

never discussed losses, only expenses. There is no legally cognizable evidence

to support the contention that Ingram and Deere agreed to share losses.

5.

Contribution of Money or Property

Finally, there is no evidence that Deere “ contribut [ ed ] or agree[d] to

contribute money or property” to the clinic as a partner. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6132b-2.03(a )( 5). Deere does not argue that there was any

agreement that he contribute either money or property to the enterprise.

See i d. Furthermore, Deere does not

contend that he actually contributed money to the clinic. In fact, Deere

acknowledged at trial that he did not contribute to clinic renovations or the

purchase of medical equipment and supplies and that he did not agree to use his

personal resources to pay for any expenses in the operation of the clinic.

Rather, Deere’s only argument regarding this factor is that he contributed his

reputation as property to the alleged partnership.

TRPA defines “property” as “all property, real, personal, or mixed,

tangible or intangible, or an interest in that property.” Id. art. 6132b-1.01(15).

Reputation is a type of goodwill and may be valuable intangible property. Tex. & Pac. Ry . Co. v. Mercer ,

90 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tex. 1936). Therefore, an

individual’s reputation can be property that is contributed to the partnership.

However, even if a person lends her good name to a business, she does not

automatically become a de facto partner. At a minimum, the putative

partner would have to prove that any such value can be distinguished from

services rendered or property given as an employee.

a. Contribution of Valuable Property

Although Deere claims his reputation was a valuable contribution to the

alleged partnership, the evidence does not support this assertion. Deere argues

that the testimony of Ingram’s expert, Ron McClellan, who stated that Deere’s

reputation was a “benefit to the clinic” and “added value” to the clinic,

supports his claim. However, McClellan only testified generally that Deere’s

reputation could add value to the clinic, and he acknowledged that his

statements were unsupported and mere assumptions, stating: “Not knowing Dr.

Deere and his reputation, I can only assume.” His opinion, therefore, was merely

speculation. Coastal Transp . Co.

v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. , 136 S.W.3d 227 , 232–33 (Tex.

2004) (quoting Tex. R. Evid . 401). In order to show

that Deere’s reputation improved the goodwill of the clinic, McClellan, at a

minimum, had to know Deere’s reputation in the psychiatric or pain management

fields. McClellan admitted he had no such knowledge. See Taormina

v. Culicchia , 355 S.W .2d 569, 574

( Tex . Civ . App .— El Paso 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e .) ( explaining that the measure of goodwill is “the fixed and

favorable consideration of customers arising from an established and well-known

and well-conducted business”).

The only other evidence supporting Deere’s claim is his unsubstantiated

statements given during his testimony that his reputation added value to the

clinic. Assuming he is qualified to give an opinion on this matter, his

testimony is devoid of support for that conclusion. Deere testified that he did

not know how many clients came to the clinic specifically because of his

presence and that the clinic’s name never changed to highlight his addition to

the alleged venture. Moreover, the pain clinic was not marketed using his name.

Neither Deere nor McClellan ever explained how Deere’s reputation contributed to

the clinic’s success. See Mercer , 90 S.W.2d at 560 (to recover damages

for goodwill, issues must be submitted to the jury to obtain findings on the

change in value of the business); Taormina , 335

S.W.2d at 574 (noting that the witness arrived at a sum for goodwill after an

investigation of the business, observation of its operations, and examination of

its books).

b. Contribution as a Partner

Furthermore, there is no evidence that Deere added value to the clinic as

a partner and not an employee. Even if we were to assume that Deere contributed

quantifiable value and enjoyed a good reputation in the psychiatric or pain

management fields, he cannot establish this factor without evidence that the

contribution is distinguishable from the contributions of an employee. Employees

may contribute to business endeavors by lending their time and reputation, but

that is not a contribution to the venture indicative of a partnership interest.

Even assuming Deere’s reputation was impeccable, nothing indicates that Deere

contributed or agreed to contribute to the clinic as a partner and not as an

employee. In sum, there is no legally sufficient evidence that Deere contributed

property to the multidisciplinary pain clinic that would establish a partnership

interest.

III. CONCLUSION

Whether a partnership exists must be determined by an examination of the

totality of the circumstances. Evidence of none of the factors under the Texas

Revised Partnership Act will preclude the recognition of a partnership, and even

conclusive evidence of only one factor will also normally be insufficient to

establish the existence of a partnership under TRPA. However, conclusive

evidence of all five factors establishes a partnership as a matter of law. In

this case, Deere has not provided legally sufficient evidence of any of the five

TRPA factors to prove the existence of a partnership. Accordingly, we reverse

the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstate the trial court’s take-nothing

judgment.

_____________________________________

Dale

Wainwright

Justice

OPINION

DELIVERED: July 3, 2009

1 The only argument Deere makes

to this Court in support of his claim that Ingram breached a fiduciary duty he

owed to Deere is that such a duty arose by virtue of their partnership . See

Tex. Rev. Civ.

Stat. art. 6132b-4.04

(recognizing the unwaivable duties of care and loyalty

and the obligation of good faith required of partners under the Texas Revised

Partnership Act); see also Bohatch v.

Butler & Binion , 977 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Tex.

1998) (recognizing “as a matter of common law that ‘[t]he relationship

between . . . partners . . . is

fiduciary in character’”). The court of appeals held there was no evidence of a

fiduciary relationship between Ingram and Deere. However, we need not address

the issue of whether there is independent evidence of a fiduciary duty because

we hold there is no legally sufficient evidence that Ingram and Deere were

partners.

2

Prior case law discusses differences between joint

ventures and partnerships. We see no legal or logical reason for distinguishing

a joint venture from a partnership on the question of formation of the entity.

See Gray v. West , 608 S.W.2d 771, 776 (Tex. Civ . App.—Amarillo 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e .). In fact, a

joint venture that satisfies the definition of “partnership” is a partnership

subject to TRPA. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6132b-2.02 Comment of Bar Committee. In this case, counsel

for both Deere and Ingram used the terms interchangeably during

trial.

3

UPA was revised in 1997 and renamed the Revised

Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA). Unif. P’ship Act , intro., 6 U.L.A. 5

(2001). Although Texas has adopted portions of RUPA, it has not adopted

the uniform act in its entirety. Id. at

45.

4

Three statutory regimes have governed partnerships

formed in Texas—TUPA, TRPA, and the Texas Business Organizations Code (TBOC).

TRPA, enacted in 1993, replaced TUPA. Act of May 31,

1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch . 917, § 1, 1993 Tex.

Gen. Laws 3887 , 3893. TRPA governs partnerships formed on or after January 1,

1994, and other, existing partnerships that elected to be governed by it. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6132b-11.03(a) . In 2003, the TBOC replaced

TRPA. Act of May 29, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch . 182, § 1, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 267 , 592–93. The

TBOC governs partnerships formed on or after January 1, 2006, and other

partnerships that elect to be governed by the TBOC. Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 402.001. In addition,

TRPA and the TBOC contain transition rules, providing that the preceding law

will apply to existing partnerships for a period of years after each act’s

effective date, unless the partnership elects to be governed by the new act

immediately. Tex. Rev.

Civ. Stat. art. 6132b-11.03; Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 402.001. On January 1,

2010, TRPA will expire, and the TBOC will apply to all partnerships, regardless

of their formation date. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6132b-11.03. TRPA and the

TBOC’s rules for determining partnership formation are

substantially the same. Compare Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 152.052, with

Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6132b-2.03.

5

TUPA did not provide a list of considerations or

factors that were important or necessary to the establishment of a partnership.

With one exception, TUPA only provides rules indicating circumstances that did

not give rise to a partnership. TUPA reads as follows:

(1)

Except as [otherwise provided] persons who are not partners as to each

other are not partners as to third persons.

(2)

Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the entireties, joint

property, common property, or part ownership does not of itself establish a

partnership, whether such co-owners do or do not share any profits made by the

use of the property.

(3)

The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership,

whether or not the persons sharing them have a joint or common right or interest

in any property from which the returns are derived.

(4)

The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a

business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business, but no

such inference shall be drawn if such profits were received in

payment:

(a)

As a debt by installments or

otherwise,

(b)

As wages of an employee or rent to a

landlord,

(c)

As an annuity to a widow or

representative of a deceased partner,

(d)

As interest on a loan, though the

amount of payment vary with the profits of the business,

(e)

As the consideration for the sale of

a good-will of a business or other property by installments or

otherwise.

(5)

Operation of a mineral property

under a joint operating agreement does not of itself establish a

partnership.

Tex. Rev.

Civ. Stat. art. 6132b, § 7

6

Four years after TRPA was enacted, Oregon adopted

factors almost verbatim to the factors listed in TRPA for determining whether a

partnership exists. Or. Rev. Stat . § 67.055

(2008). Oregon and Texas are the only states to enact a

statute that deviates from the UPA’s rules for

determining the existence of a partnership.

7

According to TRPA, “[one] of the following

circumstances, by itself, does not indicate

that a

person is a partner in the business”:

(1)

the receipt

or right to receive a share of profits:

(A)

as repayment

of a debt, by installments or otherwise;

(B)

as payment

of wages or other compensation to an employee or independent

contractor;

(C)

as payment

of rent;

(D)

as payment

to a former partner, surviving spouse or representative of a deceased or

disabled partner, or transferee of a partnership interest;

(E)

as payment of interest or other

charge on a loan, regardless of whether the amount of payment varies with the

profits of the business, and including a direct or indirect present or future

ownership interest in collateral or rights to income, proceeds, or increase in

value derived from collateral; or

(F)

as payment

of consideration for the sale of a business or other property by installments or

otherwise;

(2)

co-ownership of property, whether in

the form of joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the entireties, joint

property, community property, or part ownership, whether combined with sharing

of profits from the property;

(3)

sharing or having a right to share

gross returns or revenues, regardless of whether the persons sharing the gross

returns or revenues have a common or joint interest in the property from which

the returns or revenues are derived; or

(4)

ownership of

mineral property under a joint operating agreement.

Tex. Rev.

Civ. Stat. art. 6132b-2.03(b).

8

McCrary v. Butler , 540 So. 2d 736, 739 (Ala. 1989) (stating that “[t]here

is no arbitrary test as to whether a partnership exists, but such a

determination will be made upon all of the attendant circumstances”); Tripp

v. Chubb , 208 P.2d 312, 314 (Ariz. 1949) (stating that “the question of the

existence of a partnership depends upon the intention of the parties,” which

“must be ascertained from all of the facts and circumstances and the action and

conduct of the parties”); Moon v. Ervin , 133 P.2d 933, 937 (Idaho 1943)

(stating that to show a partnership exists, there “must be other facts, showing

that relationship to have been the intention of the parties”); Parish v.

Bainum , 138 N.E. 147, 149 (Ill. 1923) (stating

that “‘[t]he requisites of a partnership are that the parties must have joined

together to carry on a trade or venture for their common benefit, each

contributing property or services and having a community of interests in the

profits’” (quoting Meehan v. Valentine , 145 U.S. 611, 618 (1892)));

Potts v. Lux , 166 P.2d 694, 697 (Kan. 1946)

(stating that the question of whether a partnership exists “depends in each

instance upon the intention of the parties to the arrangement, the terms of the

agreement creating their relationship and the facts and circumstances evidencing

the manner in which their business affairs are carried on once that relationship

has been established”); Lupien v. Malsbenden , 477 A.2d 746, 748 (Me. 1984) (stating that

“[a] finding that the relationship between two persons constitutes a partnership

may be based upon evidence of an agreement, either express or implied”

. . . and “‘[n]o one factor is alone determinative of the existence of

a partnership’” (quoting Dalton v. Austin , 432 A.2d, 774, 777 (Me.

1981))); Cyrus v. Cyrus , 64 N.W.2d 538, 541 (Minn. 1954) (stating that a

partnership exists “if the evidence as a whole reasonably shows that the parties

have entered into a contractual relation whereby they have combined their

property, labor, and skill in an enterprise or business as co-owners for the

purpose of joint profit”); Smith v. Redd , 593

So. 2d 989, 994 (Miss. 1992) (stating that “[a]n expressed agreement is not

required; intent may be implied, or established from the surrounding

circumstances”); Temm v. Temm , 191 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Mo. 1945) (stating that

“[s] ince partnership rests on the intention of the

parties each case must be determined upon its own particular facts”); In re

Keytronics , 744 N.W.2d 425, 441 (Neb. 2008)

(stating that “[t]he five indicia of co-ownership are only that; they are not

all necessary to establish a partnership relationship, and no single indicium of co-ownership is either necessary or sufficient

to prove co-ownership”); Eggleston v. Eggleston , 47 S.E.2d 243, 247 (N.C.

1948) (stating that a “[p] artnership is a legal

concept, but the determination of the existence or not of a

partnership . . . involves inferences drawn from an analysis of

‘all the circumstances attendant on its creation and operation’” (quoting

Helvering v. Clifford , 309 U.S. 331,

335 (1940))); Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Zimmerman , 381 N.W.2d 218, 220 (S.D.

1986) (stating that “since there is no arbitrary test for determining the

existence of a partnership, each case must be governed by its own peculiar

facts” (quoting Munce v. Munce , 96 N.W.2d 661, 663 (S.D. 1959))); Harman v.

Rogers , 510 A.2d 161, 163 (Vt. 1986) (stating that “[ i ]n deciding whether a partnership has been created by tacit

agreement, courts must examine the facts to determine whether the parties

carried on as co-owners of a business for profit”); Cooper v. Knox , 90

S.E.2d 844, 847 (Va. 1956) (stating that “‘[n]o one factor or circumstance can

be taken as a conclusive criterion, but each case must be determined upon its

own particular facts and surrounding circumstances’” (quoting 68 C.J.S.,

Partnership , § 30)); Pruitt v. Fetty ,

134 S.E.2d 713, 716 (W. Va. 1964) (stating that “[t]here is no general rule

applicable in determining or ascertaining the question of partnership

. . . but each case must be governed by its own facts and surrounding

circumstances”); P&M Cattle Co. v. Holler s20 , 559 P.2d 1019, 1022

(Wyo. 1977) (stating that “the question of whether . . . a

[partnership] exists must be gathered from the conduct, surrounding

circumstances and the transactions between the parties”).

9

In closing argument, Deere’s counsel told the jury

that a partnership could be established by finding proof of only one factor. He

argued, “A joint venture is a partnership too, you know. [The judge] put ‘ors’

after all these elements. You don’t have to have all of them ladies and

gentlemen, you can have any one of them, or you can have two of them, or you can

have three of them . . . .” There was no

objection to the charge on this point.

10

This argument contradicts Deere’s trial testimony

that he was never allowed to look at the books.