DRAKE v. STATE ex rel. DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY

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DRAKE v. STATE ex rel. DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY

2015 OK CIV APP 42

349 P.3d 559

Case Number: 112917

Decided: 12/10/2014

Mandate Issued: 05/07/2015

DIVISION IV

THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, DIVISION IV

Cite as: 2015 OK CIV APP 42 , 349 P.3d 559

ARTHUR ERIC DRAKE, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

STATE OF

OKLAHOMA, ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Defendant/Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF

MAYES COUNTY, OKLAHOMA

HONORABLE REBECCA J. GORE, TRIAL JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Charles A. Ramsey, CHARLES A. RAMSEY, PLLC, Pryor, Oklahoma, for

Plaintiff/Appellant

Mark E. Bright, ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF

PUBLIC SAFETY, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee

DEBORAH B. BARNES, CHIEF JUDGE:

¶1 Plaintiff/Appellant Arthur Eric Drake (Licensee) appeals from an Order of

the district court denying his petition to reinstate his driver's license filed

more than one year after an order revoking his driver's license was issued by

Defendant/Appellee State of Oklahoma, ex rel. Department of Public Safety (DPS).

We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Licensee was arrested on May 20, 2012, for operating a vehicle while under

the influence. Licensee did not consent to the state's implied consent test and

timely requested an administrative hearing as to the suspension of his driver's

license. A hearing was held on October 17, 2012. 1 On October 19, 2012, DPS issued an

order suspending Licensee's driver's license for a period of one year, from

December 17, 2012, to December 17, 2013. 2 On March 11, 2014, Licensee filed a petition to

reinstate his driver's license in the district court. 3

¶3 A hearing was held on April 23, 2014, concerning the Licensee's assertion

that DPS lacked jurisdiction to revoke or suspend his driver's license and DPS's

assertion that because Licensee did not timely appeal the revocation order, the

district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Licensee argued DPS

was without jurisdiction to revoke or suspend his license because the arresting

officer's affidavit that was submitted to DPS was "insufficient as a matter of

law and did not grant DPS jurisdiction under" 47 O.S. 2011 §§ 753 & 754. 4 Licensee relied

on Roulston v. State ex rel. Department of Public Safety , 2014 OK CIV APP 46 , 324 P.3d 1261 . Licensee argued the

issue before the Roulston Court was whether the arresting officer's

affidavit was sufficient and did not invoke DPS's jurisdiction.

¶4 DPS argued that neither Roulston nor another case, Tucker v.

State ex rel. Department of Public Safety , 2014 OK CIV APP 45 , 326 P.3d 542 , supported Licensee's

jurisdiction argument because, in those cases, the appellate Court found the

officer's affidavit was "fatally flawed" and Licensee only argues the affidavit

in the present case is "facially defective." DPS argued the difference has to do

with whether an order is "void or voidable." It also argued that in neither case

did the appellate court decide jurisdiction. 5

¶5 On May 7, 2014, the district court entered its Order in which it found

Licensee failed to timely file an appeal from the October 19, 2012 order of

suspension pursuant to 47 O.S. 2011

§ 6-211(E), and therefore it was without jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 6 The district

court found that even if the affidavit was fatally defective because it did not

contain the required statutory language, a timely appeal to invalidate the

revocation was required by Roulston and Chase v. State ex rel.

Department of Public Safety , 1990

OK 78 , 795 P.2d 1048 , the

Oklahoma Supreme Court decision upon which Roulston relied. The district

court found the precedent fails to indicate that a fatally flawed affidavit

raises a jurisdictional issue, though it raises an appealable issue upon a

timely filing. Because Licensee failed to timely appeal, the district court

found it was without jurisdiction to set aside the revocation order.

¶6 Licensee appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7 The issue before us is whether the trial court correctly determined that

it was without jurisdiction to hear Licensee's appeal of the DPS order revoking

his driver's license because Licensee's appeal was untimely. The answer to that

issue turns on whether DPS had jurisdiction to issue the order of revocation

because of the alleged defect in the arresting officer's affidavit. Questions

concerning jurisdiction present a question of law requiring a de novo

standard of review. See, e.g. , Guffey v. Ostonakulov , 2014 OK 6, ¶ 10 , 321 P.3d 971 . "In a de novo

review," this Court has "plenary, independent and non-deferential authority to

determine whether the trial court erred in its application of the law."

Justus v. State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Safety , 2002 OK 46, ¶ 3 , 61 P.3d 888 (citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

¶8 In essence, Licensee argues the sworn affidavit of an arresting officer

setting forth the statutory requirements set forth in 47 O.S. 2011 § 753 is a

jurisdictional fact and a prerequisite to the authority of DPS to revoke a

driver's license. Further, he argues, because the order is void for lack of

jurisdiction, his failure to timely appeal is immaterial because a void judgment

can be attacked at any time.

¶9 In Abraham v. Homer , 1924 OK 393 , 226 P. 45 , the Oklahoma Supreme

Court set forth three separate elements of the jurisdiction of a court.

Jurisdiction over the person, jurisdiction over the subject-matter, and

jurisdiction to render the particular judgment are three separate elements

of the jurisdiction of a court. Each element of jurisdiction is dependent

upon both law and fact. Facts showing the service of process in time, form

and manner sufficient to satisfy the requirements of mandatory statutes in

that regard are essential to jurisdiction over the person. Facts showing

that the matter involved in a suit constitutes a subject-matter consigned by

law to the jurisdiction of that court are essential to jurisdiction over the

subject-matter of the suit. Facts showing that a particular judgment is

rendered in compliance with all existing mandatory law in that regard are

essential to jurisdiction to render particular judgment. All such facts are

known as jurisdictional facts.

Id. ¶ 2 (subparagraph 5) (citations omitted). 7 See also Parker v.

Lynch , 1898 OK 76, ¶ 0 , 56 P. 1082 ("Jurisdiction is the

authority by which courts and judicial officers take cognizance of and decide

cases.") (Syllabus by the Court); Robinson v. Okla. Emp't Sec. Comm'n , 1997 OK 5 , ¶ 8, 932 P.2d 1120 (Discussing the

difference between venue and jurisdiction the Supreme Court stated

"'[j]urisdiction' is a term of comprehensive import. It concerns and defines the

power of judicatories and courts.") (citation omitted).

¶10 By way of illustration, the Abraham Court discussed examples of

jurisdictional facts within the context of probate proceedings.

Applicable to the probate court we often find mandatory statutes which

provide that[,] though facts may be presented to the court with jurisdiction

over the person and the subject-matter, justifying the court to order real

estate of the deceased or of a minor to be sold, and although such an order

may have been lawfully made, it may be provided that such sale cannot be

confirmed unless the purchase price be equal to a given percentage of the

appraised value. In that event facts showing such appraisement in accordance

with the mandatory law relate rather to the power of the court to render a

judgment of confirmation than to a mere course of procedure, as the result

of the appraisement inheres in the judgment itself. Whenever by a statute

which the court has determined to be not merely directory, but absolutely

mandatory, the Legislature has required acts to be done and provides that

the court shall not render a particular judgment without facts showing

compliance with such statute, then such facts are jurisdictional to the

power of the court to render that particular

judgment.

Id. ¶ 2 (subparagraph 8) (emphasis added).

¶11 The Supreme Court further stated that it is upon "making of proper

distinction between quasi-jurisdictional facts and jurisdictional facts [that]

often rests the determination of the validity of a judgment." Id. ¶ 2

(subparagraph 10). The Court stated statutes that are merely directory - for

example, those that "had in mind only an advisable manner of orderly

advancement" in a lawsuit "and had not in mind the nature of the judgment to be

rendered when the course was run" - are not to be considered "in determining the

judicial power of the court to render a judgment." Id. ¶ 2 (subparagraph

11). The Court further reasoned, as follows:

On the other hand, if it appears that in the enactment of such statute

the lawmakers, while providing a step in the procedure, had uppermost in

mind the effect of such a step upon the judgment thereafter to be

rendered, and intended the taking of such step in the procedure as a

condition precedent to the existence of the judicial power of a court to

thereafter render the particular judgment, then such facts, while in a

sense being quasi jurisdictional, are clearly jurisdictional facts,

necessary to the existence of the third element of jurisdiction. Such

statute is a mandatory one.

Id. ¶ 2 (subparagraph 11) (emphasis added). The Court continued:

A directory statute of procedure, such as is above considered, has no

direct relation to the substance of the adjudication to be made, while

compliance with the mandatory statute above illustrated reaches into the

power of the court to render the decree, and the result of such compliance

inheres in such decree as a material and substantial part of the judgment

itself. If by statute the lawmakers provide that notice shall be posted of

the time when a county court shall hear the petition of a guardian to sell

his ward's real estate, and the court has already acquired jurisdiction over

the person and subject-matter, and over the special proceedings there being

had, why, such statute has naught to do with the substance of the judgment

which the court will thereafter render and the statute is one of procedure

only. But where a statute requires that the land to be sold must be

appraised and that the court shall not confirm a sale thereof for less than

a given [percent] of the appraised value of the land, then such

appraisement, while being a step in the course of procedure, creates a

result that inheres in the material substance of the judgment. Facts showing

compliance with such mandatory statute are evidently intended by the

lawmakers as material to the existence of the power of the court to render

the judgment confirming the sale and are jurisdictional

facts.

Id.

¶12 The Abraham Court cited Noble v. Union River Logging R.

Co. , 147 U.S. 165 (1893), wherein the United States Supreme Court

also described facts that are quasi jurisdictional - that is, necessary to be

proven in order for the court to act - and hence not subject to collateral

attack:

There is, however, another class of facts which are termed "quasi

jurisdictional," which are necessary to be alleged and proved in order to

set the machinery of the law in motion , but which, when properly

alleged, and established to the satisfaction of the court, cannot be

attacked collaterally. With respect to these facts, the finding of the court

is as conclusively presumed to be correct as its finding with respect to any

other matter in issue between the parties. Examples of these are the

allegations and proof of the requisite diversity of citizenship, or the

amount in controversy in a federal court, which, when found by such court,

cannot be questioned collaterally . . . . In this class of cases, if the

allegation be properly made, and the jurisdiction be found by the court,

such finding is conclusive and binding in every collateral proceeding; and,

even if the court be imposed upon by false testimony, its finding can only

be impeached in a proceeding instituted directly for that

purpose.

Id. at 173-74 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

¶13 As to the sworn affidavit required by 47 O.S. § 753, the Oklahoma Supreme

Court stated in Oklahoma Department of Public Safety v. Robinson , 1973 OK 80 , 512 P.2d 128 , the following:

The sworn report required to be filed with the Oklahoma Commissioner of

Public Safety in conformance with 47 O.S. 1971 § 753 is the

catalyst in the initial revocation of a license by the commissioner. The

matters sworn to in the report are issues which are to be covered and proven

at the hearing, if a hearing is requested by licensee. The report merely

sets the wheels of administrative machinery in motion, and loses its

major significance at the time it is acted upon by the

commissioner.

Robinson , ¶ 37 (emphasis added). 8

¶ 14 Robinson was cited in Application of Baggett , 1974 OK 95 , 531 P.2d 1011 , overruled on other

grounds by Smith v. State ex rel. Dept. of Pub. Safety , 1984 OK 16, ¶ 6 , 680 P.2d 365 , wherein the Supreme

Court stated, "The affidavit [at issue] was sufficient to support the

initiation of the action to revoke the driver's license." Baggett , ¶

17 (emphasis added). It was this language from Baggett upon which the

Court of Civil Appeals relied in Browning v. State ex rel. Department of

Public Safety , 1991 OK CIV APP

19 , 812 P.2d 1372 , when it

stated that Baggett held "the affidavit invests DPS with

jurisdiction to initiate proceedings to revoke a driver's license." ¶ 7, n.2

(emphasis added). Neither Baggett nor Robinson , however, labeled

the statements within the § 753 affidavit as jurisdictional facts, rather they

described the matters contained within the affidavit as part of the "issues to

be covered and proven at the hearing," should the licensee request such a

hearing, and as setting "the wheels of administrative machinery in motion." That

is, those cases describe the statements within the § 753 affidavit as

quasi-jurisdictional facts, "necessary to set the judicial wheels in motion and

to entitle the court to proceed with the exercise of admitted jurisdiction."

Abraham , ¶ 0 (Syllabus by the Court).

¶15 The Supreme Court's more recent decision in Chase and the Court of

Civil Appeal's decision in Roulston support the conclusion that the

statements within the § 753 affidavit are quasi-jurisdictional facts and that a

facially or fatally flawed affidavit is the basis for vacating an order of

revocation, not through collateral attack, but rather through a timely appeal to

the district court. In Chase , the Supreme Court stated the "[t]wo

statutory prerequisites for DPS revocation of the" driver's license in the case

before it concerned the written report of the driver's breath test, and,

significant to the present appeal, "the enforcement officer's sworn report 'that

he had reasonable grounds to believe the arrested person had been driving or was

in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the public roads . . . while

under the influence of alcohol.'" 1990 OK 78 , ¶ 4. The Court referred

to these items as "legislative standards for essential DPS paperwork," but did

not refer to them as jurisdictional facts. In fact, referring to the absence of

the arresting officer's signature on the affidavit, the Court stated, "This

patent deficiency in the statutorily required DPS material does indeed make

[DPS's] revocation order vulnerable to invalidation, on timely appeal,

for failure to meet the minimum legislatively prescribed standards for the DPS

paperwork on which its administrative action must be rested." Id. ¶ 5

(footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The Court thus held "when, on appeal to the

district court, the trial judge finds a DPS revocation order was issued on

administrative documentation that fails to meet the minimum standards mandated

by the applicable statute, the order should be set aside as fatally flawed."

Id. ¶ 6 (footnote omitted).

¶16 Similarly, in Roulston , another division of this Court was

concerned with the effect of what the licensee described as a "facially

defective" and "fatally flawed" affidavit required by § 753. Unlike the actions

of Licensee in the present case, in Roulston , the licensee timely

appealed her revocation to the district court. Like the argument made by

Licensee in the present case, the licensee in Roulston argued the

affidavit was defective and fatally flawed because it failed to include the

statutorily required report of the officer that he had reasonable grounds to

believe the licensee had been driving a motor vehicle while under the influence

of alcohol. Relying on the reasoning in Chase , the Court stated:

Because the Officer's Affidavit did not include the sworn report as

required by statute as to the Officer's reasonable grounds to believe the

arrested person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a

motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, the evidence on

which the administrative revocation action rested is patently

deficient. Just as in Chase , we find the Affidavit upon which the

revocation order rests fatally flawed as a matter of law and thus, that

order was properly set aside by the trial court.

2014 OK CIV APP 46 , ¶ 11

(emphasis added). The Court did not state the DPS order was void for lack of

jurisdiction; rather, it was deficient because of the absence of necessary

evidence.

¶17 We conclude the statements in the § 753 affidavit are not jurisdictional

facts, see Robinson , ¶ 37, but, in accord with the reasoning in

Chase , further conclude their absence renders a DPS order of revocation

subject to invalidation through a timely appeal to the district court. Because

Licensee did not, however, timely appeal from the DPS order, the order of

revocation is not subject to collateral attack. The trial court, therefore,

properly concluded it was without jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

CONCLUSION

¶18 Although the sworn officer statements required by a § 753 affidavit are a

prerequisite to DPS revocation of a driver's license, those statements are not

jurisdictional facts the absence of which could subject a revocation order to

collateral attack. Rather, their absence subjects the order of revocation to

invalidation in a timely filed appeal to the district court. Because Licensee

failed to timely appeal the revocation order, the district court correctly

concluded it was without jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Accordingly, we

affirm.

¶19 AFFIRMED .

GOODMAN, J., concurs, and WISEMAN, P.J., dissents.

WISEMAN, P.J., dissenting:

¶1 I dissent from the Majority's Opinion. I adopt the same position expressed

in my dissents in Cases No. 112,503 and 112,564 regarding the jurisdictional

infirmity in DPS' revocation order created by the facially deficient officer's

affidavit, an infirmity which subjects the order to vacation by the trial court

at any time.

¶2 I disagree with the Majority's view in the present case that the statutory

mandate of the officer's affidavit of "reasonable grounds" to believe the driver

had operated the vehicle under the influence of alcohol is

"quasi-jurisdictional." As noted by the Majority, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in

Abraham v. Homer , 1924 OK

393 , 226 P. 45 , stated,

"Facts showing the service of process, facts showing that the matter involved in

a suit constitutes a subject-matter consigned by law to the jurisdiction of the

court, and facts showing that a particular judgment is rendered in compliance

with all existing mandatory law in that regard are known as jurisdictional

facts." Id. ¶ 0 (syl. no. 1 by the Court). Further to the point,

Abraham clearly holds:

Whenever by a statute which the court has determined to be not merely

directory, but absolutely mandatory, the Legislature has required acts to be

done, and provides that the court shall not render a particular judgment

without the facts showing compliance with such statute, then such facts are

jurisdictional to the power of the court to render that particular

judgment.

Id . ¶ 2 (subparagraph 8).

¶3 Without both statutory prerequisites of (1) a blood or breath test report

(47 O.S.2011 § 754(C)) or the

driver's refusal of such a test (47

O.S.2011 § 753), and (2) the officer's sworn report of "reasonable grounds"

to believe the driver was driving under the influence, DPS lacked the power to

suspend the driver's license. If blood or breath test results (or the driver's

refusal of such tests) were lacking, would DPS have the power to revoke this

license? My reading of these provisions leads to the conclusion that they are

fundamental to DPS' power to act: "Facts showing compliance with such mandatory

statute are evidently intended by the lawmakers as material to the existence of

the power of the court to render the judgment . . . and are jurisdictional

facts." Abraham , 1924

OK 393 , ¶ 2 (subparagraph 11).

¶4 Because the officer's affidavit here was, on its face, non-compliant with

the clear statutory mandate, DPS lacked jurisdiction to order suspension, and

such an order was subject to collateral attack at any time. See Ashikian v.

State ex rel. Oklahoma Horse Racing Comm'n , 2008 OK 64, ¶ 10 , 188 P.3d 148 . The trial court's May

7, 2014, order should be vacated and the case remanded to the trial court with

directions to vacate DPS' order of suspension for lack of jurisdiction. I

respectfully dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1 These

facts surrounding the revocation of Licensee's driver's license are taken from

the parties' appellate briefs. "Admissions in a brief may be regarded as a

supplement to an appellate record." Woods v. Prestwick House, Inc. , 2011 OK 9 , ¶ 15 n.16, 247 P.3d 1183 (citations omitted).

See also State ex rel. Macy v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs , 1999 OK 53 , ¶ 3 n.8, 986 P.2d 1130 ("Admissions made in

the briefs may be considered as supplementing and curing an otherwise deficient

appellate record.") (citations omitted).

2 The

revocation order was presented to and reviewed by the trial judge but is not in

the record on appeal.

3

Licensee alleged that while the suspension time had run and his license was

eligible to be reinstated, DPS was requiring him to pay certain reinstatement

fees and to provide proof that an interlock device had been installed on his

vehicle.

4 Section

753 provides, in part, as follows:

If a conscious person under arrest refuses to submit to testing of his or her

blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcohol concentration

thereof, or to a test of his or her blood, saliva or urine for the purpose of

determining the presence or concentration of any other intoxicating substance,

or the combined influence of alcohol and any other intoxicating substance, none

shall be given, unless the investigating officer has probable cause to believe

that the person under arrest, while intoxicated, has operated the motor vehicle

in such a manner as to have caused the death or serious physical injury of any

other person or persons. . . . The Commissioner of Public Safety, upon the

receipt of a sworn report of the law enforcement officer that the officer had

reasonable grounds to believe the arrested person had been driving or was in

actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the public roads, highways,

streets, turnpikes or other public place of this state while under the influence

of alcohol, any other intoxicating substance, or the combined influence of

alcohol and any other intoxicating substance and that the person had refused to

submit to the test or tests, shall revoke the license to drive and any

nonresident operating privilege for a period as provided by Section 6-205.1 of

this title. . . . The revocation or denial shall become effective thirty (30)

days after the arrested person is given written notice thereof by the officer or

by the Department as provided in Section 754 of this title.

Section 754(D) provides, in part, as follows:

Upon the written request of a person whose driving privilege has been revoked

or denied by notice given in accordance with this section or Section 2-116 of

this title, the Department shall grant the person an opportunity to be heard if

the request is received by the Department within fifteen (15) days after the

notice.

5 At the

conclusion of the parties' arguments, the court asked counsel for DPS if he had

the arresting officer's affidavit. Counsel for DPS replied he had the original

but had not planned to introduce the affidavit because he thought the only

relevant document was the order of revocation. The following exchange then

occurred:

[Counsel for DPS]: . . . [B]ut I can make [the affidavit] an exhibit as well.

Would you like me to do that?

THE COURT: Yes, please.

[Counsel for DPS]: Okay.

THE COURT: And I'm, assuming, [Counsel for Licensee], that is your argument,

the affidavit is insufficient?

[Counsel for Licensee]: It is, Judge, yes.

Instead of using DPS's copy of the affidavit as an exhibit, the trial court

asked to review the affidavit. The court then stated, "based upon the exhibits

that I have . . . received as evidence and reviewed," among other things, that

it did not have jurisdiction and was not overturning the revocation.

On appeal, DPS filed a motion to strike Licensee's Exhibit A, the arresting

officer's affidavit, appended to his Brief-in-chief arguing the affidavit "was

not admitted into evidence as an exhibit" and citing Oklahoma Supreme Court Rule

1.11(e)(1) and (i), 12 O.S. 2011 , ch. 5, app. 1. By order of the Oklahoma

Supreme Court, the decision on the motion was deferred to the decisional

stage.

The exhibit appended to the Brief-in-chief does not comply with Rule

1.11(e)(1) and (i); consequently, despite the foregoing discussions and actions

at trial, we grant DPS's motion to strike the exhibit from the appellate record.

See also Chamberlin v. Chamberlin , 1986 OK 30, ¶ 4 , 720 P.2d 721 ("This court may not

consider as part of an appellate record any instrument or material which has not

been incorporated into the assembled record by a certificate of the clerk of the

trial court . . . ." (footnotes omitted). However, the trial court specifically

found the affidavit was insufficient and "fatally defective" because it did not

contain the required statutory language. That finding is part of the record on

appeal.

6 Section

6-211(E) provides, in part, as follows:

The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days after the order has been

served upon the person, except a petition relating to an implied consent

revocation shall be filed within thirty (30) days after the Department gives

notice to the person that the revocation is sustained as provided in Section 754

of this title.

7 The

Oklahoma Supreme Court also explained the significance and effect of

jurisdictional facts and "quasi-jurisdictional facts":

Facts showing the service of process, facts showing that the matter involved

in a suit constitutes a subject-matter consigned by law to the jurisdiction of

the court, and facts showing that a particular judgment is rendered in

compliance with all existing mandatory law in that regard are known as

jurisdictional facts. . . .

Facts which are not jurisdictional facts, and

which do not constitute a part of the cause of action, but which are necessary

to set the judicial wheels in motion and to entitle the court to proceed with

the exercise of admitted jurisdiction, are known as quasi jurisdictional facts.

When those facts are adjudicated by a court possessing the three necessary

elements of jurisdiction, such adjudication, in the absence of fraud, is not

open to collateral attack.

. . . .

It is not material to the jurisdiction

of the court that a cause of action be either pleaded or proven. Although the

facts stated in a petition be not merely insufficiently or defectively pleaded,

but both in form and substance wholly fail to constitute a cause of action, the

court is not solely by reason thereof deprived of jurisdiction over the

subject-matter or of the jurisdiction to render a judgment granting such relief

as otherwise it may be within the jurisdiction of the court to render.

Id. ¶ 0 (Syllabus by the Court).

8 Section

753 has been amended several times since 1971; however, the operative language

in the 1971 version is the same as in the current version. It states as

follows:

the Oklahoma Commissioner of Public Safety, upon the receipt of a sworn

report of the law enforcement officer that he had reasonable grounds to believe

the arrested person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a

motor vehicle upon the public highways while under the influence of alcohol or

intoxicating liquor, and that the person had refused to submit to the test or

tests, shall revoke his license to drive and any nonresident operating privilege

for a period of six months . . . .

Citationizer © Summary of Documents Citing This Document

Cite

Name

Level

None Found.

Citationizer: Table of Authority

Cite

Name

Level

Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals Cases

Cite Name Level

1991 OK CIV APP 19 , 812 P.2d 1372 , 62 OBJ 2458, Browning v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety Discussed

2014 OK CIV APP 45 , 326 P.3d 542 , TUCKER v. STATE ex rel. DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY Discussed

2014 OK CIV APP 46 , 324 P.3d 1261 , ROULSTON v. STATE ex rel. DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY Discussed at Length

Oklahoma Supreme Court Cases

Cite Name Level

1990 OK 78 , 795 P.2d 1048 , 61 OBJ 2091, Chase v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety Discussed at Length

1997 OK 5 , 932 P.2d 1120 , 68 OBJ 303, Robinson v. Oklahoma Employment Sec. Com'n Discussed

2002 OK 46 , 61 P.3d 888 , JUSTUS v. STATE EX. REL. DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY Discussed

1973 OK 80 , 512 P.2d 128 , OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY v. ROBINSON Discussed

2008 OK 64 , 188 P.3d 148 , ASHIKIAN v. STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA HORSE RACING COMM. Discussed

1924 OK 393 , 226 P. 45 , 102 Okla. 12 , ABRAHAM v. HOMER Discussed at Length

2011 OK 9 , 247 P.3d 1183 , WOODS v. PRESTWICK HOUSE, INC. Discussed

1974 OK 95 , 531 P.2d 1011 , APPLICATION OF BAGGETT Discussed

2014 OK 6 , 321 P.3d 971 , GUFFEY v. OSTONAKULOV Discussed

1999 OK 53 , 986 P.2d 1130 , 70 OBJ 1820, State ex rel. Macy v. Board of County Commissioners Discussed

1898 OK 76 , 56 P. 1082 , 7 Okla. 631 , PARKER v. LYNCH Discussed

1984 OK 16 , 680 P.2d 365 , Smith v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety Discussed

1986 OK 30 , 720 P.2d 721 , 57 OBJ 1415, Chamberlin v. Chamberlin Discussed

Title 47. Motor Vehicles

Cite Name Level

47 O.S. 6 -211, Right of Appeal to Court Cited

47 O.S. 754 , Surrender or Seizure of License - Receipt as Temporary License - Revocation or Denial of Driving Privilege - Hearing Cited

47 O.S. 753 , Refusal to Submit to Test - Revocation of License - Reinstatement of License Discussed at Length