KREMEIER v. TRANSITIONS, INC.

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KREMEIER v. TRANSITIONS, INC.

2015 OK CIV APP 18

345 P.3d 1126

Case Number: 112257

Decided: 10/09/2014

Mandate Issued: 03/02/2015

DIVISION IV

THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, DIVISION IV

Cite as: 2015 OK CIV APP 18 , 345 P.3d 1126

EDWARD LEE KREMEIER, an individual,

Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

TRANSITIONS, INC., an Oklahoma corporation,

Defendant,

and

M. SUE GRANTHAM, an individual, Defendant/Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF

OKLAHOMA COUNTY,

OKLAHOMA

HONORABLE THOMAS E. PRINCE, TRIAL JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Tom L. King, Justin T. King, KING LAW FIRM, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for

Plaintiff/Appellant

Jake Jones, III, Sheila Stinson, KIRK & CHANEY,

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee

DEBORAH B. BARNES, CHIEF JUDGE:

¶1 Having previously granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant

Transitions, Inc. (Transitions), the trial court granted summary judgment in

favor of Defendant/Appellee M. Sue Grantham (Grantham) in its order filed in

July 2013. Plaintiff/Appellant Edward Lee Kremeier (Kremeier) appeals the trial

court's Order denying his "Motion to Reconsider" the July 2013 order. Kremeier

does not challenge the granting of summary judgment in favor of Transitions, but

challenges only the granting of summary judgment in favor of Grantham - his

former counselor. Briefly stated, Grantham called the Oklahoma Department of

Human Services (DHS) to report that Kremeier, her patient at the time, posed a

threat of sexual abuse to Kremeier's youngest daughter. Kremeier argues genuine

disputes of material fact exist as to whether, among other things, Grantham's

report to DHS was made in bad faith. Based on our review, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Although the summary judgment motion, response, and reply, together with

the motion to reconsider, response, and reply, have been provided in the record

on appeal, no pleadings have been provided on appeal. As to the content of the

petition, in the trial court's July 2013 order, it states that Kremeier asserted

the following theories of recovery against Grantham: "[b]ad-faith reporting of

child abuse to DHS," and "[b]reach of confidentiality, conflict of interest, and

failing to assist in the delivery of counseling records." 1

¶3 In May 2013, Grantham filed her motion for summary judgment, arguing that

regardless of the theories asserted against her by Kremeier relating to her

telephonic report to DHS, she is immune from liability pursuant to 10A O.S. 2011

§ 1-2-104, which provides, among other things, that "[a]ny person who, in good

faith and exercising due care, reports suspected child abuse . . . shall have

immunity from any liability, civil or criminal . . . ."

¶4 The undisputed facts set forth in Grantham's motion and admitted in

Kremeier's response are as follows:

· Kremeier, an adult in his 50s, sought mental health treatment through

Transitions in February 2010 for "anger, [and] recovery from verbal and

sexual abuse" suffered as a child.

· Kremeier requested Grantham as his counselor and Grantham accepted

Kremeier as her patient.

· Kremeier's intake session with Transitions occurred in February 2010,

and Kremeier signed a "Consent for Use and Disclosure" form with Transitions

that states, "under state law," Grantham is ethically obligated to report

suspicions of child abuse "and has no obligation to confirm the truthfulness

of the report."

· Kremeier was separated from his wife (Wife) when he began therapy

sessions with Grantham, but prior to Kremeier filing for divorce later in

2010, "Wife moved back in with [Kremeier] and they attempted

reconciliation."

· During the reconciliation attempt, Kremeier requested that Grantham

begin counseling his youngest daughter, and he participated in at least one

joint-counseling session with Wife.

· In May 2010, after Kremeier filed for divorce from Wife and Wife moved

out of the marital residence with their youngest daughter, Grantham

contacted DHS and made the telephonic report at issue.

· DHS conducted an independent investigation of Grantham's report,

interviewed more than a dozen witnesses, and determined that neglect and

threat of harm to Kremeier's youngest daughter was "substantiated." DHS

recommended court intervention, and DHS also substantiated a threat of harm

to Kremeier's son.

· The Assessment of Child Safety related to the DHS investigation

indicated that child sexual abuse was suspected and circumstances suggested

that sexual abuse was an "immediate concern" with regard to Kremeier's

children, including his youngest daughter, and that based on the safety

assessment, there was a determination that the children were in an

environment with safety threats.

· Kremeier appealed DHS's findings and in September 2010, DHS upheld its

finding of substantiation as to the threat of harm Kremeier posed to his

youngest daughter. DHS reversed its finding as to Kremeier's son, who was

about sixteen years old at the time.

· DHS sent a letter to Kremeier in January 2011 again upholding its

findings.

· Kremeier was ordered to have supervised visitation with his youngest

daughter by the judge in the divorce case.

· Ultimately, however, by agreement of Kremeier and Wife, Kremeier was

awarded unsupervised visitation. (We note that, according to Kremeier, the

DHS findings were ultimately opposed by a court-appointed Guardian Ad

Litem.)

· Kremeier's alleged injuries and the damages he seeks in this action are

the result of Grantham's report to DHS and would not have occurred "but for"

her report.

¶5 In the argument section of Kremeier's response to Grantham's motion for

summary judgment, he asserts that although Grantham is presumed to have acted in

good faith under § 1-2-104, "that presumption can be overcome if there is

evidence of bad faith." Kremeier asserts a discrepancy exists between the

contents of Grantham's telephonic report to DHS as contained in the DHS referral

information report, and what Grantham subsequently testified she reported to

DHS. In particular, Kremeier has presented evidence that, according to the DHS

referral information report, Grantham reported that Kremeier disclosed to her

(in their counseling sessions) that he sexually abused his oldest

daughter when she was younger. Grantham subsequently testified, however,

that Kremeier disclosed to her that he had sexually molested a young child, but

that he did not specify the child's identity. Kremeier asserts this discrepancy

constitutes evidence of bad faith on the part of Grantham because it shows she

gave false information to DHS. He also asserts that the subsequent investigation

undertaken by DHS "may have never taken place if [Grantham] had told DHS the

truth at the time of her initial report."

¶6 Kremeier also asserts that Grantham called DHS to report the threat of

sexual abuse only upon learning that Kremeier might obtain unsupervised custody

of or visitation with his youngest daughter. He asserts, "[Grantham's] primary

reason is that she feared that . . . [Wife] would not be able to prevent

[Kremeier] from having unsupervised custody of their [youngest daughter]."

Kremeier asserts this constitutes evidence of bad faith because the report was

made merely "for the purpose of aiding in a child-custody dispute . . . ."

Kremeier asserts, in addition, that the report was not made promptly, and when

it was made, "Grantham divulged to DHS far more information than she should

have," and that this constitutes additional evidence of bad faith. Kremeier also

attached an affidavit of an "expert witness," Dr. Richard Kishur, "whose clear

opinion is that [Grantham] acted in bad faith."

¶7 Kremeier also argues that the immunity provided in § 1-2-104 applies only

to those who report "suspected child abuse," not to those "who believe[] they

can ' predict' that child abuse may occur at some point

' potentially' . . . ." 2 Finally, he argues § 1-2-104 requires that one must

exercise due care, in addition to not acting in bad faith, when making a report

of suspected child abuse in order for the immunity to apply.

¶8 In its July 2013 order, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor

of Grantham. The trial court found

that the claims of breach of confidentiality, conflict of interest and

failing to assist in the delivery of counseling records have been confessed

(or at least abandoned) by [Kremeier], since his response to Grantham's

Motion for Summary Judgment did not address said claims. Thus, Grantham

should be granted summary judgment on said claims.

¶9 The trial court further found,

it is undisputed that Grantham did not possess and/or act with guilty or

culpable knowledge with respect to her report to DHS. . . . [T]he Court

finds that, at best, Grantham acted negligently and/or with bad judgment.

Thus, the immunity shield provided by § 1-2-104 bars [Kremeier's] claims

against Grantham.

¶10 The trial court further stated, among other things, that it had

"disregarded, as inadmissible," the conclusion in Dr. Kishur's affidavit that,

"in [Dr. Kishur's] opinion, Grantham 'acted in bad faith, via some unknown

motivation . . . .'"

¶11 On August 1, 2013, within ten days of the July 2013 order, Kremeier filed

a "Motion to Reconsider." 3 Kremeier again asserts in this motion that disputes

of material fact exist as to whether Grantham "exercise[d] due care or act[ed]

in good faith when she reported [Kremeier] to DHS for suspected child abuse." 4 Kremeier states

it is his "unwavering position . . . that Grantham's report was made in bad

faith in an attempt to help [Kremeier's] then-wife in their looming custody

dispute and that is why Grantham's report was clumsy and contained too much

information and a lot of false information." He further states that,

Certainly no good-faith report of alleged child abuse would: (a) contain

false information; (b) lack a factual foundation; (c) be based entirely on

speculation; (d) be made a month after learning of the behavior which creates a

suspicion; and (e) be made in order to assist a different individual client in

an upcoming child custody dispute. 5

Kremeier also again argues that the immunity does not apply when the reported

abuse is threatened or potential rather than abuse that has already occurred or

is ongoing.

¶12 In its Order filed in September 2013, the trial court denied Kremeier's

motion to reconsider. From the Order denying his motion to reconsider, Kremeier

appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶13 The standard of review to be applied in this case is as follows:

Summary relief issues stand before us for de novo review. All

facts and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the

non-movant. Appellate tribunals bear the same affirmative duty as is borne

by [trial] courts to test for legal sufficiency all evidentiary material

received in summary process in support of the relief sought by the movant.

Only if the court should conclude there is no material fact (or inference)

in dispute and the law favors the movant's claim or liability-defeating

defense is the moving party entitled to summary relief in its favor. A trial

court's denial of a motion for new trial is reviewed for abuse of

discretion. Where, as here, our assessment of the trial court's exercise of

discretion in denying defendants a new trial rests on the propriety of the

underlying grant of summary judgment, the abuse-of-discretion question is

settled by our de novo review of the summary adjudication's

correctness. Judicial discretion is abused when a trial court errs with

respect to a pure, unmixed question of law.

Reeds v. Walker , 2006 OK

43, ¶ 9 , 157 P.3d 100

(footnotes omitted). In addition, "interpretation of statutory law presents a

question of law and statutes are construed to determine legislative intent in

light of the general policy and purpose that underlie them." Troxell v. Okla.

Dep't of Human Servs. , 2013 OK

100, ¶ 4 , 318 P.3d 206

(citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. The only theory of recovery at issue is the bad

faith/negligent reporting theory asserted against Grantham.

¶14 Kremeier has waived all theories of recovery in this action except the

theory asserted against Grantham that Grantham's report to DHS was made

negligently and in bad faith. Grantham does not contest the order granting

summary judgment in favor of Transitions. Furthermore, the trial court found

that in Kremeier's response to the motion for summary judgment, he did not

respond to Grantham's arguments regarding the additional theories asserted

against her of breach of confidentiality, conflict of interest, and failure to

assist in the delivery of counseling records. In his motion to reconsider,

Kremeier did not contest the trial court's finding that he abandoned

these theories. Because we treat Kremeier's motion to reconsider as the

functional equivalent of a new trial motion, he cannot rely on errors which were

not fairly embraced in the specific grounds stated in that motion. 6 Finally, we

note that Kremeier did not set forth any issue pertaining to his abandonment of

these additional theories in the "Issues to be Raised on Appeal" section of the

petition in error, and, in his "Summary of the Case," he represents that the

only issue "is that [Grantham] negligently and in bad faith made an untrue

report to [DHS] about [Kremeier]." Consequently, the only theory of recovery at

issue is the bad faith/negligent reporting theory asserted against Grantham.

II. Does the immunity provision apply where the reported

child abuse is threatened rather than ongoing?

¶15 Kremeier argues that because the child abuse reported to DHS by Grantham

was threatened and potential rather than ongoing, that the statutory privilege

set forth in 10A O.S. 2011 § 1-2-104 does not apply in this case. He argues, in

essence, that even assuming Grantham reported in good faith that sexual abuse

was threatened, because the report was not made on the basis of direct knowledge

of abuse that had already occurred to the youngest daughter, the statutory

privilege does not apply.

¶16 Section 1-2-104 provides, in pertinent part, that immunity from liability

applies to "[a]ny person who . . . reports suspected child abuse . . . ." In

Myers v. Lashley , 2002 OK

14 , 44 P.3d 553 , the Court

stated as follows:

Oklahoma's child abuse reporting laws express the State's strong public

interest in protecting children from abuse by the policy of mandatory

reporting of actual and suspected child

abuse or neglect to appropriate authorities and agencies. The statutory

scheme imposes upon all health care professionals

(teachers as well as all other persons) an obligation to report in good

faith all suspected instances of child abuse to [DHS]. No privilege or

contract will relieve any person from the legally mandated reporting

requirement.

Id . ¶ 11 (footnotes omitted). 7

¶17 We disagree that a report may only be based on direct knowledge that the

child in question has been the victim of sexual abuse, or is the victim of

ongoing sexual abuse, by the perpetrator in order for the statutory immunity to

apply. All that the statute requires is knowledge upon which a report of

"suspected child abuse" can be made in good faith. Because all that is required

is knowledge sufficient to support a good faith report of suspected abuse -

which may, of course, be based on circumstantial factors indicating that sexual

abuse is reasonably likely and potential - we reject Kremeier's strict

interpretation of the statute. 8 Such an interpretation would have a chilling effect

on the reporting of child abuse, and would be clearly inconsistent with the

strong public interest, articulated by the Myers Court and by the

Legislature, 9

in protecting children from abuse. Such an interpretation would

constitute an absurd reading of the statute meant to protect children, not the

potential abusers of children. We conclude the applicability of § 1-2-104 is not

defeated in this case merely because the report was made on the basis of

circumstantial indicators, including Kremeier's ongoing recovery from sexual

abuse he suffered as a child, and his admission of sexual abuse of a young

child, rather than on the basis of direct knowledge of past or ongoing abuse by

Kremeier of the youngest daughter.

III. Must one exercise due care, in addition to not acting in

bad faith, when

making a report of suspected child abuse in order for

the immunity to apply?

¶18 Kremeier argues that because § 1-2-104 provides that the immunity applies

to those making a report of child abuse "in good faith and exercising due care,"

that the immunity only applies when the report is both made in good faith

and without negligence. Taken literally and out of the larger statutory

context, Kremeier's interpretation is logical. However, the Myers Court

has already answered this question by determining that the statutory privilege

in question applies as a shield against all theories of recovery for damages

resulting from the report, including negligence, unless evidence can be

presented showing that the report was made in bad faith. The Myers Court

stated that, unless the plaintiff can present evidence of "bad-faith reporting

of abuse," the immunity bars "any effort by those who seek to recover for harm

occasioned by or through the act of reporting." Id. ¶ 13 (emphasis

omitted). See also Rite Aid Corp. v. Hagley , 824 A.2d 107, 117 (Md. 2003)

("[N]egligence and lack of good faith are not equivalent," and "if good faith

immunity can be overcome by establishing negligence, then good faith immunity is

a meaningless concept as one would have to be free from negligence, and thus not

liable in any event, to also avail one's self of the doctrine of good faith

immunity.") (citation omitted). We reject Kremeier's argument, and follow the

interpretation set forth in Myers . Consequently, the sole issue presented

is whether the evidentiary materials demonstrate a nonactionable theory of "bad

faith reporting" because Grantham's conduct falls within "the range of her

qualified statutory privilege for good-faith reporting of child abuse[.]"

Myers , ¶ 1 (footnote omitted).

IV. Do genuine disputes of material fact exist as to whether

Grantham's report was made in bad faith?

¶19 Title 10A O.S. 2011 § 1-2-104(B) provides that "the good faith of any

person in making a report . . . shall be presumed." In Myers , a case that

was also decided at the summary judgment stage, the Court stated that once the

statutory privilege at issue has been invoked, "the onus shift[s]" to the

plaintiff "to overcome its effect" by "tendering acceptable evidentiary

materials which would show the [reporter's] conduct in contest was outside the

range of her statutory protection . . . ." Myers , ¶ 20 (emphasis omitted)

(footnotes omitted). "[P]robative materials" showing some "intentional

wrongdoing" must be present in the record to overcome the statutory immunity.

Id. ¶ 22. The Myers Court explained that evidence even of gross

negligence, characterized as reckless indifference to the consequences, "falls

short of an intentional wrong's equivalent." Id. (footnote omitted). The

Court stated,

While gross negligence may support a punitive damages assessment, it is

insufficient . . . to provide a predicate for an inference of bad faith.

Even if [plaintiffs] were relying on gross negligence . . . [on the part

of the reporter of the child abuse] . . . they could not escalate their

claim against her to a willful tort from which bad faith could be

inferred.

Id. ¶¶ 22-23 (footnotes omitted). Rather, the Myers Court

stated that "[t]he element of scienter - that of guilty knowledge - is an

indispensable ingredient in the pattern of proof required to show lack of good

faith." The Court noted that bad faith, "or mala fides . . . consists in

guilty knowledge , or willful ignorance, showing a

vicious or evil mind [.]" Id. ¶ 20 n.46 (citations omitted).

¶20 Kremeier has presented evidence from which it may be reasonably inferred

that Grantham reported to DHS that Kremeier told Grantham he had sexually abused

a young child in the past and that this child was his eldest daughter when she

was younger. Grantham admits that Kremeier did not tell her the name of this

past victim, and, according to her testimony, she believes a miscommunication

must have occurred over the phone with the DHS employee regarding the extent of

her knowledge as to the identity of the past victim. For example, Grantham has

testified, "I told them that [Kremeier] did not disclose specifically who. I

didn't write that report." 10 Assuming, however, that Grantham reported to DHS

not only that there was a past victim, but that the past victim was Kremeier's

eldest daughter, this latter information was based on mere speculation or

inference because, according to Grantham's own subsequent testimony, Kremeier

actually told Grantham he molested a young child, but did not tell Grantham it

was his eldest daughter or otherwise directly reveal to Grantham the identity of

the child. Kremeier argues that the dispute regarding the giving of this "false

information" to DHS by Grantham creates a genuine dispute of material fact as to

whether Grantham's report to DHS was made in bad faith.

¶21 Although this dispute of fact is no doubt a crucial one in Kremeier's

eyes (as the father of the eldest daughter), we disagree that it constitutes

evidence showing Grantham's conduct to be outside the range of her statutory

protection. Even if a report contains false information, this deficiency, by

itself, does not support a finding of intentional wrongdoing or constitute

evidence of a vicious or evil mind necessary for mala fides . Good faith

reports of "suspected child abuse" may not always be made by those with perfect

knowledge of the pertinent circumstances. 11 Indeed, some reports made in good

faith will be "screened out" or found to be "unsubstantiated" by DHS. § 1-2-101.

However, the statutory privilege applies even to reports that are ultimately

rejected or found to be unsubstantiated, so long as such reports are not made in

bad faith.

¶22 Here, it is undisputed that Grantham's report was ultimately

substantiated by DHS and that the DHS investigation found child sexual

abuse was an "immediate concern" with regard to Kremeier's youngest daughter. We

reject Kremeier's argument that the inaccuracy at issue constitutes evidence

that the entire report was made in bad faith. A good faith report may contain

some "clumsy" 12 speculations or inferences, especially a report

that is otherwise substantiated, as here, after a thorough investigation by the

authorities. We conclude that the false information discussed above, even if it

was the result of negligent or grossly negligent speculation on the part of

Grantham, does not provide support for a finding of bad faith necessary to

overcome the statutory immunity. 13

¶23 Kremeier attempts to bolster his bad faith argument by asserting that

Grantham made the report only upon learning that Kremeier was seeking an award

of unsupervised visitation with, or custody of, his youngest daughter. 14 The

inference that Kremeier wishes this Court to endorse as reasonable is that

Grantham was, therefore, merely seeking to assist Wife in the child custody

dispute rather than seeking to protect the youngest daughter from abuse. In

other words, Kremeier asserts that because Grantham reported the threat of

sexual abuse only upon learning Kremeier might soon have unsupervised contact

with the potential victim, this constitutes evidence of bad faith. This argument

is self-defeating and provides support for good faith rather than bad faith. We

conclude that the timing of the report fails to support a finding of intentional

wrongdoing or of a vicious mind necessary to pierce the statutory immunity at

issue.

¶24 Finally, Kremeier argues that the opinion set forth in the affidavit of

Dr. Richard Kishur that Grantham acted "in bad faith" renders summary judgment

improper. Because the concept of bad faith is a legal one, Dr. Kishur's

conclusion that Grantham acted in bad faith is not entitled to any weight, nor

are Dr. Kishur's opinions that "licensed clinicians . . . have a higher

obligation to make thoughtful, objective, truthful reports in good faith"; that

"[s]uch reports must be free of subjective speculation and/or well intended but

injurious innuendo"; and that Grantham acted in bad faith because she "did not

have any first hand knowledge of child abuse[.]" We disregard these legal

conclusions. Although Dr. Kishur's affidavit may support a finding of negligence

or even gross negligence, we conclude it fails to provide support for a finding

of bad faith. Because no genuine disputes of material fact exist and Kremeier

has failed to overcome the qualified statutory privilege in this case, we affirm

the denial of Kremeier's "Motion to Reconsider."

CONCLUSION

¶25 Based on our review, we conclude that no genuine disputes of material

fact exist and the trial court has not abused its discretion in denying

Kremeier's "Motion to Reconsider" the July 2013 order granting summary judgment

in favor of Grantham. Consequently, we affirm.

¶26 AFFIRMED .

WISEMAN, P.J., and GOODMAN, J., concur.

FOOTNOTES

1 The

trial court also specifically found, in the second paragraph of the July 2013

order, that no "professional negligence" theory was asserted by Kremeier. The

second paragraph was stricken in an "Order Nunc Pro Tunc" filed in September

2013, thus striking the explicit finding that no professional negligence theory

was asserted. However, the trial court did not make an explicit finding that a

theory of negligence was asserted by Kremeier. Regardless, for purposes of this

appeal, we will deem a negligence theory to have been properly asserted by

Kremeier.

2

(Emphasis in original.)

3

Kremeier states in his motion that, "[p]rocedurally speaking," his motion should

be treated as a motion for new trial, and explains he "is simply asking that the

Court review the arguments, authorities and evidence in this Motion and

reconsider its decision to sustain [Grantham's motion for summary judgment]." "A

motion seeking reconsideration, re-examination, rehearing or vacation of a

judgment or final order, which is filed within 10 days of the day such decision

was rendered, may be regarded as a new trial motion." Rule 17, Rules for Dist.

Cts. of Okla., 12 O.S. 2011 , ch. 2, app. We will treat Kremeier's motion as the

functional equivalent of a motion for new trial. "[O]n appeal the movant may not

rely on errors which are not fairly embraced in the specific grounds stated in

the timely-filed motion for new trial." Id. See also 12 O.S. 2011 § 991(b).

4

(Emphasis omitted.)

5

Kremeier also asserted that he pled a theory of professional negligence in his

petition. See n.1, supra .

6

See n.3, supra . Although courts are generally "required to rule

out all theories of liability fairly encompassed within the evidentiary material

presented," Parris v. Limes , 2012 OK 18, ¶ 3 , 277 P.3d 1259 (citation omitted), a

party may nevertheless waive or abandon issues by, as here, failing to assert

them in a new trial motion.

7 The

version of the immunity provision applicable in Myers is substantially

similar to that applicable in this case. The version applicable in Myers

provides, in pertinent part: "Any person participating in good faith and

exercising due care in the making of a report . . . shall have immunity from any

liability, civil or criminal, that might otherwise be incurred or imposed." 10 O.S. 2001 § 7105(A). The version

applicable in the present case provides, in pertinent part: "Any person who, in

good faith and exercising due care, reports suspected child abuse . . . shall

have immunity from any liability, civil or criminal, that might otherwise be

incurred or imposed." Both versions also provide that "the good faith" of the

person making the report "shall be presumed."

8 See

also Wofford v. E. State Hosp. , 1990 OK 77, ¶ 17 , 795 P.2d 516 (A duty arises to third

parties "when in accordance with the standards of his profession the therapist

knows or should know that his patient's dangerous propensities present an

unreasonable risk of harm to others.").

9 See

generally , 10A O.S. 2011 § 1-2-101.

10 R.

Tab 1, Exhibit 6 at 33.

11 The

very nature of the problem, in which, roughly stated, an inarticulate young

child may be suffering abuse at the hands of a guileful (and depraved) adult,

can clearly lead to inaccurate speculations on the part of third parties in the

initial report to the DHS child abuse "hotline." See § 1-2-101.

12

See Kremeier's "Motion to Reconsider," R. Tab 5 at 14.

13

Accordingly, we need not address the counterfactual issue of whether a genuine

dispute of fact exists as to whether the investigation would have commenced even

if the inaccurate detail had not been communicated. Kremeier argues the DHS

investigation might not have commenced under such circumstances, or under

circumstances in which it was made known to the lead investigator that Grantham

provided false information. Of course, that the investigation would not have

commenced under such circumstances hardly seems very convincing, see,

e.g. , R. Tab 2, Exhibit 7 at 87-88, but we need not address this issue

because, having found the statutory immunity has not been overcome, whether the

investigation would have commenced is not a material fact.

14 As

to Kremeier's argument that Grantham gave "too much information" in her report

and that this constitutes evidence of bad faith, we reject this argument as

lacking any indicia of bad faith. Clearly, one may give "too much information"

in good faith. While this may be a relevant factor when, for example,

assessing damages after a finding of bad faith is made, we conclude it is not

relevant in this case for determining whether Grantham's conduct falls within

the range of her qualified statutory privilege for good-faith reporting of child

abuse.

Citationizer © Summary of Documents Citing This Document

Cite

Name

Level

None Found.

Citationizer: Table of Authority

Cite

Name

Level

Oklahoma Supreme Court Cases

Cite Name Level

1990 OK 77 , 795 P.2d 516 , 61 OBJ 2093, Wofford v. Eastern State Hosp. Discussed

2002 OK 14 , 44 P.3d 553 , 73 OBJ 879, MYERS v. LASHLEY Discussed

2006 OK 43 , 157 P.3d 100 , REEDS v. WALKER Discussed

2012 OK 18 , 277 P.3d 1259 , PARRIS v. LIMES Discussed

2013 OK 100 , 318 P.3d 206 , TROXELL v. OKLAHOMA DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES Discussed

Title 10. Children

Cite Name Level

10 O.S. 7105 , Renumbered as 10A O.S. § 1-2-104 by Laws 2009, HB 2028, c. 233, § 215, emerg. eff. May 21, 2009 Cited

Title 12. Civil Procedure

Cite Name Level

12 O.S. 991 , Right to Perfect Appeal to Supreme Court without Filing Motion for New Trial - Exemption Cited